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DELIBERATION FOR DEVOLUTION IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
A CASE STUDY FROM PAKISTAN

Beenish Kulsoom, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2019

Genuine democratic deliberation on design of institutional rules is possible only when the state
apparatus and political and civil society are engaged in communicative interexchange, exchanging ideas,
and speaking in a language understood and accepted by all others. Moreover, in such an exchange the
interlocutors do not hold back their thoughts to achieve strategic control in order to subvert the
communicative engagement. The deliberative theory of democracy advocates communicative engagement
between state and society actors that results in institutional rules that are accepted by all.
The advocates of the theory of deliberative democracy argue that while the state is the chief
architect of lawmaking, to regulate the society it cannot ignore the actors of either the political or civil
society. The site where state and civil society engage in communicative interexchange is the public
sphere. The theory of deliberative democracy does not question the legitimacy of lawmakers nor the
institutions through which elected representatives are chosen. It is, however, the process of making and
legitimizing decisions, policies, and laws that the deliberative theory of democracy is interested.
But what explains the role of civil society actors within such regimes that enact institutions which
favor authoritarianism over democratic rule? When I looked to the deliberative theory of democracy to
explain the complexity of devolution planning in Pakistan, I realized that the theory of deliberative
democracy was insufficient frame to address the state and civil society interexchange. First, this is
because the very entity of autonomous civil society has been absent in Pakistan. Secondly, the issue of
regime type has not been adequately addressed by theorists of the deliberative theory of democracy.

Through elite interviews, analyses of documentary evidence, and newspaper reviews, I critically
examine the political landscape of the country.
My research shows that in Pakistan the three actors of the state—the political parties (political
elite), the bureaucratic elite, and the military elite—have been locked in a constant rivalry to take control
of the executive powers of the state. The hybrid regime in Pakistan and the design of laws and policies
under hybrid regime is, however, not only the result of the long intervals of military rule. The political
society is also responsible for perpetuating hybrid regime. The military and political elite build
partnerships when it is suited for them to take reins of political power. Civil society, I argue, is a
bystander in these partnerships; engagement with civil society is invoked only when required by the
hybrid regime.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What Is the Study About?
According to deliberative democrats, the communicative link that connects the specialist
administrative power of the state with the diversified communicative power of the civil society is crucial
in sustaining the state’s devised laws. In other words, deliberative democrats believe that communicative
interexchange between the state and society enables the state to regulate society. However, these
arguments have been made in the context of established democratic regimes. The assumptions do not
apply (fully) in hybrid regimes, where the civil society is often less autonomous and the state more
arbitrary and less accountable. How does communicative interexchange occur in a hybrid regime? This
has not been studied.
In absence of communicative interexchange between the state and society, the rules devised by
the state are short-lived. The state apparatus has a crucial role to play, but contemporary societies are far
more complex and diverse to be dependent solely on the state. On one side of the scale, there are the state
and institutional arrangements that regulate society; on the other, there are societal actors generating ideas
and values that inform state institutions.
However, my inquiry in this research goes deep in the analysis and application of deliberative
democracy. It starts with a basic question: How do we explain the state and civil society connective
interaction in the context of a hybrid regime? In a political system that qualifies as being neither
democratic nor authoritarian but is midway between the two regime types, what communicative
engagement between the state apparatus and civil society can be expected? Furthermore, and most
fundamentally, how does the state manifest its control over the political society? How do the political
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society and civil society exist in a hybrid regime? What insights does deliberative democracy have to
offer concerning state and civil society communicative engagement in the context of a hybrid regime?
Research Puzzle
What enables the state to devise rules and institutions through which it can regulate society?
What transpires within the political regime that hovers between authoritarianism and hybrid democratic
rule over the design of state institutions? How do the political society and actors of civil society interact
over the design of laws in a state represented by longstanding authoritarianism? Drawing from these basic
questions, this dissertation argues that the communicative interexchange between state institutions and
civil society enables the state to devise rules and institutions through which it can regulate society. Based
on this premise, this research investigates the testing case of devolution planning in the hybrid regime of
Pakistan.
The theory of deliberative democracy provides the basis on which I present an analysis of the
devolution plans implemented by the state of Pakistan. In order to do so, I studied the political evolution
of devolution planning by the state of Pakistan in the years 1959, 1979, 2001, and 2010. With a focus on
devolution plans, I therefore analyzed whether there had been any instances of communicative and
discursive exchange between state and civil society organizations (such as think tanks, non-governmental
organizations, noneconomic and voluntary organizations), media, and the political elite.
Looking at devolution plans as a specific type of institutional arrangement introduced by the
state of Pakistan, I investigated why the state devised and focused on devolution planning. What actors
belonging to the state apparatus were involved in the design of devolution? Why have there been three
different versions of devolution plans implemented by the state in Pakistan? What has been the role of
actors of state (such as political parties, bureaucratic and military elite) and civil society actors (such as
print media, non-governmental organizations) in the formulation of the three devolution plans? Has there
been any instance of communicative interexchange between civil society actors in Pakistan that might
have sustained and developed the discourse on devolution?
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The hypotheses posited in this research are:
H1: In a political system that emerges from authoritarian rule, the institutional arrangement
devised by the ruling elite perpetuates an authoritarian footprint.
H2: Civil society actors critically analyze the institutional arrangements devised by the state. State
laws remain in effect when their development is informed by civil society actors.
Significance of Research
First, an evaluation of the institutional arrangements designed by the state of Pakistan with
special focus on communicative interexchange provides an understanding of how the state evolved over
time. Second, the analysis of role played by the political society and civil society reflects on society’s
receptiveness to the state’s devised laws. Third, the role played by political and civil society also had an
effect on the relations between the state and civil society under the military and elected governments.
Thus, fourth, and more crucially, the research analysis of this empirical case from a hybrid regime shows
that an interactive communicative exchange between state and civil society resulted in the continuation of
one institutional policy devised by the state. The case of devolution plans and communicative
interexchange in the public sphere in Pakistan provided the data supporting my research claims.
In the theory of deliberative democracy, the focus has always been on the study of democratic
systems. But the theory does not focus on systems that are undemocratic. Of course, this is expected from
the construction of the deliberative democracy theory, which presupposes that the system is a democracy
and thus adopts the principles of deliberation, that is, the free exchange of arguments in which the “better
argument” wins. Furthermore, the theory also presupposes that a democratic state exists, along with a
vibrant public sphere involving multiple actors from civil society. This theoretical model places a
premium on three main constitutive elements: (a) the free exchange of arguments, (b) the site of a vibrant
public sphere, and (c) state and civil society communicative interexchange.
But what about the applicability of a deliberative democracy in a political system that qualifies as
neither democratic nor authoritarian? Should the analysis of these political systems be dismissed because
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they are not democratic? But then how are we to analyze these very systems that (albeit selectively) allow
certain democratic institutions, such as elections and legislatures, and also a nascent existence of civil
society? The issue that I have with theorists of deliberative democracy is that they focus on political
systems that are democracies already. Such theorization of deliberative democracy overlooks political
systems that combine democratic institutions with authoritarian tendencies.
However, in recent times, deliberative democrats have also started to focus on systems that are
not democracies, but have adopted the one of the three constitutive elements to address the gaps in the
implementation of effective policies. For example, the works of Fung and Wright (2001), Baiocchi
(2002), Baiocchi, Heller, and Silva (2008), Dryzek (2009), and Dryzek and Niemeyer (2012) make an
effort to apply independent and freely working political institutions to political systems that are not fully
democratic. In other words, these scholars attempted to understand whether the deliberative theory of
democracy, with its focus on free exchange of arguments in the public sphere between the state and civil
society, can be applicable in understanding the making of laws in regimes that are not fully democratic.
Nevertheless, the issue I encountered in the application of deliberative democracy is that these
scholars have focused their scholarly attention on only a micro issue of governance. For example,
Baiocchi’s (2002) work focused on the design of making local democracy effective for local communities
in Brazil. Dryzek’s (2009) and Dryzek and Niemeyer’s (2012) work has focused on community-driven
village planning for the design of village development in China. These studies do not, however, look at
the political system in its entirety. By focusing on the micro issues of policy planning, we ignore the fact
that the system is not democratic, and hence we overlook democratic transgressions that have occurred.
My research exposes the limits of theoretical application of the ideals of deliberative democracy.
These ideals are constructed to analyze cases of democracies that have an active and vibrant civil society.
In my study, I have made an effort to understand the political system of Pakistan, highlight the main
actors on political landscape, and look at communicative interexchange between the actors for the design
of institutions. I have conducted my analysis differently than analyses reported in the work of advocates

5
of deliberative democracy. First, I understand and admit that the political system under study is a regime
that has been shaped into a system that qualifies as neither democracy nor authoritarian. Secondly, I
identify and highlight the workings of the actors that are involved in such a regime. Thirdly, I show how
these actors have engaged in communicative interexchange over the design of law. Fourthly, through this
study I expand the scope of the theory of deliberative democracy by applying it to the case of Pakistan,
which has had episodic authoritarianism under General Ayub Khan (1958-1969) and General Zia-ul-Haq
(1977-1988). Moreover, Pakistan is a complex case; after longstanding authoritarianism, it has
experienced a hybrid regime under electoral democracy in the 1990s, which was later solidified under
General Musharraf (1999-2008).
The Case Under Study
Scholars studying Pakistan’s political system have focused largely on the military’s engagement
in Pakistan as a specialized bureaucracy circumventing democratic institutions (H. A. Rizvi 2003; Aqil
Shah 2014a, 2014b). In this research, I show that Pakistan’s political regime has ranged from
authoritarianism to democracy, while exhibiting a consistent pull toward authoritarianism.
In Pakistan, the military ruled for almost three decades (1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2007).
Pakistan’s scholars have regarded these periods as military dictatorships. In this research, I show that
under the military dictatorship, the military elite would not impose direct military rule on the society for
indefinite periods. Instead, military rulers exercised authoritarian control over political institutions. These
military leaders did not eliminate political institutions such as elections, political parties, the legislature,
etc., but these same political institutions were exploited, resulting in a permanence of military
engagement on the political landscape. The institutional manipulation of political institutions was so
effective that even elected governments that followed these military dictatorships could not eradicate the
authoritarian footprints.
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Under Ayub Khan, from October 1958 to December 1969, the country was under a military
dictatorship; the dictatorship, however, allowed partisan politics (after briefly banning political parties),1
hence the formation of the Convention Muslim League. As a result, a presidential election was held on a
party basis and Ayub Khan was elected as the president. Under General Ayub, the system of government
was “presidential.” In 1969, when General Ayub abdicated, a military dictatorship was established under
then Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Yahya Khan from 1969-1971, and the presidential
Constitution of General Ayub Khan was abrogated.
From 1972 to 1977, the elected government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was
established, and a new Constitution was devised and put into effect. The Constitution established a
parliamentarian system of government, and an elected legislature, based on multiparty elections, was
formed. But the system of democratic governance was short-lived. The authoritarian tendencies of the
elected leadership brought about a system that was susceptible to failure, and the events of 1977 resulted
in military intervention.
General Zia-ul-Haq did not allow partisan politics to mobilize against his military rule, nor did he
establish any political party as General Ayub had done. Instead, under his rule from 1977 to 1985,
political processes were severely restricted and political parties were not allowed to organize the people
against the military dictatorship. After General Zia had elected himself as president based on the
referendum in December 1984, he announced general elections for national and provincial assemblies to
be held in 1985, but on a non-party basis.
In 1985, as the result of those general elections, the legislature became effective and Prime
Minister Muhammad Khan Junejo established the government under the military rule of General Zia.
However, under the government of Muhammad Khan Junejo, the political elite were allowed to organize
themselves based on their respective political lineage; hence, the legislature was formed into a partisan

1

I discuss the political parties under military dictatorships in chapter 3.
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institution post non-party elections. Nevertheless, the military dictator, who also was an elected president,
shaped the political processes by manipulating the political institutions, which affected how future
governments were formed.
Weakened political institutions had an effect on how elected leadership, from 1988 to 1997,
engaged in partisan politics and with the institution of military. The decade of the 1990s is marked by
political unrest and “11 years of venal misrule” (Diamond 2000, 92). The elected governments moved
between two political leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Although during this period there was
no direct military intervention, the military was an integral component of the political landscape. The
period also saw the continuation of the political institution that had been enacted under the military rule of
General Zia. In chapter 2, I discuss the authoritarian rule under military governments and, in the
aftermath, the hybrid regime that came into being under the elected governments.
Under the rule of General Musharraf (1999-2007), a military dictatorship was in effect from 1999
to 2002. In April 2002, when General Musharraf elected himself as president through a countrywide
referendum (much like his predecessor, General Zia), he announced general elections on a party basis
(unlike his predecessors). A political party, Pakistan Muslim League—Quaid (PML-Q), was launched and
was favored by the military dictator. The elections of October 2002 witnessed the government of PML-Q,
supported by the military elite.
Table 1 shows that in various decades from 1947 to 1999, the government alternated between
military dictators and elected leaderships. During the decades that followed the first military coup (in
1958), the military established itself as one of the key institutional players on the political landscape.
Moreover, the elected governments that were formed in successive decades relied on the military to
enable their elected rule to become established in society.
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Table 1: Nature of Government Rule
Decade

Government

Leadership

Polity IV2

1947-1954

Viceregal3

Governor General

1955-1958

Presidential

Major General Iskandar Mirza

85

1958-1969

1958-1964 military
dictatorship

General Ayub Khan

0

1965-1969 elected

Convention Muslim League

3

1969-1971

Military dictatorship

General Yayha Khan

1972-1977

Elected

Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)
under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Starting
from 1 in
1947 to 5 in
19544

-886
8

Freedom
House Scores
Not available

Not available

Not available
Partly free

2

Please see Polity IV dataset on “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2017.” Available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
The positive score ranging from numerical digit 1 onward indicates the country has representative political
institutions. The score ranging from 1 to 5 suggests fledgling democracy; the scores 6 to 9 denote steady advance
toward stronger democracy with established institutions such as open electoral competition, constitution, legislature,
judiciary, bureaucracy, etc.
3

Viceregal is the term used by Pakistan scholar Khalid bin Sayyed to describe a system of government in which the
head of the state is a Governor General who is not an elected statesman but rather is a self-appointed politician. Mr.
Jinnah was the first Governor General, followed by Khwaja Nazimuddin (1948-1951), Malik Ghulam Mohammad
(1951-1955) and Major General Iskandar Mirza (1955-1956). In 1956 with the first constitution the office of
Governor General was dissolved and replaced by the President.
4

Because of the provincial elections in 1954, there were multiple parties during this period: the founding political
party, Muslim League, Awami League, Republican Party, National Awami Party, Krishak Sramil (Peasants and
Workers). There were provincial governments in Punjab, Sindh, NWFP (North West Frontier Province now
renamed as Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, i.e., KPK), and East Pakistan.
5

According to the first constitution of Pakistan of 1956, Pakistan was declared a Republic with a President as the
head of government. The provincial governments were merged in two units—West Pakistan comprising Punjab,
Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan as one unit, and East Pakistan being the second. The government in the center was
formed based on the electoral strength in the two units; in other words, the Constituent Assembly was a result of
electoral performance of parties in the two distinctive units of Pakistan (Sayeed 1967, 82-93).
6

-88 is the code for the transition period. From 1969 to 1971 Pakistan experienced a military dictatorship under
General Yayha Khan, a civil war, and a return to elected democracy.
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Table 1—Continued

Government

1977-1988

1977-1984 Military
dictatorship

General Zia-ul-Haq

0

1984-1988 –
Parliamentarian

Pakistan Muslim League under
Junejo
But partisanship was granted by
military dictator post-elections.

0

Elected –
Parliamentarian but
under the direct
control of an
unelected president.

PPP from 1988-1990

8

PML – Nawaz from 1990-1992

8

PPP from 1993-1996

8

PML-Nawaz from 1997-1999

7

1999-2002 Military
dictatorship

General Musharraf

0

2002-2007 –
Parliamentarian but
under the direct
control of military
dictator

Coalition government led by
PML-Q

28

Transition in 2008.
Parliamentarian

PPP

5

1988-1999

1999-2007

2008

Leadership

Polity IV7

Decade

Freedom
House Scores
Not free

Partly free

Not free

Partly free

In the earlier years of Pakistan’s creation, there were multiple political parties; however, the
political government was the result of elections held under the colonial period of 1946. The founding

7

Please see Polity IV dataset on “Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2017.” Available at
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
8

From 1999 to November 2007, General Musharraf held two positions: the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and the
President of Pakistan. The score of 2 was granted only when General Musharraf had retired from being a serving
military general in November 2007. From 1999 to 2006, Polity IV had given Pakistan the score of 0 for democracy.
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political party, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), soon faced other political parties: the Awami League
(in East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), the Republican Party, Khudai Khidmatgar (in the province of Khyber
Pukhtunkwa), and other regional parties. However, having multiple parties competing in the political
domain did not transform the political system into one that was participatory and inclusive. The political
system from 1947 to 1958 (the time of the first military coup) functioned according to the Government of
India Act of 1935, which gave executive powers to the Governor General—a vestige of the colonial rule.
In the case of Pakistan, the Governor General was not appointed by the British crown in the aftermath of
1947, but the system of governance adopted by Pakistan’s early ruling elite relied on having a locally
appointed Governor General (Sayeed 1967, 62-63).9
During this early period, the ruling elite comprised the military-bureaucratic elite and was
supported by the traditional landowning and corporate business groups. The military-bureaucratic elite
was the joint complex that primarily focused on the control of executive powers, thus undermining the
political leadership that emanated from the partisan politics. At the same time, the political leadership also
was divided on matters of political governance of the newly established Pakistan. With the first military
coup effected by General Ayub Khan in 1958,10 the control of the military over the political landscape
became more direct. In the English daily Dawn, the editorial commended the military coup and argued
that the coup was the intervention from “Heaven [sic]” against the failure of political leaders to transcend
the partisan interests for order in the polity.

9

From 1947 to 1958, Pakistan had four Governor Generals. Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the first Governor
General (1947-1948), followed by Mr. Khawaja Nazimuddin (1948-1951), Mr. Malik Ghulam Mohammad (19511955), and Major General (Retd) Iskandar Mirza (1955-1956). Under Mr. Malik Ghulam Mohammad, who was a
retired bureaucrat, the military had been made part of the political arrangement. Commander-in-Chief General Ayub
Khan was given the additional role of the defense minister. Thus, this paved the way for the military’s engagement
in politics (Aqil Shah 2014a, 67-80).
10

The first military coup was effected at the behest of President Major General (Retd) Iskandar Mirza. The English
daily Dawn in its editorial commended the military coup, and declaring it the “peaceful revolution,” asserted, “God
has bestowed Pakistan on us and God will save it. The peaceful revolution of October 7, 1958, may have been the
answer from Heaven” (“The New Order” 1958).
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With the military dictatorship of General Ayub, the era of the military’s control over the political
landscape was ushered in. In the ensuing period from 1958 to 1969, the country experienced authoritarian
rule under General Ayub Khan, and then the authoritarian rule passed onto the next military general—
General Yahya Khan. It was only under the elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto that democratic
rule was seen in effect. However, as I will discuss in subsequent chapters, Bhutto’s populist appeal soon
transformed into autocratic rule. The democratic interregnum was again stalled by the military coup
effected by General Zia-ul-Haq. His authoritarian rule had been perpetuated in society not only through
dictatorial decrees that exploited political institutions, but also through his Islamist agenda that brought
the political and civil society into submission. The subsequent elected governments that came into being
in the 1990s were unable to transform morphed political institutions due to their incapacity and failure to
transcend political differences. Hence, the political system again became susceptible to the covert
intervention of military encroachment.
Thus, the emergence of an enduring hybrid regime in Pakistan. I believe, based on my analysis,
that in Pakistan under the electoral democracy (the minimalist definition as argued by Schumpeter and
Huntington)11 of the 1990s, the democratic transition brought partisan politics back to Pakistan’s political
landscape. But their internal differences and their reliance on a military-bureaucratic complex never
enabled the political elite to transcend the authoritarian past. The political, military, and bureaucratic elite
during the period of 1990s struggled to determine the institutional arrangement best suited for Pakistan’s
transitional democracy. As a result, a hybrid regime came into being, in which the executive controls of
the state were reserved for the ever-powerful military institution, and the political society lacked the

11

Schumpeter (1950) and Huntington (1991, [1968] 2006) believe the threshold to attain democracy is the event of
the elections through which the citizens (the electors) elect their leader (elected). The elections are the minimum
standard for democracy. Schumpeter asserted, “Democracy is the rule of politician” (285). Huntington, in his
analysis of third-wave democratization, asserted that procedural democracy is attained with elections. And new
democracies are far from being consolidated. To achieve consolidation, Linz and Stepan (1996) asserted that
political elite embark on institutional building. There are five arenas that set the stage for consolidation: the political
society involving political parties, elite; the civil society comprising citizen interest groups and associations; the rule
of law focusing on institutional stability and restraint; the state apparatus based on the bureaucratic rules and norms;
and the economic society that focuses on market economy.
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capacity to challenge the military and bureaucratic complex. And, thus, the hybrid regime became the
political system with the military coup in 1999.
There have been intellectual attempts by international scholars to investigate Pakistan’s hybrid
regime. But the case of Pakistan poses significant definitional challenges for scholars of regime change.
Scholars have found it difficult to categorize the regime as squarely authoritarian or democratic. This
dissertation has also encountered a similar issue. Several reasons for Pakistan’s troubling regime type are
evidenced in the facts. First, the political regime has been purely authoritarian under direct military rule
(1958-1962, 1969-1971, 1977-1985, 1999-2002), followed by periods when it has seemed to make a
democratic transition (1972-1977, 1988-1999) and then by periods when the political regime seems to
have slid back into authoritarianism (1962-1970, 2002-2008). Second, even under authoritarianism, the
political regime was more open than most closed military regimes. The discussion in the following
chapters showcases the evidence that political and civil society endured the hegemonic rule not only
under the military dictatorships but also in the wake of democratic transitions.
Studies by Diamond (2000, 2002), Oldenburg (2017), and Adeney (2017) have attempted to
understand the pattern of institutional hybridity in Pakistan, but these scholars also have been hindered by
the overwhelming encroachment of the military on Pakistan’s landscape. Diamond (2000) argued that the
“successive authoritarian regimes” under Generals Ayub (1958-1969), Yahyha (1969-1971), and Zia-ulHaq (1977-1988) and the “misrule” of the elected governments led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
in the 1990s precipitated the military coup in 1999. In chapter 4, I discuss the lack of performance of the
elected governments led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Likewise, Diamond (2000) asserted that
under the elected governments, the political regime never did transcend the stage of consolidation due to
their lack of ability to reform the judicial system, to mitigate ethnic conflicts, and to address the economic
crisis.
Later, in his analysis of General Musharraf’s rule, Diamond (2002) asserted that though the
“military regimes have disappeared, . . . ambitious soldiers either legitimize their rule by running for
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president in contested, multi-party elections (however fraudulent, coerced, and manipulated), or they
carve out large, autonomous spheres of political influence and economic domination behind the veil of
civilian, multiparty rule” (27). General Musharraf, Diamond (2002) predicted, “may yet pursue a similar
conversion in Pakistan, albeit perhaps with considerably more genuine popular support” (27). It was the
popular support that had made General Musharraf’s regime “hegemonic electoral authoritarian,” in which
the system “is more open and pluralistic than closed authoritarian regimes” (31-32).12 In subsequent
chapters, I discuss the authoritarian rule of military dictators General Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, the
electoral democracy in the 1990s, and the hybrid regime under General Musharraf.
In his analysis of Pakistan’s hybrid regime, Oldenburg (2017) claimed the lack of “loyal
opposition” in the political system has led the military to build partnerships with the disloyal opposition
found in the political society. These are the actors of political society, the elite and political parties that
have an interest in having political power and not necessarily fidelity to democratic principles. Adeney
(2017), on the other hand, focused on the institutional manipulation at the hands of the military as the
cause of a hybrid regime in Pakistan. She argued that the manipulated political institutions devised by the
military have had an indelible effect on the political landscape that the political society has not been able
to redress. Thus, this results in an enduring longevity of the hybrid regime in Pakistan.
Others have evaluated the military’s corporate enterprise in securing its economic interests
(Siddiqa 2007). Still others have analyzed the military’s utilization of religious rhetoric to portray the
military as the defender of Islam (Haqqani 2005). In a similar vein, scholars who have studied
institutional design in the context of Pakistan have stressed that the state of Pakistan has never found
balance among its electoral, legislative, judicial, and executive institutions (Waseem 1989; Jalal [1990]
2007).
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Diamond’s (2002) prediction came true, as I show in chapter 5, that General Musharraf became the elected
President through a popular referendum.

14
I believe the emphasis has been on studying the institutional transgressions of the military as an
institution. Scholars tend to downplay the fact that the political society is also responsible for the dismal
democratic culture. After all, democracy has faltered even in countries where the military has a much
smaller role in the polity. Similarly, the role of civil society has largely been masked by the political
society’s lack of resilience to the military’s intervention in politics. In Pakistan’s scholarship, the political
elite have been portrayed as the victims of military intervention in politics, but as I show in subsequent
chapters, the military’s encroachment in politics was sustained because of the political society’s reliance
on the military to gain a political advantage. The civil society, which was already a nascent entity, was
rendered ineffective because of the authoritarianism it faced from the military and political governments.
In this research, the analysis of Pakistan’s hybrid regime is examined with the theoretical
perspective adopted from the theory of deliberative democracy. I look at the role of the various actors, the
military state, the political society, and the civil society, and how the various roles have played out to
maintain the hybridity of the political system in Pakistan. In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I present a
critical evaluation of the political institutions and civil society in Pakistan. I show in subsequent chapters
that each of the actors facilitated the sustainment of authoritarian rule and the transformation into an
enduring hybrid regime in Pakistan.
In chapter 3, I show that Pakistan’s hybrid regime is reflective of the disjuncture between the
state agencies that ought to possess formal control and those with actual control, between the power that
is claimed for the people versus the limited control of power in the hands of the people, and between the
promises of ruling elites versus their actual performance. The continued existence of a weakened political
society and opportunist political elite, the clash of political institutions between elected versus
administrative officials, the persistence of institutional rivalry to dominate the political landscape, and the
permanence of confrontation leading to institutional encroachment and lapses are recurrent. These are
characteristic features that define Pakistan’s politics. The ruling elite, comprised of the political, military,
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and bureaucratic elite, as shown in chapter 3 of this dissertation, has collaborated, connived, and made
compromises with each other to consolidate their control over the polity.
The hybridity of the political system in Pakistan is distinctive because the military elite has
emerged as the insurmountable actor. Over the last seven decades, the military elite has engaged in
bringing about compromises with and between the political and bureaucratic elite to sustain the military’s
control over the state. Therefore, unsurprisingly as it happens in hybrid regimes, the weak institutions
give in to the pressure of the dominant institution. Hence, in Pakistan, the political and bureaucratic elite
and the civil society actors also have conceded to the military’s control to ensure their own survival in the
state. The ruling elite, in its attempt to subordinate society, subdued the multiplicity of voices that
challenged the manipulative executive control over society.
Theory of Deliberative Democracy and Relevance to the Study of Pakistan
Jurgen Habermas, a leading theorist of deliberative democracy, argued that communicative
interexchange between civil society and state can produce real, large-scale political changes. Habermas
(1998), in his work Between Facts and Norms, emphasized the link between the state and the civil
society; he contended the public sphere is the corrective that “steers” the law-making institutions of state.
Dryzek (2000) argued, “[I]n Between Facts and Norms, Habermas retains an emphasis on public spheres
and civil society. . . . Habermas is . . . concerned with how the communicative process of civil society
influences the legislative and policy process of the state” (24-25).
Habermas (1998) asserted it is in civil society that communicative actors come together to
interpret their living situations and harmonize their life plans through formulation of group identities and
memberships13; civil society is, according to Habermas, a “network of voluntary associations” (175, 358,
366-67). Furthermore, Habermas emphasized voluntary organizations that constitute civil society, which
are, according to him, “noneconomic” (367), “informal” (352), and generally egalitarian (367).

13

Please also refer to Jane Mansbridge, “Using Power/Fighting Power: The Polity,” in Democracy and Difference:
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, edited by Seyla Benhabib (Princeton University Press, 1996), 46-66.
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The public sphere, Habermas (1998) explains, is not a system, institution, organization, or
“framework of norms” (360). It is a “network” (298, 302, 359) of communications born of voluntary
associations of civil society. These voluntary associations, he argues, are “attuned to how societal
problems resonated in private life spheres” (381). Thus, the “voluntary organizations” provide the
mobilization grounds for collective interests to be voiced in the public sphere. He contended that for
discussion in the public sphere, participants are “recruited” from civil society’s voluntary associations
(354). The political public sphere, therefore, is a “sounding board for problems” (359), a “warning system
with sensors that, though unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society” (300, 359).14
This therefore means that the associations of civil society “distill and transmit” responses to
lifeworld problems “in amplified form to the public sphere” (367). Thus, for Habermas (1998), the public
sphere “filter[s]” (360), “synthesize[s]” (360), and “bundles” (362) “streams of communication” (360).
Together, then, civil society and the political public sphere establish a link between system and lifeworld.
This link, in Habermas’s view, is what makes genuine democracy possible.
Habermas (1998) asserted both civil society and the political public sphere, however, must be
legally protected to ensure their autonomy. The idea of the constitutional state, as Habermas has argued,
is that citizens’ communicative power must influence the administrative power developed in officials’
deliberations (Habermas 2006, 417). Or, to use another of Habermas’s favorite metaphors, citizens’
communicative power must be able to pass through the “sluice” of official deliberative procedures and
“penetrate . . . the constitutionally organized political system” (Habermas 1998, 327). Basic rights of
speech, press, association, and assembly are necessary not just for the political public sphere, but for the
civil society as well (Habermas 1998, 368; Chambers 2002, 92-93).
In the case of Pakistan, devolution plan(s) were the governance strategy adopted by authoritarian
military governments to legitimize their rule by devolving the decision-making authority from the
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Habermas (1998) describes public spheres as a “far-flung network of sensors that react to the pressure of societywide problems and stimulate influential opinions” (300).
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centralized state to the grassroots while undermining the provinces, the location of potential challenges.15
The three military regimes—under Field Marshal Ayub Khan (1958-1969), General Zia-ul-Haq (19771988), and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008)—undertook a series of similar steps to establish the
legitimacy for/of ruling. To solve the problems of governance experienced in the previous democratic
regime, each time the military regime would entrench itself in the political system by introducing a new
political order through enacting local government reforms.
Devolution plans were designed by military regime(s) with an alleged goal of developing
grassroots democracy by empowering citizens to govern themselves for an efficient and effective delivery
of services at the local level. These plans designed by the military elite, however, lacked sufficient
communicative interaction with the civil society. In fact, the state never engaged with the civil society in
identifying concerns and issues faced by the citizenry regarding state authorities at local levels. These
plans were designed more for the benefit of military regime(s) to strengthen their control over the
“system” of the state than to engage with and benefit from the associative life of the civil society
(International Crisis Group 2002, 2004; Cheema and Mohmand 2008; Cheema and Sayeed 2006;
Mohmand 2008).
Devolution plans implemented by the military regimes in Pakistan lacked legitimacy because the
design of this institutional rule was not shaped and informed by public deliberation in the public sphere.
Furthermore, the legitimacy for/of ruling itself was compromised by the military elite, who forcefully
made certain that the military generals were elected to rule over the polity. Thus, to facilitate the military
regime’s rule over the polity, devolution plans were devised. The plans were designed by the military elite
on the pretext of empowering the citizenry. Instead, they were used as a means to legitimize the military
rule, and the military elite neglected to solicit crucial input from the public sphere. In fact, during the
15

Devolving of decision making from centralized authority to regional/provincial levels is a governance mechanism
that empowers the regional authorities to plan, design, and implement policies at local levels that are closest to the
political experience of ordinary citizens. In the next chapter, I elaborate on why this governance strategy is seen by
deliberative democrats (e.g., Mark Warren, Archon Fung, Archon Fung & Olin Wright, John Parkinson, Carolyn
Hendricks) as the practical manifestation of deliberative principles.
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periods of first and second plans, the civil society and public sphere were never consulted in designing the
institutional arrangements devised by the state, the military, or the democratically elected.16
The first two plans, the Basic Democracy (BD) of 1959 and the Local Government Ordinance of
1979 (LGO), were struck down when democratically elected governments came to power (in 1972 and
1988). The Local Government Plan 2001 (LGP), however, is an exception. Though the political
government had temporarily discontinued the 2001 plan, the government retained the constitutional
clause through which the local governments were established under the military rule. The local
governments were in hiatus from 2008 to 2010. But in 2010, the policy of devolution was accepted by the
elected government; in other words, the elected governments exhibited a commitment to the crucial
importance of devolution to the grassroots by retaining the constitutional clause effected by the preceding
military rule.
What led political society to break from the legacy of the past? What explains the retention of the
constitutional clause on local governments? Did civil society raise a voice in favor of the constitutional
clause on local governments?
In this research, I have argued that communicative exchange characterizing the relations between
state and civil society under General Musharraf commenced dialogic engagement in the burgeoning
public sphere in Pakistan. This was the time when the actors of the state and civil society engaged in
communicative interexchange, which led to the implementation of the LGP. The public sphere was a
space of dialogue, opposition, agitation, and engagement between the actors of civil society and the
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The plan devised by General Musharraf’s regime included the participation of civil society actors. However, as I
will show in chapter 4, this participation was selectively mediated by the military regime. Nevertheless, the
engagement of the military regime with the civil society under General Musharraf was the one distinctive
characteristic that differentiates his rule from the previous two military dictators.
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institution of state.17 However, as I show in chapter 5, this engagement with the civil society was useful to
the military rule. The enacted local governments granted legitimacy to the military government. In other
words, to make the military rule acceptable and legitimate to society, the military elite utilized
decentralization reform as a buffer against the military’s intervention in politics.
Legitimacy of Collective Decisions and Communicative Interexchange
Legitimacy of collective decisions demands the assent of most of those who are affected by such
an institutionally driven collective decision. In a deliberative model of democracy, legitimacy of
collective decisions is the foremost condition that, if met, results in a rule that is acceptable to all.
Furthermore, to reach to such legitimacy, the communicative channels among all those who are affected
by the decision are to remain accessible to all. To achieve such accessibility of communicative
interaction, the model of deliberative democracy emphasizes public deliberation. This public deliberation
takes place between the political institutions and the actors in civil society. Advocates of deliberative
democracy argue that political institutions, such as the legislature, judiciary, or administrative organs like
the bureaucracy, engage in public deliberation with civil society actors such as media, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), and public intellectuals, including academics and civil society activists (Habermas
2006, 415-16; Hendriks 2006).
Public deliberation denotes the exchange of ideas on collective decisions or institutional
development between all those who are affected by such institutional rules and collective decisions. The
venue of public deliberation, according to deliberative democrats, is the public sphere. According to
Simone Chambers (2002), one of the advocates of the model of deliberative democracy, “[P]ublic sphere
is an important extension of civil society” (96). The public sphere is the arena that is inhabited by
multiple actors, such as institutions of representative democracy (e.g., political parties, elections,
17

A detailed discussion of the communicative interexchange between the actors of the state and civil society is
presented in chapter 5. The public sphere was formed when the actors of civil society came together to voice their
concerns to the military government. Interesting to note is the fact that, in 1999, when General Pervez Musharraf
entered the political scene through a military coup, the political and civil society in Pakistan appreciated the military
takeover (Rashid 1999; Aqil Shah 2002, 73-74; 2004, 376; Zaidi 2008a, 2008b).
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legislature, executive, judiciary, and intergovernmental organizations), non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), media, economic actors, and the citizenry. It is because of these individual and institutional
actors in the public sphere that “ideas, interests, values, and ideologies formed within the relations of civil
society are voiced and made politically efficacious” (Chambers 2002, 96). In other words, the public
sphere is the place where formal political institutions come into direct contact with the multiplicity of
voices coming from people in the society.
The issue is how multiple voices in the public sphere engage in an interactive interexchange with
formal institutions. This issue is resolved by deliberative democrats, who emphasize that for public
deliberation to take place, communicative interexchange in the public sphere must not be restricted to
only a few institutions of the state. The exchange of ideas at the fora of the public sphere results in those
ideational actions that feed formal decision making. This takes place at political institutions where the
elite—political and bureaucratic (and, in the case of the hybrid political system in Pakistan, the
military)—deliberate on developing and implementing policies through which to regulate society.
My understanding of legitimacy of collective decisions was challenged while researching
information for this dissertation. In the hybrid regime of Pakistan, the ruling elite (political, bureaucratic,
and military) have always believed that legitimacy of rule is drawn from popular elections. Legitimacy,
for the ruling elite, does not give precedence to communicative engagement with civil society actors.
Civil society, for the ruling elite, in the case of Pakistan, is a democratic misnomer.
The political society, believing in the electoral legitimacy, monopolized control over the political
institutions and in the public sphere. Unsurprisingly, this understanding of legitimacy on the part of the
political elite is drawn from the elitist model of democracy, in which elected representatives have the
authority to make decisions on behalf of their electorate. Such an elitist conception of legitimacy reduces
legitimacy to rule to only electoral legitimacy.
Such an emasculation of legitimacy, I believe, forecloses communicative interexchange with civil
society actors. In accordance with this elitist conception of legitimacy, the ruling elite also tend to focus
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only on their electoral success, rather than to engage in effective policy making. In this dissertation, I
observed that in Pakistan, the ruling elite remains fixated on electoral success, rather than engaging in
communicative interexchange with civil society on issues of policy concerns.
The conception of legitimacy, as in the elitist model of representative democracy, I argue, has
become increasingly deficient in meeting the needs of the plurality and diversity in the society. Moreover,
a modern state is not composed of only the political elite that control the state apparatus. The modern
state comprises an entire range of institutions that enable the state to exert its control and coercive force
on its inhabitants. As a result, the political regimes that are formed constitute a mix of ruling elite that are
at the helm of state affairs; these elite include political, military, bureaucratic, and judiciary, among
others. These groups of elites have access to the institutions of the state through the legally stipulated
channel. However, advocates of deliberative democracy argue that if these institutional players do not
interact with society, the governing structures they enact can become ineffective (Fung 2007, 2012;
Parkinson 2012; Parkinson and Mansbridge 2013; Hendriks 2006, 2016; Warren 2009; Chambers 2013).
Thus, for there to be legitimacy for the ruling elite to oversee the political community, it is imperative that
they develop communicative engagement with the society.
The Challenge to Deliberative Conditions
Challenge of Regime Type
How do we know that a condition of communicative interexchange will withstand the pressures
of a political regime that is neither democratic nor authoritarian? Such regimes are classified as hybrid
regimes in the field of comparative politics. Political scientists have further identified the subtle
differentiations within hybrid regimes. In this dissertation, chapter 2 delves into the literature on hybrid
regimes and investigates what insights deliberative democracy can provide for analyzing communicative
interexchange within hybrid regimes.
Scholars contend that a hybrid regime may emerge from an authoritarian regime that has lost
some of its key characteristics but has retained other nondemocratic features; or, a hybrid regime may
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emerge from a democracy that has acquired authoritarian characteristics. O’Donnell (1994), Diamond
(2002), Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010), and Schedler (2002) have identified a number of “hybrid
regimes” that are “delegative democracy,” “competitive authoritarianism,” or “electoral
authoritarianism.”18 For example, a regime may have universal suffrage, but the freedom of association
and expression is not universal; rather, it is repressed by regime. In hybrid regimes, autocratic rulers hold
formal multiparty elections but manipulate them to varying degrees to maintain, if not enhance, their grip
on power.
As shown in the empirical findings of Gandhi and Przeworski (2007), this strategy is often
successful. All else being equal, autocrats who establish nominally democratic political institutions
experience substantially greater longevity in office than those who do not (1290). Thus, in the view of
these scholars, autocratic rulers’ establishment of formal institutions is directed less toward simply
creating a façade of democracy for an outside audience and more to enhancing their grip on power and
ensuring their political and personal survival.
Thus, in the realm of political systems, hybrid regimes are constantly challenged and face
ongoing controversial demands from existing institutions, such as political, bureaucratic, and military, for
control of the state power. For example, in a hybrid regime, political institutions such as the executive,
legislative, bureaucratic, judiciary, military, etc., are locked in a competition to control the constitutional
domain of the others. In other words, in a hybrid regime the power to control the institutions of the state
remains amorphous, and power to control is constantly renegotiated. This conflict between the
institutional actors to control the political system renders the hybrid regime “on the move.”
In other words, there is no equilibrium; each institutional actor strives to control the domain of
the other. There may be moments of an artificial equilibrium in which institutional actors in conflict may
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find common ground. However, such an arrangement is short-lived only because institutions locked in
competition for control of state power never let democracy be established as the system of governance.
O’Donnell (2004), in his essay “Why the Rule of Law Matters,” has argued that equilibrium is attained
when political institutions created, maintain their institutional rule or the rule of law. Furthermore,
O’Donnell asserted that the rule of law signifies that each institution performs its duty according to its
institutional logic. For example, the legislature devises laws; the executive branch implements the laws;
the judiciary interprets the laws; the bureaucratic apparatus provides service to the executive institution in
the enactment of regulatory framework; and the law enforcement agencies, such as police and the
military, provide security from internal and external threats. This schema exhibits an equilibrium in which
institutional powers are divided among the institutions of the state. O’Donnell (1994), Diamond (2002),
Levitsky and Way (2002, 2010), and Schedler (2002) have argued that in a hybrid regime we may find the
institutional equilibrium manipulated by the ruling elite. In such regimes, the ruling elite (such as an
authoritarian ruler) exhibits blatant disregard for institutional checks, thus rendering political systems
susceptible to breakdowns. Furthermore, O’Donnell (1999) asserted that the ruling elite dismantles the
accountability checks, thus rendering the ruling elite all too powerful.
O’Donnell (1999) categorized accountability checks into horizontal and vertical. In terms of
horizontal accountability, the work of each political institution is limited to its institutional logic. That is
to say, the ruling elite is subject to institutional checks; for example, the executive branch is checked by
the legislature if the executive is overstepping by dictating decrees to the legislature. In the case of
Pakistan, the horizontal accountability would signify that the military defends the security of the state as
demanded by the executive and legislative branches, not that the military has the authority to direct the
executive, legislature, judiciary, or political elite. When the military dictates the institutional roles of other
institutions, then the result is an institutional rupture, or what O’Donnell would call the disregard of
horizontal accountability.
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The rule of law, pertaining to the institutional role that each actor is expected to play and as
derived from its specific institutional principle, is constantly encroached on by military-bureaucratic
institutions. In the case of Pakistan, its hybrid regime came into being in the aftermath of military
dictatorships, which gave the military unprecedented control over the political arena. Also, the hybrid
regime during a period of elected leadership never did remove the executive powers that the military as an
institution exerted over the political landscape. In Pakistan, the rule of law, in terms of the two standards
of accountability—the horizontal and vertical, has always remained more or less absent. Neither the
military’s devised hybrid regime nor the hybrid regime fashioned by an elected leadership created respect
for the rule of law.
In other words, the rule of law and division of power might never be achieved in a hybrid regime.
For example, the executive institution is expected to bring about better governance of the state, while the
legislature deliberates and devises rules and policies of governance; similarly, other coercive organs of
the state, such as the police and military, ensure the internal security and the external defense of the state,
respectively. However, when any of these institutional actors begins to unduly influence the institutional
role of another, then the consequence of such an endeavor results in institutional chaos. The consequence
of such an institutional encroachment is the emergence of a political system that favors certain
institutional actor(s) over others, the result of which is a mishmash of institutional actors performing
political functions that are not in their domain.
Other than the horizontal accountability, O’Donnell (1999) argued, vertical accountability
signifies that the ruling elite in democratic political regimes are the elected representatives of the
citizenry. The institution of elections signifies the accountability of the representatives vis-à-vis those
who elect the ruling elite. But if the ruling elite manipulate the very institution through which it comes to
rule over society, the accountability link between the rulers and the ruled is compromised. O’Donnell
(1994, 1999, 2004) argued that vertical accountability is gauged via the institution of elections. Elections
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provide the direct link between the elected and the elector. But if elections are manipulated, a miscarriage
of vertical accountability is evident.
In their analysis of hybrid regimes, Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2004) developed the
term selectorate to explain that in hybrid regimes the regime incumbents establish a select group of
regime supporters from the existing political landscape. The selectorate is bound to the regime, for the
selectorate receives the rents, or patronage from regime incumbents, that is, access to state resources, in
return for providing regime incumbents a “winning coalition” at the time of electoral competition. The
equilibrium so gained by such an arrangement remains artificially enacted (Mesquita et al. 2004, 37-40).
In chapter 2, I discuss the attributes of the selectorate in the context of Pakistan’s hybrid regime
and identify its constitutive being in Pakistan’s political landscape. The political elite that comprise the
selectorate are basically what I call the constituency level politicians. The selectorate is a subset of the
political society that has a fluid political loyalty to partisan politics. In fact, for the selectorate, the
political parties downplay the individual’s connection to the electoral constituency. These are the political
elite that are most interested in keeping themselves electorally relevant in their respective constituencies.
Thus, in order to remain relevant, the politicians are co-opted by the military elite. In return for this
co-optation, the politicians gain access to the state resources. These selectorate politicians then cement
their hold on their constituencies. For the selectorate, political parties are a mere afterthought for political
mobilization, for they do not believe that political parties are strongly rooted in electoral constituencies.
Instead, it is the individual politician who drives the personal electoral performance, not the ideology of
the political party. The selectorate, therefore, aligns itself with the military leadership in times of military
rule. Moreover, I show that with the enactment of local governments under the military rule, new political
aspirants are subsumed in the category of the selectorate.
Study of Pakistan as a Hybrid Regime
When incumbents are top military officials, they have two distinct advantages in extracting
cooperation that other regimes do not. First, they are directly in control of a security and coercive
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apparatus that can be used to terrorize elite opponents and put down dissent. And second, the institutional
infrastructure necessary to easily and efficiently promote allies and designate challengers already exists in
the form of the military itself. In a case such as Pakistan, the military as an institution and its incumbents
have an insurmountable influence on other state players, such as the political and bureaucratic elite.
Scholars studying regime types from the field of comparative politics contend that authoritarian
rulers, which includes military rulers and elected leaders, often establish nominally democratic political
institutions as a means of increasing the durability of their regimes. According to Gandhi (2008) and
Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009), these nominal democratic institutions, which often include legislatures,
courts, opposition political parties, and even elections, are mere “window dressing”—façades designed to
impress or deceive outside observers (Gandhi 2008, xvii-xxi). These scholars argue that the manipulated
democratic institutions serve practical functions for the rulers, such as guarding against the popular
unrest.
Similarly, scholars who have analyzed hybrid regimes argue that leaders in such regimes also
create institutions such as hegemonic political parties, legislatures, and/or general elections.
Decentralization and devolution of power to local levels are also intended to enhance the durability of
their rule (O’Donnell 1994, 1999, 2004; Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010; Diamond 2002). I therefore
believe that within the field of comparative politics the scholarship on authoritarian regime and the
analyses of the hybrid regime have overlapping insights. The rulers belonging either to the military or to
the elected political elite have devised semi-democratic institutions so as to extend their control over the
political landscape.
Therefore, in this research I conceptualize that Pakistan has hovered between an authoritarian
regime with a military ruler as the dictator and president of the country and the democratically elected
regime. The military, when it has taken power (in 1958, 1969, 1977, 1999), has not seen itself as opposed
to democracy per se; rather, the military elite claimed it has taken over the political scene only
temporarily in order to cleanse the democratic system of abuses. The military’s claimed attempt to cleanse
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the political system was to effect manipulation of democratic institutions. Such manipulation came in the
form of continuing with the democratic institutions of elections and the elected legislature. The military,
however, made complicit the political elite to perpetuate its control of the political landscape, thus making
the military dictatorship a political system with the military ruler as the head of the state. Political
institutions such as the executive, legislature, bureaucratic apparatus, and judiciary operated under the
directives of the military’s leadership led by the military general. The military dictatorship of General
Ayub (1959-1969) and General Zia (1977-1988) were periods of authoritarian rule. These periods were
authoritarian since the political and civil society lacked arenas from which to contest the authoritarian
decrees of the military rulers. Under General Pervez Musharraf, the political system adopted liberal
policies that did open the public sphere for political and civil society activism. However, the political
system under his rule was not transformed into a solid democracy, but instead signified an enduring
hybrid regime.
During the time of the elected governments, from 1947-1959 and 1988-1999, the executive and
the legislature were comprised of elected representatives, but the very political system of the regime was
not fully democratic. The political society from 1947-1958 had relied on military and bureaucratic
apparatus, and thus with the first military coup (in 1958), the political society was neutralized by the
military-bureaucracy oligarchy.
From 1988-1999, the political society wrestled against the military and bureaucratic apparatus for
control of the political landscape in terms of developing democratic political institutions. But it was also
during this period that the political society relied on the military and bureaucracy to provide them with the
means to enact democratic institutions. The expectation of the political society was rejected by the
military and bureaucracy. Instead, the political society increasingly became dependent on the militarybureaucracy complex, the consequence of which was the hybrid regime with elected political elite being
led by the military and bureaucratic complex.

28
I believe the hybrid regime in Pakistan has been the most recurrent political feature. Of course, in
Pakistan scholarship, the military’s intervention and encroachment is presented as the cause of Pakistan’s
dismal democratic experience. It seems to me that the threat of the military’s intervention in politics has
transfixed the political regime in Pakistan into remaining hybrid. During the time of authoritarianism,
which is the direct military rule, the military elite are at the helm of the political landscape. Similarly,
during the time of elected rule, the military elite directs the political scene. Therefore, in a case such as
Pakistan, how can the reality of authoritarianism be separated from the military-led hybrid regime?
In this research, for me, the hybrid regime in Pakistan is a recurrent theme that cannot be ignored.
The taxonomy of hybrid regimes by comparative scholars argues that a hybrid regime is a regime that
combines authoritarianism with democratic principles and that a hybrid regime emerges from the
authoritarian practices of the ruling elite. I believe the case of Pakistan signifies such a political regime,
which carries forward the authoritarian tendencies of its ruling elite and thus shapes the political system
into a combination of two distinctive political systems—in other words, authoritarianism with democratic
principles. The military dictatorships have shown a continuing regard for democratic institutions for the
purposes of their military rule. The elected governments, on the other hand, never did strengthen the
democratic institutions so as to challenge the military’s intervention on the political front. Both of the
ruling elite—the military and the political—have been complicit in maintaining a hybrid regime.
The Players of the Hybrid Regime in Pakistan
In Pakistan’s scholarship, the nexus of the political-bureaucratic-military elite is also known as
the “establishment.”19 The “establishment” in Pakistan is led by the military elite and serves the interest of
the military as an institution of the state, which has overruling authority over other organs of the state.
The military as an institution in the hybrid regime of Pakistan has great influence on the executive,
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legislative, judiciary, and administrative organs. The military as an institution and military elite as an
actor direct the formulation of interests of other actors, such as the political and bureaucratic elite
(Shafqat 2011; Waseem 1992, 2002).
In this dissertation, I discuss these state actors and others from the civil society in more detail in
chapter 3, while also making reference to how the state and civil society relations evolved within the
political regime in Pakistan, characterized by intermittent periods of democratic rule faced with persistent
praetorian takeovers. As will be shown in chapter 3, the early institutional arrangements designed by
political elites (in the early period of its formation and in the latter years) were centralized, and the
arrangements did not motivate engagement with civil society. The public sphere was an exclusive domain
of the state agencies; the state did not encourage communicative interexchange with society. Furthermore,
the institutional arrangements designed by the state did not ensue communicative and discursive
interexchange with civil society.
In Pakistan, elected governments have never controlled the state power for long, sustainable
periods. Regime changes in Pakistan have been the result of military coups. Pakistan’s six-decade-long
political history is marred by long rules of military governments. Each time the military regime came on
the political landscape, the first step taken by military leaders was to legitimize their rule. In order to do
so, the military engaged in recruitment and selection of the political elite, much in the same way political
parties do (Wilder 2004, 2009; Shafqat 1999, 2011). The military focused on elite recruitment at the
grassroots levels by patronizing a local power structure to legitimize their rule (Ziring 1988; Rashid 1999;
International Crisis Group 2002; Waseem 2006a; Cheema and Mohmand 2008; Mohmand 2008; Niaz
2010; S. A. Khan 2015; Ali 2015).
Scholars studying the military engagement in Pakistan politics have argued that each time the
military regime removed the elected government by a military coup (1958, 1977, 1999), the military
regime implemented a system of local governance with an alleged goal to develop grassroots democracy
by empowering citizens to govern themselves. However, military regimes have used local governments to
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also provide a source of patronage: by holding local elections (by banning political parties), the military
elite reared new political leadership loyal to the military regime, replacing the existing leadership (Ziring
1988; Aqil Shah 2004; Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir 2005; Waseem 2006a, 2006b; Rizvi and Khatoon
2007; Cheema and Mohmand 2008; Cheema and Sayeed 2006; S. A. Khan 2015).
With the local government reforms, the military regimes maintained a link between state and
society to ensure that the political elite would support and respond to the new regime (Cheema and
Mohmand 2008; International Crisis Group 2002, 2004). With the first two of the three devolution plans,
the military rulers had institutionalized local governments to extract cooperation from political elites.
Through the local governments, dictators preferred to be seen as legitimate political authorities. In other
words, these military rulers had no resolve toward strengthening the political institutions. Their focus was
more on strengthening their military rule by means of the local governments (Baxter 2004; Zaidi 2005b,
2015; Cohen 2006).
However, this was not General Musharraf’s only expectation that was fulfilled with the local
governments. His military regime also expected that with these local governments being implemented at
the grassroots, civil society would come to see these institutional measures as a serious effort toward
democratization in the country. Furthermore, unlike his predecessors, Musharraf had revived the
multiparty elections, parallel to the establishment of the local governments. He realized that to continue to
extract cooperation from the political elite, to secure financial aid from International Financial Institutions
(IFIs), and to gain the support of civil society organizations, completely dismantling a system of
multiparty elections would be less preferable. He instead kept the electoral institutions in place, thus
giving the political society access to the political institutions, and he maintained his regime’s
communicative exchange with the civil society.
The case of General Musharraf’s military rule is different from previous military regimes. In one
crucial sense, the liberalization policies of his regime, such as the opening of media (electronic) and direct
engagement with civil society actors in the public sphere, created opportunities for civil society actors to
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be involved in mobilizing the citizenry in civic and political engagement. The print media and the active
electronic media are the result of his regime’s liberalization policies; media appreciated the effect of those
liberalization policies. A newspaper editorial in Dawn admitted that “[T]he irony cannot be lost that in
many ways the devolution process by a military dictator may have actually helped democratize—through
increased representation and participation—the political involvement of citizens.”20 The local government
reforms of 2001 were more comprehensive and significantly more ambitious in their objective to transfer
meaningful power to grassroots organizations than the reforms that had been instituted in 1959 and 1979
(Aqil Shah 2004).
The role that the public sphere has played in the communicative interexchange has not been
examined by scholars and observers of Pakistan’s politics. While I am not challenging the importance of
contentious politics, what I am highlighting is that the study of the communicative and discursive
interexchange over the deliberation of institutional design or collective decisions in Pakistan’s politics is
missing.
Focusing on the military governments (of Generals Ayub, Zia, and Musharraf) and comparatively
analyzing the period of elected governments (Benazir Bhutto, Sharif), I show in chapter 4 that under the
military rule of General Musharraf, civil society gained the momentary advantage by being able to engage
in communicative interexchange with the military regime. Likewise, in chapter 5, I show that under the
military government of General Musharraf, civil society actors, print media, and non-governmental
organizations debated the discourse on devolution generated by the military regimes of the past, creating
an awareness in the public sphere on the merits of decentralization. They also critiqued the military
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government’s use of this plan to legitimize the dictatorial rule21 by building partnership(s) with the local
elite to implement the plan at the grassroots level.22
The dissenting voices that came from the civil society openly challenged the military’s devised
project; however, the military government was not deterred from their plan for devolution. For the first
time, critical voices emanating from the civil society could be heard, speaking out against the military’s
devised institution. This also signaled the fact that the military ruler had opened the regime to criticism,
but the very foundation of the hybrid regime was not to be changed. Civil society actors were able to
voice their concerns and engage in communicative interexchange with the military government, but the
government never enacted measures to democratize the hybrid regime. The military remained at the
governing helm while the political society was co-opted, and civil society was pulled into governance
reforms.
Bridging the Scholarship Gap
I have drawn my analysis of military regimes from the literature on authoritarian and hybrid
regimes. In much of the literature, the tendency of authoritarian rulers to manipulate institutions of state to
regulate society is highlighted (Schedler 2002, 2010; Brownlee 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007;
Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010; Svolik 2012; Boix
and Svolik 2013). However, this literature does not identify the communicative interexchange between
the societal actors and the formal institutions of the state. Much of the literature argues that institutions
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are manipulated by autocrats, and it is assumed that political processes are dictated and no critical voices
are heard.
This last point is crucial for this dissertation. In chapters 3 and 4 when I present the case of
devolution planning in Pakistan, I discuss that within the literature on authoritarianism, this scholarship
opens itself to evaluate the contemporary changing administrative dynamics of authoritarian regimes.
Evaluation in this dissertation is undertaken to understand how an authoritarian state engages society in
designing political institutions. Here, the focus of new scholarship is to understand such regimes within
the context of the deliberative theory of democracy. For example, in contemporary Peoples’ Republic of
China, scholars have begun to study and evaluate the regime vis-à-vis the principles of the deliberative
theory of democracy (Niemeyer 2011, 2015).23
Scholarship on Pakistan lacks concerted research analysis on communicative interexchange
between civil society organizations and the state. This is not to say that no material is available on the
work of civil society in Pakistan. The available material, however, presents a state-society that is engaged
in a ceaseless agonistic and contentious clash.24
Some reports and studies have been made available by civil society, generated specially by
intergovernmental organizations and media (print and electronic). These reports are evaluative studies on
the implementation of the devolution plan of 2001 by the state. The reports, which are generated by thinktanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the media reporting on the state-society relation, do
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give a sense of how society responded to the institutional arrangements of the state. Because of the lack of
independent and critical studies on the communicative interexchange between civil society and state
institutions, these reports are important sources of data indicating communicative interexchange in the
public sphere.
This dissertation has collected and researched material from the actors representing civil society
organizations in Pakistan. This research draws on the groundwork laid by civil society actors in extending
the state rule to the wider society. The one collective decision of the state-devised institutional rule, which
is the focus of this research, is the case of the devolution devised and implemented by the military rulers
in Pakistan. In planning, deliberating, and implementing the government’s devolution plans (1959, 1979,
2001), the military leadership colluded with other state actors, such as the political and bureaucratic elite.
This is the missing story in Pakistan’s scholarship—that other state actors have established alliances with
the military elite to ensure their institutional and political survival.
The fact is that military governments secured legitimacy of their dictatorial rule by capturing the
political society. The capture of the political institutions of the state was sustained because the political
society itself remained passive to the military takeovers. In Pakistan, the political landscape is based on
patronage of localized politics, and this therefore makes it easy for the military elite to identify potential
supporters for the in-effect hybrid regime.
There is in Pakistan, according to Mohammad Waseem (1992), “dyarchical arrangement for
sharing power between the parliamentary and non-parliamentary forces,” and this dyarchy has rendered
democracy unstable (634). In the event of military takeovers, the political society, because of internal
rivalries, has particularly colluded with the military elite. The authoritarian tendencies that have existed
among the political elite (democratically elected civilian governments and the military governments) have
prevailed from the country’s formation up through the subsequent periods of military and civilian
governments (Sayeed 1954, 1967, 1968; Jalal 1995; Aqil Shah 2003, 2004). Furthermore, as I show in
chapter 3, the political elite have cooperated with the military regimes to secure their electoral position in
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the constituencies. The security gained by being electorally and politically relevant for the political elite
means that they have easy access to state resources. The political elite, in other words, have remained
determined to extract benefits from patronage by remaining close to the military regime.
These authoritarian tendencies among the political elite restricted democratic deliberation and
engagement with society (Jalal 1997). Siddiqa (2007) agrees and asserts that in Pakistan “politicians or
other dominant classes view military power as a tool to extract benefits while denying the same to other
citizens” (22). In Pakistan’s parliamentary system, floor-crossing has come to take place on such a large
scale that the political system is popularly seen as afflicted with lotaism.25 This, therefore, has led to a
political landscape that functions more on patronage than on deriving its existence based on the principles
of a representative system of democratic governance.
Challenge of Legitimacy for/of Rule Versus the Legitimacy to Rule
Legitimacy in the Weberian sense is drawn from “legality” and is based “on rational grounds”;
thus, in this sense, the claims to legitimate domination (by political, military, bureaucratic elite) are
founded “on belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such
rule to issue commands” (Weber 1978, 215). On the other hand, according to the conceptualization of
political legitimacy in a deliberative democracy, legitimacy of collective decisions does not turn on the
ballot box or on majority rule per se, but rather on giving defensible reasons, explanations, and accounts
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for public decisions.26 Legitimacy of collectively binding decisions27 (acceptable to citizens and political
elite) is an overarching goal in deliberative theory. And the public sphere, according to theorists of
deliberative democracy, is the space where citizens are engaged in communicative interaction before
legitimacy of collective decisions is reached (Dryzek 2001). The theory of deliberative democracy
contends that public deliberation is the force that gives legitimacy to the collective decisions.
I have drawn the theoretical analysis of the case of Pakistan based on two major components of
the theory of deliberative democracy: legitimacy of collective binding decisions, and the public
deliberation underlying the collective binding decisions. The fact is, the theory of deliberative democracy
considers institutions of representative democracy as essential, fundamental, and crucial to the working of
contemporary complex societies. Under this assumption, it is believed that the institutions of
representative democracy provide the “necessary” support and protection to its citizens in safeguarding
not only their individual but also their local and associational interests. But the question is: What is the
legitimacy of the institutions within a hybrid regime? Can the manipulated institutions of the state within
a hybrid regime satisfy the conditions of legitimacy, public deliberation, and communicative
interexchange, as formulated in the deliberative theory of democracy?
In the analysis of the case of Pakistan, I found that for the ruling elite, legitimacy of collective
decisions is not a standard deemed necessary. For the ruling elite, the standard of legitimacy itself is
unambiguously conflicted. In the case of Pakistan, I argue that legitimacy for/of ruling and the legitimacy
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to rule ought to be seen separately. I believe that the distinctions I have made to understand legitimacy in
case of Pakistan signifies the two distinctive stages of legitimacy.
Within the theory of deliberative democracy, we are reminded that it is the legitimacy of
collective decisions and the public deliberation that defines the system of deliberative democracy.
Undoubtedly, legitimacy for/of rule is derived from contesting at the multiparty electoral arena, while
legitimacy to rule is derived from that fact that the system of governance engages with other
political/formal institutions and informal actors in the society.
The legitimacy for/of ruling is derived from the fact that rulers in the political system come to
control political power through a result of the institution of elections. While this gives rulers legitimacy
for ruling, in order to achieve the legitimacy to rule, rulers must not abuse political institutions; in other
words, they must respect the rule of law. For legitimacy to rule, the rulers must engage in communicative
interexchange with the society in the public sphere. The respect for rule of law and engagement in the
public sphere generates legitimacy of collective decisions through which the ruling elite rules over the
polity.
What I have realized through the course of research for this dissertation is that, in Pakistan, there
is emphasis on electoral legitimacy of the rule, but legitimacy to rule based on rule of law and
communicative engagement with society is largely missing. Under both the military dictatorships and the
elected rule, the ruling elite blatantly disregarded rule of law and communicative engagement with
society.
The objective of each, the military government and the elected government, was to strengthen
their rule by means of electoral engagement or the legitimacy for/of rule. For the ruling elite, winning
elections brought about the legitimacy that is a precondition for democracy. For the ruling elite,
legitimacy of collective decisions and rule of law is only an afterthought and is not the reason for which
power is acquired (in the case of elected government) or captured (in the case of military dictatorship).
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While I have no issue with deliberative democrats’ insistence to have communicative
interexchange between state, civil society actors, and citizenry to generate public deliberation, I ask, what
does the deliberative theory of democracy tell us about the system where electoral legitimacy is the only
definition of legitimacy to rule? Does deliberative democracy hold that collective decisions are legitimate
if they are the outcome of an undemocratic regime? Does deliberative democracy approve of a ruling elite
that comes to control political power by manipulating political institutions?
My frustration with deliberative democrats’ emphasis on the public sphere is that it does not
enable us to understand fully what is crucial for the deliberative theory of democracy. So what is
important for deliberative democrats: legitimacy for/of ruling or legitimacy to rule, which is derived from
the communicative interexchange? For example, on one hand there is an emphasis on legitimacy of
collective decisions and the effect this legitimacy has on the working of institutions in democracy
(Benhabib 1996). On the other hand, deliberative democrats (e.g., Dryzek, Mansbridge) emphasize that
deliberation must not be restricted to working with any particular institutions of representative
democracy. The latter deliberative democrats believe that an open and vibrant public sphere has a crucial
role to play before legitimacy of collective decisions is reached.
However, collective decisions on the institutional arrangement formulated within the hybrid
regime raises questions on the legitimacy per se. This is the constraint that has been identified in this
research. As exhibited by devolution planning in Pakistan, I have come to realize that the challenge of the
hybrid regime is the difference between legitimacy for/of rule and legitimacy to rule.
Tensions Between Legitimacy for/or Ruling and Legitimacy to Rule Derived
From Collective Decisions
Deliberative democrats believe that the arena for public deliberation is not restricted to the
institutions of the state only, but it is in an open and vibrant public sphere where different civil society
actors, such as non-governmental, civil, private, and public voluntary associations, alongside the
economic connections reside and engage in communicative exchange (Habermas 1998, 367; Young 2002,
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160-64). It is communicative action of civil society actors in the public sphere that influences the
institutions and policies designed by the state.
Thus, according to the theory of deliberative democracy, legitimacy to rule derived from
collective decisions is not a one-time event originating from one or two institutions of the state, such as
elections or the legislature. Rather, legitimacy to rule is derived from public deliberation generated and
contested in the public sphere on the collective decisions devised by the state. Deliberative democrats
argue that for the state’s policies to be legitimate, these policies have to be “critically examined” in the
public sphere. In other words, critical examination of the state’s policies must be ongoing and regular and
not reduced to a one-time public action. Parkinson (2006) believes “[L]egitimacy is built over time” (25)
and it is derived from public deliberation. Young (1999, 2002) contended that the public sphere is the
space where public deliberation ought to take place; for her, the public sphere is where “organized
citizens can limit power and hold powerful actors accountable” (Young 2002, 174) by generating debate
on collective problems and their possible solutions and exerting “pressures on state institutions to institute
measures to address them” (177).
In this dissertation, analyses of documentary evidence and elite interviews has helped me to solve
the puzzle of why the military elite in Pakistan consistently devise devolution as a policy. I have found
that in Pakistan, the narrative of legitimacy based on the standard of legitimacy of collective decisions
derived from public deliberation is disrespected by the ruling elite. For the ruling elite, legitimacy for/of
ruling is most coveted; the legitimacy to rule, derived from rule of law and deliberation on collective
decision, is a mere afterthought, not a standard to pursue.
I argue that the making of collective decisions as an event of public deliberation in the public
sphere remains an ideational construct having no relevance to the hybrid regime in Pakistan. In contrast,
according to the theory of deliberative democracy, legitimacy, as a deliberative ideal, necessitates that the
rules for making collective decisions should be the result of, and are defensible in, public debate. This
account of legitimacy therefore suggests that “people actually consider institutional arrangements
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[designed by the state] to be in their interest” dependent on whether “institutional arrangements actually
are in everyone’s interest” (Chambers 1996a, 194). But as I show in subsequent chapters, in Pakistan, the
ruling elite has always been preoccupied with fulfilling the first standard of legitimacy, that is, to control
political power. For the ruling elite, including both the military and elected governments, the legitimacy
to rule derived from collective decisions and public deliberation has been only an afterthought.
Furthermore, my research for the dissertation indicated that the academics, practitioners such as
the political and bureaucratic elite, and the civil society actors (such as non-governmental organizations
and social activists) whom I have interviewed, as well as the documentary evidence I reviewed—all have
an elitist conception of what democracy is and should be. In this elitist conception, actors other than the
state institutions have little or no role to play. Thus, in the context/perspective of this elitist conception, it
is taken for granted, as Schumpeter argued, that democratic politics is the rule of the politician or the
political elite.28
In this elitist equation signifying modern representative democracy, we see that the people are
forced into having a minimal role: to vote and to elect representatives. Ironically though, the Pakistan case
is interesting in that the electoral legitimacy of the political elite occurs only irregularly. The first general
election on the principle of universal suffrage was held in 1971, after which the country descended into
chaos and the eastern wing of the country emerged as an independent sovereign state—the state of
Bangladesh. At the same time, the political elite belonging to the western wing declared itself to be the
legitimate ruler of Pakistan, based on that same election. The irony is that the elected government formed
in Pakistan came into existence when one half of the country had seceded. Ever since the secession of
eastern wing of Pakistan, elections, as one of the political institutions, has signified democratic politics in
Pakistan.

28

But as Schumpeter would want, the bureaucracy and bureaucratic apparatus guiding the political elite is
something that is also missing in the case of Pakistan.
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The antithesis to this method of democratic politics is the military rule. But even the military
elite, much like the political elite, also rely on elections to legitimize their power. Therefore, we see that
elections as a political institution are put into action under both the military and political contenders for
political power. These contenders for power neither believe nor have shown any concern for the
legitimacy of their actions. In other words, the military and/or the political elite ascertain that the process
by which they come to control power is the only step toward securing legitimacy of their rule. In this
sense then, legitimacy is a one-time standard or goal.
I believe the meaning of legitimacy, as drawn from the ballot box and/or the majority rule, is a
predominant fact and manifests itself in the demeanor of the ruling elite of Pakistan. As a consequence,
the ruling elite does not feel and has never felt the need to provide reasons for their actions. They do not
believe that, if they are to command legitimacy, they must give justifiable or sound reasons for their
actions, irrespective of where they are located in the relevant chain of action. The evidence for the ruling
elite’s disregard for offering justifiable reasons is presented in chapter 3, while chapter 2 outlines how the
ruling elite manipulates and maneuvers the institutions of the state within the hybrid regime. Furthermore,
I evaluate what insights can be drawn from the deliberative theory of democracy to secure legitimacy of
the collective decisions within the hybrid regime of Pakistan.
The respondents interviewed for this research do not conceptualize democratic politics that
differentiates between legitimate reasons to rule and the legitimacy of ruling. However, to progress
toward ruling and to actually rule demands that the rulers at each step of action chain give reasons to and
engage in a dialogic communicative interexchange with those who are to be and are ruled. In short, I
believe legitimacy requires that a course of action is explained and justified by those in power, that is,
from ruling elite to the ruled.
Justifiable explanations have currency insofar as they are acceptable to all affected by the actions
of the ruling elite. In chapter 5, when I evaluate the devolution plan devised by the military regime in
2001, I explain that the military elite, by engaging with the bureaucratic elite and civil society groups, had
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to provide justifiable reasons for the design and implementation of the plan. The LGP was sustained
longer than the previous two devolution plans because the design of this plan was discussed (though
selectively) in the public sphere.
In contrast, when the dominant groups or ruling elite try to legitimize their rule by manipulating
political institutions in the name of democratic politics, based on the rules of discourse that the dominant
players have established, there is a clear risk that any opposing argument will be superseded. But when
argumentative reasons are given discursive space, then the dominant positions come face-to-face with the
marginal perceptions; this exchange of opinions is significant for any political regime wanting to sustain
its rule.
Deliberative democrats influenced by Habermas (1998), such as Chambers (1996b, 2002, 2013)
and O’Flynn (2006, 2015), believe the political elite in the formal institutions of the state have legitimacy
to deliberate collective decisions. On the other hand, deliberative democrats such as Dryzek (2000, 2001,
2010), Goodin and Dryzek (2006), Mansbridge (1996; 1999), Bohman (1996, 2013), Warren and Pearse
(2008), Warren (2009), and Mackenzie and Warren (2013) believe deliberation cannot be restricted to any
one single formal institution in a polity. These scholars contend that the political elite are not the only
bearers of legitimate authority to deliberate on collective decisions. These scholars therefore argue for the
role of civil society in the public sphere to engage in communicative interexchange with the state
institutions to effect legitimacy of collective decisions.
The argument in this research is concise and consistently forceful in its reason—that legitimacy
of making decisions in a political community is drawn from public deliberation that takes place in the
public sphere between state and civil society. The communicative engagement between the state and civil
society enables a dialogic exchange based on which policies regulating society are devised by the state.
The fundamental point at the center of this research project is that state and civil society are seen not as
independent actors, each acting in isolation from the other. Rather, the two actors are interconnected in
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the sense that each one’s action has an impact on the other, and the resulting reaction of the other affects
the former.
Centralized, bureaucratized representative institutions must be viewed as necessary devices for
enacting legislation, enforcing rights and obligations, promulgating new policies, and containing
inevitable conflicts between particular interests, among other things (Mansbridge et al. 2013). However,
when representative institutions are weak, policy-making processes tend to be unresponsive to the
viewpoints raised in the public sphere. Representative electoral institutions, including Parliament and a
competitive party system, are an inescapable element for authorizing and coordinating the state’s actions.
Deliberative democrats assert that state and civil society communicative interexchange is the
backdrop that enables the state to devise the institutional rules and policies through which the state
regulates society. In absence of such a backdrop, policy devised by the state remains unsustainable, and
the two entities of the state and society remain remote to each other.
The state power has an institutional advantage over the diversified base of the associational life of
the civil society. The state has an effect on how the civil society organizes itself and responds to the
state’s power of coercive and bureaucratic control. However, combining the state’s administrative power
with the civil society’s communicative power in the public sphere generates a discursive and
communicative exchange. The question, however, is, Who initiates this communicative interexchange
between the state and civil society?
In consolidated democracies, where democracy as rule of governance is an established fact and
where the principles of democratic governance are the declared rules of game, discursive exchange
between the state and civil society is a permanent feature of political life. In consolidated democracies,
the conduct of civil society is that of an actor who has relative freedom from the state’s power; however,
this does not suggest that civil society is free from the state’s devised rules and institutions. Nevertheless,
the civil society has more independence in terms of mobilizing and voicing its particular interests.
However, hybrid regimes such as Pakistan present a challenging site to apply deliberative democracy. The
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theoretical perspective drawn from deliberative democracy lacks what is needed to address the hybridized
political system of Pakistan.
The challenge is evident, because the political system in Pakistan is what I may call “pseudo
democracy.” In such a system, the military’s insurmountable effect on political institutions has rendered
the political society co-opted and the civil society weakened. I have researched and investigated the ideal
of communicative interexchange for the hybrid regime of Pakistan. My research opens the debate on the
theory of deliberative democracy in political systems where democratic standards are wanting but are not
fully absent.
Research Design and Methodology
Research outcomes are substantially influenced by the data sources that a researcher employs in
her project; my research is no exception. This research employs qualitative methods, which are
appropriate to a small-N study. A small-N study could be triangulated with quantitative analytical tools
that could improve the analytical vigor of the study. But quantitative data on the topic under study are
scarce and difficult to gather. Therefore, this study draws from primary and secondary sources and is
complemented by other data sources.
Case-study scholars such as George and Bennett (2005), Gerring (2006), and Beach and Pedersen
(2013) asserted that researchers need to critically assess and weigh the value of collected data and
recognize the pitfalls that may limit their usefulness and benefits. For these reasons, the data sources for
this research are not limited to any single source.
Data in this research are gathered and analyzed from four sources: historical research; reporting
by civil society (think-tanks, NGOs); print media and elite interviewing; and elite interviewing with
academics, NGOs, and political and bureaucratic elite. To collect data from these multiple sources, I spent
time in the field gathering material from November 2016 to August 2017. During this period I not only
collected evidence in the form of official documentation but also conducted interviews with those who
had specific technical and historical knowledge on devolution planning in Pakistan.
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Data collected from the various sources provided the research material that enabled me to
understand the institutional arrangements designed by the state and the role of civil society organizations
in sustaining and implementing institutional arrangements. The institutional arrangement under study in
this research is the devolution plans implemented by the state of Pakistan.
Research Tools: Process-Tracing, Historical Analysis, and Elite Interviewing
The methods that I adopted in my single-case study research design are theory-testing processtracing (George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2015; Beach 2016),
quasi-triangulation in historical analysis (Lustick 1996), and elite interviewing (Tansey 2007; Davies
2001).
Process-Tracing Employed for Causal Theory
Process-tracing as a method adopted in case studies effectively captures how an issue, situation,
or pivotal event evolves, especially when the focus of the case is subject to the dynamics of change
(George and Bennett, 2005; Collier 2011; Bennett and Checkel 2015; Beach and Pedersen 2013). The
dynamics of change in my study focuses on answering why the earlier two devolution plans introduced by
the state of Pakistan were terminated but the third plan endured.
George and Bennett (2005) argued, “[I]n process tracing, the researcher examines histories,
archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory
hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident” (6). Thus, by adopting process-tracing, the researcher
is not only able to gather basic information about a case (89), but this information also fills in gaps in
existing historical accounts (96) that further highlight the missing or omitted causes (18, fn 32).
In chapter 5, I have unpacked the role that civil society actors have played. By analyzing the
research material gathered, I therefore looked for the intervening causes (or variables) in the narratives
and elite interviewing. By identifying the actors and their activities, I present the causal mechanism that
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can sufficiently explain the outcome of interest (i.e., endurance LGP). The civil society actors I examine
are people working with the NGOs, academics, print media reports, and bureaucratic and political elite.29
I interviewed NGOs workers, academics, and bureaucratic and political elite to develop a
comprehensive understanding of the planning for devolution in Pakistan. This understanding was crucial
to understand the political milieu in which the different actors, i.e., military regime incumbents, the
political society, and the civil society, operate. I concede my understanding of the issue of devolution
planning in Pakistan was primarily focused on the LGP, but as I started to gather data from the various
sources, and especially through the elite interviewing, the NGO workers helped me to understand why the
political society opposes the autonomous local elected governments; the academics encouraged me to
highlight the constitutional transgressions of the military interventions; the bureaucratic elite persuaded
me that the bureaucracy has never opposed the local governments, but neither the military nor the
political government is committed to the devolution, per se. The political elite, on the other hand,
remained politically astute and emphasized that political arrangements devised in a democratic system
always are a result of debate and reasonable argumentation, whereas the military dictatorships destroy
such an exchange of free debate.
In my analysis of the role of these actors amidst the hybridity of Pakistan’s political system, I
have learned that each actor has shared his/her critique of the military rule and the continual military
interventions. However, all those who were in a position of political significance—the political and
bureaucratic elite—never raised their voices against the authoritarianism under the military and civilian
governments. The civil society organizations, on the other hand, such as print media, the NGO workers,
and the academics, raised their oppositional voices regarding the democratic transgressions. Their voices,
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I interviewed 29 respondents for my research. These respondents belonged to the NGO sector; 17 respondents
were the NGO workers. Four respondents were academics. There were four political elites: three were high-ranking
former bureaucratic elites, and one of the respondents was the designer of the LGP, who also happens to be a
bureaucratic elite.
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however, never had a significant effect on the government (military or political) that was needed to revise
its policy of authoritarianism.
Historical Analysis
Mahoney (2015) argued the method of process-tracing is often used when researchers engage in
historical explanation, that is, the identification of causes of outcomes that have already occurred. These
explanations are usually composed of sequences of events or causal chains in which factors located at
different points in time contribute to an outcome (202).This, therefore, raises an issue of how the data
should be gathered, and from which sources.
I juxtaposed and evaluated competing evidence and narratives as well as media reports on the
civil society actors’ communicative interexchange in the public sphere and political parties’ position(s) on
the devolution. Finally, I conducted elite interviewing with the people working with these think-tanks to
better understand the dynamics of communicative interexchange, which enabled me to trace back the role
of communicative exchange in the development and continuance of the 2001 devolution plan.
Collecting research material from the government agencies proved to be more difficult. For
example, the NRB, the think-tank that was established during General Musharraf’s rule, was disbanded in
2009. The reports which were authored by the think-tank and the LGP itself were difficult to find. I
therefore had to rely on scholarly articles, media reports, and documentary evidence received from the
civil society organizations in order to read through the text of the LGP.
I also encountered an issue with the lack of state records. No substantive analyses were available
on how society responded and/or benefitted from change in institutional arrangements in the wake of the
devolution plans that were introduced in 1959 and 1979. The two plans were devised under the military
rule and during that time the state did not engage with the civil society; hence, no documentary evidence
is available. There is also a lack of analyses focusing on the early period of Pakistan’s formation and its
devolution plans.
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Furthermore, to access the military’s institutional perspective of the devolution planning, I did try
to obtain interviews with military elite who were engaged with the NRB at the time of the LGP’s design
process. However, I was not able to secure interviews with the leading military professionals.30 I also tried
to get the military’s perspective on the planning for devolution by contacting the National Defense
University (NDU). It is a public-sector university that offers higher education degrees to military
personnel and to private citizens. Military officers from the army’s education corps manage the NDU.
However, the high-ranking former military general who is the professor in the Governance and Public
Policy Department did not accept my request to be interviewed. Hence, in order to address the lack of
primary material on the military’s position on devolution planning, I had to identify other sources, such as
any military publications through which I could glean the military’s institutional position on the
devolution planning undertaken by military regimes. I was able to review one military publication from
2000 called The Pakistan Army: Green Book, from the Army Central Library in Rawalpindi. Access to
this library was possible because of my association with a military family. Membership to this library for
civilian individuals is very tedious and time-consuming.31
The publication The Pakistan Army: Green Book is a collection of essays written by some 17
mid-to-high-ranking military officers from the rank of captain to major general. The essays gave me an
insight into the military’s understanding of the issues of the governance faced by Pakistan, as well as how
the army can help address the problems of bad governance. In chapter 4, I present a critical analysis of the
military’s approach to the planning for devolution in Pakistan.

30

I had tried to get an online interview session with General (Retired) Tanvir Naqvi, the architect of the LGP and
the head of the NRB from 2000-2002. General Naqvi lives in Karachi and I was able to contact via email. I
exchanged a detailed questionnaire with him and explained my research to him. He did agree to fill in the
questionnaire and give me online interview, but due to his wife’s failing health, the plan to interview did not
materialize. I also did not hear back from him regarding the emailed questionnaire.
31

If I did not have access to the Army Central Library, then the review of print media from 1959, 1977, 1979, 1999,
2000, 2001, and 2002 would also have been very difficult for me. The library not only holds a vast collection of old
newspapers, but it also provides limited access to the declassified military publications on the issue of governance,
security, and defense. My access to the Army Central Library was possible because my father is a retired army
officer, and because of him, I was therefore given access to this library.
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The other sources on devolution planning were secondary material such as research material and
commentary by scholars (of the early era). Sayeed (1954, 1967, 1968) and Ziring (1971, 1997, 2000) are
two sources on the then-status of state-society relations that provided some insights. I was faced with this
limitation when it came to availability of material from Pakistan on state-society relations for that period.
Hence, I had to rely on later works by other Pakistan scholars such as Jalal (1990/2007, 1995, 1997), Rais
(1997), and Waseem (1989, 1992, 2002) and on the documentary evidence generated by the print media
and other civil society actors.
I also collected documentary evidence from the NGOs who had been actively engaged in the
implementation of the LGP. These reports helped me to understand the sense of narrative on devolution
that had been generated in 2000 with the design of the LGP. However, physical access to the reports was
a challenge. The organizations that were based in Islamabad, such as Strengthening Participatory
Organization (SPO), SUNGI, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), and Free and Fair Election Network
(FAFEN), have all shifted their office locations within Islamabad. These organizations were not able to
share any reports with me on devolution from their library resource centers. But my interviews with the
staff of these organizations proved to be a useful data source.
Other organizations such as PATTAN, South Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), SANGAT
Development Foundation, and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) had a vast collection of
research material on the LGP. Some was available in the Urdu language only; the contents of the reports
were then translated in English to be used for analysis.
The reports prepared by PATTAN were available only for sale. PATTAN had conducted research
studies in 2000, 2002, and 2005 to evaluate the effect of the LGP in the local districts. I used their
research material in chapter 5 of this study. The other documentary evidence on the devolution planning
in Pakistan and the LGP was collected through the websites of donor agencies such as World Bank (WB),
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Department for International Development (DFID), and United States
Agency for International Development (USAID).
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The critical evaluation reports on the LGP generated by the International Crisis Group (ICG)
were also accessed from their website. These reports, prepared in 2002, 2004, and 2005, raised critical
questions on the military’s objective of planning for devolution and the role of political society in the
2002 and 2005 local government elections.
The reports and data generated by these non-governmental organizations were triangulated with
the media sources. Media sources such as the electronic and print coverage play a secondary and
supplemental role in the analysis of discourse on decentralization and devolution generated by the thinktanks in the public sphere. By accessing data from media sources, I was able to obtain an understanding of
the communicative interexchange in the public sphere. My attention was on the newspaper articles and
op-eds in the English and Urdu newspapers that discuss devolution and decentralization at local levels.
To access the old newspapers (English and Urdu), I spent considerable time in the Army Central
Library in Rawalpindi. The library provides access to declassified military publications and also has a
vast collection of newspapers from 1950 onward. As explained earlier, the military publication that I had
reviewed was The Pakistan Army: Green Book, whereas the newspapers reviewed were the English
newspapers Dawn, The News, and The Nation and the Urdu newspapers, Jung and Nawa-i-Waqt. These
newspapers have been in circulation in Pakistan for many years; in fact, the English Dawn is considered
to be the first English newspaper of Pakistan and has been in circulation since Pakistan’s independence.
This newspaper was not critical of the government’s policies in its earlier days of circulation, but in recent
time, the newspaper has adopted a more critical position against the military’s interventions on the
political landscape. The newspaper articles and editorials for the years that I reviewed were not critical of
BD and LGO, but when the LGP was being planned and implemented, many articles critical of the
military’s devised plan were published.
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Just like the English Dawn, the Jung32 and Nawa-i-Waqat33 are considered to be the oldest Urdu
newspapers in Pakistan. These two newspapers also had adopted a very cautious position on the military
regime’s enactment of devolution planning in Pakistan in 1959 and 1979. In fact, these newspapers have
never had been critical of the hybridity of the political system in Pakistan under the military dictatorships
or the civilian leaderships. However, these newspapers in recent times, starting with General Musharraf’s
rule, have become critical of the authoritarianism showcased by the hybridity of the political system in
Pakistan. The newspapers have also been critical of the military’s encroachment. The reader will also find
that as I have translated and reviewed newspaper articles and editorials, there is an invective critique
leveled on the military’s devolution planning in Pakistan.
The newspapers I reviewed were from 1958, 1960, 1977, 1979, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and
2010.34 The material reviewed from the Urdu newspapers was translated in English and is analyzed in
chapters 4 and 5.
Furthermore, to overcome the lack of documentary evidence from the earlier periods, I gathered
evidence by conducting elite interviewing with the civil society activists, the academics, the state
functionaries belonging to the administrative bureaucracies, and the political elite. The role of elite
interviewing in process-tracing should not be undervalued, as it permits researchers to “move beyond
written sources, and ask probing, theoretically driven questions of key participants in the events and
processes of interest” (Tansey 2007, 771). A thorough process-tracing approach combines all available
sources.
Elite Interviewing
Review of the material that was created within the state, its associated agencies, and civil society
organizations helped me unpack what work civil society performed for communicative interexchange to
32

Literally, the word Jung in the Urdu language means “war,” but the word is also used to mean “struggle.”
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Literally, the word Nawa-i-Waqt in the Urdu language means “voice of time.”

34

The Army Central Library had these newspapers available for reading, but the library had the Urdu newspapers
only from 1972 onward. The English newspaper Dawn was available from 1949 onward.
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take place in the public sphere. This study had identified the state’s devised devolution plan as the case to
study, and the research highlighted the role of communicative interexchange between the state and the
civil society. Although documentary analyses of state and civil society-generated documents provided
selective accounts, the state documentation often conceals informal processes and considerations that
preceded decision making (Davies 2001; Tansey 2007). Thus, another important tool for analyzing the
documentary evidence is to interview those people who were directly involved in the political process.
Elite interviewing complements documentary analysis in process-tracing case studies by
corroborating the findings, adding new information, and ultimately reconstructing events that occurred
(Davies 2001, 75; Tansey 2007, 766). As Aberbach and Rockman (2002) put it, elite interviewing is used
“to help the investigator fill pieces of a puzzle or confirm the proper alignment of pieces already in place”
(673). The gaps are particularly problematic in policy studies, as the process that occurs is hidden behind
closed doors (Davies 2001, 74).
Hence, collecting interview data fills the gaps in information unavailable elsewhere and aids in
interpreting documentation (Davies 2001; Tansey 2007). As Davies (2001) argues, “[I]nterview evidence
can provide information additional to documentary materials, as well as corroborative information” (75).
For example, in this dissertation, key informant interviews (with state bureaucrats, academics, and civil
society activists) were an essential resource for examining the policy decision making that occurred, since
public documents (such as LGP 2001) provided only very partial information pertaining to the design of
the plan. Who was involved in the planning process and how planning on devolution plan was debated
were missing in official documentation.
Therefore, besides analyzing the program narratives, I conducted and analyzed open-ended elite
interviews with the people working in civil society organizations and with state bureaucracy and political
elite; these respondents have been engaged in providing support to state agencies in planning projects to
motivate citizen engagement at grassroots levels. Furthermore, academics were also interviewed; these
individuals had critical knowledge of the state and society communicative interexchange over the
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planning for devolution. Elite interviewing provided me information about the underlying context of
communicative interexchange. The purpose of conducting elite interviews was to better understand the
work that civil society organizations had undertaken in generating discourse on planning for devolution.
The tool of elite interviews helped me to tap into the political constructs that may otherwise be difficult to
examine.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 29 different actors representing academia, state
bureaucracy, political elite, and civil society; one interview was conducted via an emailed questionnaire.
These individuals have special insight into the causal process of planning for devolution, and they had
specialized knowledge about devolution policy and planning. The actors belonging to the state
bureaucracy and the political elite, specifically, were privy to and participated in discussions and
decisions on planning or devolution policy.
Because the knowledge on policy planning is specialized, the sample size in elite interviewing is
inevitably smaller (Richards 1996). For this research, 29 interviews were conducted. The interviewees
were subject experts who had insightful information on Pakistan’s institutional politics and devolution
planning. Special arrangements had to be made to schedule an interview with them. In most instances, I
was able to get an interview by contacting someone who personally knew and was close to the
interviewee.35 This was especially true in the case of the political and bureaucratic elite.36 These two elite
groups were not openly accessible; furthermore, to interview them, I had to travel between Islamabad and
Lahore, as some of them were living in these two separate cities. In fact, most of the interviewees
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This was especially true of the academics who were interviewed for this research. To interview Dr. Mohammad
Waseem, Dr. Saeed Shafqat, Dr. Ayesha Jalal, and Dr. Ali Cheema, it took me over 5 months to make contact with
them directly and schedule a time for the interview. I interviewed Dr. Mohammad Waseem and Dr. Saeed Shafqat in
November 2016, and Dr. Ayesha Jalal and Dr. Ali Cheema in March 2017.
36

The political and bureaucratic elite were a difficult group to access. In the case of the former, I had to wait for
more than a month to schedule the interview. In my attempt to schedule an interview with Chairman Senate Mr.
Raza Rabbani, who had played an instrumental role in retaining the constitutional clause on local governments under
the 18th Amendment, I was not able to contact him directly. From March to September 2017, I attempted to
schedule an interview with him, but his office did not respond to my requests.
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including the NGO workers and academics, were available for an interview in Lahore. The NGO workers
interviewed were another group with whom scheduling an interview took more than three weeks. Since
my interview would last for more than 60 minutes, all the interviewees were informed of the amount of
time needed.
A semi-structured interview was developed for this research. In a semi-structured interview, the
interviewer asks open-ended questions, which give both the space for interviewees to provide the most
relevant (and unforeseeable) information, and the opportunity for the interviewer to probe more deeply
into the discrete (and most relevant) experiences of the interviewees (Tansey 2007; Aberbach and
Rockman 2002; Davies 2001).
The scheduled interview opened with some simple corroborative questions to build a basic level
of rapport with the interviewee.37 The schedule was then divided into five other key themes or subject
areas, each with a set of “probe notes” (Richards 1996, 202). The five main themes were as follows:
(1) events and circumstances leading to the devolution planning, (2) the role of other actors belonging to
the state in devolution planning, (3) development of the military state’s devised model, (4) discussions
about the political elite’s response toward the devolution plan and implementation, and (5) importance of
devolution as a governance strategy in Pakistan. A sample version of this interview schedule, including
some examples of tailored probing questions, is provided in Appendix A.
In the interview session, I would always ask, “Who else was involved in the planning or
devolution? And, who else would have critical knowledge on state and society communicative
interexchange?” This played an important role in verifying and reinforcing the selected population, as

37

Building a rapport with the interviewee was crucial to initiate dialogue. I would always start the interview session
by first explaining my dissertation, informing them of theoretical debate(s) in focus, and also mentioning the names
or titles of prominent individuals already interviewed. This exchange of information facilitated the process of
gaining access to the interviewees’ knowledge of the subject under discussion. Please also see:
R. L. Peabody, S. W. Hammond, J. Torcom, L. P. Brown, C. Thompson, and R. Kolodny. “Interviewing Political
Elites,” PS: Political Science and Politics 23 (1990): 451-55.
Philip H. J. Davies, “Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the
Study of the Intelligence and Security Services,” Politics 21, no. 1 (2001): 73-80.
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names of interviewees were often repeated (Tansey 2007, 770). This referral process, i.e., of asking
interviewees to suggest other actors belonging to the state bureaucracy, academia, and political and civil
society, helped me to identify and access those who were directly engaged in planning for devolution and
also those who have critical knowledge on the complexity of state and society communicative
interexchange in the case of the hybrid regime of Pakistan. This process of accessing other relevant actors
is also known as snowball sampling (Beamer 2002). This approach involves developing the sample by
identifying potential respondents while interviewing respondents previously identified. Thus, it was
beneficial to ask questions like “Who else should I talk to about this? or “Who was the main policy expert
for developing the devolution plan of 2001?”
In this research, all of the interviews were recorded on a voice-recorder and later transcribed. The
language employed for conducting elite interviews was either English or Urdu. However, based on the
comfort of the interviewee, sometimes one language would take precedence over the other; in most cases,
Urdu was the preferred language. Nonetheless, all interviews were audio-recorded, with the exception of
one unrecorded38 interview and another interview which was received via email questionnaire; all were
transcribed in English. All the interviews, including the interviewees’ opinions and their quotes, were
then incorporated in the analytical chapters 4 and 5.
The research tools employed in this research—process-tracing, historical analysis, and elite
interviewing—were particularly suited to examining the genesis of the devolution planning. Through both
documentary analyses and elite interviews, multiple perspectives were investigated to discover the origins
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There was only one interview—the interview with one of the senior academics, Dr. Mohammad Waseem from
Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS), that was not recorded because he did not give consent to be
recorded. However, his responses were allowed to be written. Another interview, a questionnaire submitted via
email, was with Dr. Kaiser Bengali. He is a senior economist living in the city of Karachi, who has been associated
with the civil society organizations. Over the years he has also worked with the elected governments to develop
economic policies and governance models. Because of the traveling distance between Islamabad (the city of my
residence) and Karachi (Dr. Bengali’s residence), I requested Dr. Bengali to fill in the questionnaire that I shared
with him for my research. Upon receiving his completed questionnaire, I transcribed his responses on the key
themes that are the focus of this dissertation and incorporated them in the analytical chapters 4 and 5.
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of the design measure of devolution and the role of communicative interexchange between state and civil
society.
Organization of the Study and Chapter Plan
Organization of the Study
This study is divided into two major parts. The first part (comprising chapters 1 and 2) establishes
the theoretical foundation of this research, focusing on the theory and application challenges within
hybrid regimes. In this part, I open the discussion on three fronts: (a) I analyze literature on hybrid
regimes and critically evaluate this political system that combines authoritarian principles with
democratic standards; (b) I present the discussion of the public sphere by theorists and practitioners of
deliberative democracy; and (c) building on the theoretical foundation of deliberative democracy, I then
discuss the role of actors in a hybrid regime that are engaged in the public sphere.
The second part (comprising chapters 3, 4, and 5) presents the case of Pakistan. I investigate the
political beginnings and the institutional arrangements enforced by the state. My intention in discussing
its political beginnings is to trace the role of the relevant actors, such as the military regime and the
political society, as well as the crucial role of political parties and print media and NGOs representing the
civil society. The major highlight of this section is how the state political institutions have been
manipulated by the ruling elite, and, given this manipulation, what communicative interexchange between
state and civil society existed.
Chapter Plan
Chapter 2: Deliberative Democracy, Hybrid Regime, and Civil Society
This chapter discusses Pakistan’s hybrid political landscape and the role of civil society in such a
setting. I present the discussion on civil society from the deliberative theory of democracy and argue that
the theory assumes that civil society is not working under pressure from the state. I then introduce the
case of Pakistan and argue that in hybrid political systems, as other institutions of the state are co-opted,
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civil society also is co-opted by the authoritarian state. I discuss the situation of Pakistan through the
periods of the three military coups.
The discussion in chapter 2 builds on the actors in the hybrid regime of Pakistan and the role that
actors such as the military elite, bureaucratic elite, political elite, and civil society are expected to play
from the perspective of deliberative democracy.
Chapter 3: Actors in the Public Sphere: Political Parties, Print Media, and NGOs
Building on my discussion on hybrid regimes and the role of the actors in the public sphere, I
investigate the role of three actors in Pakistan—political parties, print media, and NGOs. In this chapter,
the role of political parties is traced back to the political beginning of an independent Pakistan. The lack
of political parties’ organization and political divisions within the political elite became the source of
political chaos. Thus, taking advantage of the political turmoil, the military elite controlled the political
situation. The military’s encroachment began its longstanding intervention to institutionalize the role of
the military in Pakistan’s politics.
The other actors, the print media and NGOs, were affected by the disorganized and subsequently
defunct political society. The print media was the most active in raising its voice against the
authoritarianism experienced at the hands of the political parties. But under military rule, the critical
voices from the print media were dispelled.
On the other hand, NGOs also had a nascent existence in the beginning of Pakistan’s
independence. The non-government sector was nonexistent except for a few charity-based organizations
working across Pakistan. These organizations were not politically active in raising a voice against the
political society and the military dictatorships. It was only in the 1980s that NGOs became a more regular
actor in society, working with the then-military government to provide relief to Afghan refugees that had
come to Pakistan following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
In chapter 3, the focus is on highlighting and investigating the role of actors on Pakistan’s social
and political landscape. I present these actors and analyze their role in the context of the hybrid regime.
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Chapter 4 presents a detailed critical discussion on the military government’s direct political intervention
in establishing the institutions by which it established the base for popular support for the military rule.
Chapter 4: Deliberation in the Public Sphere: The Case of Pakistan
Chapter 4 traces and investigates the military governments’ design of the devolution plans as their
strategy to fragment the political parties and take control of the political landscape. This chapter is an
empirical chapter, for in this chapter, I have not only analyzed the devolution planning, but I have also
analyzed the data gathered from the elite interviews; the review of print media from 1959, 1979, 1999,
2000, 2001, 2002 and 2010; and documentary evidence on devolution planning.
In this chapter, I also discuss the role of the political governments toward the devolution planning
and explain why these governments never challenged the military governments in their policy intervention
on designing the devolution plan. Chapter 4 also presents a critical evaluation of the role of political
governments in bringing reforms to the civil bureaucracy, the political government’s reluctance and
diffidence in effecting such reforms, and the establishment of local governments. I argue that the political
government’s ambivalence to the local governments has been advantageously used by the military
dictators against political parties.
Furthermore, in this chapter I present the emergence of the NGOs as the one of the civil society
actors in Pakistan. In the previous chapter, I highlighted that the NGOs were nonexistent in the political
beginnings of Pakistan; however, in the 1980s and onward, the NGOs arose as the third sector in
Pakistan.
Lastly, this chapter analyzes the public discourse on the devolution planning generated in the
print media and the data that I collected through the elite interviews. The center of the analysis is the
devolution planning devised by the military governments. Analyzing the three devolution plans, while
focusing on the third plan, I show that under the third military government of General Musharraf, the
critical voices regarding the Local Government Plan 2001 (LGP) were most prominent in the public
sphere. The military regime selectively had engaged with civil society actors such as the NGOs in raising

59
a favorable narrative on the LGP. The political parties, however, for reasons of political expediency, had
allied with the military ruler in his “revolution by devolution,” but as soon as the political governments at
the province and federal levels were established, the revolutionary aspects of LGP were rolled back.
During this process of policy reversal, the NGOs did raise their oppositional voice, but they could not
effect change to the policy reversals.
Chapter 5: Local Government Plan 2001 and the Elected Governments of 2002 and 2008
Chapter 5 is last of the empirical chapters. In this chapter, I give an explanation for the retention
of the constitutional clause on local governments under the 18th Amendment. However, my earlier claim
that the retention of the LGP was made possible through the communicative interexchange between the
state and civil society is refuted based on the evidence I analyzed in chapter 5. Through the documentary
evidence and the information collected in the elite interviews, I show that in the hybrid regime of
Pakistan, the tendency toward authoritarianism is most prominent among the ruling elite. The military
government’s plan for devolution was to sustain the military government. The political and bureaucratic
elite, therefore, in order to secure their institutional significance, succumb to the pressure of the military
ruler.
However, as soon as they are in control of parliamentary government, the political parties decide
on the rules of engagement with the civil society. The local governments, which had been formed under
General Musharraf’s hybridized political government, were systemically rendered ineffective by the
elected political government in 2004 and then in 2008.
Chapter 6: Conclusion
In the last chapter of the dissertation, I discuss that in the hybrid regime of Pakistan, the
performance of the actors, such as the military, political, and bureaucratic elite, have been a formidable
force against the dissenting voices emerging from the civil society. The civil society, an independent
entity in Pakistan, has been a nascent entry to the public sphere. Furthermore, the institutional rules that
had been devised by the military regimes were mainly to serve their interest of securing political power.
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The political and bureaucratic elite in the times of military rules have been the most willing of the actors,
enabling the military to sustain its control over the political landscape.
Moreover, the devolution plans devised by the military regimes signify the continuity of
military’s approach of building partnerships with the political elite to maintain its control over the
political scene. The plan devised by the military government of General Musharraf was distinctive, for it
was the first time that communicative engagement with the civil society was encouraged. This
engagement, however, was selective in the sense that the regime did not engage with the civil society on
the critical issue of the military’s political intervention.

CHAPTER 2
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, HYBRID REGIME, AND CIVIL SOCIETY
. . . the political [is] an expression of the idea that a free society composed of diversities can
nonetheless enjoy moments of commonality when, through public deliberations, collective power
is used to promote or protect the well-being of the collectivity. Politics refers to the legitimized
and public contestation, primarily by organized and unequal social powers, over access to the
resources available to the public authorities of the collectivity. Politics is continuous, ceaseless
and endless. In contrast, the political is episodic. . . . Democracy is one among many versions of
the political. (Wolin 1996, 31)
Background
Contestation, opposition, argumentative exchange, and mediating the differing preferences are
what define politics in a given polity. In other words, politics is marked by continual contestation of
differing ideas. Wolin (1996) contends public deliberations over ideas for the well-being of the
collectivity is a paradigmatic feature of politics. Though continual public contestation is a recurrent
constant, public deliberation does generate a brief moment of commonality that, according to Wolin, is
the political. However, he believes that in a polity the commonality is all but an infrequent specter. A
moment of commonality, Wolin argues, is episodic. When commonality is achieved, it transcends the
continual contesting argumentative politics. Wolin asserts democracy is one of many versions of the
political. In his conceptualization of democracy, democracy is a moment of commonality defined as the
political, which is always under threat by the pressures of argumentatively profane politics.
Democracy, one of the versions of the political, offers the promise that the will of the people is a
priority. However, throughout most of history, the will of the people has not played a leading role in
contesting the dominant elite’s influence in politics. The powerful elite, which includes the political,
social, and wealthy, continues to dominate political contestation through designing rules and enacting
boundaries to exercise their influence over the will of the people.
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Jürgen Habermas, one of the leading proponents of the theory of deliberative democracy, argued
that formal political rules informed by the communicative power in the public sphere can institutionalize
the episodic surges of democracy. Habermas approached politics as a communicative interexchange
between the formal rules and informal discourses to reach an understanding in the regulation of society.
In other words, Habermas’s inspired deliberative theory of democracy allows for the articulation of a
process that makes the case for a wider inclusion of non-elites in democratic decision making.
Deliberation, therefore, is that form of public communication that is oriented to understanding, as
opposed to forms that are oriented toward intimidation, mobilization, and even pandering. It is my
contention that public deliberation generates moments of commonality in society for the well-being of the
people.
The basic argument of this research wrestles with the idealistic claims set forth in the deliberative
theory of democracy and their application in a real-world scenario. I follow the argument conceived by
Habermas, which promotes the public sphere as a sounding board for civil society actors. For Habermas
(1991, 1998, 2006), civil society is the crucial constituent vis-à-vis the state to engage in communicative
interexchange. In a democratic polity, it is argued that civil society and the state cannot function in
isolation; the communicative interexchange between these two constituents is an essential prerequisite for
deliberative democracy.
Habermas’s argument in favor of communicative interexchange taking center stage in the public
sphere is further expanded by Dryzek. He emphasized the crucial role that the discursive engagement
between civil society and the state plays in making the collective decisions that are required for the
political community. Dryzek, for his part, is emphatic on three criteria: (a) the state must not be the
singular generator of discourse, (b) the state and civil society must therefore remain in discursive dialogue
that should guide the collective decision, and (c) no single institution of state has a monopoly on
deliberative engagements.
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These three conditions, it seems to me, put even more demanding constraints on those who
engage in deliberative engagement. Here, I refer to the conditions of rational engagement that Habermas
lays out in his communicative interexchange: speakers speak same language, speakers have commitment
to resolve matters, and speakers are open to reasoned argument and thus concede to the forceless force of
the better argument.
Now imagine such communicative conditions are engendered in a discursive dialogic engagement
that Dryzek argued for. Would one not be left wondering whether these conditions put constraints on the
speech of the interlocutors? Young (2002) asserted, “[D]emocratic process ought to encourage and enable
the organizing of multiple and contending discourses, forms of expression, and debates” (172), implying
that individuals engaged in communicative interexchange speak, listen, and learn about each other’s
perspectives. Young (1996) also has argued that in contemporary democratic polities, those engaged in
dialogue are socially, politically, and economically situated in ways that are distinctive from each other.
Hence, in such an arrangement, the deliberative conditions imposed on speakers forces them to disavow
their distinctive beings. Hence, in this sense, then, the idealistic communicative interexchange valuing
reciprocal and rational exchange of reasons turns out to be an exercise in political domination (127-28).
Like Young, Sanders (1997) also contended that in a world of cultural, social, and structural differences,
any initiation of communicative interexchange based on shared and neutral premises is hard to find. She
believes deliberation, as is conceived by deliberative democrats, is too restrictive in its communicative
practices to produce the kinds of transformation that deliberative democrats desire.
My question is: If democratic potential is lacking in a democracy, then can we judge
undemocratic societies through the perspective of communicative interexchange? Young’s (1996, 1999,
2002) analyses focus on political communities that, although democratic, are faced with the scourge of
social, political, and economic inequalities. These political communities are unable to deliver to the
people the benefits of communicative engagement with the institutions of the state. Young (2002)
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lamented the lost potential of democracy in democratic societies. However, Young (1996, 1999, 2002)
does not extend her inquiry beyond the political system that is characterized as distinctively democratic.
Therefore, I am interested in analyzing the deliberative conditions centered on communicative
interexchange in a political community that lacks many features of a democratic political landscape. The
larger political landscape here refers to a political system that connects the ruler to the ruled. But if in
such a political system the rulers lack legitimacy to rule over the political community, then how can these
conditions of deliberative democracy be applied?
In a political community that has few democratic features, the political connection between the
ruler and the ruled is a casualty of a non-elected dictatorial force. In such a political environment, the
elected institutions remain under constant threat from the transgressive pursuits of other institutions of the
state. The result of these pursuits of non-elected institutions is the emergence of a political system that
lacks democratic principles.
As a result, the political regime that emerges in such a political community is a variant of an
authoritarianism claiming to have adopted certain democratic conditions. In comparative politics, scholars
have termed such a political regime as a hybrid, favoring authoritarian transgressions at the expense of
democratic principles. Under such a political system, the will of the people is subjugated to the will and
directives of those few who blatantly transgress institutional bounds to control the political system. These
few force themselves on the polity to decide, deliberate, and execute collective decisions affecting the
lives of the people. The political regime that is formed as the result of the transgressions of non-elected
institutions always is in need of popular support, and thus in order to attain popular approval, the regime’s
incumbents devise institutional rules to help the regime endure the continual and ceaseless pressures of
politics. In the discussion to follow, I look deeply into applicability of conditions of deliberative
democracy in such a regime that is classified as a hybrid regime.
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Introduction
In the field of comparative politics, authoritarianism is not something that exists as the antithesis
to democracy and/or representative government. Authoritarianism can, in fact, spread within such systems
of government. In the literature on authoritarianism, scholars recognize those regimes that combine
democratic principles such as political equality with the establishment of (certain) formal institutions—
such as hybrid regimes. In such regimes, democratic principles are utilized by the regime incumbents to
legitimize their rule over the polity.
These are the regimes that establish authoritarian rules with democratic principles. The political
structure that pervades such regimes combines the two systems: multiparty elections rather than singleparty elections, elected legislatures instead of nominated or selected legislatures, an executive accountable
to an absolute executive, the designing of political institutions to serve the particular interests of the rulers
rather than the interests of the people, etc.
In a hybrid regime, the institutions of the state are manipulated by the regime incumbents.
Through such manipulation, the incumbents devise certain institutional rules on the pretext that such an
institutional design bridges the distance between the state and society. Political institutions are formed in
a way that enables regime incumbents to strengthen their control of the political arena by creating a
façade of communicative interexchange between the regime and the civil society.
As in the case of devolution plans in the hybrid regime of Pakistan, which is the focus of this
research, the long-term military dictatorships in the country enabled military rule to create institutional
measures that served the interests of the ruling elite. The military dictatorships successively caused the
nascent democracy to deteriorate. As Mohammad Waseem (1992, 2002) has suggested, the legacy of a
non-sovereign parliament subordinated the national will, as reflected in the representative body that was
subject to the whim of a non-elected individual. As a consequence of military interventions, a political
regime emerged that was neither “fish nor fowl.” The hybridity of the political system that emerged
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combined democratic principles in the structure of formal representative political institutions, such as the
legislature and elections, with non-elected dictatorial individuals.
The formal political institutional rules devised by the selective military elite not only relied on
popular will or support, but they were implemented through dictatorial decrees. Thus, in order to sustain
the hybridity of the rule over the polity, the dictatorship co-opted the political and civil society to capture
the popular will. The divisions within the political society and a disorganized civil society in the postcolonial state enabled the military to rule over the political landscape. The origins of disorganized civil
society go back to the colonial style of British rule in the India-subcontinent, which was carried forward
by the ruling elite in the newly independent state of Pakistan. Scholars have argued that the civil society
in Pakistan has not been able to break away from its colonial legacy (Jalal 1995).1 The civil society that
emerged in post-colonial Pakistan was an entity divided along ethnic and linguistic differences; this had
an effect on the emerging political society in the newly formed state. Religion, it was assumed, binds the
disparate civil society. In order to control political power, the political elite from the political society
immersed themselves in neutralizing the social-ethnic differences; however, this attempt backfired. The
political society’s incapacity to provide a public space for disparate voices from ethnic groups across
Pakistan eventually paved the way for nonpolitical forces to capture the political scene. The political
society engaged the military to resolve the political stalemate.
Consequently, the regime(s) that was formed enabled the military junta to rule over the polity.
The authoritarianism practiced in the case of the devolution plans in Pakistan functioned through the very
pseudo-democratic rules that the regime(s) installed. The institutional measure of devolution had a lasting
effect on the political landscape of the country, for it created a flexible political elite that benefitted from
the regime’s largesse. The political elite cloaked the military elite in some degree of political legitimacy.

1

Jalal (1995) argued that both India and Pakistan in post-colonialism were met with similar challenges. The political
and civil society in Pakistan was less organized and divided along communal lines than was its counterpart in India.
The evidence of communal division was reflected in Pakistan’s difficulty in uniting disparate voices for the launch
of a democratic regime.
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The political elite secured its significance to the electorate, and, at the same time, the political elite turned
to the military elite to strengthen its control over society.2
Chapter Outline
I explore the literature on hybrid regimes with a special focus on the communicative
interexchange between the state and civil society on governing society. This aspect is crucial to my
research agenda, since I want to explore the empirical efficacy of the theory of deliberative democracy
based on one of the theory’s fundamental postulates: communicative interexchange in the public sphere
between the state and society lends legitimacy to the institutional rules devised by the state in order to
regulate the society. Thus, based on this fundamental premise, my research evaluates the case of the
devolution plans devised by the state in the political system of Pakistan that fits the theoretical definition
of hybrid regimes. In this chapter, I trace the institutional setup in Pakistan from the theoretical
perspective through which hybrid regimes are evaluated.
The theorists of deliberative democracy have focused narrowly on the normative value of
communicative interexchange between state and civil society while ignoring the theory’s research appeal
in evaluating the existing complex reality of political regime type, such as the hybrid regime. Theorists of
deliberative democracy focus more on the enactment of deliberative conditions to build its normative
appeal and expend less effort on examining the theory’s expansive influence on the field of comparative
politics. My contribution to the theory of deliberative democracy is that I critically examine the theory as
it pertains to the existing case of complex regime type.
The literature reviewed in the first section evaluates the theory of deliberative democracy and the
conception of state-civil society communicative interexchange. The deliberative theory of democracy
asserts that state-society interaction becomes efficacious due to the activism of civil society actors in the
public sphere. But the theory does not delve into the complex reality of the state’s manipulation of
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For a critical discussion on the role of the political elite under military dictatorships, please see the discussion in
chapters 3 and 4.
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political institutions and its exploitation of civil society. In such a scenario, then, the assumption posited
in the deliberative theory of democracy debilitates the empirical analysis.
Thus, in order to address this limitation of the theory of deliberative democracy, I look into the
literature on such a political regime that cloaks authoritarianism in its manipulation of political
institutions. The second section of this chapter draws on the subfield of democratization from
comparative politics. I review scholarly literature on hybrid regimes and ask where scholars of
comparative politics situate the institutional design in such regimes.
In the third section, the scholarly discussion on the hybrid regime is then utilized to examine the
political landscape of Pakistan. I review political institutions such as the Constitution, legislature, and
multi-party elections and explain why Pakistan exemplifies a hybrid regime.
The fourth section of the chapter reviews the role of civil society in such regimes. Focus is
directed to the communicative interexchange between state and civil society in hybrid regimes. The
discussion in this section is drawn from the literature on hybrid regimes, as the theory of deliberative
democracy lacks exploration of its impact on hybrid regimes.
In the fifth section, I look into the state and civil society communicative interexchange in hybrid
regimes and review the available scholarly literature from comparative politics. I then discuss the case of
Pakistan and analyze state and civil society communicative interexchange.3
Part I: Deliberative Theory of Democracy – The Conditions and Application
Deliberative democratic theory starts from a diagnosis: the problems of contemporary
democracies are, at heart, a cognitive matter. The cluttering of public reason—by mass media, by
technology, by the differentiation of market spheres, of bureaucratic entities, of social groups—makes it
impossible for common, ordinary people to make sense of the political environments they inhabit. In
keeping with its diagnosis, the promise of deliberative democracy is bringing about more clarity and
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In chapter 3, I evaluate the state and civil society actors from Pakistan under the military’s authoritarian rule and
the military’s devised hybrid regime under the elected governments.
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rationality into public matters (Habermas 2006). The ideal of deliberative democracy is summed up in a
few words: Most democrats consider deliberation, one of many kinds of communication, to be the ideal
means for making collective judgments (Steiner et al. 2004; Rummens 2012).
Deliberative democratic theory seeks to revitalize democratic praxis through the
institutionalization of public deliberation. Deliberative democrats argue that there are two kinds of power
at play in democratic politics. One is the strong but inauthentic power that is created by the forces of
money and political authority. The other is the more modest, but more authentic, power that is created in
the communicative arenas of civil society and the public sphere (Habermas 2006, 2008; Young 1999,
2002). To maximize the second kind of power, it is necessary to curtail the first kind of power—and to do
so, it is necessary to protect the spaces in which deliberation takes place from the intrusion of money and
authority (Mansbridge 1996). According to deliberative democrats, contemporary democracies have
become prey to two opposite but equally damaging tendencies: a pull toward bureaucratization and
rationalization on the one hand, and a pull toward irrationality and fanaticism on the other. It is the vitality
of democracy that has been lost (Scheuerman 2002; Saward 2003b; Elstub 2010).
To counterbalance these trends, the theory wants to replace the contemporary concept of power—
one that links it with economic or ideological domination—with a viable conception of “communicative
power” that is based on the empowering effects of rational dialogue and discussion. The most
fundamental argument of deliberative democracy, then, is that deliberative political institutions make for
better political outcomes because the outcomes generated through such deliberation tend to be more
rational than, and hence superior to, those achieved through other means (Habermas 1998; Scheuerman
2002; Steiner et al. 2004; Dryzek 1994, 2000).
Deliberative democrats’ argument is simple: When properly institutionalized, public deliberation
produces better public judgments. Communicative reason, created in and through certain procedures of
public argumentation, can increase the democratic legitimacy and rationality of the political outcomes.
For this to happen, the key is to institutionalize the kind of public discursive situations that bring forth and
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maximize the rationality of the speakers, so that they can deliberate rationally and, therefore, come to
rational conclusions (Dryzek 2000, 2001).
The proponents of deliberative democracy argue that public dialogue develops in such a way that
it creates “understanding-oriented” discourse (Dryzek 1994; Chambers 1995; Mansbridge 1996), and that
public deliberation draws people toward understanding-oriented types of communication (Young 1996).
According to these principles, most people, when participating in public communication, are oriented by a
desire to understand others and make themselves understood.
These normative standards in the development of the deliberative theory of democracy are
brilliantly formulated by its advocates. For deliberative democrats, a democracy centered around public
deliberation attains legitimacy due to the inclusion of all in the deliberative process. Deliberative theorists
Gutmann and Thompson (1998) believe that through public deliberation, “citizens and their
representatives are more likely to take a broader view of issues, and to consider the claims of more of
their fellow citizens” (42).
However, a principal criticism of deliberative democracy raises the question of institutionalizing
these standards. Political theorists have criticized the theory because its highly normative standards ignore
the existing socio-political inequities experienced in modern contemporary democratic societies. This
critique of deliberative democracy is developed by critics who belong to democratic societies, for they
insist that institutionalizing public deliberation in contemporary democracies is challenging amidst the
widespread inequalities.
Deliberative theorists point to the importance of meaningful inclusion for deliberation but do not
adequately describe how meaningful inclusion might be achieved in modern, pluralist democracies
characterized by significant socioeconomic inequalities. This, then, necessarily raises the question of
whether such a vision can in fact be implemented on a widespread basis.
Deliberative theorists, Carole Pateman (2012) observed, devote little attention to explicating and
criticizing “structural features of the wider society” (10). Given the social and economic inequities in
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society, the argumentative discursive engagement will always be more supportive of those discourses that
are already dominant. Critics raise questions about the inability of deliberative democracy to offer
substantial insights on how to mitigate the effect of inequality that exists in society, which therefore has a
serious impact on how individuals ought to be engaged in communicative interexchange. Critics raise the
objection to deliberative democracy’s lack of insight, because the theory of deliberative democracy is
precariously set on “procedural conditions” (Hauptmann 1999, 2001; Green 2010) that provide the tenets
of the theory a “refuge” (Medearis 2015) from practical realities of democratic practice (Walzer 1999).
Critics are not convinced that deliberative ideals have any practical implications for how communicative
interexchange takes shape in the public sphere.
Walzer (1999) asked advocates of deliberative democracy to show how and in what settings the
theory is applicable. Walzer contended political inequality is a reality, in the sense that the ruling class’s
desire to keep its power prevents anything like deliberation from taking center stage in the political
processes. Also, the sheer size and scope of modern democracies make deliberation impracticable. He
argued, “[D]eliberation is not any activity for the demos. I don’t mean that ordinary men and women
don’t have the capacity to reason, only that 100 million of them, or even 1 million or 100,000 can’t
plausibly ‘reason together.’ And it would be a great mistake to turn them away from things they can’t do
together. For then there would be no effective, organized opposition to the powers-that-be” (68). Instead,
Walzer believes “[D]eliberation’s proper place is dependent on other activities that it doesn’t constitute or
control” (Walzer 1999, 68). The activities that Walzer (2002) has in perspective are the contentious
politics by the civil society in a politicized space, i.e., the public sphere. The public sphere is the place
where state and civil society engage in communicative engagement. Walzer argued that “mobilizations”
that take place by civil society exert force on the state to act in more “egalitarian ways” (43).
But here again, I have a serious contention against the advocates and critics of deliberative
democracy. Advocates argue to institutionalize public deliberation via the communicative interexchange
between state and civil society; critics, on the other hand, emphasize the existing social inequalities to
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sever the communicative interexchange. For both advocates and critics, state and civil society are seen as
separate yet interdependent entities. My objection is that emphasizing communicative interexchange
between state and civil society, restricted analytically only to the democratic state, narrows the theoretical
applicability to the larger empirical world.
This very fundamental observation regarding the theoretical application of deliberative
democracy is tested in evaluating such a regime that is struggling to initiate public deliberation, despite
the regime’s claims to have devised laws of the state based on state-civil society communicative
interexchange. This brings me back to the fundamental issue for this research: to find a compelling
explanation for the lasting endurance of the devolution plans devised by the military rulers in the case of
Pakistan.
In searching for such an explanation, my early sole reliance on the theoretical lens of the
deliberative theory of democracy blinded me to the fact that, in Pakistan, the devolution plans were
devised under military dictatorships. The military ruled not through the domination of decision making by
a group of officers, but by successively manipulating political institutions such as the legislature,
executive, elections, and Constitution to strengthen its rule. At the same time, the civil society was also
co-opted by the military regime.
In the theory of deliberative democracy, any discussion on undemocratic regimes is missing. The
theory of deliberative democracy emphasizes the activism of civil society and ignores the authoritative
regime. Hence, to counter such shortcomings in the theoretical perspective of the deliberative theory of
democracy, an analytical bridge had to be formed to better understand the empirical case under evaluation
in this dissertation.
Part II: Hybrid Regimes and Institutional Design
According to Carothers (2002), hybrid regimes are in a “grey zone” hovering between the two
extremes: the authoritarianism and a liberal democracy. In comparative politics, regimes that combine
democratic principles such as political equality with the establishment of (certain) formal institutions are

73
called hybrid regimes. Hybrid is understood as the sprawling middle of a political continuum between
democracy and nondemocracy. In such regimes, democratic principles are utilized by the regime
incumbents to legitimize their rule over the polity. In the comparative politics, political scientists have
developed typologies to differentiate between various kinds of hybrid regimes—whether they came into
being in the aftermath of an authoritarian rule or as the result of democratic backsliding.
Brownlee (2007) contended that in past few decades, with the third wave of democratization,
regimes have moved toward establishing democratic institutions, “but in their shift from authoritarian rule
to democratic practices, quite a few of them have displayed substantial continuity with their prior political
experiences” (21). And once the authoritarian state makes the transition to democracy by holding
elections (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), the consequent system of governance that comes into being
may still be holding onto its past legacies in the form of the institutional design that the political elite
decides on.
A hybrid regime may emerge from an authoritarian regime that has lost some of its key
characteristics but has retained other nondemocratic features. On the other hand, a hybrid regime may
emerge from a democracy that has acquired authoritarian characteristics. The coexistence of democratic
rules and authoritarian methods is maintained in order to keep the incumbents in power.
Morlino (2009) defined a hybrid regime as “a set of institutions that have been persistent, be they
stable or unstable for about a decade, have been preceded by authoritarianism, a traditional regime
(possibly with colonial characteristics), or even a minimal democracy and are characterized by the breakup of limited pluralism and forms of autonomous participation” (282). Hybrid regimes, therefore, should
be viewed as dynamic: The coalition of individual and collective actors that operate the political
institutions and form the base of the regime may be in a state of flux. The definition of a hybrid regime
determined by Morlino implies that in a polity if a political regime that combines audacious
authoritarianism with the complexity of minimal democracy endures for more than ten years, then such a
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regime becomes an established reality. In such a hybrid regime, it can be argued that the main actors
solidify their control by forming alliances, by supporting precariously designed political institutions.
In this research, I show that the case of Pakistan qualifies as an authoritarian regime controlled by
the military junta for almost three decades (1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2007). Pakistan’s political
regime has spread between authoritarianism and democracy while exhibiting a consistent pull toward
authoritarianism. The military, as the foremost organized institution of the country, has wielded decisive
political influence by meddling in politics, primarily to protect or advance its financial autonomy and
expansive commercial interests.
During the military rule, the executive was the military general, who would get himself elected by
a presidential referendum—a measure effected only to gain popular legitimacy. The military ruled over
the country for three decades by manipulating the political society, institutions, and civil society. The
country has not been able to break away from its authoritarian past. In the early period, as shown in
subsequent chapters, the discord among the political elite successively paved the way for the military to
engage in politics more directly than ever before. The military’s engagement in politics impacted the
political landscape, for when the country did move toward electoral democracy, the military never did
step back. The military retained its hold in the disguise of authoritarian arrangements.
In the 1960s, the country remained under the military government with the military general, Ayub
Khan, as the president. In the 1970s, there was a brief period of democracy under elected Prime Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This period, however, was also marred with curbs on civil and political freedoms and
military operations against Bhutto’s political rivals (more details in chapters 3 and 4). Bhutto’s elected
government came to rely on the military to help subdue political dissidence. The scheme was short-lived,
as the military removed Bhutto by a coup. With General Zia-ul-Haq as the military president in the 1980s,
the country was again under direct military rule. The institutional manipulation that was initiated under
General Zia-ul-Haq had a lasting impact on successive governments.
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Pakistan moved toward a hybrid regime under the elected Parliament from 1988 to 1997. During
this period, although the military had no direct political engagement, it was an integral component of the
political landscape. This period is, I believe, an extension of the authoritarianism in the guise of the
hybrid regime, because by the 1990s, the military had established a permanent domain in the political
arena. The military elite wielded influence through the office of the president, who had been awarded
extra-constitutional power to dissolve elected governments. The presidential decree, the infamous 8th
Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, was first introduced by military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq in
1985. It was retained from 1988 to 1997 and was upheld briefly from 1997 to 1999, only to be
reincarnated as the 17th Amendment in the 1973 Constitution by the military government of General
Musharraf.
Since Pakistan’s creation, the military has ruled directly for more than three decades. From 1947
to 1958, the political elite remained embroiled in deciding the system of government of the newly created
state. The political elite during this period squabbled over political control, while the military and
bureaucracy administrated the country’s governance.4
The period from 1958 to 1969, under first military dictator General Ayub Khan, and from 1970 to
1971, under General Yahya Khan, marks the military’s direct political intervention. During this period,
the political system was presidential, with the military dictator assuming the role of the president. This
was the measure that the military elite devised to give the military general stronger executive control over
the political elite.
The period from 1972 to 1977 was the time of a democratically elected government under
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. This was a time when the military remained passive under the control of civilian
leadership. The new Constitution devised by Bhutto’s government had subordinated the institution of
military to be in the service of the elected leadership and only “act in aid of civil power when called
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upon.”5 Furthermore, all military officers had to take a solemn oath not to transgress the Constitution or
engage in any kind of involvement in politics.6
The six-year democratic interregnum returned to military dictatorship from 1977 to 1988 under
General Zia-ul-Haq. During this period, the military elite retained the 1973 Constitution, but the role of
chief executive was taken away from the office of an elected prime minister. The executive was the
military general, while the elected legislature was constituted as the result of nonpartisan elections. By
doing so, the military dictatorship neutralized the political parties from mobilizing the people against
military rule.
With the death of General Zia ul Haq in 1988, the political regime transcended authoritarianism
but only to transform itself into a hybrid regime. During the period of military dictatorship, the
governance system effected by the military elite crafted extra-constitutional measures to safeguard the
military dictator as being the president of the country. This constitutional measure had given way for the
president to be the executive, thus undermining the role of the elected legislature and prime minister as
envisaged under parliamentary form of governments.7
In the decade from 1988 to 1999, Pakistan experienced four elected governments, and the
Constitution retained the presidential veto to dissolve the elected Parliament. During this time, however,
the president was not a military general but was under the influence of the military; thus, in that decade of
the hybrid regime, the military exerted decisive political influence through the office of the president. The
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Article 245(I) of the constitution states that armed forces are “to defend Pakistan against external aggression or
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http://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com).
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I discuss the extra-constitutional measures devised by the military dictators in this chapter under Part III: What
Explains the Hybridity of Pakistan’s Political System?
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military exercised prerogatives, which are defined by scholars studying hybrid regimes (Karl 1990;
Diamond 2002) as “reserved policy domains.”
Scholars have argued that such regimes persist in the guise of electoral democracy. Diamond
(2002) argued that more “regimes than ever before are adopting the form of electoral democracy”;
however, the “reserve domains of military, bureaucratic, or oligarchical power” persist in such regimes.
Karl (1990) asserted that in Latin America the authoritarian regimes that have moved toward democracy
are, in fact, aborted cases of democracy; in such regimes the “military prerogatives” (2) to control the
political landscape persist.
Diamond (1999) has argued authoritarian regimes that have moved toward democracy through
electoral competition have merely transformed into another version of hybrid regime—the “electoral
democracy.” Such a regime, Diamond contended, may have a “constitutional system in which the
legislative and chief executive offices are filled through regular, competitive, multiparty elections with
universal suffrage”; however, such regimes are not liberal democracy (10). Such regimes are similar to
what Zakaria (1997) has termed “illiberal democracy,” since the protection for basic freedoms, such as
civic and political freedoms, is absent. Diamond asserted that mere competitive elections in the absence
of substantive civic and political liberty does not make “electoral democracy” a liberal democracy. These
regimes enact authoritarian measures to craft “reserved domains of power for military or other actors not
accountable to the electorate” (10) to have an enduring political effect on the polity.
Elsewhere, Diamond (2002) argued that in such regimes, by having “reserved domains,” the
unelected actor, such as the military, wields influence by “carv[ing] out large, autonomous spheres of
political influence and economic domination behind the veil of civilian, multiparty rule” (27). In his
critical evaluation of the case of Pakistan in the aftermath of the military coup by General Musharraf,
Diamond (2000) questioned Pakistan’s constant democratic backsliding and a constant weak civilian
control over the military.
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In their analysis of regime dynamics in Pakistan, Diamond (2000) and Oldenburg (2017) asserted
that the institution of the military in Pakistan has an undeniable control over the political landscape. The
military’s commitment to liberal democracy is contingent upon civilian leadership refraining from
exercising control over the military. When the military itself is in political power, it never encounters
threats from political aspirants and it enjoys control in defining its role in the polity. In times of elected
governments, the institutional and economic interests of the military are off limits for civilian political
elite (Oldenburg 2017, 84).
Pakistan military’s control of the “reserved policy domains” included policy issues concerning
national security, which included a portion of the annual budget for defense, military personnel policy,
professional training, the deployment structure of the armed forces, and nuclear doctrine (Aqil Shah
2014a, 18). According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), an industry
standard in the field of defense budget analysis calculates that, on average, from 1988 to 2017, the
defense expenditure accounted for 4.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while the share of
education and health expenditure is less than 3 percent of the GDP.8
Siddiqa-Agha (2001) argued that “[A]dministrative control of the armed forces and general
military planning are areas where the armed forces do not allow any interference” (74). The elected
representatives do not enjoy the power to debate defense expenditure (Siddiqa-Agha 2002). Since the
national security narrative is developed by the military, any shift in the form of government, from military
to civilian control, has had minimal or no effect on the military’s control of state apparatus.
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During civilian control of the government in the 1990s, the period of a hybrid regime, the military
exerted its influence through the office of the president.9 According to Aqil Shah (2016), “the military
used presidential decrees to prematurely unseat three elected governments—two belonging to the PPP led
by Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990, 1993-1996) and the third to Nawaz Sharif’s right-of-center Pakistan
Muslim League government (PML-N, 1990-1993)—mainly when they challenged military prerogatives”
(30). In 1999, the military effected a coup to remove the elected government of Nawaz Sharif only
because the presidential decree, the infamous 58-2(B), which had given extra-constitutional powers to the
president to dissolve the elected legislature, had been annulled by Nawaz Sharif after he was elected in
1997. This, however, did not deter the military from wielding its control over the political landscape.
From 1999 to 2007 under General Pervez Musharraf, the political regime under the elected
leadership reverted to a direct military dictatorship. Under the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf,
there was an elected legislature, but the executive was a military general who had elected himself as
president. The trend that had been initiated under General Zia-ul-Haq continued under General
Musharraf’s military rule. The difference was that the former granted nonpartisan elections, imposed
Islamic ideology over the multi-ethnic state, and curbed freedom of speech and association. General
Musharraf, on the other hand, allowed for partisan elections and granted liberalization of the regime by
opening up the public sphere.10
During the period under General Musharraf’s military dictatorship, the elected representative
government from 2002 to 2007 was formed by the military junta. The elected government during this
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In Part III: What Explains the Hybridity of Pakistan’s Political System?, I explain how the constitutional
amendment effected under the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul-Haq became the source of the military’s
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liberalization policies in detail.
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period signifies the political regime moving toward authoritarianism but with an openness to
liberalization. However, despite the policy of liberalization, the military retained its overpowering status
over the political landscape. The military dictatorship, as shown in subsequent chapters, manipulated the
political and civil society in order to perpetuate its hold. The devolution plan devised by General
Musharraf was one such policy area through which the military government co-opted the political society
and engaged with the civil society. In chapter 4 of this dissertation, I present the state and civil society
interexchange on devising the devolution plan implemented under General Musharraf’s rule.
In the discussion that follows, I present the critical analysis of scholarly research on Pakistan’s
political system. However, for now, to further our understanding on the concept of a hybrid regime, a
clarification is made regarding how to conceptualize a regime and its descriptor hybrid.
What Is a Hybrid Regime?
In the literature on democratization, the differentiation among regime, state, and government
forms the analytical ground upon which the concept of hybrid regime is built. The conceptual distinction
by Lawson (1993) among the three establishes that regime is the “center of political power [as it]
determines who has access to political power,” that is to say, autocrats or democrats. The state “is the
locus of political power,” that is, the stage where power is laid out among its various organs—the
executive, legislature, judiciary, military, and bureaucracy. Citing Fishman (1990), Lawson (1993) wrote,
“regime is more permanent than a government,” whereas government is “less permanent than the state”
(187). In other words, regime is the collection of institutional rules, the state is the bureaucratic apparatus
that administers the institutional rules, while the government is only a temporary entity that comes into
being only after institutional rules are materialized. The role of government, therefore, is miniscule in
terms of devising institutional rules that enable it to regulate the society. In other words, the regime, as the
“center of power,” has the determining authority over how the rules that regulate society are to be
deliberated and devised.
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Moving forward from these definitional differentiations of regime, state, and government, I now
define how hybrid regimes are conceptualized in comparative politics.
Bunce (2000) argued, “[B]ecause of sheer reach” of the “wave of democratization, mass publics
today have a higher probability . . . of living in a democratic system”; however, this system may be
“flawed, fragile, and in some instances, fleeting” (704). The system may be flawed due to overreliance on
the institution of election to usher in democracy. Zakaria (1997) and Diamond (1999, 2002) have insisted
that the misplaced belief on elections as the only democratic standard feeds into the inability of the rulers
to break away from the authoritarianism of the past.11
The continuity of authoritarianism does not let regimes make substantial progress toward
mainstreaming democratic principles. In the following discussion, the transitory period toward
consolidation unravels a “new-species”—to use O’Donnell’s term (1994, 51)—that is, hybrid regime.
Such regimes, scholars argue, are not able to completely break from past legacies and thus reflect their
past in their present; in short, these regimes are the carriers of their authoritarian past. And this is the
reason that the “uncertainty” plays like a “multi-layered chess game” (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 66)
in which the various actors strive to effect a stalemate, preventing the democratic rules of game from
taking effect.
Following the third wave of democratization, the regimes that have made a transition to
democracy have invested time and resources in developing those political institutions that are
characteristic features of any democracy. However, in hybrid regimes, rulers are mainly interested in
securing, strengthening their control over political landscape and to maximize their time in office. The
longer a regime can stay in power, the more resources it can extract over time. In order to secure their
survival and to extract rents, two possible strategies are used make the population comply: cooperation
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Please also see an illuminating discussion by Bunce and Wolchik (2010) in which they have argued that with the
third wave there is a proliferation of mixed or hybrid regimes. In such regimes, these scholars believe, competitive
elections pave the way for the continuity of authoritarian practices (43-46). But, in reality, such a trend has only
given emergence to the regimes that are more at the authoritarian end of the continum than at the democracy end.
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and coercion (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008). Scholars studying rent-maximizing dictatorial
regimes argue that cooperation is not a viable pure strategy (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008; Gandhi and
Lust-Okar 2009; Morlino 2009; Schedler 2002, 2010; Svolik 2012). And since coercion limits the
political elite in its power to extract resources, it will choose a mixed strategy. Democratic institutions are
the instrument to introduce elements of cooperation.
Discussion on hybrid regimes focuses attention on the impact that preceding regimes have had on
successive political regimes. For example, I have consistently stated in my discussion that a hybrid
regime combines authoritarian rule with democratic principles and that the emergence of these hybrid
regimes has become more prominent with third-wave democratization. The argument is, a political
regime is undemocratic if it does not move away from its authoritarian past and inculcate democratic
principles.
Hence, we see a strange mix of democratic institutions, such as a constitution, legislature, multiparty elections, etc., under a farce of democratic principles. The increased interest in democratic
institutions by mixed authoritarian regimes occurs, in part, because they recognize that almost all
democratic regimes (authoritarian, democracy, or hybrid) have democratic institutions such as
legislatures, elections, and parties. For example, regarding legislatures, from 1946-2008, more than 80
percent of legislatures operated under authoritarianism. This figure jumps to 98 percent after the end of
the Cold War (Svolik 2012, 36-7).
However, authoritarian regimes that gradually construct rules, institutions, and processes to
define the distribution of decision-making powers among various groups in the society transition into
stable democracies. The nature of the concessions reached during a dictatorial regime and the
characteristics of the groups who received these concessions determine the institutional structure of the
resulting democratic regime. Gandhi (2008) argued that for authoritarian rulers, assembling powersharing institutions helps them secure their control in three ways: (1) they help the dictator identify the
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relevant partners, (2) they allow both the opposition and the dictator to reveal information, and (3) they do
so in a way that prevents popular mobilization.
Part III: What Explains the Hybridity of Pakistan’s Political System?
Hybridity, therefore, refers to a political system where there is an existence of democratic
principles and authoritarian practices. In Pakistan’s case, the hybridity of the regime may be explained by
the intervention of the military in politics, the persistence of reserved policy domains for the military, and
the inability of disarrayed political and civil society to curb the military’s encroachment. The military as
an institution has had an unchallenged effect on setting the political course of the country. The military in
the early days of Pakistan’s founding witnessed political chaos propelled by members of the political
society. Haqqani (2018) has argued that the military’s dominance in Pakistan’s politics is rooted in the
circumstances of Pakistan’s birth in 1947. This was new country that was carved from within British
India and acquired one third of British India’s army.
The military in newly carved Pakistan belonged to the geographic regions that became Pakistan
(Haqqani 2018, 160-61). But the military’s internal uniformity, Jaffrelot (2002, 2015) argued, contrasted
with Pakistan’s political and civil society. The political elite belonging to the founding political party
Muslim League consisted of leaders who belonged to geographic regions that became part of independent
India. The political elite, comprised of émigré leadership, was faced with the challenge of asserting itself
on a multi-ethnic civil society. The civil society consisted of ethnic divisions between the provinces of
West Pakistan and East Pakistan.
At the time of its emergence as an independent country, Pakistan was comprised of six major
ethnic groups: Bengalis (the outright majority in terms of population), Punjabis, Pathans, Sindhis,
Baluchs, and Mohajirs (the Muslim migrants from India). Bengalis belonged to the region of East
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Pakistan where they were the majority; their language and ethnicity were different from the people of
West Pakistan.12
Within West Pakistan, the Pukhtuns, Sindhis, and Balochs demanded regional autonomy. The
Pukhtuns from the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)— the present-day Khyber Pukhtunkhawa
(KPK)—in 1947 were led by the Red Shirts movement of Ghaffar Khan, who had opposed the integration
of NWFP with Pakistan. Red Shirts were the allies of the Congress Party and opposed the Pakistan
Muslim League led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. In the 1946 elections under the
British, the Red Shirts had formed a government in NWFP. But with the partition of India in 1947, the
government of the Red Shirts was dismissed by Jinnah.
The Sindhis and Balochs also demanded their regional identities be protected and granted
regional autonomy against the centralization of the state. The Sindhis nationalist movement was led by
G. M. Syed, who had demanded a greater role for the Sindhis in provincial and national politics, as well
as recognition of their language rights against the Mohajirs (the group of people who had migrated to
Pakistan from India after the partition of British India in 1947). The Balochs, on the other hand,
demanded recognition of their separate identity other than the dominant Punjabis, the politically active
Pukhtuns and Sindhis. The area of Balochistan that came into the state of Pakistan was ruled by
distinctive principalities that had their autonomous status under the British. These principalities looked up
to the princely state of Kalat; the Khan of Kalat, the ruler of Kalat, attempted to remain independent, but
the state of Pakistan integrated the territories of Balochistan within Pakistan.13
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Nationalism without a Nation, edited by Christophe Jaffrelot (Zed Books, 2002), 7-47.

85
Amin (1988) argued that because the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, “wanted to
build a strong nation following the policies of one nation, one culture, one language,14” he therefore
considered the issue of diversity within the Muslim-concentrated provinces of India as a “curse” (Amin
1988, 73). It was assumed by the Muslim League that the centralization of decision-making authority
would subsume the regional differences that existed within and between the different provinces of the
newly formed country.15 The ethnic divisions that existed in the newly created state of Pakistan demanded
recognition of the differences by the state. Instead of paying attention to resolving these differences, the
state resorted to centralizing the state’s authority over the multi-ethnic state.
Drawback of an Emigré Political Society
The political society remained elusive in resolving the issues of ethnic divisions stemming from
within the society. The constructed ideology based on religion, however, did not withstand the latent
regional diversity and complexity (Samad 1995; Jaffrelot 2002). Naqvi (2013) has argued that by the
1950s, the Muslim League, as the political party that had founded Pakistan, was challenged by the
regional differences emanating from the society. The strategy of the émigré political elite to force
centralization of the state institutions over the multiple ethnicities generated dissent in the society.
Consequently, the political discord among the political elite did not result in a democratic
arrangement of political institutions. Two institutions of the state that were not elected institutions but
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86
were administrative and security institutions—the civil bureaucracy and the military—were more
organized than the diversified political society. In such a scenario of ethnic and cultural divisions between
the regions of newly formed Pakistan, the political elite relied on the military and the bureaucracy to help
the state function as an independent sovereign post-colonial state.
Amidst the political chaos, the military emerged as the only organized institution of the state to
direct the political discourse. Haqqani (2018) argued that at the time of independence, Pakistan acquired a
17 percent share in the revenues of British India, while the country inherited almost one third of British
India’s army (46, 161). Pakistan inherited some 150,000 of the former Indian army’s 461,800 personnel,
although this figure of 150,000 comprised more soldiers (or privates) than officers. Nevertheless, the
military was a most organized bureaucratic force in terms of the state’s rudimentary institutions (Fair
2014, 56-58). In terms of administrative bureaucracy, the country was joined by 95 of the Muslim
bureaucrats from the combined Indian Civil Services (ICS) of British India. There were 101 Muslim
bureaucrats in ICS, other than the Hindus, Sikhs, and other religious minorities.16 Out of these 101
bureaucrats, 95 opted to serve Pakistan and six remained in India (Jaffrelot and Rais 1999, 157).
In the early days of the country’s creation, it was the military-bureaucracy complex that ruled
over Pakistan. The émigré political elite, amidst the ethnic divisions, was dependent upon the organized
strength of the coercive force of the military and the administrative authority of the bureaucracy. In time,
the military overpowered the bureaucratic apparatus of the state and reduced the bureaucracy and the
political elite to junior partners in military’s devised political landscape. In chapter 3 of this dissertation, I
have analyzed the role of these two institutions vis-à-vis the role of the political parties in governing the
democratic state. The political elite engaged the military to help oppress the ethnic uprisings in the
provinces of East Pakistan and Balochistan, and to control the oppositional groups in Sindh and NWFP.
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European ancestry), 25 Indian Christians, 13 Parsis, 10 Sikhs, and four from other communities (Kaushik 2012).
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The military’s early engagement in politics showed the military elite that it was the most organized
institution to resolve the political chaos initiated by the political elite. Thus, this became military’s most
commonly used pretext for taking over the political situation.
Publicly, the military has always explained its intervention in politics as necessary to save the
country from allegedly corrupt and inefficient politicians and to “clean up house.” Since the early days of
military engagement in politics, the legacy of the discourse “clean up house” has had an unprecedented
effect on Pakistan’s political history. In the following section, I show that over the political history of
Pakistan, the three other institutions of the state—the Constitution, legislature, and elections—have been
controlled by the military to wield its overbearing effect on the political scene. The military has
successively controlled these institutions to carve its permanent reserved policy domain within the
political landscape.
Political Institutions Under the Military and Elected Regime of Pakistan
This section argues that under the military rule, the authoritarianism imposed by the military
dictator created an optical illusion by establishing these institutions that indicate to the population that the
military is committed to tutelary democracy. Under the elected leadership, the military wielded its control
over these political institutions by not allowing them to encroach upon the military’s devised system of an
authoritarian-styled elected government.
Constitution
The Constitution is the institution that defines the rule of politics in the state. Constitutions mark
the roles that each organ of the state, such as the legislature, executive, bureaucracy, judiciary, etc., must
perform. The Constitution lays out the system of governance of the state and defines the structure of the
political system.
Depending on the nature of the political community, the Constitution could be presidential,
whereby the president is the head of state and has the executive authority to regulate society via an elected
legislature known as congress. On the other hand, the political community might favor a parliamentarian
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system of political governance. In this system of governance, the head of the state is not a president but a
prime minister, who is elected by a directly elected legislature. The legislature is the deliberative body
that decides the policies that the executive (i.e., prime minister or president) makes into laws.
In the case of Pakistan, the constitutional history is marked by an intermittent abeyance of the
Constitution and its effect on the structure of the political government system in place. The first
Constitution was not finalized and formally enacted in Pakistan until 1956. And since this first
Constitution was declared in 1956 (and abrogated in 1958 because of a military coup), Pakistan has had
two more constitutions, the Constitution of 1962 and the Constitution of 1973 (which was held in
abeyance in 1977 and 1999 because of military coups).
The 1956 Constitution provided a parliamentary form of government, with a strong role for the
central government17 under the executive role of the elected prime minister. Under the one-unit system,
Pakistan was divided into two administrative units, East and West Pakistan. Under the parity formula, the
National Assembly, i.e., legislature or the Parliament, was comprised of 310 members; 150 were elected
by popular vote from each unit, and 10 seats were reserved for women to be elected indirectly. The 1956
Constitution was abrogated in 1958 with the military coup by General Ayub Khan. From 1958 to 1962,
the country was governed under the directives of General Ayub Khan and the civil-military bureaucracy.18
The 1962 Constitution provided a strong role for the president, both as the head of state and
government. The system of dividing the country into two distinctive units, East and West Pakistan, was
retained in the Constitution. A one-house legislature known as the National Assembly was elected for five
years. The members of the National Assembly were elected on the parity formula, equally from East and
West Pakistan. The balance of power under the 1962 Constitution was in favor of the federal
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Legislative powers of the Parliament were divided into three lists: the Federal List included 30 items, the
Provincial List included 94 items, and the Concurrent List covered 19 items. If there was a clash of interests over
legislation on the Concurrent List, the right of the central government prevailed (Baxter 1974 ; Waseem 2010).
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In 1959, General Ayub Khan introduced the “Basic Democracy” local government system by decentralizing the
administrative powers to the local levels.
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government.19 The jurisdiction of the federal legislature was totally dominant over the provincial
legislature.
In 1969, President Ayub Khan stepped down as president.20 His successor, General Yahya Khan,
abrogated the 1962 Constitution and imposed martial law in 1969, announcing first general elections. On
March 30, 1970, Yahya Khan promulgated the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which set out the basis for
a future constitution. The parity formula that existed between East and West Pakistan was dissolved, and
the election for the National Assembly was based on the population in each province, thus giving more
opportunity for East Pakistan to be represented in the assembly. As a result, the Awami League won the
election victory, securing 160 seats from East Pakistan in the National Assembly, in contrast to Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) win from West Pakistan, with 81 out of 138 seats in the
National Assembly.21 The political events that followed in Pakistan led to the military operation against
the Awami League in East Pakistan, resulting in war with India, the secession of East Pakistan, and the
creation of a new independent state, Bangladesh.
In 1973, a new Constitution declared a parliamentary form of government. This new Constitution
devised a new power arrangement, redefining the principles of federalism under the term maximum
provincial autonomy. The 1973 Constitution envisaged a bicameral legislative body with the institution of
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the items mentioned in the provincial and concurrent lists were not specified.
20

President Ayub Khan stepped down from office in the wake of widespread opposition against his government. In
East Pakistan, the political party Awami League, led by Mujib ur Rehman, demanded provincial autonomy. And
within West Pakistan, a new political party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged, demanding provincial autonomy.
Fair (2014) and Adeney (2009) noted that the military defeat against India (in 1965) had initiated the distrust against
Ayub Khan’s government.
21

In the general elections of 1970, the Pakistan Peoples Party of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto achieved victory in the Punjab
and Sindh. Jamiat-ul-ulmai Islam (JUI) and the National Awami Party (NAP)—the representatives of Pashtun and
Baloch nationalists—were the leading parties in NWFP and Balochistan. The three leading parties (PPP, JUI, and
NAP) entered into the tripartite accord and decided to respect the mandate of each party in its respective jurisdiction.
However, the accord among the three parties in West Pakistan was short-lived following the secession of East
Pakistan in 1971. The election win by the Awami League in East Pakistan was a watershed for inter-provincial
relations and provincial-center relations. The Awami League’s victory meant that the central government was to be
led by the Awami League, which further meant that Bengalis would have a resounding majority over West Pakistan.
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a senate included in the newly crafted Constitution. The members of the senate were elected for four years
on parity bases: the provinces, namely, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan, had to elect 14 members
each for four years. Half of the members retired after two years.
Under the military rule of Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988) and Musharraf (1999-2008), the parliamentary
form of government envisaged in the Constitution was modified by military generals to allow for the
military’s engagement in the country’s politics. The 8th Amendment had a significant effect in this
regard, for it gave extra-constitutional power to the president of the country to dissolve the elected
assemblies. The effect of the 8th Amendment cast an undemocratic shadow over politics in the country in
the 1980s, 1990s, and the 2000s until it was overturned in 2010.
Military Intervention Morphed into a Parliamentary Form of Government
With the implementation of the 8th Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, the political system in
the country morphed into a disarranged system of government, giving extra-constitutional powers to the
president, who, according to the original spirit of the 1973 Constitution, was to be the ceremonial head of
state acting on the advice of the head of the executive, the prime minister.
But with the 8th Amendment, the 1973 Constitution became what can be best described as
“hodge-podge”; the institution of the presidency was forced on the parliamentarian system of government
by the military’s executive decree. With this amendment, the locus of power shifted in favor of the
president. As one scholar argued, “[U]nder the amended constitution, the prime minister shall hold office
during the pleasure of the president” (Rais 1985, 49).
In the scholarly literature on forms of government systems, there is a distinction between a
presidential and parliamentarian form of government. Under each distinctive system, the balance of
executive power between the president and legislature or between the prime minister and legislature is a
crucial matter, distinguishing one system from the other. In presidential systems, executive power resides
with the president, while in parliamentarian systems, prime ministers hold executive power.
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In the case of Pakistan, however, the system of balance of executive power had been traditionally
modeled on the Westminster model of democracy in which the Parliament is sovereign. The name
Westminster reveals the origin of this democratic model, the British parliamentary and government
institutions. In this model, the elected head of the state is the prime minister; the system concentrates
decision-making power on the cabinet that is dependent on the Parliament, etc. In most of the former
British colonies, this is the preferred model of government (Lijphart 1999, 9-20).
On the contrary, presidential systems are those in which an executive (a) is elected by a popular
vote, (b) holds office for a fixed term (i.e., is not dependent on parliamentary confidence), (c) selects and
directs the cabinet, and (d) has some legislative authority. In parliamentary systems, the executive (a) is
selected by the legislature, and (b) is dependent on the legislature’s confidence (Jones 1995, 6).22
Furthermore, there are political systems that combine the executive powers of presidents with the
legislative powers of the cabinet.
For such systems, Shugart and Carey (1992b) distinguish the President-Parliamentary from
Premier-Presidential. Both of these are variegated distinctions of a presidential form of government.
Premier-Presidential regimes meet the following criteria: (a) the president is elected by popular vote;
(b) the president possesses considerable powers; and (c) there also exists a premier and cabinet subject to
legislative confidence, who perform executive functions. President-Parliamentary systems have the
following characteristics: (a) the president is elected by popular vote, (b) the president appoints and
dismisses cabinet members, (c) cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence, and (d) the
president has the power to dissolve Parliament and/or legislative powers (Shugart and Carey 1992b, 2324).
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Also see Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, “Criticisms of Presidentialism and Responses,” in
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Under military dictatorships, the parliamentary form of government transformed into a system
having a close resemblance to the President-Parliamentary system conceptualized by Shugart and Carey
(1992b). But even here again, the Pakistan-styled system of government defies Shugart and Carey’s
criterion for a President-Parliamentary system. Though the president of the country was to be elected
through popular vote, this was possible only through a presidential referendum, in which the people had
no choice in deciding between various presidential candidates. The presidential choice had always been
only one candidate, one who was a military general. Even the call to elect a military general as president
through the popular vote was summoned by the military general himself. The people and political and
civil society had no say in this regard.
According to the 1973 Constitution system of government, the cabinet is the collegial body
advising the executive; the legislature was made bicameral, with the National Assembly or the Parliament
as the lower house and the Senate as the upper house. In this manner, then, the president was to be elected
through an indirect vote from the electoral college in the Parliament, but in order to give a semblance of
supremacy of popular will, the military dictators would get themselves elected through a presidential
referendum when the elected Parliament was dissolved.23
Under the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, this system of balancing the executive power in
favor of Parliament and the prime minister was disfigured by shifting the locus or power to the president.
Unlike General Ayub Khan, who had rejected the parliamentary form of government and devised the
presidential Constitution in 1962, General Zia-ul-Haq manipulated the 1973 Constitution to give extraconstitutional powers to the president. He did so by making the president extremely powerful, having
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The 8th Amendment fundamentally altered the basic structure and essential features of the 1973 Constitution to
bring it in line with the military’s preferences. It created a strong executive, a weak legislature, and a docile
judiciary, and it diminished provincial autonomy. The executive authority of the federation was now vested in the
president instead of the prime minister. The president was given power to appoint the prime minister, provincial
governors, judges of the Supreme Court and high courts, and chiefs of the armed forces. He could also dissolve the
National Assembly at his discretion. Moreover, the validity of anything done by the president in his discretion could
not be called into question (Mahmud 1993, 1284).

93
executive control over the elected legislature, the Parliament and Senate. The disarranged system was
institutionalized with the 8th Amendment, which proclaimed the president to be the chief executive.
Furthermore, with the manipulation of the 1973 Constitution, General Zia-ul-Haq elected himself
president through the decree issued by him as the military dictator. The decree prioritized the referendum
as the principal electoral connection between the dictator and the people. This referendum also was the
institutional design enforced by the military dictator to the Constitution.
In Pakistan, as one scholar contended, “[T]he parliament’s loss of sovereignty . . . has been the
rule rather than the exception”; furthermore, “elections, parties, and elected assemblies operate along a
dynamic that runs counter to the dynamics of the permanent non-elected machinery of the government”
(Waseem 2002, 4535).
In the next chapter, I will discuss how the successive military dictatorships effectively devised
institutional rules within the scope of the Constitution so as to strengthen the military’s control of political
power. The institutional manipulation at the hands of the military dictators legitimized their control of the
political power. The dictator would dismiss the elected government, have himself elected president
through a referendum, and make changes to the Constitution by giving extra executive powers to the
president.
Legislature
As defined above, the Constitution of the state defines the roles of each of its organs. The
legislature is the protector of the constitutional principles that define the existence of any state, whether it
be authoritarian, democratic, or a hybrid combining the two systems of governance. The legislature is the
collective of elected representatives that represent the interests of their electorate. Elected legislators, be
they Parliamentarians or Congressmen/women, are the lawmakers only because the Constitution gives
them the power to do so. The legislature is the deliberative assembly where the representatives of the
citizens talk, exchange views, represent constituents’ interests, deliberate, argue, and decide on laws that
enable the state to regulate the society.
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The authoritarian practices effected by the ruling elite seek to maximize their hold on power,
while the citizens and the civil society are pacified by the regime guardians through piecemeal incentives,
such as policy concessions. The case of the elected legislature in Pakistan carries complex political
baggage. As can be seen from the discussion above, the multiple changes in the Constitution had an effect
on the behavior of the legislature as well. The legislators elected to the representative assemblies (national
and provincial) following the military coups in 1962, 1977, and 1999 affected the legislative assembly
and the roles played by elected representatives. The Constitution under hybrid regime provided executive
control to the military ruler and the (military general or civilian24) presidents, thereby affecting the
behavior of the legislators elected to the state legislatures. The political elite never had challenged the
transgressive tendency of the institution of the military. This attitude of the political elite encouraged the
military elite to strengthen its control over the political landscape by manipulating the political
institutions.
Promulgation of the 8th Amendment to the Constitution, its revocation in 1997 by the 13th
Amendment, its reintroduction as the 17th Amendment in 2002, and again its revocation in 2010 were
possible only because of legislators’ consent and approval. In times of military rule, the legislators never
exhibited any serious threat to the military’s devised presidential order, knowing that the military general
was not only the chief of the military force but also the president of the country. Any direct challenge to
the military dictator meant an early exit of aspiring politicians from the political landscape. The
extraordinary powers bestowed upon the president, who also was the in-service military general, gave the
institution of the military an incentive to remain engaged in politics more directly. By enacting legislative
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In 1988, 1990, 1992, 1995, and 1997, the presidents were civilians. For example, from 1988 to 1992, Ghulam
Ishaq Khan, a senior retired bureaucrat, was the president of Pakistan who effected the 8th Amendment and
dissolved the elected governments of Benazir Bhutto in 1990 and Nawaz Sharif in 1992. From 1993 to 1996, the
president of Pakistan was Farooq Leghari; he was also a former civil servant and supporter of the Pakistan Peoples
Party (the political party of Benazir Bhutto). In 1996, he developed differences with party leader Benazir Bhutto and
subsequently he effected the 8th Amendment and dissolved the elected government of Benazir Bhutto in 1996. In
1997, when Nawaz Sharif won the general elections and formed the government, he utilized his house majority to
revoke the 8th Amendment, thus giving legislative authority back to the legislators and away from the state
figurehead, the president.

95
barriers such as the 8th and 17th Amendments, the military elite successively strengthened the military’s
control of political power and subdued the oppositional voices emanating from political and civil society.
Elections
The one feature that makes a hybrid regime distinct from a pure authoritarian type is the
institution of electoral competition. Electoral competition brings the political elite to compete for popular
support. Some hybrid regimes do allow elections to take place to give a semblance to their tacit
commitment to the democratic value of giving each citizen the right to vote. The popular vote therefore
grants legitimacy to the regime incumbents, and if the regime loyalists are able to exact substantive
support, the resulting political landscape therefore allows them to profess the legitimacy of their rule
through the popular vote. The primary strategy used by the dictator is “buying off” or co-opting some
members of the opposition group by offering them perks and privileges in return for their support for the
regime. Co-optation creates insider-outsider divisions and generates competition among the opposition
members for access to scarce insider positions.
In hybrid regimes, the multi-party electoral competition is always a manipulation of this
institution. The oppositional forces in the polity are barred from competing for the popular vote, since
their contesting election may be a death knell to the authoritarian incumbents. Therefore, dictators thrive
on and stoke divisions among groups to weaken the opposition by reinforcing ethnic, regional, and
religious differences, for example, through the unequal distribution of resources. As long as these
opposition groups appear more threatening to each other than the dictator himself, the dictator’s position
remains secure. As divided groups of citizens focus on each other in their political struggle, the center of
political power remains uncontested (Lust-Okar 2005).
In Pakistan, under the different military governments, the political parties were constrained in
their ability to contest the elections. The political parties have contested the elections in the 1960s, ’70s,
’90s, and the 2000s. But these elections had been officially nonpartisan and were manipulated by the
military rulers so as to favor those contenders who remain loyal to the regime and not to their party
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affiliations. In his discussion on the hybridity of Pakistan’s political system, Oldenburg (2017) noted that
electoral competition under different military and civilian regimes has always been consistent; however,
who shall contest the elections always was one major issue that was closely watched by the authoritarian
incumbents, civilian and military alike.
The military dictators would find a solution to neutralize the political opposition by not allowing
partisan elections to take place; by doing so, the regime incumbents would rather create a pool of regime
loyalists whom I call the selectorate25. This selectorate would be those political aspirants who, for the
sake of their political future, presented themselves as electorally significant candidates to the military
regime. The term selectorate is dissimilar to the political science’s derived entity of electorate. The
electorate are defined by the territorial constituency within the polity; the electorate are the citizens with
voting rights to elect their representatives. The voters-as-electorate have no influence on the elected once
the latter is in control of political power, joining the ranks of the ruling elite as the political elite.
The selectorate, on the other hand, is defined by its political savviness to ally with the ruling
powers to be. For the selectorate, finding permanence in the ruling hierarchy is foremost. The selectorate,
to strengthen its electoral significance, continuously patronizes the voters-as-electorate. For the
selectorate, partisan confrontation on issue-based politics is of no concern; for the selectorate, the route to
political power is to accumulate its electoral mass and to align itself with whoever takes them closer to the
corridors of political power.
The selectorate, in the context of Pakistan, is a select group of political elite who provide the
electoral connection between the ruling elite and the people. The selectorate provide the ruling military
governments a popular base via the selectorate’s electoral connection to the people. Hence, by building an
alliance with the successive military governments, the selectorate has access to state resources and has
remained politically relevant in its electoral constituencies. The political elites’ co-optation was beneficial
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for the military ruler, because it gave the ruler the electoral connection to the people. And the political
elite, i.e., the selectorate, benefitted from such an arrangement as it kept their political careers activated.
Episodes of deliberation over policy-making between the military elite and the selectorate never
was an area of concern for either of the actors. The military elite devised a policy of controlling the
political landscape by enacting certain institutional rules that enabled the military to lengthen its rule. The
selectorate, on the other hand, was submissively obedient to such an arrangement, for if it had challenged
the military-devised policy of governing, members of the selectorate would be risking their political
careers.
In three of the four military coups, the military attempted to bring about democratization through
the implementation of local governance (Ayub’s Basic Democracy, Zia’s Local Bodies, and Musharraf’s
Local Government). By granting membership in the selectorate to new contenders, the military replaced
the incumbent political class with new recruits through the institution of competitive elections at national
and provincial levels. But these attempts did not lead to a comprehensive democratic transition and move
toward consolidation. Instead, what the long-term military dictatorships did instead was to help raise a
pseudo-leadership that stood against the development of democratic institutions.
This pseudo-leadership is the group of elite belonging to the political, military, and civilian
bureaucracy and favored by the country’s business class. The hybrid-leadership is crucial to the
selectorate mentioned in preceding discussion. The selectorate were the members of the political society,
those aspiring politicians who intended to secure their electoral significance. By winning elections for the
military junta, the selectorate would then became the constitutive members of the hybrid-leadership that
ruled the polity.
How the Hybridity of Rule Is Maintained in Pakistan
In Pakistan, the military’s engagement in politics is not only due to the preceding political chaos
set forth under civilian leaderships, but also because of the military’s persuasive rebuke of incompetent
political leadership in the wake of external security threats. The political society seemed to be less
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organized and effective in countering the security narrative developed by the military. In my
understanding, the existence of a belligerent neighbor, such as India, has also catapulted the military on
the political landscape. Thus, in order to secure its institutional interests, the military in Pakistan has
adopted a more direct, yet clandestine, approach toward political and civil society.
In her analysis, historian Ayesha Jalal ([1990] 2007) implicitly applies the “Garrison State”
theory to argue that “security compulsions” induced centralization of resources for the defense of the
state, a process that militarized politics. Likewise, Siddiqa (2016) is unequivocally incisive in declaring
the ruling elite in favor of the security narrative advocated by the Pakistan military. She contends the
ruling elite in Pakistan regards the military’s interests to be foremost to security, rather than strengthening
the political institutions of the state. In his recent book on the state of Pakistan’s politics, Christophe
Jaffrelot (2015) argued that the “establishment” in Pakistan combines the political leadership, civil
bureaucracy, wealthy elite, landed elite, and the military elite that strongly believe that their material and
political interests are intertwined.
In my understanding of Pakistan’s hybrid regime, I believe as long as actors’ (political,
bureaucratic, military) interests of securing maximum rents from the state are safeguarded and coincide
with each other’s political, social, and capital gain, the hybrid regime will remain a permanent
characteristic of Pakistan’s politics. It seems to me that the actors engaged in maintaining this hybrid
regime are committed to hybrid-leadership emanating from the governing interests of the establishment.
One recent discussion of this fact is captured by Oldenburg (2017), developing the typology of
the loyalty of opposition to the regime by Linz (1978). Oldenburg contended that the military in Pakistan
has always shown its “semi-loyalty” to democratic rules, but as soon as the incumbent elected
governments have tried to make the military subservient to civilian leadership, the military has retaliated
by derailing the democratic advance. Oldenburg believes the institution of the military is the driving force
behind the perpetual hybridity of the regime in Pakistan. He contended, “Pakistan is a paradigmatic
hybrid regime. . . . It is not a democracy because although it has had relatively free and fair elections in
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2008 and 2013, with the military not interfering in the peaceful transfer of power between government
and opposition (unlike the 1990, 1993, and 1996 transfers), the military is not entirely subordinate to the
civilian government” (87).26 Furthermore, he strongly believes “[W]hat keeps Pakistan’s hybrid regime
stable, and prevents Pakistan from advancing on a path to full democracy, is clearly, a relatively
autonomous military” (88).
Furthermore, Siddiqa (2016) argued that the military thrives on an ideologically constructed
security narrative against the military might of India and the threat to the Islamic state of Pakistan. Such a
narrative, scholars argue, inevitably grants “the right to rule at times of crisis,” thus enhancing the
“legitimacy” of takeover of democratic institutions (Oldenburg 2017, 88). The military’s commitment to
democracy, Oldenburg (2017) argued, is dubious; it shows “semi-loyalty” to the democratic governments.
It is the semi-loyalty of the military that is the threat to the consolidation of democracy in Pakistan.
Furthermore, Oldenburg contended that the semi-loyalty exhibited by the Pakistan military makes the
future of consolidated democracy in Pakistan unlikely, because the military has shown its commitment to
democracy in the name of “true democracy,” “real democracy,” “power to the people,” etc.
Siddiqa (2016) argued that the military functions in the manner of a guardian by engaging in the
politics of the country through building partnerships with the political elite, whom I have termed the
selectorate. The building of partnerships with the select political elite has provided the military
establishment the willing electorate that connects the military with the people. It is these partnerships that
enable the military to replace the direct rule in politics with an indirect “process whereby the military
remains entrenched in the polity to benefit and secure its interests” (56). These interests are not only
political but are economic and social in nature, therefore making the military dependent on “building
partnerships amongst political and civil society stakeholders” (59).
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Many scholars would argue that this is because of the semi-loyalty of the military to the
democratic politics in Pakistan. For example, Oldenburg (2017) argued, “[T]he military has never been
explicitly disloyal to the democratic system, even when it has taken over in a coup and implemented laws
that seek to transform the country. It always has claimed a dual-aspect guardian role: guardian of the
nation and the country; guardian of its ward—the political system—until it can be revived, once purged of
its faults. It thus sees itself as fully loyal to the constitution, even when it suspends it” (95).
Thus, in the specific context of Pakistan’s political system, it may seem at the surface level that
democratic leaders are increasingly playing a part in politics. But in actual fact, the real power rests with
the military. The military successfully crafted a narrative against the incompetence of the political elite;
furthermore, the political elite also has been equally responsible for allowing the military to perpetuate
such a narrative among the people. In this section, I have discussed that the selectorate is formed from
within the political elite, which offers its electoral support to the military generals when they come to
control the political landscape. The collusion between the military and the selectorate (the subset of
political elite) has not only entrenched the hybridity of rule, it also has an impact on the civil society to
rise up against the authoritarianism exhibited by the regime’s hybrid-leadership.
The role of the citizens and civil society is minimal in challenging the military’s advance to take
over. The narrative that has been built around the security of the country, and Islam as the religion, feeds
into the role of the military as the guardian of the Islamic values of the nation of Pakistan. As long as the
military has an independent and autonomous status vis-à-vis the democratic institutions, the hybrid
regime in Pakistan shall prevail. However, there have been momentary uprisings in the sense of Wolin’s
“the political” by the civil society actors against the democratic transgressions of the military control.
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Two examples of those social movements include the Lawyers Movement of 2007, when the civil society
stood up against the military ruler, and the students’ movement against the military dictator in 1969.27
The commonality in these movements is that they emerged when the military leadership was at
the helm; however, there is no such movement against the clandestine military interferences into the
making and unmaking of elected governments. Although there has been a women’s rights movement,
which was launched in the 1980s against the Islamist policies devised by the military dictator General
Zia-ul-Haq, these movements were crushed by the military dictatorship. But this had not deterred
women’s rights organizations from mobilizing themselves and voicing their concerns against the selective
interpretation of Islamic ideology.28
In the discussion to follow, I examine the role of civil society in hybrid regimes. Within
comparative politics, the civil society is evaluated on its own merit as an entity within the polity.
However, it is usually argued that civil society is most active in democratic, rather than undemocratic,
states.
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organizations against the Sharia law known as the Hudood Ordinance. But the women’s movement was brutally
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details, please see: Martin Lau, “Twenty-Five Years of Hudood Ordinances—A Review,” Washington & Lee Law
Review 64 (2007): 1291-1314.
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In my study of civil society within the hybrid regime of Pakistan, I focus my attention on those
actors of civil society who, in order to establish themselves in the public sphere, at times compromised
their autonomy against the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling elite.29
Part IV: Role of Civil Society in Hybrid Regimes
In most cases, the contemporary authoritarian state is unable to maintain power simply
through the maintenance of a closed monolithic, homogenous state order, with clear
domain boundaries from both the market and from civil society. Instead, an assemblage
of formal and informal networks, economic, and financial flows, and discursive,
symbolic, and performative dynamics all serve to constitute the contemporary
authoritarian state. (Lewis 2013, 330)
Civil society is discussed in innumerable articles and books; many focus on the origins of civil
society for the establishment of the state first and foremost. The works of canonical writers of political
theory, such as Hobbes,30 Locke, and Rousseau, place civil society as crucial for the formation of the
state. Supporters of the premise that civil society is key to understanding how democracies originate and
develop make an implicit assumption that civil society does not exist or is weak under authoritarian
regimes. This is not necessarily the case. Civil society exists in all countries, although at different levels
and with varying formal and organizational structures.
Democratic countries, unlike authoritarian regimes, tend to have established civil societies and, in
some cases, they are even institutionalized.31 Nonetheless, these societies do exist even under the least
favorable conditions. Opponents of the premise that civil society can lead to democracy argue that the
assumption that all associations promote trust is deeply flawed, when organizations such as the mafia or
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A more comprehensive analysis of Pakistan’s civil society actors, the print-media and non-government
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Though, for Hobbes, civil society is secondary to the authority of the sovereign. The sovereign is the state itself,
and it is the sovereign who has the absolute power (Hobbes 1996, 129). Hobbes argued that the sovereign prescribes
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In some developed countries, the environmentalists have now a significant role to play in directing the state to
revise its industrial policies for the protection of the environment—for example, the Alliance 90/The Greens of
Germany and Green Party of England and Wales. Both these political parties were initiated in the public sphere as
civil society actors, later to have a greater impact on environmental policies reconstituted into political parties.
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racial supremacist groups are considered (Berman 1997a, 1997b; Chambers 2002; Chambers and
Kopstein 2001). They are also critical of the leap taken by the proponents of the theory who argue that
civil society necessarily engenders social capital.
Proponents of the positive role of civil society include Putnam (1993), who in his study measured
in Tocquevillean terms the degree of voluntary associational participation. In that often cited study, he
argued that Italy’s democratic success should be accredited to the vibrant, civic associational participation
that transpired in the northern region of Italy. According to Putnam, it was the occurrence and
fortification of social capital, which constituted “features of social organization, such as trust, norms and
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions,” that ushered in
the process of democratization in the country (167). Since then, many scholarly works (e.g., Edwards
2014; Foley and Edwards 1996) reflected Putnam’s Tocquevillean operationalization of civil society,
proclaiming the same findings and leading to a consensus around Putnam’s thesis.
In contrast, critics, in response to the assertion that voluntary associations inevitably produce
social capital, counter that this is a contingent, not an automatic outcome. Civil society has as much
potential for tribalism and exclusivity as for the desire to work together for the common good (Kymlicka
1995; Berman 1997a, 1997b; Young 1999; Chambers and Kopstein 2001). Therefore, without disputing
the analytical value of civil society, many studies have directly challenged the hypothesis that civil
society is a necessary condition for democratization. These projects have revealed that, in fact, while civil
society has contributed to democratic efforts in some cases at various points in time, the link is tenuous.
That is to say, agents of civil society are most likely to advance democracy when the formal institutions
of the state generate the incentive structure to do so. Hence, when that incentive structure is absent, the
converse is more likely to occur (Berman 1997a, 1997b; Chambers and Kopstein 2001).
Thus, the assumption that there exists a simple approach to development of the link between
growth of associational life and democratization has even led to scholars to question that vitality of this
simple conceptualization. Encarnacion (2006) in his essay contends this simplistic notion has initiated a
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“civil society backlash” (357). That is to say, the heroic narrative of civil society’s role toward
democratization misses the essential point: the role that state institutions play in supporting its version of
state-sponsored associations that challenge the oppositional, so-called activist associational life in the
society. For example, an illuminating study by Spires (2011) shows how the state-sponsored citizen
associations in China have enabled the authoritarian state to be further entrenched in the societal
associational groups. These government-owned non-governmental organizations, commonly known as
GONGOs, are another attribute relevant to the literature on hybrid regimes. Spires noted in his
observation of these GONGOs that “we should not assume that NGOs in an authoritarian state, even
independent grassroots organizations, are working toward democratic purposes” (35).
If a state’s political institutions are capable of channeling and redressing associational grievances,
then civil society is likely to contribute to the advancement or deepening of democracy. However, if the
existing political regime is (or is perceived to be) ineffective or provides no reciprocity for civic
associations, then civil society is likely to undermine political stability, deepen social cleavages, further
dissatisfaction, and provide a breeding ground for disparate oppositional groups to grow (Berman 1997a,
428-29). In reality, therefore, it is the receptive political institutions established as result of the state’s
communicative engagement with the society that solidifies the democratic state. If the rules and
institutions devised by the state are able to draw on society’s concerns, then the civil society acts to
support the state—even when it is not a democratic state.
In his study on citizen associations and state authority’s communicative linkages in the
authoritarian China, Hsu (2010) suggested that “the people who run Chinese NGOs tend to view state as a
resource-rich conglomeration of competing actors, and agencies, and therefore the best source of alliances
available for NGOs” (260). Furthermore, in his interviews with civil society actors, Hsu found that the
activists valued the symbiotic relationship of their NGOs and with the state agencies and activists asserted
“the purpose of their NGOs was not to weaken or replace the state, but instead to strengthen that state and
help it fulfill its responsibilities to its citizens” (Hsu 2010, 328).
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As shall be seen in the discussion to follow, the military regimes in the state of Pakistan exacted
cooperation and support from the civil society actors in the implementation of their governance plans.
The civil society actors (media, academia) were not able to challenge the military regimes in
these regimes’ attempts to legitimize their rule over the polity through the design of such devolution
plans. The presence of civil society posed no threat to the ruling hybrid political institutions, such as the
selectively elected legislature, the morphed Constitution, or a weak executive.
In fact, the civil society was no more than a bystander to the institutional measures devised by the
military junta. This is also because civil society under the hybrid regime in Pakistan has played a minimal
role in challenging the super-narratives devised by the military rulers. These narratives—the vulnerability
of the state to India’s aggression and the Islamist narrative of safeguarding Islamic values—greatly
restricted the activism of the liberal voices of civil society. In contrast, the religious sentiments within
civil society found a much more supportive patronage by the military state. Under the military rule of
General Zia-ul-Haq, religion inspired civil society actors, such as the Islamist scholarship, and its
influence in devising the state’s laws was favored by the military dictator.32
The military has such a perpetual control over the political power, and by virtue of its strong
coercive position in society, the military regularly co-opts the political and civil society. As will be seen
in the discussion to follow, in this hybrid mosaic that combines authoritarian principles with democratic
rules, the activism of civil society has been a casualty of the hybridity of the regime. The state, under the
military rule or the civilian elected rule, however, has always had control over the civil society. The
oppositional challenge from the civil society against the authoritarian practices of the state has been
largely missing.
In gathering material for civil society engagement with the military state on matter of governance,
I found that civil society activists showed their disappointment with the lack of any open and vibrant civil
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society in Pakistan. The actors belonging to the civil society in Pakistan are the human rights groups:
charitable organizations, women’s rights associations, academia and the print media. The most active
among these actors is the print and electronic media. The print media in Pakistan is the oldest civil society
actor; despite the continual military dictatorships and ongoing hybrid regime, the print media have been
actively engaged in raising social and political awareness.
Since the 1980s, another of actor has emerged in the nascent civil society of Pakistan—the nongovernment organizations (NGOs). These organizations were initially formed by socially active citizens
to help address society’s development needs. These organizations were engaged in varied social causes,
such as women’s and minority rights, and protection of the rights of Afghan refugees in the aftermath of
political and social unrest in Pakistan’s neighboring country, Afghanistan. During the decades of the
1980s and the 1990s, the NGOs actively engaged with the state for the Afghan cause, but into the
millennium, state and civil society engagement experienced a sharp downturn. Nevertheless, the NGOs
remained actively engaged with rural and urban communities to address their developmental needs.
NGOs work in the communities, and their financial and technical affiliation with international donor
agencies make them the most prominent of the civil society actors.
In Pakistan, civil society means non-governmental organizations or NGOs. In my interviews with
political and bureaucratic elite, academics, and even NGO personnel, all 29 of the interviewees (with the
exception of the four academics interviewed) unapologetically asserted that civil society is the NGO; they
believe that in Pakistan the NGOs are the paradigmatic examples of civil society.33 However, the purpose
of this research is not to debate the merits and demerits of civil society, or what constitutes civil society in
a theoretical debate. My focus is primarily on the role that civil society actors such as the print media and
NGOs play in a hybrid regime.
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As I have shown through the material discussed in the above section, the hybrid regime in
Pakistan granted a minimal role to the civil society actors. In doing so, the incumbents of the hybrid
regime exhibited a strong resolve to strengthen their rule, in part by branding themselves friends of
democracy. However, in their attempt to capture political power, the rulers ransacked the democratic
system of governance. By contrast, the extent and ability of civil society to challenge these discourses
were absent and did not therefore have any effect on the crafted political institutionalization spearheaded
by the hybrid regime.
Political scientists tend to see civil society and state as separate yet interdependent entities
(Edwards 2014, 23-26).34 Following Migdal (1988), I believe that state and societal groups coexist in a
complex social milieu. They therefore contest, cooperate, and affect each other in ways that shape both of
them. The liberal thought on state and civil society interaction (informed by neo-Tocquevilleans such as
Robert Putnam) asserts that there exists an autonomous being that is the civil society. This view suggests
that for the sustainable value of democratic principles, the being of the civil society provides a platform
for the populace to voice their interests, concerns, and needs to the state. This view sees civil society
actors as conduits of democratization leading toward democracy.
But what about in those regimes that are authoritarian? In such a regime, can the entity of civil
society coexist within the authoritarian state? In my review of the contemporary scholarship on
authoritarianism and hybrid regimes, I find that these questions remain unanswered. The evaluative
discussion on the presence of civil society actors and their role in hybrid regimes is absent.
By viewing civil society as systemically distinct from the state and only as a location of resistance
to political hegemony, we miss out on the complex and nuanced state-civil society relationship in which
the two support each other. The point is, in complex social milieu, non-government associations and the
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state are intricately entwined in a complex multi-layered network of material transactions, personal
connections, and organizational linkages. Civil society generates debate and carries issues from the
margins of society to the centers of power of the state. This communicative schema carries forward those
societal concerns that might otherwise never reach the radar of institutional politics. Young (2002) has
argued, “[T]hough civil society stands in tension with state institutions, a strengthening of both is
necessary to deepen democracy” (156). Furthermore, she has emphatically contended that even in
democratic societies, the “state institutions are prone to abuse their power” (194) and hence it is the role
of civil society to check the state’s authoritarianism.
Now the question arises: How do we as students of civil society develop an understanding of the
role of civil society in such regimes that thrive on the close social complexity of state-society interaction?
These regimes gain access to civil society not only through the manipulation of institutions of state but
also by directing and leading the hegemonic discourses in the society. This last point is of crucial
importance to the last section of this chapter, where I make the conceptual link between the deliberative
theory of democracy and hybrid regimes.35
Part V: State-Civil Society in Hybrid Regimes
It is my interest in civil society and institutional design that has led me to the study of state and
society relations. Though I realized this late in my research, all through the beginning of my research I
was, in fact, interested in how to address the communicative link between the state and civil society. This
interest in addressing this question brought me into close contact with democratic theory. I quickly
became interested in the deliberative theory of democracy, especially in the writings of Jurgen Habermas,
John Dryzek, Iris Marion Young, Jane Mansbridge, Simone Chambers, Seyla Benhabib, Archon Fung,
Mark Warren, John Parkinson, Stephen Elstub, Carolyn Hendriks, James Bohman, Jon Elster, and others.
A close look at the writings of these scholars helped me become familiar with their particular views, but
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more generally with the normative development of the theory of democracy emphasizing communicative
interexchange between state and society. These deliberative democrats have argued that for a polity to
devise rules of governing society, the state institutions and associations of civil society ought to publicly
engage in the exchange of ideas. Deliberative democrats believe rules to govern society in a polity can
never be relegated to civil society nor be a privileged domain of the state.
However, as I delved into the theory of deliberative democracy and tried to make sense of the
case of Pakistan, I realized that the deliberative theory of democracy from a normative perspective lacks
sufficient conceptual tools to explain the complex political state of Pakistan. Hence, I began my journey
to understand how civil society should be conceptualized in the case of hybrid regimes. In the discussion
to follow, I look at the role of civil society in hybrid regimes more generally, and most specifically in the
case of Pakistan. As I have mentioned, in the beginning my focus was on investigating the state-civil
society communicative interexchange in the specific case of devolution plans devised by the state in
Pakistan.
But as I show in the discussion to follow in subsequent chapters, the ruling elite within the hybrid
regime in Pakistan devised institutional rules to maximize their control over the political landscape. The
military devised rules that strengthened its control over the political scene, targeting most specifically the
grassroots in order to achieve popular legitimacy. Indeed, all through the political history of Pakistan, the
designing of devolution plans was undertaken by the military elite. In doing so, the military had enacted
and sustained the hybrid political regime, combining democratic institutions with authoritarian principles.
In such a regime, the state-civil society interaction was highly problematic, because as other formal
institutions had been compromised to support the military rule, the state-civil society communicative
interexchange was also short-lived.
The answer available in the theory of deliberative democracy is that episodic deliberation in
authoritarian and hybrid regions is possible. In other words, for advocates of deliberative democracy,
episodic deliberation in illiberal democracy is permissible (Dryzek 2010, 136) . For example, in his work,
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Dryzek (2009, 2010) emphasized that even if regimes are authoritarian, in such regimes the rulers engage
with society to devise institutional measures to foster deliberation. Such engagement of authoritarian
states, Dryzek (2009, 2010) argued, signals the “deliberative capacity” of the regime. Dryzek (2010)
asserted that even in Communist China at the macro level, i.e., at the highest level of the Communist
Party, this does not mean that China “does not have any deliberative capacity, [for] it might be found in
participatory innovations at the local level” (139). Furthermore, Dryzek (2010) believes “[D]eliberative
capacity does not have to be sought in any particular set of institutions (such as elections), but can be
manifested in different ways in different systems” (136). Dryzek (2009, 2010) identified that a political
system—regardless of whether it is authoritarian or democratic—can engage in deliberation between state
and society. He argued that deliberation in a system can initiate if it is authentic, inclusive, and
consequential. Authentic means that actors in deliberation are willing interlocutors and engage in
communicative interexchange in “noncoercive fashion” (Dryzek 2010, 137).
Furthermore, actors engaged in communicative engagement do not enact barriers to exclude any
segment of the society; in other words, ideas, opinions, and language are open for all and are inclusive.
Moreover, communicative interexchange between state and civil society actors is consequential, i.e., it
generates an “impact upon collective decisions, or social outcomes” (Dryzek 2010, 137). However, the
impact “need not be direct” (Dryzek 2010, 137) in the sense that tangible decisions or policies are
devised. The fact of matter is, as Dryzek (2010) argued, communicative interexchange as a process is
long-term and ongoing in the public sphere and thus should not be tied to any specific policy.
When I analyze the case of devolution planning in Pakistan, I see that the three components of
Dryzek’s defined “deliberative capacity” were not pervasive either in the time of direct military rule or
when elected governments controlled political power. The military devised devolution plans to strengthen
its control of the political environment. The plans (Basic Democracy under General Ayub Khan and Local
Government Ordinance under General Zia-ul-Haq) were devised by the military government by
downgrading the voices of political and civil society. The regimes of that time were not authentic,
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inclusive, or consequential. Similarly, the elected governments’ performance in the 1990s also lacked
these very characteristics that could have generated deliberative capacity for the fledgling democracy.
The basic argument is that in the authoritarian regime of military rule in Pakistan, during the
military dictatorships, the military elite had manipulated the institutions of the state to control political
power. In enacting institution policies—passing a presidential referendum to elect a military dictator as
president, granting extra-constitutional powers to the military general/president, devising local
government plans to grant the military regime a popular base, and allowing the electoral competition for a
military-controlled legislature—the military elite was given strong control over the political scene. On the
other hand, during the democratically elected governments, the political elite was affected by the deep
impacts of authoritarian imprints of the last military rule.
As I have shown in this chapter, the military’s influence in politics never weakened, even during
governance by the elected political elite. Even then, the military retained substantial control over its own
interests, such as its share of the government’s resources and its independence from civilian control. This
created for the military the reserved policy domain which no civilian elected governments could
disengage. Thus, a hybrid regime was established, combining the military’s strong presence with a
weakened political elite. In such a scenario, the political elite itself was a nascent entity, and thus civil
society was also devalued. However, civil society actors such as the media and NGOs showed resilience
when pitted against the military and political elite.36
As I show in subsequent chapters, communicative interexchange between the state and civil
society under both military rule and elected governments was selective and sporadic. It was active
exclusively during the third military rule, between 1999 and 2007. In contrast, I argue in chapter 3 that
state and civil society communicative interexchange did not exist under the previous two military
dictatorships, from 1958 to 1969 and from 1977to 1988. However, once communicative interexchange
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did take place, it was selective and exclusively centered on making the Local Government Plan of 2001
(LGP) an unconventional but acceptable governance reform for the society at large.
Between 1999 and 2007, the civil society actors did raise oppositional voices against the military
regime’s objective to legitimize its rule through reform initiatives, but, at the same time, civil society did
acquiesce to these reform measures. Thus, I show in chapter 4 that civil society did enable the state to
implement its devolution plan and gain a base of popular support for the military’s devised institutions of
local government.
In chapter 5, however, I show that such an arrangement between the military regime and civil
society was rendered ineffective by the political society, because when the politically elected
governments took control of the political setting, the political elite decided the fate of the LGP. In chapter
5, in an evaluation of the LGP devised by General Musharraf’s regime, I show that the communicative
interexchange between the military government and civil society concealed the reality of the subjugation
of political institutions to dictatorial decrees. This concealment was exposed when the locus of political
power moved away from the military general to the elected political elite.
Literature on State-Civil Society Interexchange in Hybrid Regimes
In the literature on hybrid regimes, the role of civil society has been regarded by political
scientists mostly as an antidote to an authoritarian legacy. But scholarly discussion on civil society within
hybrid regimes does not indicate an examination of state and civil society communicative engagement.
On the contrary, within the theory of deliberative democracy, the role of communicative interexchange
between the state and civil society is primarily to develop sustainable political institutions. Within hybrid
regimes, there is an overreliance on the state to formulate institutional rules, which enables the state to
regulate society, and thus civil society is seen as a nonexistent entity. Scholars discuss civil society as a
separate entity on its own merits, but how civil society might participate in deliberation on institutional
design is missing in contemporary scholarship. In other words, scholars studying hybrid regimes have
considered civil society only as a secondary afterthought.
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The discussion on democratization does feature civil society, as shown by Juan Linz and Alfred
Stepan (1996) in their work Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe. However, that discussion also does not illuminate how civil
society should be working or is currently working in hybrid regimes that have yet to reach the
consolidation phase.
Linz and Stepan (1996) emphasized the importance of “arenas” of contestation that must be
fostered in new democracies in their advance toward consolidation. These arenas are a robust civil
society, political society, rule of law, bureaucracy (i.e., state apparatus), and economic society. Linz and
Stepan asserted that the first three arenas relate to the definitional issues of the democracy (i.e., they must
exist), and the other two are signs that democracy has indeed moved toward maturity or consolidation.
These scholars of democratization believe that with the active presence of all these arenas in the
democracy, the polity’s journey toward consolidation ensues. These arenas signal the significant
emergence of paradigmatic features for democracy to take root. These features pertain to behavioral,
attitudinal, and constitutional aspects of the polity. The behavioral characteristic applies to all political
and social groups in society and relates to their realization that none of the groups can dismantle the
democratic government. The attitudinal characteristic applies to the population of the polity in its entirety
in the sense that the majority (citizens, elites, groups) all work within the parameters of the “democratic
formulas” to make changes in politics. The constitutional characteristic relates to the maturity of the
institutions of the state and the fact that the state apparatus is governed by their arrangement, and each
functions according to its specialized tasks.
However, in this discussion we do not see the role of civil society and where it plays a part in the
consolidation mapping of the democratic regime. In the previous chapter, when I presented a literature
review of the deliberative theory of democracy, I discussed how Habermas conceptualized and presented
civil society as significant in making deliberative democracy possible. Habermas (1998, 2006) contended
that civil society is a mediating set of institutions that “distill” (Habermas 1998, 367) concerns from the
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private sphere and transmit them to a public sphere in an institutionalized form. This institutionalized
form does not mean that the institutions are formal in the sense that they are electorally, politically, and
legally sanctioned to amplify citizen voices. These institutions refer to the informal yet organized citizen
bodies that advocate their specific interests. These citizen bodies may be the collective of individual
citizens; the bodies can be organized associations that perform the task of voicing citizens’ interests based
on reasons of solidarity. Take, for example, the multifaceted social movements that resulted from citizen
engagement and which effected changes to laws: the civil rights movement during the 1960s in the United
States, the student movements of the 1960s in Europe, the Solidarity movement in Poland in the 1980s,
and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa in the 1980s and ’90s.
In all these examples, it is crucial to note that the collective voices of the aggrieved citizens did
not have any institutional outlet. Of course, they were able to mobilize citizen groups, but their material
participation in “distilling” concerns from the private sphere to the public sphere inevitably lacked the
support from the authoritative state apparatus.37 Nevertheless, these movements did have a public forum,
i.e., the public sphere, where the aggrieved voices raised their concerns. In contrast, the Civil Rights
movement in US, the Solidarity movement in Poland and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa
had to face the coercive force of the state.
The issue therefore is that, in most authoritarian states, any notion of public forum and sphere—
an arena for public discussion where actions by the state may be contested—has been severely limited by
a formal censorship regime; the physical repression of political activists, journalists, and writers; or a
range of more indirect forms of pressure by agents and organs of the state (Mansbridge 1996; Hendriks
2006).
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generating alternative voices against the authoritarian practices of the state (Tarrow 1998).
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In such environments, where the public sphere is non-existent or highly constrained, authoritarian
states expend considerable resources in restricting the ability of civil society to act as producers of any
emerging public arena of discussion (Brownlee 2009). Thus, while many authoritarian states might permit
civil organizations to operate, at least to some degree,38 they consistently take careful measures to prevent
such associations from developing discursive activities that would contribute to a public sphere in which
non-official discourses might circulate (Chandhoke 2001, 10-14).
My argument is that the rise of autonomous institutions is closely related to the nature of state
domination over society. The state may provide a role for non-governmental associations in making
public policies through lobbying, plebiscite rights, or legislative initiative rights. In order for civil society
to develop, this hypothesis argues, there has to be an opening of the political public sphere to independent
groups and organizations. But in the case of hybrid regimes, the state can be highly selective in opening
up the space for any institutions of collective action to emerge. Authoritarian regimes, therefore, in order
to maintain tight control over the oppositional narratives and discourses, repress and subvert the spheres
from which any such discourses might emerge. The emergence of oppositional discourses not only poses
a challenge to the dominant official discourse, but it is also detrimental to the survival of the authoritarian
incumbents.
Discussion of civil society in hybrid regimes is considered a separate topic demanding evaluative
research. However, in the democratization literature, Guillermo O’Donnell and Phillipe Schmitter (1986)
have provided the keystone scholarship on the transition of authoritarian regimes. These scholars are
cognizant of the fact that authoritarian regimes face continual challenges to their regimes from
challengers inside the regime and from oppositional forces. They argue that even within authoritarian
regimes, there are forces that pressure regime incumbents to liberalize and open up the space for citizen
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engagement. These scholars do not see civil society as an entity to actively engage with the state; civil
society is seen as secondary to the state. The state remains the decisive force directing civil society in the
support of the state.
Likewise, in their discussion on opening up the space for citizen engagement in the USSR, Linz
and Stepan (1996) argued that with the shifting power structure and ideology in the Soviet Union under
Gorbachev, the Soviet Union reduced its military expenditure and opened up space for citizen
engagement, which therefore had an effect on how oppositional actors in the society behaved. The case of
the USSR indicated that when economic and political hegemony of the communist state was loosened,
institutions of collective action started emerging around various interests that already existed in society.
Hybridity of Interaction: State and Society Communicative Interexchange in Pakistan
In the above discussion on state-society in hybrid regimes, I have tried to show that in the wake
of the hybrid regime, the concept of civil society is seen as secondary to the power of state. Civil society
in the hybrid political landscape plays a minimal role, or a role that is clearly outlined by the regime to
support the state in the application of the state’s developmental projects. In this scenario, the state and
civil society develop a mutually beneficial mode of cooperation involving an exchange based on common
goals and complementary activities and functions (Fung and Wright 2003; Parkinson 2004; Hendriks
2006; Fung 2006). Based on this discussion on civil society in hybrid regime, I critically evaluate the state
and civil society interchange in Pakistan.
Civil society in Pakistan is an elusive entity and is therefore difficult to conceptualize. As an
entity, any organizational and associational forces of citizens coming together to form like-minded citizen
groups and associations is lacking in Pakistan. Citizen groups such as women’s groups, minority groups,
student groups, trade unions, and workers’ associations are missing in the local parlance of what
constitutes civil society. Other than the print and electronic media, the entity most commonly regarded as
the civil society in Pakistan has been recognized with the emergence of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
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In the case of Pakistan, the civil society that has existed has been manipulated by the ruling elite.
Less frequently and much less effectively, the civil society engaged politically with the state to voice its
grievances, but it has not been able to build a coherent platform. One reason for this lack of effectiveness
and disparity in the civil society vis-à-vis the state is the civil society’s lack of organization. In addition,
the permeation of ethnic cleavages in Pakistan’s civil society has had a detrimental effect on efforts to
counter the authoritarianism of the state.
Washbrook (1999) noted a colonial civil society that was “divided” along communal lines was
well-suited to British governance that privileged the state as a nonpartisan force for social integration. The
communal divide shown in the Hindu-Muslim divide in British India was transformed into an ethnic
divide in newly created Pakistan. The communal divide that produced the partition of British India was
amplified in a contentious ethnic divide in the newly created Pakistan. The new state was not prepared for
a civil society organized along ethnic lines, which fueled and intensified political polarization. Pakistan
was established because of religious differences with India, yet the ethnic and linguistic distinctions
within the various provinces of the new state nation revealed a diverse civil society.
East Pakistan differed with West Pakistan on the division of political power, while within West
Pakistan, the seemingly homogenized civil society was divided on the deep ethnic divide that persisted
(Jaffrelot 2002, 18-29). The nationalist movements stemmed from the increasingly diversified regions of
Pakistan: the nationalist movement of Baluch in Baluchistan, the Pukhtun nationalist movement from
NWFP, and the confrontational political struggle in the province of Sindh between native Sindhis and
immigrants from Muslim minority provinces of India, who settled in Sindh following the partition of
British India.
Such a regional ethnic divide resulted in a chasm between the political and civil society and the
ruling elite. This rift proved to be a challenge for the newly independent state of Pakistan, and the state
wrestled with how to suppress existing ethnic, social, and cultural differences (Amin 1988). In the post-
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colonial state, the highly differentiated civil society vis-à-vis an evolving political society was a challenge
to the evolution of representative institutions.
In the postcolonial setting, the ruling elite squabbled over creating a share of political power in
the polity. The political elite expended less energy on pacifying their internal differences than on
designing political institutions. Instead, the political society purposefully depoliticized the diverse civil
society in the service of an authoritarian state. The internal disarray amongst the political elite paved the
way for praetorian encroachment. Individual rights; state accountability to the citizenry; freedoms of
expression, dissent, and critical thinking; provincial autonomy and decentralization—all were
conveniently banished under the overarching rubric of threats to national security posed by hostile
neighbors: Afghanistan to the west, India to the east.
Thus, the state’s prioritization of defense over development, combined with the external
imperatives of the cold war, opened the door for the rise of civil-military bureaucracies within its power
structures. Dominance of the coercive arms of the state over parliamentary ones not only impeded the
development of democratic initiatives and civil society (Jalal [1990] 2007; Rais 1997; H. A. Rizvi 2003);
it also generated tensions among nascent political institutions of state and pitted military-bureaucratic
forces against democratic principles.
This tendency has remained consistent and pervasive since the establishment of Pakistan; up to
the present, the state’s reliance on authoritative diktats has prevailed. In such a scenario, the emergence of
any such voices that challenge the dominance of undemocratic forces has remained on the fringes. There
have even been instances, especially during the military coups, when the overtly divided civil society
(both critics and the supporters of military rule) has welcomed the military elite to take control of political
institutions.
Long-term martial rules in the country have systemically affected the organizational abilities of
the citizenry, particularly like-minded associational groups that could develop into an organizational
entity or vibrant civil society. Since Pakistan’s independence in 1947, its military-dominated authoritarian
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governments have coerced, co-opted, and manipulated important vocal groups in civil and political
society to suit their own agendas, which included legitimizing and prolonging military rule. Thus,
consistent periods of autocratic rule characterized by the arbitrary suspension of political processes,
forceful assault on opposition and dissent, and overtly strong centralization of state authority have largely
depoliticized the civil society, stunting its evolution and its ability to influence any substantive political
change.
For their part, civilian-led governments have all too frequently exceeded the limits of democratic
authority and violated parliamentary codes of conduct, making the task of institutionalizing democratic
norms and values even more difficult. Given this peculiar pattern of historical development, civil society
is weakly organized and unable to regulate non-state governance effectively or to articulate public
interests independently and organize for collective action.
Civil Society Actors Under the Military Rules
The state of martial and praetorian rules in Pakistan has much to do with the historical makings of
the country, based on the communal and religious divide, as well as its vast borders with hostile
neighbors. The political elite’s inability and ineffectiveness in reconciling the state-society disconnect
have also contributed to the long military rule in the country. The military in Pakistan has thus
rationalized its engagement in politics by reserving its veto on matters of national security. Because of its
control of the coercive apparatus and its internal bureaucratic cohesion, the military has successively
asserted itself on the political and civil society.
Despite the restrictions on civil society, however, two civil society actors have been able to
remain relevant to political processes under all conditions. These two actors are the NGOs and the print
media, despite the overt control of the military and elected governments alike. Both military and elected
governments have always imposed their hegemony on the NGOs and the media through legalistic and
coercive means.
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In the next chapter, I discuss how these actors in the public sphere have been co-opted,
compromised, and coerced to further the dominant discourse advocated by the state in the service of the
regime’s incumbents. In the course of discussion, I show that these actors challenged the state but also
compromised on their objective of contentious politics.
Concluding Remarks
For the advocates of deliberative democracy, state and civil society are the two distinctive
“tracks” engaged in communicative interexchange to transform the political system to achieve
deliberative democracy. The leading deliberative democrat, Habermas, conceptualized two kinds of
deliberation occurring in these two tracks. The state persists in having decision making take place within
formal political institutions, that is to say, within the walls of the legislature and through the workings of
institutions such as elections and political parties. The state is uniformly administrative in making
decisions that regulate society.
Civil society, on the other hand, is attuned to the plurality of interests in society. The kind of
deliberation that takes place among civil society is public, decentralized, distributed, informal, and
diffuse, with the assumed function of setting the agenda for the formal institutions of the administrative
state. For Habermas, the “sluice” metaphor is supposed to capture the relation between the two tracks (the
formal and informal); in other words, the “sluice” suggests a filtering mechanism connecting the
unstructured deliberations of the people to those of elected elites.
This conceptualization of deliberative democracy is a potent marker to evaluate contemporary
democracies in terms of communicative interexchange between the two tracks. But this persuasive
theoretical lens is tested when applied to political systems that fall short on democratic principles. The
two tracks envisaged by deliberative democrats face a challenge within the political system that combines
democratic principles with authoritarian practices. As explained, such political systems are defined as
hybrid regimes. In such regimes, as I have discussed, a persistent shadow of authoritarianism is carried
forward from previous undemocratic regimes, and the effect creates a lasting impact on the evolving
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political system. In the political regime formed out of authoritarianism, the assumption of interactive
communicative interexchange thus reduces to a wishful claim. For in such a regime, the actors belonging
to state and the nascent civil society are constantly entwined in a game of asserting and reasserting
themselves.
The consequence of this constant tussle might result in moments of communicative interexchange
between state and civil society, without ever disrupting the hybridity of the political regime. In the
chapters to follow, I present and critically evaluate the state and communicative interexchange within the
hybrid regime of Pakistan.

CHAPTER 3
ACTORS IN THE PUBLIC SPHERE: POLITICAL PARTIES, PRINT MEDIA, AND NGOS
Military state authoritarianism in Pakistan has developed in relation to contests between the civilmilitary bureaucracy and the legislative institutions of the state over autonomy, legitimacy, and
access to resources, including the legitimate means of violence. (Naqvi 2013, 280)
Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was discussed, authoritarian rulers are mainly interested in rents and to
maximize their time in office. The longer a regime can stay in power, the more resources it can extract
over time. In order to secure their survival and to extract rents, there are two possible strategies to make
the population comply: cooperation and coercion (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Gandhi 2008). Scholars
studying rent maximizing dictatorial regimes argue cooperation is not a viable pure strategy (Brownlee
2007; Magaloni 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Morlino 2009; Schedler 2002, 2010; Svolik 2012).
And, since coercion limits the ruling elite in its power to extract resources, it will choose a mixed
strategy. Therefore, democratic institutions are the instrument to introduce elements of cooperation.
Hence, in this regard, so as to ensure cooperation, authoritarian regimes gradually construct rules,
institutions, and processes to define the distribution of decision-making powers among various groups in
the society creating a veneer of democracy. Such a façade however does not guarantee that resulting
regime shall be democratic – such regimes, as I have discussed in the previous chapter are called hybrid
regimes. In such regimes, the nature of concessions reached during the period(s) of dictatorial rule(s)
between regimes’ incumbents and the groups - who received these concessions determine the institutional
structure of the resulting democratic regime. The argument presented in this chapter asserts that an
authoritarian regime inevitably leaves authoritarian footprints on the future political regimes to follow.
Thus, in the case of Pakistan, the ruling elite that includes state institutions such as the military,
elected and civil bureaucracy have devised institutions that are fundamentally authoritarian than
122
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democratic. Most analysts of the Pakistani state and politics view the ruling elite to be in a continual
cooperative oligarchic relationship between the landed feudal elites and the civil and military
bureaucracy. This ruling elite constitutes the military, bureaucracy, industrialists, feudal landlords, and
religious leaders (Jalal [1990] 2007; Waseem 1989; Malik 1997; Siddiqa 2016, 2017). This ruling elite in
common parlance is also known as ‘establishment’.1 It is this establishment that decides on the political
system of the country; determining matters such as who is to rule over the country? Who should be given
political space? Which segments of society have to be curtailed? What state discourse to be generated and
strengthened in the public? What counter discourses have to be curtailed, etc.
In contrast to the power of the establishment, the other or the ‘subaltern’ segments of society,
such as the ethnic minorities, women, teachers, peasants, workers, and journalists tend to reflect the
subordinate views. Their views stand in contrast to voice the dominant view guarded by the so-called
establishment. A noted Pakistani sociologist Hassan Gardezi argues, “There is a deadly combination of
forces that sustains the praetorian role of the Pakistani state and retards the process of democratization in
the country” (Gardezi 1991, 139). Hence, if subaltern voices contest the dominant view, the state
unleashes its coercive apparatus by enactment of institutional measures such as enactment of regulatory
laws by which the state censored and controlled counter subordinate voices in forms such as direct
violence to exact cooperation by coopting the counter discourses. In short, in contemporary Pakistani
society, the elite groups control all the power and resources; they are the ones who are at the top echelons
of state authority and power.
1

Ayesha Siddiqa, “Mapping the ‘Establishment,’” in Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence,
edited by Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq (Routledge, 2016), 53-71.
Philip Oldenburg. “Loyalty, disloyalty, and semi-loyalty in Pakistan’s hybrid regime,” Commonwealth &
Comparative Politics 55, no. 1 (2017): 82-103.
Also refer to Mushahid Hussain, a former Information Minister under the elected government of Nawaz Sharif
from 1997-1999 in newspaper op-ed contends that establishment is made up of only 500 people belonging to the
various segments of the society, constituting military and civilians. Please see his newspaper articles:
“Establishment, President and Prime Minister,” The Nation. Nov. 3, 1996.
“Whither Pakistan’s Establishment?” The Nation. June 18, 2002.
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Chapter Outline
In this chapter, I shall be discussing the actors in the public sphere in case of Pakistan. These
actors discussed are political and civil society actors, mainly political parties, print media and nongovernment respectively. In their own capacities, these actors have been coopted by the various military
and elected regimes. These actors have cooperated with the regimes of the day, though their cooperation
has been at times extracted by the state through means of coercion.
The following discussion is divided into four parts. In the first part I discuss the role of political
parties, print media and the non-government organizations within a political community. The second part
discusses political parties and their conduct during times of military and elected rule; the print media
especially in the times of the military and elected rule; the third set of actors are the non-government
organizations that had occupied the public sphere in the early 90s. And, it was under the third military
government of General Pervez Musharraf the NGOs were the enthusiastic partners for implementation of
his regime’s devolution plan.
The discussion in the third part of the chapter features analysis of the interviews with the
representatives of the NGOs working in Pakistan – the views expressed by these representatives delve
into the civil society-state communicative engagement on the design of devolution plans in Pakistan.2 The
last part concludes the discussion presented in the chapter summarizing the argument on three actors
discussed in this chapter and their conduct vis-à-vis military and elected governments respectively.
But before a detailed discussion of the case of Pakistan is analyzed in the following section, I
look at the entities of political parties, print media and non-governmental organizations in a political
community. The presence of these entities reflects on the role of political and civil society in generation
and endurance of communicative interexchange with the institutions of the state.

2

This however, does not suggest that NGOs cooperation to the military regime had provided legitimacy to the rule
of Musharraf. In fact, there were NGOs such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) that had been a
vociferous critic of regime’s devolution design.
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Why Political Parties; Print Media and Non-Governmental Organizations?
As the title of chapter suggest, in this chapter there are two main actors that are under discussion,
I focus my attention to the three constitutive members belonging to the two distinctive group of actors
i.e., political society and the civil society. The political parties are one such member that belongs to the
political society, and whereas the other two actors belonging to the civil society are the print media and
the non-government organizations (NGOs). These actors, I believe, are crucial constituents of any
political democracy.
Political Parties
The political parties are the conveyors that not only mobilize the people but also give them the
ideological platform by which the electorates are able to identify their political elite. The political elite are
the personification of the political parties. The political parties not only provide political contenders to
organize on certain ideological positions but political parties also are learning base for the newly
emerging political aspirants.
Because political parties are formed to channel demands and voices in a society to the arenas of
power, the political parties therefore are an extension of ruling elite. In his discussion on political parties
Huntington ([1968] 2006) argued that they enable the expansion of political participation and
mobilization. The main argument put forth by Huntington on political parties is that he believes that
though elections and legislatures have the elected representatives, however, this alone is not the necessary
condition for the presence of proper working political institutions. Huntington contends, it is the political
parties that structure the participation of new social groups in politics. He asserted that as political
institutions elections and parliament are ‘instruments of representation’ however it’s the political parties,
which are the ‘instruments of mobilization’. He strongly views that political parties, and the party system
are the crucial formal institutions that enable the fostering of political institutions in democracy.
Parties are considered institutionalized when they create ties of loyalty within their members;
with voters, and interest groups in the society. The more the political parties have outreach the greater
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their organizational complexity. The organizational complexity means that parties’ electoral presence is in
multiple territories or functional subunits within the state boundaries; the party has regular interaction
between its members with their constituents, and most importantly political party is not controlled by any
single charismatic leader (Lupu and Riedl 2012, 1348-49).
In the case of Pakistan, the establishment of political parties though have emerged as mobilizing
grounds for bringing in and accessing the citizenry by the ruling elite. However, as I have been able to
gather data through interviews and documentary evidence, it is found that the political parties lacked any
settled formalized ideological stand with which they could develop a direct associational and loyal voter
base. The political instability in Pakistan and continuous democratic reversals the political parties have
never been able to cement strong loyal voter base.
Pakistan’s political parties lack internal political organization along democratic principles.
Furthermore, the political parties also lack ideological commitment to democratic politics– the political
parties merely bring together aspirants for political power on organizational platform. In other words,
political parties in Pakistan operate merely as electoral entities indulging in public activity based on
patronage structures. These patronage structure are the base that provide political aspirants to engage in
electoral politics. The political aspirants activate patronage to the people in time of electioneering. After
election cycle is over these ‘entities’ become oblivious to the demands of the citizenry (Waseem 2002,
2016b).
The “[y]ears of political atrophy, long and frequent periods of martial law, the failure of
representative institutions, and especially the inability to develop and perpetuate responsible political
parties” have given rise to “more exclusive and parochial forms of political expression” (Ziring 1988,
798). The military and political elite realize that the political parties’ internal structures lack democratic
principles; while the former exploits the absence of democratic political commitment, the latter holds onto
its parochial practices and even offers military the opportunity to extract legitimacy for its regime(s)
through parties’ constituencies.
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The political parties are minimally ideologically driven; they are instead driven by the individual
political aspirants. These political aspirants draw on their familial, ethnic, and linguistic identities to
remain relevant on the political landscape. In other words, politicians’ relevance to electorates is drawn
from their individualistic styles which is an impression of their social, economic and cultural standing in
the society. The political party is not the organizing force that brings together the individual political
aspirants on certain ideological ground with which the politicians mobilize the electorates. Rather, the
electorate are attracted to the material benefits that political contenders promise to the constituents. The
political contenders thus assert their social and economic influence over the voters. The political party for
political aspirants is a mere rhetorical irritant of contemporary democratic politics.
Print Media
A leading deliberative democrat Jurgen Habermas contends that a political system cannot
function properly if the media is not a constitutive part of it. The media generates and amplifies the issues
faced in the public space to the other actors within a political system (Habermas 1974, 2006, 415). He
argues, “political system constitutes familiar institutions: parliaments, courts, administrative agencies, and
government …[whereas] at the periphery of the political system, the public sphere is rooted in networks
for wild flows of messages – news, reports, commentaries, talks, scene and images, and shows and
movies with an informative, polemical, educational, or entertaining content” (Habermas 2006, 415).
Furthermore, Habermas (2006) argues that through interactions between political institutions and
information networks “published public opinions” are generated in the public sphere. According to
Habermas, actors that are the source of the “public opinion” are multiple and not limited to any specific
entity. These actors belong to the institutions, networks, and civil society. The “politicians and political
parties” represent the political institutions, whilst “lobbyists and pressures groups, or actors of civil
society” are one constituents of information networks. The other constituents according to Habermas are
the “mass-media professionals” (416). The media therefore is the constitutive member of the vibrant civil
society that generates “subjectless communication” in the public sphere.
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According to deliberative democrats such as Habermas (1974, 1998, 2006); John Dryzek (2000,
2001, 2005); Jane Mansbridge (1996, 1999, 2003); Simone Chambers (2003, 2013), the public sphere is
the communicative link between the formal institutions (of the state) and informal networks and
association (belonging to the civil society). These scholars argue that in deliberative democracy it is the
public sphere that is geared towards development and expression of collective visions. These theorists of
democracy demand a return to the practice of politics that values communicative interexchange between
the multiple stakeholders within a political system. Thus, politics according to deliberative democrats is
not reduced to being an elite occupation in which some of the public take part once every four or five
years through elections, but as an ongoing process through which citizens can help to shape both the ends
and means of the functioning political democracy.
The citizens’ actions within the political democracy are an effect of active vibrancy of the public
sphere where the “published political opinions” are generated by the “professionals of the media system –
especially journalists who edit news, reports and commentaries” (Habermas 2006, 416). Thus, the debates
generated by civil society can affect political institutions when issues and concerns of the public are
amplified by information networks. The print media (and now the electronic media) thus play a crucial
part to the construction, amplification and communication of the public concerns.
But how does the communicative link between institutions of the state and civil society function
in an undemocratic state? In a state that has weak democratic institutions and lacks an active civil society
how is public opinion generated? What is the authenticity of public opinion? Under the hybrid regime of
Pakistan, the mass-media (focusing on the print media) is under the direct control of the state’s coercive
apparatus. The military and the political elite have had a censoring influence on what communicative
messages were to be generated, amplified and exchanged in the public sphere.
The media, as will be shown in this chapter, endured the authoritarian rules of the ruling elite. My
discussion of the print media in this chapter focuses on how the state in Pakistan has controlled the
newspaper reporting and analysis.
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Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)
In theoretical conceptions, civil society is defined as an ‘arena’ where distinct “kinds of
activities” occur across a range of private, political and civic associations and networks (Young 2002,
160). One of civil society’s defining features is its capacity to “self-organize” and to “develop
communicative interactions that support identities, expand participatory possibilities and create networks
of solidarity” (163). Under this definition civil society, it is the arena that encompasses private sphere of
families as well as associations, social movements and other forms of public communication, such as the
media. However, it excludes state-bounded institutions such as political parties, parliament and the
bureaucracy, as well as organizations centered wholly on the market and economic production.
Jurgen Habermas (1992) has argued that civil society’s institutional core “is constituted by
voluntary unions outside the realm of state and the economy and ranging from churches, cultural
associations, and academies to independent media, sport and leisure clubs, debating societies, groups of
concerned citizens, and grassroots petitioning drives all the way to occupational associations, political
parties, labor unions, and alternative institutions” (453).
One of the actors identified in this research project is the print media and the other the nongovernment organizations (NGOs). The term NGO was initially coined by the United Nations (UN) and
is defined: “a not-for profit, voluntary citizen’s group that is organized on a local, national or international
level to address issues in support of the public good” (UNROL 2014). Since its inception in 1945, the UN
guaranteed space for the civil society within the UN system by citing in its Article 71 of Chapter 10 that
NGOs could be accredited to the UN for consulting purposes. As a result, 41 NGOs received consultative
status through the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1946. Currently, more than 3,400 such
organizations are playing a significant role in policy making and implementation at the international level.
Introduced by the UN, the term NGO is widely used in conjunction with civil society all over the world,
especially in developing countries (United Nations 2011). The UN recognition of the NGOs as civil
society actors amplifies their status as the actor other than state and economic. As per the UN provisions
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every private body that is independent from government control, not seeking public office, not operating
for profit, and not a criminal organization is therefore regarded as NGO (Willets 2001).3
Similarly, scholars studying civil society actors do regard NGOs to be an integral part of the civil
society. Gray, Bebbington and Collison (2006) suggest that NGOs are part of civil society, and, therefore,
the term NGO is to be understood through its location within civil society; Ndegwa (1996) contends that
NGOs as being the actors of civil society can influence the rule-making of the state over the society.
Whereas, Keck and Sikkink (1998) show that the NGOs provide local citizenry from developing countries
transnational platform to mobilize and organize themselves against the dominant cultural discourses and
the authoritarian rules of the state.
Likewise, some scholars view NGOs as a “bulwark against the state amassing unbridled power”
(Weiss 1999, 143). Others appreciate NGOs for their democratizing potential and view them as essential
actors in moving away from authoritative forms of government (O. A. Khan 2001). Civil society
organizations such as NGOs have often proven to be the most powerful (if not the only) voice against
authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, repression, and injustice (Ndegwa 1996; Keck and Sikkink
1998; Weiss and Gilani 2001). NGOs play a critical role in providing a check on governments, especially
in regions where governments have been historically abusive or corrupt. Scholars studying NGOs in this
view regard them as civil society actors designed to empower the disadvantaged and, thereby, alter the
balance of social power (Fowler 1991; Fisher 1993; Baiocchi 2002).
But what is the role of NGOs as constitutive component of the civil society in the state that lacks
democratic freedoms of speech and association? In such a society where civil society is passive and
democratic institutions weak – what role can NGOs play in democratizing the state?

3

The NGO Branch of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) maintains a civil society
database of all the registered NGOs with the UN the world over. This database divides the NGOs according their
specific fields of activity such as the public administration; social development; population, etc and their
organization type for example if the registered NGO is a trade union, media organization, or belong to academia. For
more details, please refer to http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do
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Part I: Freedoms of Associations and Speech in Pakistan
Though freedom of association is guaranteed under Article 17 of the country’s 1973
Constitution,4 this fundamental right has often been usurped, curtailed, and subjected to restrictions. Thus,
restrictions on freedom of association and free speech were the first orders that were passed after the
imposition of martial law by all military regimes. In both General Ayub and General Zia’s martial law
regimes, restrictions on media and, more generally, on free speech remained in place even after the
constitution was partly restored.
In contrast to his military predecessors, General Musharraf instead embarked upon a process of
gradual political liberalization, including relaxing restrictions on civil liberties. Musharraf’s regime
afforded many concessions not only to political elites (for example, by affording them limited decisionmaking power through the establishment of the legislature) but also to more broad-based citizen groups,
including the media and judiciary by allowing them to operate relatively independently (Aqil Shah 2016).
However, when the judiciary, emboldened by the relative lack of restrictions, demanded Musharraf’s exit
from power by threatening to forcibly remove him, he resorted to repressive policies. Nevertheless, the
judiciary, media, lawyers, and other sections of civil society cooperated to form a movement that resulted
in Musharraf’s resignation a year after his major crackdown on the judiciary.
Actor 1: Political Parties in Pakistan
Following the formation of the newly independent state of Pakistan, the chief political party that
spearheaded the freedom movement, the Pakistan Muslim league, got embroiled in administrative
struggles within the party ranks. The political party mobilized support from those provinces of British
India where the Muslims were in a minority vis-à-vis Hindus. In the provinces where the Muslims were in
a majority, the political party had not been able to reach out to local levels. The political party instead
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Freedom of association and voice was also admissible act of civil and political freedoms under the Government of
India, 1935 – that became the interim Constitution of Pakistan until the 1956 Constitution was ratified. Later, under
the 1962 Constitution civil and political freedoms of citizens were also granted; though the right to vote for
President was reserved through the electoral college raised through Ayub Khan’s system of Basic Democracy (BD).
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relied heavily on the local landed feudal elite to build the party’s connection and its relevance to the
Muslim population of the British India. The gulf that existed between the people (belonging to Muslim
majority provinces and the provinces where Muslims were in minority) and the party elite led to an
increased disunity within the founding political party of Pakistan (Amin 1988; Jaffrelot 2002).
Noted Pakistan scholar, Khalid bin Sayeed, believes this internal turmoil in the party ranks was
due to the fact that Pakistan movement was not mobilized by the organizational effort of the political
party but instead was driven by the religion of Islam. This was problematic because Islam as the religion
and religious identity was not the only factor that united the Muslims in British India. Muslims in British
India were not a monolithic cultural, social and an economic group. The Pakistan Muslim League aimed
to join the multilingual, multicultural segments of the Muslims living in India. The ‘two nation theory’
that provided the ideological reasoning for the making of Pakistan emphasized the differences between
the religions of Hinduism and Islam but ignored the ethnic differences that existed within the Muslim
majority provinces (Sayeed 1959; Waseem 1989; Amin 1988).
From the time in 1947 when the elected representatives formed the cabinet to devise the
Constitution of the newly formed country, the founding political party and its leaders relied on the
Government of India Act of 1935 to guide the new state in its administrative and governance duties. The
founder of the country, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, though a constitutional lawyer retained the executive
power to his office as the viceroy (a quintessential imperial position signifying the importance of the
British Crown). This act of Jinnah’s introduced the ‘viceregal’ (Sayeed 1954) system in which
parliamentary politics was discounted.
Waseem (2002) attributes the continuation of colonial practice as in the office of Governor
General to the ‘migrant politics’ that shaped politics in the early days of Pakistan’s formation – the old
guard of Muslim League belonged to the Muslim minority provinces of British India and these were the
political elites who migrated to Pakistan after partition. Once in Pakistan they had to confront the party
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elite who belonged to the Muslim majority provinces such as Punjab, Sindh, NWFP5, Balochistan and
East Pakistan.6 The political elite became embroiled in a tussle amongst themselves (i.e., the leaders of
party from minority provinces and their counterparts from majority provinces) for the control of party and
administering of newly independent state.
Naqvi (2013) argues the national stature of Muslim league as a political party diminished by the
mid1950s because of internal regional tensions within the party (280). During this initial period of
country’s foundation, the inefficient organization of the Muslim League paved the way for the entry of
civil bureaucracy and military on the political landscape. The civil bureaucracy and military alliance led
the administration and governance of the country. Furthermore, the course of tensions within party ranks
and growing tension of regional politics between the East and West Pakistan “prompted the civil military
bureaucracy to question the suitability of mass electoral democracy” (Naqvi 2013, 280). Consequently,
the distrust of the elected institutions of state by the two unelected institutions of the state had the lasting
effect overriding the parliamentary politics in Pakistan.
Waseem (1992, 2002, 2006b, 2008) has argued the “dyarchical” arrangement for sharing power
between the parliamentary and non-parliamentary forces had created a situation characterized by limited
policy choices and an inherently unstable relationship between permanent state apparatuses on the one
hand, and political leaders and parties who participate in electoral politics on the other. In other words, the
political history of Pakistan is marked by the continuous struggle between the institutions of state (such as
legislature and executive) that derive their strength through electoral engagement with the people and
those formal institutions that operate based on their specialized and bureaucratic reasoning. The formal
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North West Frontier Province (NWFP) present day Khyber Pukhtunkhawa (KPK).

Present day Bangladesh. The cessation of East Pakistan was the consequence of continual tensions between the
two regions of Pakistan over control of state. These tensions were not addressed by the leaders of founding political
party the Muslim League. Within the first few years of Pakistan’s foundation, many of the founding members of
Muslim League belonging to the East Pakistan had formed their own political parties. However, the regional
tensions fuelled by the intra party competition over control of state apparatus were not addressed by the political
elite. The rise of regionalism in Pakistan aggravated the tensions between the two regions, and which therefore
resulted in the eventual cessation of Pakistan’s one region into another separate independent sovereign state.
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institutions such as the civil bureaucracy, judiciary, and military belong to the latter category of the
institutions of that state. It is these unelected institutions of the state that have had a strong effect on
institutional building and communicative interexchange with the society.
Early Period and First Martial Law: 1947-1958 and 1958-1969
From 1956 to 1958, three prime ministers, Suharwardy (from Awami League), Ismail Ibrahim
Chundrigar (Pakistan Muslim League) and Firoze Khan Noon (Republican Party) followed in rapid
succession. These leaders presented the interests of their respective social and cultural groups,
Suharwardy representing the interests of the disgruntled East Pakistan (later in 1971 the region became a
sovereign independent state Bangladesh). I.I. Chundrigar represented the interests of the old Muslim
League the party that had formed Pakistan but was now marginalized because of the emergence of the
local leadership in party ranks. Firoze Khan Noon’s party Republican Party was launched to neutralize the
influence of the political elite from Bengal and the traditional Muslim League.
The ‘state of nature’ which was rampant in the 50s was inimical to the political development of
the country. The political parties of the 50s remained stuck in quagmire to take over the institutional
mangement of the regional politics in the newly formed country. As one scholar argued “Pakistan needed
a desperate remedy for this malady. And, martial law was the Leviathan which emerged to maintain law
and order and public good at the point of sword” (Sayeed 1959, 389-90). Following such turmoil, the
political parties were then kept on fringes by military government of General Ayub Khan who by
effecting military coup in October 1958 pushed the political elite and parties to the margins of the
political landscape.
When General Ayub Khan imposed martial law in October 1958, the very first of his actions was
to ban political parties and to impose stricter measures on the print media.7 Ayub Khan, in March 1959
banned most of the political parties such as Suharwardy’s Awami League, Noon’s Republican Party
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Actor 2: Print media is discussed in this chapter.
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under the martial law Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order or EBDO. With the implementation of this
law, over 150 former cabinet members and 600 former assembly members were indicted for corruption.
Those who were found guilty were banned from holding elective office until 31 December 1966. Thus by
the virtue of this law, Ayub Khan had neutralized the political elite and divided them (Waseem 1989,
149).
However, Ayub Khan did need public support for legitimizing and strengthening of his rule. He
therefore, launched a devolution plan the Basic Democracy under the Basic Democracy Order on October
26, 1959 (a year after the first military coup in October, 1958). The BD was a country-wide system of
forming local governments at the village, sub-district and district levels through means of direct election.
From across Pakistan, a total of 80,000 Basic Democrats (BDs) as they were called, were elected via
universal suffrage. Through the BD, Ayub Khan established a system of an electoral college for the
election of a president. Under his rule, General Ayub got himself elected as a President of the country on
February 15, 1960 with 75,084 votes out of the total 80,000. When Ayub Khan was elected as the
President of the country, the country did not have a Constitution – he was able to devise a Presidential
Constitution and presented it to the nation on March 1, 1962.
The Basic Democrats who were 80,000 in number, then elected the members of the national and
provincial assemblies in April and May of 1962. Those who contested these elections, even if they were
affiliated with political parties, were not able to show party affinity, since the elections were non-partisan.
After the political elite had been elected to the legislature, the military dictator launched his political party
the Convention Muslim League in September 1962 thereby legalizing the political parties. The policy
concession to grant political parties the ability to operate in legislative arena enabled the military regime
to maintain close watch on the elected leaders, their political engagement with their electorate, and their
commitment with the military regime.
Despite his dictatorial measures to steer the political landscape, Ayub Khan was the first ruler,
either military or elected, to have embarked on land reforms. Ayub Khan appointed a Land Reforms
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Commission in October, 1958. Based on the Commission’s recommendation, the military government set
a ceiling of 500 acres of irrigated land, and 1,000 acres of non-irrigated land for individual landholding.
This measure allowed millions of acres to be distributed to tenant farmers and who eventually became
independent farmers.
Mr. Shahid Javed Burki, an economist by education, and senior civil bureaucrat during Ayub
Khan’s rule, argued that the independent farmers benefitted from land reforms were the “rural
progressives who had become fierce supporters of the Ayub Khan and they were the ones who were also
elected as Basic Democrats in 1960”.8 Military regime’s initiative to grant ownership rights to the farming
community and its policy of industrialization in the country secured Ayub Khan’s hold on political
power. Thus, Ayub Khan’s system established Presidential government over Parliamentarian government.
His divisive Basic Democracy (BD) plan; his policy of engaging military elite into his Presidential
government; and his populist measure of land reforms had secured him an enduring position against any
political mobilization against his military government.
However, the 1965 war with India and the rise of an urban middle class disgruntled with the
trickledown effects of state-led industrialization were the factor(s) that led to his ouster. Student protests
and discontent among the citizenry and regional divide between East and West Pakistan became the
reasons that Ayub Khan handed over power to the then Commander-in-Chief Yahya Khan in 1969
(Maniruzzaman 1971). The rule by Yahya Khan lasted not more than 2 years, from 1969-1971; he
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Interview with Mr. Shahid Javed Burki in Lahore on March 29, 2017. Mr. Burki was a civil bureaucrat who had
left government service in 1960s to join World Bank. Please also read chapter “Insiders and Outsiders,” in Pakistan
under Bhutto: 1971-1977, by Shahid Javed Burki (St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 11-35.
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abrogated the 1962 Constitution; announced general elections in 1971.9 Civilian transfer of power
transitioned in 1972 and Zulfqar Ali Bhutto took charge as the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
Second Martial Law, 1977-1988
Taking over the charge from General Yahya Khan in 1972, Bhutto as the Prime Minister of the
country embarked on the making of the new Constitution. The 1973 Constitution was promulgated with
the consensus of all opposition parties, Jamiat-ulema-Islam (JUI); Jamat-i-Islami (JI), National
Democratic Party (NDP)10 and other regional parties. The 1973 Constitution established parliamentary
form of government, and making the legislature bi-cameral with a National Assembly and a Senate.
Bhutto, close to the completion of his government’s 5-year term, announced general elections on January
7, 1977 for the National and four provincial assemblies. During his period of government, Bhutto had
centralized power to the office of Prime Minster, and had antagonized his adversaries. As a result, there
was an alliance of nine opposition political parties which formed the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in
January to contest jointly the March elections.
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In 1971, the political party Awami League swept victory in East Pakistan and had an overriding majority to form
the national government; the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who had won majority in West
Pakistan, but still was not in position to form national government, declined the right to Awami League to form
national government. This led to the rise of ethnic riots and division in the country. Yahya Khan ordered military
operation in East Pakistan. During the operation, the Bengali separatists solicited support from India, which resulted
in war between Pakistan and India. In the end, in 16 December 1971, Pakistan lost to India and East Pakistan is
secede to emerge as an independent state of Bangladesh. Hence a chapter on East and West Pakistan rivalry comes
to an end with one half of Pakistan established as an independent sovereign state.
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Formerly the National Awami Party (NAP). NAP was one of the oldest party in Pakistan that retained its
organizational structure intact from early days of electoral politics in united India. The party was launched by Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan the Pukhtun leader who supported Indian National Congress during the British Raj. In 1970s
the party was managed by his son Wali Khan. Wali Khan was a fierce critic of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government.
Bhutto, had banned NAP on charges of inciting ethnic division in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) –
present day Khyber Pukhtunkawa (KPK). NAP also had opposed the military operation in the province of
Balochistan. The operation was launched under the directives of Bhutto against the Baloch insurgency. The local
Baloch’s demanded provincial autonomy.
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In March, 1977 when the elections were held, according to the PPP, the party had won 80 percent
of the 200 seats to National Assembly.11 The oppositional alliance alleged the elections had been widely
rigged and that the government resources were utilized blatantly to effect the electoral win of the PPP.
The PNA was unequivocal in its criticism of Bhutto’s monopoly of power over the state machinery; they
asserted that in Pakistan, “real power did not reside in a political organization, but rather in the
personality of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his capacity to use the apparatus of national government to enhance
his status” (Ziring 1977, 591). PNA rejected the results, boycotted provincial elections, and launched an
opposition movement against Bhutto. The alliance had brought both the religious parties (JI, JUI) and
other secular parties (TI, NDP) joined together against Prime Minister Bhutto’s one-man, authoritarian
rule. From March 1977 to July 5, 1977 – Bhutto’s PPP and opposition alliance was embroiled in vicious
confrontation which reached a conclusion with the military intervening. On July 5, 1977 General Zia-ulHaq imposed martial law and banned political activities in the country.
From July 1977 until August 1988 Pakistan was ruled under a military dictatorship. From year
1977 to 1985 the country remained under the direct military rule; it was only in 1985 the General Zia-ulHaq announced general elections, allowing only non-partisan contestation for National Assembly and
provincial assemblies. Unlike General Ayub Khan, General Zia-ul-Haq never let the political parties to
embark on any process of organization against the military rule. Ayub Khan had banned the political
parties initially, only to reinstate them in a few years’ time; Zia-ul-Haq was shrewd in realizing that some
political parties’ support is crucial for lending legitimacy to his regime. Zia-ul-Haq made an amendment
to the Political Parties Act of 1962, according to which only those political parties that published an
electoral manifesto, elected their leader through party elections each year, and submitted their financial
accounts and membership list to the Election Commission were recognized by the state. Most parties did
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The 1973 Constitution provided for a 216-seat National Assembly, or the lower house of the Parliament. The
remaining seats were to be filled by ten women and six members of minority communities nominated by the
majority party and elected by the convened Assembly.
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not register themselves with Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP)12 and Zia-ul-Haq thus used this as
an excuse to hold non-partisan elections not only at the local levels in 1979, 1983, and 1985 but also the
general elections in 1985.
Furthermore, during the period from 1977 to 1984, Zia-ul-Haq delayed the general elections for
the National Assembly and provincial assemblies. However, when an opposition alliance of 8 political
parties was launched under the name Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), Zia-ul-Haq
announced general elections for February 1985. However, in a Machiavellian action, Zia-ul-Haq got
himself elected as the President through a popular referendum in December 1984, so that when the
National Assembly and provincial assemblies are elected in 1985, he remained President.
The MRD that was launched in summer of 1983 comprised oppositional parties opposing the
military rule. The MRD was not an ideological bloc of likeminded political parties; instead it was the
coming together of oppositional political parties against the military dictator. The MRD comprised of
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP); National Democratic Party (NDP); Pakistan Democratic Party (PDP);
Pakistan National Party (PNP); Kisan Mazdoor Party (the Peasant Worker Party, i.e., PWP); Quomi
Mahaz Azadi (National Front for Freedom); Jamiat-ulema-Islam (JUI) and Tehreek-e-Istiqlal. Of these
political parties in MRD, the one religious party was the JUI. The other religious party the JI did not
oppose Zia’s dictatorship. The JI is an Islamist party that ideologically never had opposed Zia-ul-Haq’s
policy of Islamization. JI had welcomed Zia-ul-Haq’s use of Islam as religious ideology to direct the state
in making of laws to regulate society.
Hasan Askari Rizvi (2003) contends during Zia’s military rule, other political parties and their
leaders were being persecuted for opposing the military regime’s policy of Islamization. The Islamization
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The religious party the JI and other regional party the Pakistan Muslim League – Pagara had registered with the
Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). ECP is the authority that grant the right to political parties to contest
elections. Without the sanction of the ECP no political party can initiate political mobilization and recruitment in
society. While others, the religious party the Jamiat-ulema-Pakistan (JUP), the other center-left parties such as
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), Tehreek-il-Istiqlal (TI), National Democratic Party (NDP), National Awami Party
(NAP) and other smaller parties had not registered.
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of the political community entailed that the state devise and implement the strict interpretation of the
Islamic law or sharia in the country. The making of such laws meant that democratic principles of civil
and political freedoms would be secondary to the Islamic interpretation of governing laws. The
implementation of Islamic laws by the military dictator was seen as authoritarian and based on
exclusively strict interpretation of Islamic laws (170-73). The one political party that had been supportive
of military regime’s Islamizaion was the JI. The JI in exchange of their support to the military general
enjoyed freedom to engage in political activity (175).
Though the MRD had boycotted the nonpartisan elections of National and the four provincial
assemblies, Zia-ul-Haq was able to neutralize the MRD by holding general elections. The neutralization
of its opponents was effected by the military regime by imprisoning the leaders of opposition parties; by
instructing the print media to not to report any adverse campaign against the nonpartisan election; and by
declaring the expressed resentment of the media and political opponents against nonpartisan elections a
punishable criminal offence (H. A. Rizvi 2003, 185).
Since some political parties were not recognized political entities by the military regime, this
therefore provided opportunity for the President’s supporters to gain access to the National and provincial
assemblies. Much like the PNA of the 1970s against Bhutto, the MRD also lacked any specific
ideological base. The absence of any persuasive ideology, the MRD was no more than a coming together
of contenders for power. Some individual members from various political parties and belonging to this
alliance defected from the MRD. Their defection from the alliance allowed these individual politicians to
remain politically relevant in their constituencies; and to prevent any newcomers in their constituencies
(H. A. Rizvi 2003, 185).
These defectors from the MRD were aware of the fact that their access to the legislative forum is
possible only through their respective electoral relationship in the local constituencies. These contenders
for political power believed that to effect their political influence on their electorate, they must remain
actively engaged on the political landscape by contesting in electoral politics. Not only the individual
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members of the MRD contested the nonpartisan elections; but there were other candidates who were
vehement supporters of the military dictator. These individual belonged to the political parties and were
supportive of the military regime such as the JI, and the one regional party from province of Sindh the
Pakistan Muslim League –Pagara13. The MRD thus collapsed in the wake of nonpartisan elections and its
lack of commitment to challenge the military dictatorship.
The nonpartisan elections of 1985 for National and provincial assemblies meant that in the
absence of the party platforms, candidates had to rely on either their charisma or their ability to be patrons
of gifts in kind, entertainment, public housing, and public sector employment. Politicians dealt with the
complexity of material resource flows not through the administrative infrastructure of the political party
but by having multilevel contacts that ranged from national politics down to the municipal level. Hasan
Askari Rizvi (2003) argues political aspirants contesting the nonpartisan elections “shied away from
major domestic and foreign policy issues and focused on local problems and issues similar to these raised
in the local bodies poll, i.e., construction of roads, streets and hospitals, improvement of sanitation
conditions, installations of street lights, supply of electricity and gas for domestic consumption, etc” and
furthermore due to the military dictator’s preference for Islamization the “candidates often highlighted
their personal piety and devotion to Islam” (185).
The effect of these nonpartisan elections on Pakistan’s politics was immense. Because of these
elections, the political elite who were elected to the national and provincial legislatures focused their
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Pir Pagara was the religious leader from the province of Sindh. Pir literally means spiritual mentor or a teacher,
and Pagara is the family name. Pir Pagara belonged to the landed elite family who owns large agricultural lands in
the rural Sindh. He was the religious figure in the area because of his family lineage going back to a local religious
and spiritual leader. Belonging to the landed elite and being a religious figurehead, Pagara commanded loyalty and
submission to his authority from the people of his region. His followers who are known as hur are organized as a
local militia providing security to Pagara’s economic and social interests in the region. Because of Pagara’s social
and economic status, his political affinity to the ruling governments thereby means a loyal local support to the
political regimes of the time. Traditionally the Pagara family have been supportive of the military rules. Though the
elderly patriarch who was alive in times of Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq’s military dictatorships have passed away,
the family’s political relevance in Pakistan’s politics still has not withered.
For a discussion on the religious and spiritual leadership in Pakistan’s politics please also refer to:
Adrian C. Mayer, “‘P r’ and ‘Murshid’: An Aspect of Religious Leadership in West Pakistan,” Middle Eastern
Studies 3, no. 2 (January 1967): 160-169.
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attention onto politically capturing their electoral constituencies. Those elected were not engaged in the
making of the laws and rules with which to regulate the society and to effect any substantive political
change to the military regime (Ziring 1988).
President General Zia-ul-Haq was thus able to hold general elections on non-party basis in 1985
and got his supported politician, Muhammad Khan Junejo to be elected Prime Minister. Junejo, though
handpicked by Zia-ul-Haq, did not remain a regime loyalist for long, as he started to intervene in the
public policy matters, much to Zia-ul-Haq’s chagrin. One of his early steps was to get political parties
legalized in February 1986. The policy confrontations between the President and Prime Minister ranged
from issues of reducing defense expenditures, construction of new military bases and lastly, Junejo’s
attempt in extracting a consensual non-partisan stand on Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan14 were seen by
the military ruler as an encroachment on his executive authority (Rais 1997, 256-58; H. A. Rizvi 2003,
201; Aqil Shah 2014a, 159). As a result, Zia-ul-Haq deposed the government of Junejo in May 1988 and
announced new general elections for November 1988. Had Zia-ul-Haq not died in a plane crash in August
1988, he might have again held elections on non-party basis to neutralize the political parties’
mobilization of public support against his military rule.
Decade of the 90s and the Third Military Coup of October 1999
The brief political interlude provided by Junejo’s government did open up the arena of
contestation for political parties to get themselves organized and mobilize public support. The Pakistan
Peoples Party (PPP) under the leadership of Bhutto’s daughter and political heir Benzair Bhutto won
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The Soviet operation in Afghanistan concluded in 1989 – before Soviets withdrawal of its forces, an international
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USA participated. Zia-ul-Haq’s policy of supporting Afghanistan’s resistance against Soviet invasion was in fact the
result of US’s show of aggression against Soviets. In year 1979 Soviets had moved their forces in Afghanistan,
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electoral victory in 1988. The other political party that stood against her were the alliance of religious
parties and the Muslim League – called the Islami Jamhoori Iteehad (Islamic Democratic Front). The
alliance’s candidate Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto would alternately prevail over
Pakistan’s political landscape for the period of the 90s.
Nawaz Sharif was a political aspirant who had been beneficiary of General Zia’s military
dictatorship. Sharif was handpicked by the intelligence agency under General Zia’s rule,15 held public
offices under the watchful eyes of the military government and was groomed to lead the political alliance
against the Benazir Bhutto.
The decade of the 90s was marked by the dictatorial legacy of Zia-ul-Haq, and his authoritarian
innovation into the 1973 Constitution that had rendered the Parliamentary Constitution a mockery of
parliamentary institutions. Confrontation over the control of executive between the elected institution of
legislature and the military in time of direct military rule and civilian government remained pervasive in
Pakistan’s politics. The confrontation was accentuated with Zia-ul-Haq’s enduring legacy in the edifice of
the 8th Amendment that granted the President the extra-constitutional powers to dissolve the elected
legislatures without letting the elected parliament to complete its 5-year term. Both Sharif and Bhutto
would become casualties of this dictatorial action.
During Bhutto and Sharif’s control over the power of the state, each of them however did collude
with the institution of military to the disadvantage of the other. However, each of these political leaders
did not initiate democratic principles within their party ranks; the political process in Pakistan remained
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The rise of Sharif in Pakistan’s politics is a case paradigmatic of military dictatorship’s engagement in politics.
The political aspirants such as Sharif, was dependent on his benefactor (i.e., the military) for electoral success and
securing of political positions. Christophe Jaffrelot argues, “[General] Jillani [head of Pakistan intelligence agency
the Inter Services Intelligence (ISS)] appointed [Nawaz] Sharif finance minister of Punjab … [Gillani] continued to
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the Muslim League in Punjab” (Jaffrelot 2015, 241).
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personality driven. These political leaders remained embroiled in a severe political clash with each other,
and did not engage in making any substantive changes to the political culture of the country.
The democracy experienced by the citizens of Pakistan lacked political debate within the
institutions of state and with the civil society on the policy issues such as revival of democratic system in
the country that ensured civil and political freedoms and economic uplift of the citizens. During the 90s
the two major political parties, the PPP and PML-N were embroiled in a vendetta against each other. This
continual confrontation had a dismal effect on peoples’ expectation with the democratic politics. The
political process in Pakistan during the pseudo-democratic transitional period of the 90s is marked by
interparty rivalry and confrontation between civil and military balance on the making of state policies.
On the issue of civil-military balance in the 90s – the situation reached to a climax with the 1999
Kargil Operation on the Kashmir border with India. The Kargil is the border location between India and
Pakistan and is situated in the territory of disputed Kashmir region. Kargil became part of the Indian
occupied Kashmir and since the 90s there is an active freedom movement in Indian-occupied Kashmir.
The governments in Pakistan (both military and elected) have always shown their support to the ensuing
freedom movement in Indian occupied Kashmir. Both Pakistan and India have also fought wars over the
disputed territory of Kashmir, there is a third of geographic area that is under the control of Pakistan and
whilst the two-thirds of the territory of Kashmir is occupied by India.
In the summer of 1999 there was a resurgence of freedom movement in Kashmir which was
fueled by the material support provided by the state of Pakistan to the local Kashmiri insurgents in area of
Kargil. The Pakistan military and its intelligence agencies had initiated insurgency against the Indian
military. The Kargil campaign was planned and devised by the military intelligentsia and the elected
government of Nawaz Sharif (who was the Prime Minister at the time) was informed of such an
operation.
Nawaz Sharif however later claimed that he was unaware of the military’s support for the
insurgency in the Indian Kashmir and General Musharraf, then the Chief of Armed Services (COAS),
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contended the operation was with the mutual understanding of the civil and military elite.16 With the
failed Kargil operation that brought international disrespect to Pakistan’s position on Kashmir dispute, the
tensions between the military generals and civilian leadership furthered the gap between the two
institutions of the state. The elected leadership in an attempt to rein over the military institution sacked
General Musharraf from his position of COAS. The move was seen by the military leadership as betrayal
of the country’s supreme defense institution; the military therefore reacted against such a civilian
executive decree.
The confrontation between the elected government and military general culminated into the
military coup of October 12, 1999. The military seized the control of the state apparatus in a bloodless
coup and the entire government machinery was put under martial law. General Musharraf, supported by
the other senior-ranking generals in the armed forces, took control over the state’s governing apparatus.
General Musharraf chose to be addressed as the Chief Executive and not the Chief Martial
Administrator as had his two predecessors. And unlike his predecessors’ policy of banning political
parties only to allow them to partake in political process later, General Musharraf announced the stricter
measures against the leaders of the political parties the PPP and PML-N who he believed were the culprits
who had unleashed the scourge of corruption in the country. The deposed Nawaz Sharif was put under
arrest on charges of corruption and his adversary Benazir Bhutto chose to live in self-imposed exile in
fear that if she returned, she would also have faced the similar treatment at the hands of the military junta.
In an attempt to gain legitimacy for his military rule, General Musharraf’s policies towards civil
society actors were more permissive than the previous elected and military leaders (see discussion under
Actor 2: Print Media and Actor 3: NGOs). In terms of the control over the political society, General
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Musharraf’s regime benefitted from the divisions within the political society. To gain control of the
political society, General Musharraf’s regime devised a plan for devolution of power to grassroots.17
Though the stated objective of this plan was to devolve decision-making power to local levels, it was an
attempt by the military government to gain outreach in the society. The plan for devolution was
introduced to the people as the project of true democracy in which the state created an enabling
environment for local citizenry to be involved in matters of local governance.
But I strongly believe, and this view shared by others also, that the motives of General
Musharraf’s regime were to create a group of local constituents’ representatives who would provide a
support base for his military rule and the continuity of his regime. In the course of research for
dissertation, the civil society actors interviewed and the documentary material reviewed confirmed that
military regime devised devolution plan was to create a pliant supportive political base that abide by the
executive decree imposed by the military dictatorship. After all, the timing of the Local Government Plan
2001 (LGP) and General Musharraf’s proclaimed presidential referendum of April 2002 suggests that
military dictatorship had purposively planned for LGP in order to gain popular support for General
Musharraf.
LGP was announced in March 2000 by General Musharraf and work on its implementation
strategy was undertaken by the military’s constituted think-tank the National Reconstruction Bureau
(NRB). According to the strategy devised by the NRB, it was proposed that a series of local elections to
be held in the 92 districts countrywide so as to elect district mayors or Nazims. After having the local
leadership is elected, the local councils shall be operationalized within a year’s time i.e., by March 2001.
By the March 2002 the LGP was in effect across the country with district mayors elected and the local
councils established, hence the military regime achieved its one of the objectives.
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The Local Government Plan 2001, will be discussed in the next chapter; in the next chapter I look this military
devised strategy of generating legitimacy for their military rule.
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During the process of making of LGP, General Musharraf’s regime had initiated a series of policy
engagement exchanges with the political and civil society. The political parties PPP and PML-N that had
been marginalized because of their leaders’ arrests, showed no interest in exchange of ideas on the
making of the plan, whereas the other politicians who had been marginalized under the civilian rule of
Bhutto and Sharif were clamoring for an active role in the military setup of the General Musharraf. It was
during this time the period from December 2000 to April 2002 that a new political party, a variant of
Pakistan Muslim League18 was formed under the auspices of military regime.19 This new variant of PML
(Q) was in fact a party that brought to the fore another of familial lineage in Pakistan’s politics, the
Chaudhrys of Gujarat.20 The patriarch Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and his cousin Chaudhry Pervez Elahi
led the formation of the political party and their support to General Musharraf.
The established local governments then proved their utility for the military dictator when
presidential referendum was announced. The motive of the referendum was to get General Musharraf
elected to the office of President for a limit of five years. The local governments that had been established
across the country were the instrumental factor in securing popular support base for General Musharraf
military rule. General Musharraf’s military rule was cemented when he was elected president in countrywide presidential referendum in April 2002 – just a month after the country-wide establishment of local
governments.
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Political Parties in Pakistan: Dynastic, Opportunist, and Unapologetic
The conduct of Pakistani political parties denotes that contestation in electoral politics is their
only experience of democratic politics. For contenders of political power (military and civilian leaders)
electoral politics determines their political relevance in the society. Democratic politics is defined by the
success or failure in elections – in case of the success wider recognition, while failing in elections
portends end of political career. However, success in elections the democratic experience does not mean
crafting, designing political institutions; it merely means control of political power and recognition in
society.
The political elite therefore have not worked to strengthen their political experience by forging
ideological connection with their constituents. I believe the ruling elite does not regard maintaining,
securing and investing in the communicative political connection with their electorates as a worthwhile
political act. This act of being engaged and invested in the political communicative connection demands
that political elite engage in decision-making and deliberation over the rule-making for the service of their
constituents. Such political service demands from the ruling elite a certain discipline to the institutional
rules.
The foremost of these rules is the supremacy of the institutions of state, such as the Constitution,
legislature, judiciary and other administrative apparatuses of the state. The ruling elite, including the
military generals and the political parties’ leadership have looked to the electoral arena as one of the only
conditions qualifying the system as a democracy. The ruling elite have not considered the fact that
democracy is more than just a system of electing leaders; democracy also puts demand on the elected,
civil bureaucracy, and military to respect the other institutions of the state so as to strengthen rule of law.
In Pakistan the ruling elite have minimal institutional regard for all institutions of the state the respect for
institutions is rather seen as only secondary.
To put it differently, democracy in Pakistan is denoted by electoral competition, and electoral
competition is seen as means towards the end of political power. Aslam (2017) contends, military and the
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political elite collaborate; while Abbas (2005) argues that with time the “army rule mutates into a hybrid
democracy, with a few turncoats and some new political faces becoming willing tools of the new setup”
(183). The political events in the country showcase how over the years the political parties have only been
active in moments of electioneering. Their presence in policy making, rule devising, institutional
designing deliberation and communicative exchange is missing from the institutional landscape.
Granted, the presence of an active engagement of the political (elected) elite in making of laws
had been severely restricted because of the overbearing control of the military. But even in those
moments of restrictive controlling regimes, certain political actors did play their role, minimal though it
might be.21 These acts, I believe are reflective of resilience of the political society. When they were united
for the cause of rule of law, the political elite in government and those who were in the opposition have
brought about a democratic moment. However, in Pakistan the democratic moment(s) have been too few
and momentary. One of the causes for lack of political elites’ commitment to democratic politics is the
absence of organizational platforms of political parties that brings together the political aspirants for
ideological commitments. Furthermore, the political parties lack ideological commitment to stand against
and oppose unelected institutions such as military, bureaucracy to encroach upon the political landscape.
The major political parties as identified in Appendix B have all had a role in military
governments and elected governments. These political parties have for reasons of safeguarding their
political role have increasingly relied on military-bureaucracy establishment for continual relevance on
political landscape. It seems to me that political parties lack ideological commitment to democratic
politics. Moreover, for reasons of political expediency, the political parties engage in center to right
politics and favor religious undertones.
For example, the short-lived elected government of Junejo from 1985 to 1988 aimed to establish
itself as a popular government. But the elected government under Junejo was not the result of partisan
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engagement in electoral politics. It was only the aftermath of non-partisan elections in 1985 under the
military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq that within the legislature the military dictator granted political elite
to identify themselves with political parties. This was aimed to identify the political elite and their
partisan engagement with the military dictator. Prime Minister Junejo who was favored by the military
dictator formed the elected government with the likeminded political elite.
However, in an attempt to craft legislative and executive position independent of the military
dictator, Junejo lacked the ideological opposition to military rule. The political elite who had come to
extend their partisan loyalty to Junejo soon ascertained that their new position of challenging military
dictator threatened their political future. Hence, any ideological position for bringing democratic rule in
country was given up to secure political office under the military’s rule. This trend of safeguarding the
personal electoral positions in order to secure political offices have been paradigmatic of all individual
political aspirants and the political parties in Pakistan.
In his discussion on the ineffectiveness of the political parties to sustain the democratic
principles, Jaffrelot (2015) contends, there are two practices of “party nomadism and dynastic
patrimonialism” in Pakistan’s political parties (271) that motivate the political elite to engage in
“unparalleled opportunism” so as to extract rents from the state when the opportunity becomes available.
“Party nomadism” suggests the politicians’ fluidity in terms of party affiliation – changing the party as
and when a different party offers the best deal in extraction of rents. This practice also coincides with
military takeovers, which often try to weaken the major political parties. Many politicians switched
parties when the military dictator, General Musharraf, created the Pakistan Muslim League—Quaid, often
called ‘the king’s party’, before the 2002 election, after disqualifying the leaders of both the PPP and
PML-N from running for election.
The second practice that Jaffrelot (2015) calls “dynastic patrimonialism” is the most crucial of the
ills of party politics specific to the case of Pakistan. It refers to the familial lineages that define the
politician’s qualification and her ability to navigate through the political landscape. Furthermore, it also
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suggests a kind social and economic prowess essential to electoral success. Thus, candidates are powerful
in and of themselves, beyond their parties. According to a report in the local newspaper Dawn, the
percentage of the National Assembly and members of Provincial Assemblies belonging to political
families had increased from 37 percent in 1970 to 50 per cent in 1993, before falling to 44 percent in
2008.22 Familial lineage solidifies a politician’s connection to the constituency and in mobilizing masses
(Rumi 2011).
These families have a strong social and economic presence in the local constituencies, and by
virtue of their strong presence in their respective geographic areas they engage in electoral politics so as
to maintain and strengthen their political authority over the region. In Pakistan, the patronage offered by
the political families takes the form of direct face-to-face interactions and strengthened through the
proverbial traditional bonds between them and their constituents (Shafqat 1990, 42-44).
The dynastic political engagement of the families is derived from their entrenchment in the local
constituencies’ social, and economic fabric. The dynastic families engage in electoral politics so as to
enhance their presence in the society. Traditionally in Pakistan the dynastic families belonged to the rural
landowner and the tribal kinships. This has largely remained unchanged, though with time the dynastic
arrangement has expanded and now includes families from urban, religious and military backgrounds
(Rumi 2011). But no matter the origins of dynastic families, the objective of their engagement in politics
is to entrench themselves in the political landscape. These dynastic families by virtue of their social,
economic and thus the political status award the material benefits in their constituencies.
Candidates from the dynastic families therefore rely on their family’s social status as their ability
to be patrons of gifts in kind such as public housing, health, education, security from lawlessness and
public sector employment to their electorates. The voters therefore in order to fulfill their material needs
succumb to the might of strong political families and vote for the traditionally strong social and
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economically families to political offices. For the voters, there are not more than piecemeal material
gains; the political families, on the other hand, secure their electoral strongholds, preventing any new
entrants to political landscape by remaining active in the local politics of their constituencies.
As a result, the pattern of political competition that has evolved among the political parties is to
be dependent on dynastic families to capture the hearts and minds of the voters.23 As argued by Jaffrelot
(2015) “patrimonial practices [born out of familial lineage belonging to a political dynasty] explain the
dynastic inclinations of all families at the head not only of constituencies, but also of political
organizations” (274). Political parties also rely on the strong family lineages to yield them the desired
electoral results so as to form and secure government. The political families therefore become heavily
invested in stimulating the mobilization of constituencies by offering direct material incentives. Political
competition thus grants the members of political families a formidable role in the making and exploitation
of their individual access to the political offices.
Actor 2: Print Media
Pakistan has a record of vibrant, private, and independent print media despite the overt control of
the government for most of its history. A noted journalist, Zamir Niazi24 is known for his detailed account
of the state’s repressive controls on the media. Niazi (2006, 2010) highlights that there were thirty-two
English dailies and an equal number of weeklies being produced in 1937; within the next ten years, the
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number of publications increased to 51 dailies and 258 weeklies. This gigantic increase in print media is
reflective of the fact that these publications played a pivotal role in raising awareness among the Indian
population and in mobilizing Hindus and Muslims towards the goal of independence. Niazi contends that
in the years immediately before Partition in 1947, newspapers from all corners of India were in print and
available. Notable among them were the Urdu daily Nawa-i-Waqat25 published from Lahore; English
daily Dawn and Urdu daily Manshoor26 published from Delhi; English daily Morning News published
from Calcutta; and English dailies Eastern Times and Pakistan Times published from Lahore. These
newspapers, Niazi argues, played crucial part in mobilizing support for Pakistani independence.
However, in the post-colonial period from 1947 to the 1958 (the time of the first military coup),
Pakistan’s political elite showed discontent towards the independent print media. The reasons for political
elite’s discontentment echoed the similar control measures imposed under the colonial period during the
British Raj. Like their colonial predecessors, the newly independent state believed an unregulated media
fuels publics’ discontent towards state. The state, they believed, must therefore control the media,
generating such state narratives and public discourse that helps it to capture the society.
Contrary to the popular belief that it was only the military dictatorship(s) that suppressed the
freedom and independence of press, Pakistan civilian governments have shown themselves to be equally
repressive, even draconian. The first repressive measure against the free print media was launched in
October 1948 under the Public Safety Ordinance. With the promulgation of this Ordinance, civil liberties,
including the freedom of speech and expression were curtailed. The Ordinance empowered the
government with the discretionary powers to stop publications of any newspaper without the requirement
to provide any reason.
This Ordinance opened a new chapter on the curtailment of civil liberties in the newly
independent state of Pakistan. Another repressive law, the Security of Pakistan Act, introduced in 1952,
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allowed the federal and provincial governments to close down any publication and arrest the publisher,
editor or writer if the government believed that a new story or editorial was likely to endanger the
defense, external affairs, or security of Pakistan.
General Ayub Khan (1958-1969)
Military rulers’ close attention to news media, and to the power of propaganda in general, became
immediately clear when their first representative took control of the country. One of the first measures
taken by General Ayub Khan, after the declaration of martial law in 1958, was the establishment of the
Bureau of National Research and Reconstruction (BNR&R), which later became the Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting. Following an approach to the media that still seems to exist, the BNR&R
embarked on a campaign of hiring journalists who were well known and willing to lend their names to
commentaries that were published in national newspapers in support of government policies (Nawaz
2008, 173; Niazi 2006, 111).
The military government of General Ayub Khan took control over the Progressive Papers Limited
(PPL) newspaper group in April 1959. It was a massive setback to press freedom and Pakistan’s civil
society as the people were deprived of accessing the critical and oppositional discourses contesting the
military rule. Strict control over allocation of officially imported newsprint and government advertising
helped maintain official dominance. Following its assuming control of PPL, the military regime also took
over the Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), thus making newspapers that did not have a large group of
correspondents, dependent on an official source of information (Jaffrelot 2015, 414; Nawaz 1983, 938).
In 1960, the government introduced another repressive law: Maintenance of Public Order
Ordinance. This law restrains Pakistan’s media even today. As and when required, this law allows the
government to prohibit the publication of material, impose pre-censorship, close down publications for an
unspecified time, prohibit the entry of a publication into any province, require disclosure of sources and
make arrests.
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Furthermore, in year 1963, the military regime introduced the Press & Publications Ordinance.
This law was seen as more authoritarian than the press laws under colonial rule. Hundreds of dailies and
publishing houses were closed down and scores of journalists were jailed. Shuja Nawaz (2008) contends
the law has been invoked periodically by both military and civilian regimes which enables the authorities
to exert control over the news media, holding not only editors and publishers, but also printers and
distributors liable for punishment if they printed anything counter to the government’s views (Nawaz
2008, 174).
General Ayub Khan’s regime also introduced another authoritarian practice, the so-called press
advice. A newspaper house receives a telephone call from government’s Press Information Department
(PID) which gives advice to the newspaper which news or paragraph should be highlighted, played down
or totally suppressed (H. A. Rizvi 2003, 86-96, 114).
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-1977)
When it comes to the coercive measures to control media, the elected government of Z.A. Bhutto
was no better than the military dictator. Bhutto’s government acquired full control over the press in 1972
when it issued directives to all government, semi-government, and autonomous, semi-autonomous
institutions to release program and policy advertisements27 through the PID. Even to this date, the PID has
sole authority to determine which newspaper will, or will not get, a quota of advertisement. Through this
measure the government of Bhutto managed print media groups by regulating their monetary earnings
with the government.
During the 1977 election campaigning, Bhutto’s government controlled the print media and
oppositional voices were never given space not because print media did not have access to the dissenting
voices, but because print media was constrained in how it covered the opposition’s proceedings. Ziring
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(1977) noted “up until the very last week of campaign the government controlled newspapers avoided
giving equal coverage to the opposition and while Prime Minister Bhutto’s pictures were published daily,
the [Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)]28 Alliance leaders were nowhere to be seen” (589). Niazi (2006,
2010) notes several newspapers and journalists were intimidated during Bhutto’s rule and several
publications were closed down for not supporting the regime in its measures to control over the
dissenting, oppositional voices in the democratic political landscape (Niazi 2010, 157).
General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988)
General Zia-ul-Haq seized power in July 1977 in a bloodless coup. His rule from 1977-1988 saw
substantive backsliding in terms of civic and political freedoms in the country. Through the measures of
Press and Publication Ordinance first invoked under General Ayub Khan – General Zia-ul-Haq went far
ahead in administrating the repressive measures. Under his regime, the press was directly censored, and
also expected to exercise self-censorship on its news coverage, editorial and analysis. In the early 1980s
newspapers were required to deliver drafts of each edition before printing to the censor office for
clearance (H. A. Rizvi 2003, 179-180; Niazi 2010). Talbot (2002) contends, in addition to restrictions on
the freedom of expression, Zia-ul-Haq’s regime also imposed severe punishments on those who did not
abide by those restrictions, the military regime would publicly flog the dissidents including journalists
and political workers (Talbot 2002, 316; Aziz 2015).
In a brazen show of his absolute dictatorial power, General Zia-ul-Haq declared in a speech: “I
could close down all the newspapers, say, for a period of five years, and nobody would be in a position to
raise any voice against it.”29
Newspaper newsrooms, editors, and journalists were directly monitored by the state, ensuring that
all published material met the state requirements for supporting General Zia-ul-Haq and his regime.
Besides censorship of media, his regime also imposed a complete ban on coverage of political parties,
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activities for the restoration of democracy, or protests against the martial law regime. For example, in the
same speech cited above, General Zia-ul-Haq warned against contentious politics on the part of all the
political parties and any other dissenting groups in the civil society. He advised them that “by coming out
on the roads for this purpose [of creating pressure on regime to lift ban on political activism so as to]
create problems for me they will also create problems for themselves.”30
The Period of the 1990s: Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
Although the restrictions were most severe during dictatorial regimes, the democratic
governments including Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s and the successive elected governments (Benazir Bhutto and
Nawaz Sharif) also were not less vindictive than under the military rule. The elected governments as is
shown in this section did not allow the press to grow. The Press and Publications Ordinance was kept in
place and the harassment of journalists continued.
Under Benazir Bhutto’s (daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto) government, though democratic
euphoria had swept through the civil society, the wave did not break with the authoritarian legacies of the
past. During the democratically elected governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990;1993-1996) and
Nawaz Sharif (1990-1992; 1997-1999), thirty-six journalists lost their lives while scores of others were
assaulted. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) in their 1999 report discuss at length the
numerous examples of intimidation of the media by state agencies, religious groups and drug mafia.
The government of Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999) introduced several new measures to subject the
print media to state control by issuing a directive to the newspapers to be less critical of his government.31
The newspapers that defied his directives were then accused by his government of tax evasion. His
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government arrested one newspaper owner for drug trafficking and kidnapped another for courting Indian
interests. Mr. Rahmat Shah Afridi, the editor-in-chief of the English daily The Frontier Post, published
several stories that exposed massive corruption in the Nawaz Sharif’s government. Afridi was arrested on
charges of drug smuggling. Another editor of an English weekly The Friday Times, Mr. Najam Sethi who
had criticized the policies of the Sharif government at a forum held in India, and had given interview to a
BBC documentary on corruption in Nawaz Sharif’s government was arrested on charges of treason.
Police raided his house late at night and forcibly took him to prison (HRCP 1999, 135-36 ; Jaffrelot
2015, 417-18).
Sharif’s government also launched an attack on the freedom of press by targeting one of the
largest print media houses in the country, Daily Jung. Sharif’s government issued a directive to the Jung
group to sack sixteen journalists from the newspaper because they had been critical of Sharif’s
government; the government also issued an order to the newspaper not to print anything against the 15th
Amendment to Constitution.32 The 15th Amendment also known as ‘Shariat Bill’33 promulgated under
Nawaz Sharif’s government vested extraordinary powers to the elected Prime Minister thus centralizing
powers in the executive, thereby increasing the power of federal government at the expense of the
federating units. The Nawaz Sharif’s government conveniently used Islam as an ideological base for the
‘Shariat Bill’. Anyone opposing this undemocratic amendment was threatened with dire consequences by
the Prime Minister himself (O. A. Khan 2001, 280-81; Ziauddin 2013).
The Jung group refused to give in to the directives of Sharif’s government. For this act of
defiance the group was punished for its boldness by the tax administration; however, journalists
responded by staging a nine-day countrywide hunger strike. Several political parties and civic groups
joined the struggle to protect freedom of expression. One of the civil society actors, the NGOs,

32

The 15th Amendment to the Constitution gave extraordinary powers to the Prime Minister in silencing the
oppositional voices in the National Assembly. With the effect of this Amendment, Sharif could bar parliamentarians
from expressing disagreements with their leader (HRCP 1999, 134).
33

“Shariat” is an Arabic word. This literally means actions as prescribed according to Islamic law.

159
vehemently supported and participated in the struggle of the press because of their own grievances against
the government. The Sharif government was in the process of revising the Societies Registration Act of
1860 – which could give powers to the government to effect state’s directive onto the work of NGOs by
controlling their financial independence. This act of the Sharif government was seen by the NGOs as an
attack on their independence (HRCP 1999, 148). Thus with the participation of the disparate and diverse
voices, The Jung group was able to overcome the Sharif’s government’s onslaught on its operations and
newspaper business. The government was then forced to withdraw its legal cases against the organization
(HRCP 1999, 134-43).
General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008)
General Pervez Musharraf came onto the political landscape with a military coup initiated by his
acolytes in the military. His dictatorial rule had many trappings of democracy; the liberalization policies
introduced under his regime were a break from the legacies of the past. The policies of a relatively free
press laid the basis for wide-ranging debate in public sphere, the devolution of electoral power at
grassroots and an active judiciary. Like dictators in the past, General Pervez Musharraf vowed that
returning to “real” democracy rather than “sham” democracy was the objective of his rule.34
In the course of my data gathering and interviews with the civil society actors, I have been
reminded constantly by the hardliners (those who oppose military government’s policies) and soft-liners
(those who support the military government’s policies) that the liberalization policies of General Pervez
Musharraf distinguish his military dictatorship from all the previous regimes, both civilian and military.
I. A. Rehman, one of the most senior and oldest journalist in the print media, known for his independent
journalism and a hardliner, contends, the “liberalization policies of General Pervez Musharraf were
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designed to legitimize the military rule, however opened space in the public arena to be mobilized.”35 It
was under his military government that the print and electronic media established itself as a forceful
independent actor in the public sphere (Khan and Joseph 2008; Mezzera and Sial 2010).36 The media
developed and flourished during Musharraf’s regime. Salman Abid, a civil society activist and a respected
journalist, while recounting the history of freedom of press in Pakistan, stated: “no one can deny the
attitude of the Musharraf government towards the print media which was permissive in comparison to
previous civilian and military governments”.37
The one characteristic liberalization policy of General Pervez Musharraf’s regime was opening up
the space for print and electronic media. Many commentators however believe that although broadcast
media gained independence during the Musharraf regime, the motivation of this development was not to
promote democratic values; rather, it was much more strategic (Siddiqa 2009). Khan and Joseph (2008)
and Mezzera and Sial (2010) argue media liberalization can be attributed to the 1999 Kargil War between
India and Pakistan.
According to the non-profit organization Intermedia in its Annual Report for year 2005-2006,
millions of Pakistanis tuned in to Indian satellite television for live coverage of the war because “in the
absence of private [Pakistani] broadcast media and with state-owned TV and radio telling them virtually
nothing of Pakistan’s military setbacks [in Kargil]” (Intermedia 2007).Hence, less than a year after the
Kargil conflict, and few months after General Pervez Musharraf’s military coup, the Minister for
Information Javed Jabbar explained Pakistan’s intentions in liberalizing the electronic-media sector as an
attempt “to develop an indigenous capacity to counter increasing Indian propaganda (Intermedia 2007).”
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Therefore, within two years, Musharraf’s military government had opened the electronic
broadcasting arena to privately owned media houses. Independent electronic media stations were issued
licenses of operation in January 2002 only after setting up a regulatory body, the Pakistan Electronic
Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA). PEMRA was headed by a 12-member committee, which was
dominated by bureaucrats of the General Pervez Musharraf’s regime. Under PEMRA regulations, the new
channels were expected to conform to a code of conduct “to ensure decency and responsibility”, and their
broadcasts were “to be strictly and regularly monitored”. The Code of Conduct expressly prohibited any
“aspersions against the ... integrity of Armed Forces of Pakistan” (Siddiqa 2007, 98; Khan and Joseph
2008, 35; Mezzera and Sial 2010, 26-27).
General Pervez Musharraf strongly believed that his regime’s liberalization policy of providing
the public space to the media broadcasters reflects on his democratic credentials and his commitment to
democracy. In one of the speeches delivered at Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in September 2006
he stated proudly “Civil discourse has taken a quantum leap through open discussion on the air waves on
issues related to state and society”. 38 There was such a large impact of the opening up of government
media that, within one year, in the words of weekly columnist Ayaz Amir “[T]he live political discussion
on TV is something [which] no government, military or political, ever risked ... has become a regular
feature these days, which means another taboo has been broken” and that “the openness of the press and
even the gradual opening of...the state television, is taken for granted nowadays. This too in a military
government. But only a few years ago this would have been unthinkable.”39
Because of General Pervez Musharraf’s liberalization policy towards print and electronic media,
there are now more than 40 TV channels (54 satellite-TV licenses issued); 50 FM radio stations (102
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licenses issued); and 1,218 local cable-TV operators (Khan and Joseph 2008; Mezzera and Sial 2010).
The government- controlled Pakistan Television (PTV) network has four channels, reaching nearly 90
percent of the country, while the 25 state-run radio stations, which broadcast in nineteen languages, have
a countrywide reach (PEMRA 2002). According to an estimate, the country has 85 television channels;
most of these channels are news channels which telecast talk shows devoting considerable discussion to
politics and social issues in the country. While there are 15 million Pakistanis who read newspapers, there
are 90 million Pakistani who have access to television (Khan and Joseph 2008; Mezzera and Sial 2010).
The opening up of media in Pakistan under General Musharraf created an environment where information
from multiple sources was being disseminated and made available in the public space. The citizens for the
first time were able to access this information through the critical privately owned electronic and print
media against the state-controlled media.
But the media organizations in Pakistan have traditionally been cautious of going against the
state. However, this does not mean that the media organizations were supportive of state’s
authoritarianism – though the media organizations criticized the policies of the government, the criticism
was not focused on how the ruling elite manipulates political institutions like , the entrenchment of
security agencies in the political landscape; the dynastic political organization within the political parties,
etc. Owing to their organizational interest, the media organizations have not had engaged in any direct
confrontation with the state. The media organizations therefore have been an extension of amplifying the
official discourse that is favorable of the military to the detriment of political society. Siddiqa (2016)
argues that media organizations, by voicing official discourse, forge alliances with the state’s
establishment comprising military, civil bureaucracy and a neutralized political elite. It seems to me that
the media organizations also have moved towards center to right, similar to the course of the political
parties. In the next chapter I show that how under the different military and elected rules each of the
governments have had an effect on the public discourse generated by the media organizations.
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Actor 3: Non-Government Organizations (NGOs)
Habermas (1998, 2006) contends civil society occupies a unique space in society, one where civil
society through its social networks has low cost access to information about citizen needs and government
action. The basis of these groups in social networks generate communicative power which the civil
society groups sustain in the public sphere. The voices generated by civil society actors in the public
sphere is what Habermas terms is the communicative power. The civil society actors indeed are the agents
of change, so to speak. These agents of change raise their voices in the public sphere and attempt to
influence the administrative power of the state.
As societies have grown in complexity and diversity so have the citizens of contemporary
societies changed, adopted and grown into mobilizing and organizing themselves. The mobilization
efforts of the citizens are increasingly under the pressure of financial and organizational constraints. In
such adversity and faced with the paucity of resources of individual citizens, many other actors have
emerged on the societal landscape. These emerged actors or players are the collective citizen associations,
and groups that have come together to form alliances and networks. These alliances or network give an
organizational and unified platform to certain specific interests persistent and or latent in contemporary
societies.
One such actor that qualifies as a civil society actor are the non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) that have emerged in the international and domestic political arenas. These actors are nongovernmental because they do not represent the interests of any sovereign political entity; rather they are
independent entities working on highly specific and specialized interests that citizens of the contemporary
world face. The examples of such non-governmental organizations or actors are service-delivery
organizations such as United Nations Development Fund (UNDP); Save the Children Fund; Doctors
Without Borders, etc. There are other NGOs that are characterized as faith-based organizations, for
example, Catholic Relief; Christian Aid; Muslim Aid, etc. There are the advocacy and rights-based
organizations such as the Action Aid; Oxfam; Human Rights Watch; Amnesty International, etc.
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The emergence of NGOs in the world is largely due to the fact of increased complexity and
diversity in the modern societies; the growth of NGOs in the developing nations is most noteworthy, not
only because developing nations are experiencing changes in cultural and social complexity but because
the state apparatus in these developing countries have not been able to meet the socio-economic needs of
the population.
Service-delivery NGOs provide development services to the citizenry such as education, health
care, and community mobilization; they also organize citizen groups and create awareness among the
local populations. The role of advocacy organizations is therefore to raise awareness among the people to
demand the protection of their fundamental rights from their respective governments.
And, while some scholars feel that NGOs are a positive phenomenon - a sign of democratization
and liberalization - others do not share this enthusiasm (Yudice 1998; Spires 2011). As George Yudice
(1998) asks: “[D]oes not the effervescence of NGOs cut two ways: helping to buttress a public sector
evacuated by the state and the same time making it possible for the state to steer clear of what was once
seen as its responsibility?” (373) Though the state has been relieved of its basic responsibility towards the
citizens and taken over by the NGOs, this responsibility reversal however does not directly mean that the
NGOs are independent of the state. As Morris-Suzuki (2000) has argued: ‘‘NGOs may pursue change, but
they can equally work to maintain existing social and political systems’’ (68). NGOs as constitutive
members of civil society are not independent of the state’s regulatory laws and even its directives in some
cases.
In a case such as China, for example, the state apparatus utilizes its authority over the workings
and the supposed independence of the non-governmental organizations (Hsu 2010, Spires 2011).
Similarly, in the case of Pakistan, Zaidi (2008a) argues “a number of Pakistani NGOs have become the
state’s partners, to the mutual benefit of both. Development NGOs that emerged to fill gaps left by
government failure now serve as official “advisors” to various state institutions gaining publicity,
credentials, and lucrative contracts in the process” (39).While NGOs have certainly become more
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prominent as the state has abdicated its responsibilities, yet this does not mean that state has lost its
control over these civil society actors. In fact, it has been observed that although the state apparatus’
capacity to deliver services might have deteriorated, yet its coercive apparatus is stronger than before.
The questions therefore then arise are: Can NGOs remain independent actors vis-à-vis the state?
Do NGOs have democratizing potential? Should they be considered as agents of democracy and
liberalization? There are several studies that look into these questions and have relevant answers for this
research enquiry: Ndegwa’s (1996) study of the advocacy work of the two NGOs in Kenya; Baiocchi’s
(2002) research in Porto Alegre; and Fung and Wright’s (2003) model of Empowered Participatory
Governance (EPG), presented in a volume of edited work on the different community-civil society
initiatives in the various parts of the world (developing and developed countries).
NGOs’ Work and Their Effect on State-Society Interaction
Ndegwa (1996) argues that NGOs (and civil society more generally) do not necessarily lead to
political liberalization; that is, NGOs are not necessarily “central to opposing undemocratic governments
and to furthering and consolidating democracy” (2). He argues that NGOs have the potential to be
progressive or regressive. He finds that the two NGOs he researched in Kenya are very different in their
agendas. While one does not politicize its activities, the other is actively involved in consciousnessraising and empowerment of the targeted community. His analysis, though important once again in
highlighting the links between the state and civil society, proves unsatisfactory as he explains away the
differences as arising merely from the “willingness of the leadership of these organizations to use
organizational resources against the repressive state . . . this political will stems from a fairly arbitrary
element of personal leadership” (Ndegwa 1996, 111).
Fung and Wright’s (2001, 2003) concept of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) is based
on five successful experiments from across the world in the USA, Brazil and India. Fung and Wright’s
(2003) work highlights the innovative institutional measures combining the mobilization efforts of civic
associations of citizens’ neighborhood committees and their local state officials. The communicative
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interaction between state and citizenry was mediated by the NGOs. The NGOs were instrumental in
bringing the state and citizenry onto a common platform in order to better utilize state’s resources
according to the common daily needs of the citizenry. Thus NGOs provided financial and technical
services in raising awareness in mobilizing and organizing communities in their interactions with the local
authorities.
The common daily problems faced by the communities pertained to their social development
needs such as peace in the neighborhood, accessibility to basic facilities such as education, health, etc.,
and in making the cohesive community development plans. To the advocates of EPG, Fung and Wright
(2001, 2003) contend, this kind of institutional architecture introduces accountability at a dual level – to a
coordinating body above and to civil society below (Fung 2002, 2003, 2012). Fung (2002, 2006) believes,
civil society groups can promote learning and necessary skills to make participatory bodies work. By
mobilizing citizens to remain active through the entire public-policy cycle, civil society actors help to
ensure the longevity of participatory bodies.
Baiocchi’s (2002) work is another excellent example of research that takes into account the
context within which NGOs operate. Like Fung and Wright (2001, 2003), Baiocchi also does not pose
NGOs as either pro-state or anti-state, instead, he argues for a “relational” (7) framework when analyzing
state-civil society relations.
The “relational” approach between the state and civil society therefore emphasizes the
communicative interaction between the state and civil society as opposed to an emphasis on contention
alone. The communicative interaction under the relational approach focuses on all of the ways in which
various parts of civil society interact with the state (formal, informal settings, meetings, protests etc.) and
attempts to understand how it is that these interactions affect the functioning of civil society at large
(Baiocchi 2002, 7; Fung and Wright 2003, 25-28). In this relational model, three factors influence the
state-civil society relationship(s): 1) degree of state openness (authoritarian vs. democratic etc.); 2) types
of constraints on civil society (placed by the state, such as censorship, lack of freedom of the press); and
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3) “institutional forms of state-society interfaces” (such as office of a legislator, town hall meeting). Thus
the nature of the relationship between the state and civil society can vary at different times and in
different countries depending on these three factors.
Much like the work of Fung and Wright (2001, 2003) and Baiocchi (2002), my work also
emphasizes that state and civil society need to be studied relationally. I find that when the state is
increasingly authoritative in its actions against the civil society, the voices in the civil society are led by
the state directives. Yet there are still moments of transgressions against the state-directed schema.
However, as the state sheds its responsibility towards its citizens by not providing them the basic
development needs of the society (e.g., services such as health, education), associations and oppositional
voices in the society start to emerge.
It is in this moment of state lapse that civil society actors organize and mobilize themselves in the
service of the citizens’ needs and demands. However, the state as an entity can never remain completely
aloof from societal demands and pressures; the state is after all, to use Weber’s classic definition, in
control of legitimate means of force and violence. Thus even if the authority of the state over the years
has shrunk, its relevance has not disappeared. The case of Pakistan is testimony to this very contention
that state’s influence over the society and civil society in particular has never entirely waned.
My discussions above of how the authoritarian practices of both the military and elected
leadership have influenced and controlled the political parties and associations of free speech such the
media in Pakistan showcases that state’s coercive and hegemonic control have directed the state-society
interaction. They still do. As I discuss in the following section, NGOs are subject to this control as well.
Part II: NGOs as Civil Society Actors in Pakistan
In Pakistan, civil society is a misunderstood concept. The concept is misunderstood because the
traditional civic associations, such as trade unions, student unions, and workers’ unions, hardly exist in
the society. And civil society is a contentious organizational entity because civil society includes not in
traditional sense the civic associations organized by the citizens, but all non-government organizations
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that create awareness of citizens’ rights and thus mobilize citizens in pursuance of basic services such as
housing, health, education, and livelihood are colloquially widely known as the civil society.
In the cases of unions, their mobilization, organization and functions have always been severely
restricted by the authoritarian state. The country’s eight thousand registered unions represent just over 5
percent of the total employed labor force, partly because the agricultural and informal sectors, which
employ the majority workforce, are excluded from unionization under current laws (Sattar and Baig
2001). Trade union numbers are also falling owing to privatization, public-sector downsizing, and a
general decline in industrial activity (Sattar and Baig 2001).
The nascent independent media on the other hand have come onto the societal landscape only
recently. The media organizations driven by their corporate interests have great influence on information
generation and opinion making in the society. Owing their outreach in the society to the liberalization
policies of the military state, the media organizations are cautious of their newfound freedom seldom
engage in direct confrontation with the state (Siddiqa 2009). Furthermore, being the economic entity as
the media organizations are, their objective remains to earn profits and expand on their businesses in
media industry. The table on media organizations in Pakistan (Table B-2: Media groups in Pakistan at
Appendix B) shows that the leading business families in Pakistan have invested not only in print media
but in entertainment industry also.
In the course of my field work in Pakistan, the civil society activists and academics interviewed,
all have pointed to the fact that since any citizen organized and mobilized associations in Pakistan are
missing, therefore the NGOs as the organizational entity have taken over the operational definition of the
civil society in Pakistan.
Because the state has withdrawn from providing basic services to the citizens, the NGOs
therefore also have increased in scale and scope of their work in Pakistan. Though faced with structural
impediments in terms of overt and direct control over the work of NGOs, the authoritarian state under the
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military rule of General Musharraf (1999-2007) did relax its control over the NGOs because of the
support that NGOs provided to the state in terms of the development programs in the country.
The data on the NGOs working in Pakistan is scant, an issue I encountered while collecting data.
To see how many NGOs had come into being under the different military and civilian governments turned
out to be an impossible task. I was not able to gather decade-wise breakdown of the number of NGOs in
Pakistan. If I had concentrated on a specific period such as the military dictatorship of General Ayub
Khan, then I would have had to include the NGOs which operated in East Pakistan. This therefore would
have reduced the number NGOs in operation under Prime Minister Bhutto’s time. Under the military rule
of General Zia-ul-Haq the number of NGOs increased because of the external security effects of the
Afghan war in the neighboring Afghanistan and the influx of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. These
organizations including the local and international NGOs all reduced their operations in Pakistan with the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Likewise, if I had concentrated on the military rule of Musharraf,
then I would have had to include all those NGOs that emerged in the aftermath of earthquake of 2005.
During that time period i.e., 2005 there were number of NGOs (local and international) that started its
operations in Pakistan, but then within few years’ time these NGOs withered away for paucity of
resources such as funds, technical expertise.
State Rules and Regulations on NGOs Registration
There are eighteen different laws under which NGOs can be registered. However, the most
common under which the NGOs are registered are six (Ismail 2002, 5). The fact that all but two of the six
of these laws are colonial instruments reinforces the image that official NGO policy has changed little
since country independence from the British Raj. The laws from the colonial period that persist even
today are Societies Act (1860); the Trust Act (1882); Charitable Endowments Act (1890); the Cooperative Act (1925). The other two laws which were devised were crafted under the military
dictatorships: under General Ayub Khan, it was the Voluntary Social Welfare Agencies (Registration and
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Control) Ordinance (1961); and under General Zia-ul-Haq, the Companies Ordinance (1984). Table 2 lists
these laws and the provisions that each provide to the NGO.

Table 2: The Acts/Laws Under Which NGOs Are Registered
Act/Law

Provisions

Societies Registration Act, 1860

This act provides for the registration of voluntary organizations
engaged primarily in activities in the areas of culture, science, and
charity.

Trusts Act, 1882

This act provides for the registration of certain assets as a trust and
authorizes activities for charitable objectives. According to this Act,
the trustees are bestowed the ownership of the property. Trusts are
granted a high degree of independence.

Cooperative Societies Act, 1925

This act authorizes activities of economic organizations such as
Consumer Society, Housing Society, and Banking Society.

Charitable Endowments Act
(1890)

This act provides for the registration of assets for charitable purposes.
The Act grants authority to the Government to appoint a Treasurer
for better financial management of Trusts, thus ensuring the
management and safeguarding of any Trust property which might be
in financial difficulty.

Voluntary Social Welfare
Agencies Registration and
Control Ordinance, 1961

This ordinance authorizes institutions established for social welfare
services such as education, health, and women.

Companies Ordinance, 1984

This ordinance provides for the registration of non-profit companies
which undertake activities promoting commerce, art, science,
religion, sports, social services, and charity.
Source: Nejima 2002, 101-102; Ismail 2002, 4-11

However, there is no system whereby non-functional NGOs are struck off the registration
records. Consequently, many NGOs that have become defunct continue to be listed. These registration
lists, therefore, present a false picture of the sector. Since there are six different laws that record the
registration and define the legal status of the NGOs in Pakistan, the mutual co-ordination among Pakistani
NGOs is very weak. If one NGO is registered with the Social Welfare Agencies Ordinance, then it reports
to the provincial authority and not necessarily to the federal authority. Similarly, the NGO that is
registered under the Companies Ordinance then it reports only to the federal authority. All these NGOs
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therefore even if they are operating in the same geographic area, operate under distinctive registration
rules and each NGO also does not necessarily communicate their program initiatives with the other NGOs
for the specific region thus duplicating and saturating their efforts in the same region.
However, this began to change in the 1990s when the elected governments embarked on
developing measures to control the scope and space available to NGOs. In 1995-96, a large number of
organizations from across the country joined hands to form the Pakistan NGO Forum (PNF). According
to estimates, the membership of NGOs to PNF in 2000 stood to be around 2,500 (Ghaus-Pasha, Jamal,
and Iqbal 2002). Similarly, the NGO Resource Center (NGORC), a project of the Agha Khan Foundation,
aims to build the capacity of the NGO sector by conducting research and analysis on key development
sector issues such as legal and fiscal frame-works for NGOs, NGO registration, and NGO-corporate
partnerships.
Growing Number of NGOs in Pakistan
Reliable data on the number of NGOs operating in Pakistan is scant. The data that exists is
arranged and surveyed by international donor agencies like the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) and other international agencies such as Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank
(WB). These agencies sometimes do commission surveys of civil society to know how many NGOs are
working in Pakistan.
There are various studies available on the number of NGOs in Pakistan. A study by United
Nations Development Fund (UNDP) which was conducted in 1991 identified 4,833 NGOs working
across Pakistan.40 Another study conducted by the UNDP and cited by the Asian Development Bank
(ADB) in its publication on NGOs in Pakistan notes that “number of NGOs in Pakistan is between 8,000
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The survey noted that of these, 2,714 were located in the Punjab, 1,742 in Sindh, 213 in Balochistan and 163 in
the NWFP. The survey also revealed that 70 percent of organizations were urban-based. For further details, please
refer to Adnan Sattar and Rabia Baig, “Civil Society in Pakistan: A Preliminary Report on the CIVICUS Index on
Civil Society Project in Pakistan.” CIVICUS Index on Civil Society Occasional Paper Series, Volume 1: Issue 11,
NGO Resource Center (Agha Khan Foundation, 2001). Also available at
https://www.scribd.com/document/24006641/Civicus-i-n-d-e-x
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and 16,000. ADB publication asserted, many of the organizations, however, may simply be. If
nonregistered NGOs and CBOs are added to those registered under the six laws, then the number of
Pakistani NGOs could be anywhere between 25,000 and 35,000 (ADB 1999, 4).”
By end of the first decade of the new millennium, the number of NGOs reported by the
international agencies, such as International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)41 had increased to
45,000 – though the official state-level reports suggest that number of NGOs in Pakistan may have risen
to 100,000 (Dawn 2009).42 In addition to the increase in the numbers of the NGOs in Pakistan, their role
in the public sphere also grew since the state granted these entities the authority to engage in the
development work in the society.
During the 1980s and the 1990s, according to a report by NGO Resource Center, the state was
unresponsive to the growing needs of the burgeoning population. The military and the successive civilian
governments were faced with the issues of controlling the institutions of the state. These internal clashes
within the institutions of the state created a vacuum between the state and the society which therefore
resulted in the growth of NGO sector in Pakistan. This claim was supported by the late Omar Asghar
Khan, leading civil society activist who in the early period of 90s formed a NGO called SUNGI in the
northern region of Pakistan.
Omar Asghar Khan was also one of the Cabinet Ministers appointed by General Pervez
Musharraf during his period of direct military rule (1999-2002). Omar Asghar Khan (2001) argued
emphatically that due to “failure of the mainstream political parties to respond to people’s aspirations for
socio-economic change has led to a general disillusionment with traditional forms of politics dominated
by feudal and big business interests, and the lack of a political debate on issues of poverty, distributive
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ICNL is an international agency based in Washington and funded through McArthur Foundation and US
Assistance for International Development (USAID) maintains the latest information on the civil society
organizations freedom to work in the different regions of the world.
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Please see these newspaper/periodical report:
Data on NGOs being collected, Dawn June 30, 2009. And, Faiza Shah. “The Rise of NGO’s and Their Harmful
Impact on Pakistan,” in Herald, April 27, 2014.
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justice, women's rights and environmental degradation” (283). The space which was formed because of
citizens’ dissatisfaction with the state was then remedied by the growing number of NGOs. The NGOs,
Khan argued, strengthen civil society by creating and expanding space for the citizens by questioning
decision-making institutions and systems in which the state and the ruling elite have occupied a dominant
position in the society, thus leaving little space for oppressed to voice their needs and interests (283).
Scholars studying growth of NGOs in Pakistan argue that it was during the time of military rule
by Zia-ul-Haq when the number of citizen-based initiatives and associations started to emerge on the
social landscape. One explanation for this growth, according to a study by ADB suggests that this growth
in local-based citizen association was due to the devolution plan that was under implementation during
Zia’s regime: “During the 1980s, many new NGOs emerged to avail [themselves from the funds made
available] of the funding set aside for development through local bodies (district, municipal, town, and
local councils) (ADB 1999, 3).” Furthermore, the ADB report contends that since elections under Zia’s
rule were non-partisan therefore “many legislators encouraged the growth of new NGOs to absorb the
special funds available to them for the development of their constituencies (ADB 1999, 3).” According to
the Local Bodies Ordinance of 1979, the local political elite was given substantive development funds
which were to be utilized to meet the development needs of the local community (ADB 1999, 3).
Governments and Their Interaction with the NGOs – More Antagonism than Partnership
The state in Pakistan has been consistent in imposing restrictions on civic and political freedoms
of its citizens. Hence, the course of the repression as experienced by the political parties, and the media
also was also experienced by the burgeoning sector of NGOs in the society. According to ICNL,
Pakistan’s legal framework, instead of providing a facilitative regulatory environment for the NGOs to
work, is characterized ambiguous administrative guidelines, arbitrary application of the law, and official
discretion to refuse registration or even dissolve organizations without the right to appeal.
The state therefore has been overly attentive to the kind of work that these relatively independent
entities were performing in the society (Ghaus-Pasha, Iqbal, and Mumtaz 2002). These agencies have
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never been fully independent because all the NGOs working in Pakistan have to register with the state;
otherwise these agencies are not allowed to undertake any of the service, advocacy and right-based work
in Pakistan. The state as the license issuing authority that grants the non-government organizations to
openly engage in development of advocacy work. The organizations if they are registered with the state
are exempted from paying tax (as being a nonprofit entity). The NGOs as registered entities therefore can
also apply for the financial grants from the state agencies in the field of service, advocacy and right-based
work. By being registered with the state, the NGOs are identified as a recognized entities therefore
allowed to engage with other international organizations such as UN agencies, and other international
NGOs for example Oxfam, Save the Children, Médecins Sans Frontières, etc (ADB 1999; Ghaus-Pasha
and Iqbal 2003; Ismail 2002).
Following the end of Zia’s rule in 1988, the elected governments of both the Pakistan People’s
Party (in power from 1988-90 and then in 1993-96) and Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz League
(PML-N) (1990-93 and 1997-99) had adopted a generally supportive attitude toward civil society
organizations, especially those providing social welfare services. These organizations were seen as
supplementary measures to support the works of the state’s goals of providing services to the citizens.
The one episode of the state-NGO linkage was evident from the Eight Five-Plan (1993-98).43 Under the
Eight Five-Plan the government promoted the Social Action Program (SAP) with support from World
Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). The discussion paper on SAP under the Eight Fiveyear plan made repeated references to the participation of NGOs in the state-society partnership (Nejima
2002). Thus to implement the SAP, a policy was developed to facilitate activities through community
organizations in the four fields of basic education, basic health, and sanitation, waterworks, and sewer
systems in rural villages, and population planning.
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The Five-Year plans is the state planning initiative through which the state identifies the key policy areas for the
period of five years and the plan highlights the initiatives that successive elected government might as well select for
the development of the country.
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While the state might express its appreciation of the participation of the NGOs in development
initiatives, the state remained highly vigilant to the activities of the NGOs. The second government of
Benazir Bhutto (1993-96) proposed an NGO bill to parliament that provided for intrusive regulation of
nonprofits through mandatory registration, compulsory auditing, detailed information disclosure, and
gave the government the power to seize NGO assets and terminate their operations. Bhutto’s government
proposed the bill to rein over the project initiatives of the NGOs across Pakistan. The NGOs were able to
expand their outreach thereby creating performance pressure on the legislators to design similar initiatives
in the respective constituencies. The bill was not made into law, as the government of Benazir Bhutto was
dissolved in 1996. It was also during this time that the Pakistan Development Forum (PDF) was also
mobilized, a consortium of 2,500 NGOs working in Pakistan. The PDF was instrumental in lobbying
against proposing this bill in the parliament (ADB 1999; Nejima 2002; Ghaus-Pasha, Iqbal, and Mumtaz
2002).
However, two years later, the other major party, the PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif, went ahead and
ordered intelligence inquiries and deregistration of a large number of NGOs in the wake of a growing
friction between the government and the NGO sector on issues such as human rights, prevention of
violence against women, and minority rights. According to Omar Asghar Khan, the proposed bill, called
the 15th Amendment (known as Sharia Bill) to the 1973 Constitution, gave extraordinary powers to the
Prime Minister and through this Bill, the government of Nawaz Sharif pledged implement the Islamic law
in the country – thereby bringing all the so-called liberal sections of the society under state’s direct
control. The NGOs opposed this proposed bill and along with the media and political parties organized
protests nationwide. The government of Nawaz Sharif “went to an extent of calling NGOs anti-Islam and
anti-state”; furthermore “about 2,500 NGOs were dissolved by the Punjab, NWFP and Sindh
governments” (O. A. Khan 2001, 281).
In 1999 the elected government of Nawaz Sharif was removed by the military coup launched by
General Pervez Musharraf. The ‘Sharia Bill’ which was proposed under the 15th Amendment could not be
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promulgated in law because of the dissolution of the parliament under General Musharraf’s coup.
Musharraf’s government in his early days under the military rule (1999-2002) had invited some of the
leading figures belonging to the civil society to join him in resolving the chaos and bringing order to the
society that became exceedingly disoriented with chaotic performance of the politically elected
government. Within few days of controlling the state apparatus, General Pervez Musharraf announced an
ostensibly radical devolution plan (the Local Government Plan 2001) and recruited NGO figures such as
Dr. Attiya Inayatullah (known as a civil society women’s rights campaigner), Mr. Javed Jabbar (an
advocate of independent media; Jabbar was managing a NGO in the Thar desert) and Mr. Omar Asghar
Khan (the head of the NGO SUNGI and leading social rights campaigner) to serve in government
positions.
The civil society in Pakistan welcomed such initiatives by Musharraf and supported his rule of
liberalizing the media and public sphere. In my analysis of the newspaper articles of the period 20002001, I noticed that the civil society actors such as print media and the domestic intelligentsia were
enamored of the new military ruler and his policies of freeing up the society for the new millennium.
Aqil Shah (2004) in his analysis of the state-civil society interaction under General Musharraf’s
rule, contends civil society support for military rule was due to the ‘public disenchantment’ with the
experience of democratization in the 90s. The public and intelligentsia were equally disoriented with the
performance of democratic governments, and when Musharraf came onto the political landscape, the
NGOs and the media were caught in the “dilemma posed by a ‘reform oriented’ army general.” One of
NGO activists cited in Aqil Shah (2004) discussed the predicament NGOs faced: “we were caught
between principles and practicality. We have to deal with a military government, and we have to engage
with it, but we cannot condone a military set-up. But there is also a clear consensus that the
(democratically elected) government should not be restored” (376). These sentiments were echoed by the
NGOs and the intelligentsia; the cooperation of the leading civil society activists and the NGOs with the
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new military ruler was testament to their disenchantments with the democratic cycle the country had
experienced in the last decade or so.
A volume of essays by Anita Weiss and Zulfiqar Gillani titled Power and Civil Society in
Pakistan (2001) holds the view that the kind of democratic politics exhibited by the leading political
parties in power left ordinary Pakistanis disoriented and disenchanted with the idea of democratic politics.
Furthermore, the structural forces such as weak economy, the high volatility in civil-military relations, the
dysfunctional political parties and self-aggrandizement of political elite pushed the nascent democracy
into disarray. Weiss and Gillani (2001) asserted “after a dozen years of floundering democracy, a new
breed of military rule seems to have emerged, hindered not by the politics of selfishness but by the
sentiment of love of country and compatriots… the military government seems breaking new ground by
assigning capable, qualified people to hold key positions in government” (ix).
The military regime of General Musharraf charmed the civil society for developing state-civil
society interactive engagement so as to benefit the citizenry. By engaging some of the leading figures
belonging to the civil society more generally and NGOs in particular (the likes of Mr. Javed Jabbar, Mr.
Omar Asghar Khan, Dr. Atiya Innayatullah) the military regime of Musharraf was able to construct an
acceptable and a likeable image of the military government. These were the figures who were well
respected in the civil society for their contributions in the fields of media, human rights activism, and
community development. The military regime benefitted from this engagement with the leading members
of the civil society so as to gain popular acceptance in the society. While these members of civil society,
who many believe were equally disenchanted with the politics of the country, saw in General Musharraf a
military general with an agenda to address political chaos that had cumulated with dysfunctional political
elite.
In my interviews with the civil society activists, working with the various NGOs, I found that
they all agreed that it was the disenchantment experienced with the regressive democratic practices of the
elected leaders that the civil society lent its support to the military regime. In this sense, as one of the
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prominent figures in the contemporary NGOs work field in Pakistan, Harris Khalique argued, civil society
provided “a sort of good governance narrative to the military regime,” especially since Musharraf’s
military regime had crafted an image in the society of portraying Musharraf as being distinctive from his
military predecessors.44
Another NGO representative, Sarwar Bari from PATTAN, an Islamabad-based NGO that was at
the forefront of supporting Musharraf’s regime, strongly believes that the mantra of “good governance” as
one of the policy “reform measures” was something that “had been missing in the policy discourse,
though in the public discourse, the general public had been raising their concerns on the ineffectiveness
and inefficiency of government institutions.” Bari contends, “Musharraf’s regime read the public pulse
and was able to craft changes in the institutions” and it was his regime’s willingness to work with the civil
society that “made Musharraf a popular general among the civil society actors”.45
Aqil Shah (2004) in his discussion on civil society-military regime collaboration highlights that it
was the disaffection with the democratic experience that led the civil society elites to accept the military
intervention as a “necessary evil to cleanse politics and governance”. Furthermore, it was this
collaboration with the civil society that allowed the military to craft the support for reform initiatives in
the society (377). Shah asserts the reform measures announced by the military regime and its cooptation
of the civil society was “crucial to the military’s ability to neutralize external concerns about its coercive
actions and acquire semblance of legitimacy otherwise missing in the domestic context” (377).
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Interview with Mr. Harris Khalique. Interview with the author July 18, 2017 in Islamabad. He is the team leader at
DAI (Development Alternative, Inc) a US-based development planning and assistance organization in its country
office in Islamabad, Pakistan. Currently, DAI is managing seven developmental projects in the field of education,
governance, across Pakistan with financial support from donor agencies such as Department for International
Development Fund (DFID); European Commission (EC); US Assistance for International Development (USAID)
and others international multilateral donor agencies.
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Interview with Mr. Sarwar Bari, the Chief Executive of PATTAN, as Islamabad-based NGO working with rural
communities across Pakistan. PATTAN was in the forefront of the implementation of the Local Government Plan
introduced by Musharraf’s regime in 2001. PATTAN produced reports on the local elections held for local offices in
2002 and 2005. Interview with the author in Islamabad, March 13, 2017.
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Harris Khalique, in sharing his insight on the nature of partnership and collaboration echoes the
sentiments of that NGO activist whom Aqil Shah (2004) cited in his discussion on civil society activism
during Musharraf’s regime. That is, NGO representatives were faced with the predicament either to
remain impassive to the malpractice of the democratic government or to welcome military general with
his publicly announced reform agenda. The rule of the previously civilian governments rendered state
institutions ineffective leaving the citizens with an indelible dissatisfaction with democratic governments.
Seemingly the progressive agenda of the military dictator for creating participatory spaces for the ignored
segments of the society, such as women, workers, peasants, and minorities, found enthusiastic allies in the
civil society. Both Harris Khalique and Sarwar Bari contended the military general was more progressive
than the regressive minded political elite – the political parties and the politicians were keen during the
90s to secure political space for themselves while shrinking the democratic space for civil society.
But all this does not suggest that the military regime of General Musharraf remained a promoter
of civil and political freedoms. Nevertheless, since the liberalization policies of Musharraf’s regime were
devised to present his government as distinct from the last military governments of General Ayub and
General Zia and as being more progressive and democratic than the previous elected governments of
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, these liberalization policies did open up the public sphere.
However, such liberalization initiated by authoritarian rulers often turns out to be a dangerous
gamble. As O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) remind us, once an authoritarian regime permits even limited
contestation, it sends out the signal to society that the “costs of collective action” are no longer high. As a
result, previously severely restricted arenas of opposition become available for contestation, especially if
“exemplary individuals” were willing to probe the boundaries of the regime’s tolerance for societal
freedom. The independence enjoyed by civil society began to be exhibited by the vibrant media and other
actors in civil society when they started to question Musharraf’s hybridized political order that combined
military-backed political elites in the national legislature.
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In the case of Musharraf’s liberalized military regime, the one incident that led to the cataclysmic
fall of Musharraf’s regime is the unconstitutional dismissal of the Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad
Chaudhry of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the consequent Lawyers Movement from years 20072009. In an act of executive highhandedness, Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) Mr.
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry in March 2007. The Chief Justice had been considered Musharraf’s
protégé in his early days of military rule (1999-2005)46; however, CJP argued that his dismissal by
Musharraf was unconstitutional (Ghias 2010; S. Ahmed 2015).
General Musharraf had dismissed CJP because the latter had been judicially active in critiquing
the military government on its poor performance towards fulfilling its reform agenda (Ahmed and
Stephan 2010, 492-94; Ghias 2010, 990-96). Furthermore, and most crucially, the CJP was seen as
opposing military ruler’s intention to get reelected as a president again after his first term had expired in
April 2007. The military dictatorship needed the approval of the country’s highest judiciary; however,
when it became evident that CJP disagreed with General Musharraf’s decision to continue his active
military service as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) of Pakistan military and the president, the military ruler
moved to eliminate Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry from his position of CJP (Kalhan 2013, 42-46).47 The
series of events then unfolded a direct confrontation between the judiciary and the military dictator; as a
consequence, the goodwill earned by the military government with the people and civil society was
severally damaged (Ahmed and Stephan 2010; A. S. Akhtar 2010).
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Looking at the career of CJP Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, it is a revelation that following his appointment in
2005 as CJP, his tacit and unequivocal support to the military ruler General Musharraf followed a downward trend.
Before he was appointed as the Chief Justice, he has been supportive of military regime and its policies. A look at
his pre-appointment career shows that in May 2000, Justice Chaudhry was amongst the twelve (12) judges of the
Supreme Court of Pakistan who supported the military coup led by General Musharraf in October 1999. Similarly,
in 2002 along with the nine (9) other judges on the bench, he legalized Musharraf’s non constitutional presidential
referendum; this referendum had enabled General Musharraf to remain President until year 2007 (along with the top
military position). But in year 2007 as the CJP Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry challenged the dictatorial authority of
the military ruler.
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For more details, please read “Notes: The Pakistani Lawyers’ Movement and the Popular Currency of Judicial
Power,” Harvard Law Review (2009-2010): 1705-1726.
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During the course of this public upheaval and dissent against the military dictator, the two actors
of civil society, NGOs and the media (print and electronic) provided citizens and lawyers the space for
amplification of their grievances. These were the alternative spaces which were missing or were under
state’s direct control during the 50s, 60s, 70s, 80s, and 90s. However, the situation started to change
during the late 80s and then in the 90s.
The NGOs and the media that had grown under the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf
had provided the people alternative space to launch and amplify their grievances against the regime.
Traditionally, it is the political parties that facilitate the people in channeling and redressing their
grievances. However, the lack of institutionalization of political parties in Pakistan propelled the other
alternative venues to emerge. The NGOs and the media organizations allowed the people to use these two
civil society actors to raise issues with the state.
Part III: Ruling Governments – Military and Post-Military Styles
In my discussion of the actors, political parties, media and the NGOs, I have presented a
historical account of how these actors belonging to the political society and civil society in Pakistan have
performed and acted under the military and elected governments. There is a predictable pattern that
developed. The weakened civilian elected governments are taken over by the army. But soon the
Pakistan’s normally fractious civil society and political parties eventually become tired of the military
rule; and they join forces temporarily to push for the restoration of civilian rule, secured by means of at
least nominally democratic elections.
The history of Pakistan has witnessed several tumultuous trysts with democratic politics. Alavi
(1972) argues the politics of Pakistan is characterized by the discord between the elected bodies on one
hand versus the bureaucratic and military oligarchy on the other. These three institutions of the state have
had no regard for respecting the democratic institutions (Naqvi 2013, 280). Waseem (2002, 2006b)
contends Pakistan has not been able to break away from the legacies of the past that go back to the very
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formation of the country. Waseem therefore argues that this distrust led to discounting of the role of
parliamentary sovereignty (Waseem 2006b, 2008, 2015).
Agreeing with Alavi (1972) and Waseem (2002, 2006b), Naqvi (2013) contends the permanency
of the martial rules in Pakistan signifies that the postcolonial state has struggled to resolve the question of
who should define the executive. There has been a constant tension and “contest between the civilmilitary bureaucracy and the legislative institutions of the state (280) .
The three military dictatorships that Pakistan have experienced are marked by their distinctive
effects on the society. Ayub Khan’s period (1958-1969) was a time of economic vibrancy but restricted
political participation of the people. Zia-ul-Haq’s (1977-1988) military dictatorship is characterized by
religious fervor and marginalization of political freedoms. Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007) military rule is
known for its liberalization policies towards civil society.
While Ayub Khan restricted civil and political freedoms in the country, the economic
performance of his regime had a galvanizing effect on the societal groups to organize themselves against
the military dictatorship. The period of Ayub Khan’s military government is known as the “development
decade” during which the military general had initiated economic development programs but his military
regime lacked commitment to develop the political institutions. The vacuum thus created between the
state and the people was thus taken up by the nascent political parties to bridge (Aqil Shah 2014a, 95106).
During the period from 1972 to 1977, the emergence of political party Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP) under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto manipulated the military’s defeat against India in 1971
and thrived on mobilizing the societal grievances against the previous military rule(s). During the prime
ministerial reign of Z.A. Bhutto, he systemically subverted any oppositional voices against his
government (Ziring 1977, 582-83).
It was during his government that state of Pakistan moved towards the religious right. This trend
of stoking religious sentiments was later perpetuated under Zia’s military rule via state-level policies in
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all fields of society – education, foreign policy, development planning, etc. Bhutto was, however, the one
leader who could bring all the opposition parties, regional, ethnic, nationalists and religious to a
consensus on the parliamentary form of Constitution – the 1973 Constitution. Z.A. Bhutto was however
ruled through executive arrogance and his “use of institutions often contravened the democratic ideals”
which therefore makes him “more an authoritarian than a parliamentarian” (Jaffrelot 2015, 238, 295).
The blatant disregard for the political institutions that was initiated under the populist Z.A. Bhutto
was exacerbated under the military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. General Zia-ul-Haq has had lasting effect
on the society and under his rule the military blatantly engaged in the politics of the country. Like Ayub
Khan, Zia-ul-Haq manipulated the political institutions, but unlike Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq did continue
with the 1973 Constitution. However, by introduction of article 58-2(b) in the 1972 Constitution, Zia gave
extraordinary and constitutional powers to the President – which meant the President could dissolve the
elected legislature. This Constitutional manipulation by Zia was the bane of the many elected
governments that followed the 1988 general elections (Kalhan 2013, 25-33).48 On the other hand, there is
sharp contrast between the quality of democracy that emerged in Pakistan in 2008 after Musharraf’s
dictatorial rule and the democracy that emerged in 1988 after Zia’s regime.
Far from being perfect, nine years of Musharraf’s dictatorial regime allowed the judiciary to
amass some independence from the executive and the legislature so that it continues to challenge the
present democratic government (O. Siddique 2015). The relative freedom of expression during
Musharraf’s regime allowed the media to flourish, and now it is an integral part of the government‘s
accountability system. On the other hand, General Zia-ul-Haq’s 11-year regime was largely repressive
and, consequently, the democratic system that emerged lacked the basic institutional structures required
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For a detailed discussion on the Article 58 2(B) also known as the Eighth Amendment in the 1973 Constitution of
Pakistan please refer to Osama Siddique, “The Jurisprudence of Dissolutions: Presidential Power to Dissolve
Assemblies Under the Pakistani Constitution and Its Discontents,” Arizona Journal of International & Comparative
Law 23, no. 3 (2006): 615-715.
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for democratic functioning. The democratic government (of PPP)49 which was formed following
Musharraf’s military rule was a result of bargaining between the citizens and the dictator, while Zia-ulHaq’s regime came to a sudden end due to his death. This difference is reflected in the institutional
structure of the democracy that followed.
However, the striking feature(s) common to the rule of these three military rulers is the fact that
all followed the narrative initiated by Ayub Khan that Pakistan’s military was the guardian of the country
and it is patriotic duty of soldiers to save Pakistan from the unruly political chaos unleashed by the
opportunist political elite. Jaffrelot (2015) contends it was the coup of Ayub Khan in 1958 that had
introduced the prototypical coup by consensus that was destined to repeat itself. This ‘model’ is
defined by five complementary features: (a) the army behind its leader (and never behind some
colonel); (b) takes over peacefully; (c) to replace politicians or bureaucrats made out to be
dangerous for the nation – and corrupt; (d) with the blessing, of the judicial apparatus; (e) the
general leading the coup having been placed at the head of the army by the very figure he
removed from power. This model would repeat itself with variants in 1977 and 1999. (305)
The three dictatorships have shared the following similarities: a military general supported by his generals
control state apparatus through bloodless coup; isolate the political society only to coopt it later for
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The PPP’s government was formed in 2008. The elected government was a coalition; the major coalition partner
was PPP’s rival political party the PML-N.
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legitimizing the military government; a strengthened military regime supported by its strong benefactor,
the United States.50
However, the degree of repression exhibited by the military regimes in their policy towards the
political society, civil society (media, NGOs) varied distinctively: military regimes did impose measures
to restrict contentious politics. However, each military regime did face push back from within the
repressed entities in the society. For example, Ayub Khan faced the disenfranchised segments of society
which were dissatisfied with his regime’s economic success; opposition to Zia-ul-Haq’s theocratic
military rule was cautiously led by the marginalized liberal voices in the media and civil society. The
dictatorial rule of General Musharraf was challenged by the very segments of civil society (i.e., media and
NGOs) that had been able to assert their presence in society only because of liberalization policies of his
government.
Part IV: Concluding Points
Political society and civil society form the basis of any political community. Political parties are
the principal protagonist of a political society. Parties provide the ideological platform from which the
50

From country’s foundation, Pakistan has benefitted from its diplomatic ties with USA. During Ayub Khan’s
military government, USA provided military and economic aid to Pakistan. The economic and military aid provided
to Pakistan was to prevent Pakistan to join the communist USSR. In return Pakistan provided US and its allies
access to airfields from where US initiated “intelligence collection …. to monitor Soviet missile capabilities” (Aqil
Shah, 2014, 92).
According to a recently released intelligence report by CIA, in the early days of Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime,
USA had shown reservation on the military coup, but with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, USA’s attitude
tempered down and Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime benefitted from the financial largess provided by the USA against
Soviets for Pakistan’s support for Afghan Jihad. The CIA report can be accessed at:
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP06T00412R000200070001-1.pdf
In 1999, when Musharraf came onto the political landscape, initially his military regime was disregarded by the
USA as being dictatorial, however, Musharraf regime’s fate changed with September 11, 2001 attacks on World
Trade Center in USA which eventually led to USA’s military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s geopolitical
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contenders to political power can mobilize societal demands (Huntington [1968] 2006). On the other
hand, it is the civil society that brings people together to engage in self-organized groups, to create public
space where citizens can act and communicate freely, independent of the state. The civil society is the
realm outside of political parties where individuals and groups aim to democratize the state rather than to
capture the state (Kaldor 2003, 8-9, Edwards 2014, 7-15).51 Civil society, however, can only strengthen
the political process; but it is the function of the parties to articulate popular sentiment and provide a
platform for citizens to coordinate their activities.
I believe, even with all its discontents and pathologies, political and civil society does have a
presence in Pakistan. As it has been discussed in this chapter, the three actors belonging to political
society (political parties) and civil society (media and NGOs) have performed under severe pressures and
restrictions imposed on them by the hybridized political order enacted under the authoritarian rulers –
which include the military generals and the elected civilian leadership.
In Pakistan, however, the mainstream political parties, the PPP, PML-N, JI and others were both
unwilling and unable to perform as they kept trying to forge alliances with the military’s encroachment on
political landscape and dictatorial rule. The members of political elite, who comprise these political
parties, still remain the intermediary between state and the citizens and are the fountainhead of political
support in Pakistan. But strong familial lineage and dynastic politics which are the basis of their support,
give them the luxury of not responding to public pressure.
Furthermore, I believe, the people are ambivalent towards democracy. In other words, there is an
absence of strong public sentiment in favor of democratic politics as well. Citizens also are actively
entwined in maintaining localized clientele relationships because for them these are the most efficient
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way of acquiring material benefits from patronage based system of localized politics.52 At the same time,
citizens also aspire to a democratic system of governance that maintains rule of law in society, provides
freedom of expression and more liberty to the people. But citizens as self-organized and self-asserting
groups in communicative engagement with the state is lacking.
Similarly, the civil society in Pakistan also has a dubious presence. Its activism within the society,
and its engagement with the state for a creation of a public space has had momentary upsurges. Civil
society did engage in contentious politics against authoritarianism of the military and elected regimes;
however, there are only episodic moments of democratic revivals. Any continual mobilization by the civil
society, its engagement within the society and with the state is missing.
In one confrontation, civil society, did find a space to organize against the authoritarian state.
This gradual momentum was accelerated under the military rule of the last military general, General
Musharraf. This civic and political momentum gained by citizenry itself was the result of liberalization
policies of General Musharraf’s military regime. The liberalization of the media and openness towards
NGOs signaled to the civil society that the costs of engaging in contentious politics were lower than what
was used to be the case under the previous military dictatorships. For example, the strategic choices and
the symbolic leadership provided by the CJP Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, helped unite and galvanize
opposition in both civil and political society in year 2007. It was during the momentum that had built
during the Lawyers Movement that the political parties were able to get organized in their opposition to
the military dictator.
In 2006, the major political parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had signed the
Charter of Democracy (CoD) pledging their support to each other in their opposition to the military
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In chapter 4, discussion on local government plans highlight that military governments were able to forge civilmilitary partnership based on, and by making politics localized. By making politics localized the qualitative distance
between the constituency and legislative politics was dissolved, the political elite elected rushed to forge alliance
with military governments to have its share in the hybridized politics of the country.
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dictator and for the return of democratic politics.53 At the time of signing this Charter the leaders of
oppositional political parties were in exile in London. Away from Pakistan’s military government, the
signatories pledged not to “join a military regime or any military sponsored government” or “solicit the
support of military to come into power or to dislodge a democratic government,” but instead to embrace a
“bipartisan” ethos that accepts “the due role of the opposition” and—whether in opposition or in
government—not to “undermine each other through extraconstitutional ways” (“Text of the Charter of
Democracy” 2006).
The political parties signing the CoD however could not be actively engaged in political
opposition against the military regime until political society had joined the Lawyers movement. The
Lawyers Movement which was initiated by the civil society in 2007 directly challenged the military ruler,
this movement for restoration of deposed CJP gained popular support for initiating contentious politics
against military regime (Ahmed and Stephan 2010, 495-96; Kalhan 2013, 51-52).
However, the point that guides my investigation in this research is Musharraf regime’s interactive
exchange with civil society most particularly the NGOs in the designing, devising, planning and
implementation of the plan of enactment of local governments all across Pakistan. This plan of
devolution, though administratively and structurally distinct from the plans which were implemented
under General Ayub and General Zia, allowed the military regime to coopt the political and civil society.
The military regime secured its control over the political landscape through the local governance plan and
it also made partners in civil society through the technical and financial support provided by the NGOs.
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CoD was signed between the opposition parties against the military dictatorship of General Musharraf. The
protagonists of this agreement were Benazir Bhutto of PPP and Nawaz Sharif of PML-N. As one civil society
activist believes, “CoD was primarily an affirmation of peace between these two major parties and their agreement
to unite against the military general” (Interview with Harris Khalique by the author, July 19, 2017).
CoD was signed between the opposition political parties outside of Pakistan in London in May 2006. Since the
leaders of major political parties PPP and PML-N had been banned from entering Pakistan by the military ruler.
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In the next chapter I present the empirical evidence on how the designing of Local Government
Plan 2001 had taken shape through an analysis of the interviews conducted with the civil society actors,
such as journalists and NGOs, on how the plan was devised.
Through an analysis of the newspaper articles for the period 2000-2001, I ask How was the plan
received in civil society? What did the actors in civil society think of the plan then and what do they think
now (in retrospect)? And, why is it that the political government in 2008 accepted the idea of devolution
initiated by the preceding military regime?

CHAPTER 4
WHY PLAN FOR DEVOLUTION? THE PLANNING
FOR THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLAN 2001
May the people who hold the power in the polis maintain their office confidently: a system of rule
that looks ahead and concerns itself with the welfare of the community.
Aeschylus, The Suppliants
Principle of Policy in the 1973 Constitution.
The State shall encourage local government institutions composed of elected representatives of
the areas concerned. And, in such institutions special representation will be given to peasants,
workers and women.
Article 32, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan
The Provincial Governments in the 1973 Constitution.
Each province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political,
administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local
governments.
Article 140, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan
Local Government in the 1973 Constitution.
Each province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political,
administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local
governments.
Elections to the local governments shall be held by the Election Commission of Pakistan.
Article 140-A, 1973 Constitution of Pakistan
Introduction
Scholars studying the military’s engagement in Pakistan focus on the military as a specialized
bureaucracy circumventing democratic institutions (H. A. Rizvi 2003; Aqil Shah 2014a, 2014b). Others
have evaluated the military’s corporate enterprise in securing its economic interests (Siddiqa 2007). There
are others who have analyzed the military’s utilization of religious rhetoric so as to position the military
as the defender of Islam (Haqqani 2005). In a similar vein, scholars who have studied institutional design
in the context of Pakistan have stressed that the state of Pakistan has never found balance between
electoral, legislature, judicial, and executive institutions (Waseem 1989; Jalal [1990] 2007). I believe the
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emphasis has been on studying the institutional transgressions of the military as an institution. Scholars
tend to downplay the fact that the political society also is responsible for the dismal democratic culture.
Similarly, the role of civil society has largely been obscured by the political society’s lack of resilience
against the military’s intervention in politics.
In this chapter, I highlight, analyze, and critically evaluate the role of civil society in its
engagement with the state in designing one institutional measure. This chapter presents the case of
devolution planning in Pakistan. In this chapter, through the critical voices raised by the civil society
(print media and interviews with civil society activists), I highlight the fact that the civil society was not
engaged with the military regimes of Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq.
The argument that I am presenting in this research does not reject the fact that in order to
legitimize their rule, the military regimes depended on the decentralization and devolution plans. I agree
that all three plans (1959, 1979, and 2001) were designed to undermine the formal political institutions in
the country; the military elite had a clear intention of subverting any of the oppositional voices. Under the
military dictatorship of General Ayub (1958-1969) and General Zia (1977-1988), devolution plans were
devised and implemented based on the institutional design constructed by the military leadership in
consultation with the administrative bureaucracy.1 These plans, however, did not involve the civil society;
the public sphere was treated as being dormant and as an unwanted antagonist that had to be subverted.
However, leading figures from the civil society of Pakistan, such as the widely recognized nongovernment organizations (NGOs), did participate in the debate and discussion on the proposed Local
Government Plan 2001 (LGP) initiated by the military regime of General Musharraf. Although these civil
society actors criticized the motivation to legitimize military rule behind this plan, they all were
unanimous in their position on the need for devolution of power to the grassroots. The NGOs were also
1

The devolution plan implemented under the military government of General Zia had been designed by the civilian
leadership under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1972. This devolution plan, however, was not implemented during Bhutto’s
civilian leadership. It was only under Zia’s military rule that the plan was implemented and Local Bodies elections
were held on a non-party basis in 1979 and 1983. For more details, please refer to Rizvi and Khatoon (2007) and
Zaidi (2005b).
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the vehement supporters of the LGP. They believed “the military regime has reached out to the civil
society actors more so than the previous military dictators and elected political governments.”2
I used primary and secondary sources as the foundational base for my analysis. My analysis of
devolution planning in Pakistan was based on secondary research material on the history of institutional
politics, with special focus on devolution; the primary source of data was the collection of interview data
with civil society activists, academics, bureaucrats, and political actors. I analyzed a military publication
(from the year 2000); and a review of documentary sources collected from civil society organizations.
The interviews with civil society actors provided me with data for critical review of the underlying
motives of the military and elected governments. I corroborated the data from the interviews with the
secondary research material and documentary evidence collected from the NGO sector in Pakistan.
Furthermore, based on the interviews, I categorized the responses of interviewees into three categories:
the cynics, critics, and supporters. These categories were developed to contextualize the opinions of civil
and political society in the case of devolution in Pakistan.
Outline of the Chapter
This chapter is divided into six parts. The first part looks into the decentralization and devolution
discourse as a component of governance strategy. The second part discusses the first two devolution plans
under General Ayub (Basic Democracy) and General Zia (Local Government Ordinance). This part also
discusses the political consequence of the devolution plans on the politics of Pakistan. The third part
presents a crucial discussion on civil service reforms commissioned by the civilian and military
governments. These civil service reforms were commissioned to bring changes in the civil bureaucratic
apparatus.
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In interviews with activists working in the NGO sector in Pakistan, this point was repeated the most often. These
are the workers who have worked in the sector over the last three decades and have seen the democratically elected
governments’ attitude toward local government and opening the political space for marginalized segments of
society. Interview with Harris Khalique, July 18, 2017; Interview with Bilal Naqeeb, July 31, 2017; Interview with
Salman Abid, August 4, 2017; Interview with Zahid Islam, November 16, 2016; Interview with Azhar Bashir Malik,
August 17, 2017; Interview with Malick Shahbaz, August 24, 2017; Interview with Irfan Mufti, August 21, 2017;
Interview with Sarwar Bari, March 13, 2017; Interview with Omar Javed, September 7, 2017.
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The fourth part looks into the democratic decade of the 1990s, the underperformance of elected
governments, and the rise of the non-government sector in Pakistan. The discussion in this part is carried
forward to the fifth part, which opens up discussion on the LGP devised by the military regime of General
Pervez Musharraf and how that regime communicatively engaged with civil society actors such as the
NGOs in planning and implementing the LGP. In this part of my discussion, I present a conceptual map
of the various actors in the public sphere belonging to academia, NGOs, civil bureaucracy, and political
society and how they shared their experiences with the LGP. Finally, in the concluding section, I
summarize my argument on the collective role of the actors of the state, military, civil bureaucracy, and
political elite, as well as the part that civil society played with regard to devolution planning in Pakistan.
Part I: Decentralization and Devolution as a Governance Strategy
The literature on local government acknowledges that local government can, and does, exist
within authoritarian regimes. Therefore, it can then be claimed that local government is not exclusively a
democratic phenomenon and need not be participatory in the least. Looking at the case of devolution
plans designed under military regimes in Pakistan, the claim seems to be validated.
Generally, local government simply refers to particular institutions, created by the Constitution,
legislation, or executive order, that deliver specific services in a delineated and relatively small
geographic area within a state. Local governance, however, is a broader term, indicating the “formation
and execution of collective action at the local level” (Anwar Shah and Furhawn Shah 2007, 73). Among
local government reforms, decentralization is one such type of reform. Primarily, decentralization occurs
under the framework of devolution of power, i.e., the transfer of powers, resources, and administrative
responsibility from central to sub-national, regional, or local authorities and elected representatives. The
basic principle governing the devolution of functions and resources is that of subsidiarity which means:
what can be done best at a particular local level should be done at that level and not at higher levels
(Bardhan 2002, 185).
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Typically, there are three forms of decentralization: political, administrative, and fiscal.
Decentralization is believed to promise a range of benefits in the way that it reduces the power of an
“overextended or predatory state.” By fragmenting central authority and introducing more
intergovernmental competition and checks and balances (Bardhan 2002, 4), it promises to make
government more responsive and efficient while ensuring local, cultural, and political autonomy and
control to local self-governing communities.
Proponents of political decentralization argue that bringing decision makers closer to their
constituencies enables greater citizen access and more flexibility to local conditions; devolving authority
allows for more citizen participation and accountability. Political decentralization gives citizens, through
their elected leaders, more power in public decision making. It is often associated with a pluralistic setting
and a representative government (Weingast 1995). Several scholars have argued for more inclusion in
policy process as a way to improve governance, especially economic governance; scholars, however, have
argued that the benefits of decentralization are inevitably contingent upon a functioning democratic
government (Bardhan 2002).
The objective of decentralization is to make local-level governance more responsive to citizens
by diluting the centralized authority; that is to say, the mega structures of decision making in a polity have
to be devolved (Fung and Wright 2001, Faguet 2014). In other words, “for decentralization to be really
effective, it has to accompany serious attempts to change existing power structures within communities
and to improve the opportunities for participation and voice and engaging the hitherto disadvantaged or
disenfranchised in the political process” (Bardhan 2002, 202).
Thus, according to scholars, the reform agenda for decentralization focuses on fostering local
institutions that are geared toward development of people-centric policies (Fung and Wright 2001;
Bardhan 2002). Decentralization centers on effective participation of citizens in setting public policy
priorities. If the local institutions are strong, then citizens can hold their elected accountable in time and in
a cost-effective manner. This, therefore, creates an environment of public transparency between citizens
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and the local state institutions. In absence of strong local institutions, the levels of accountability and
transparency between centralized state institutions and citizens at the grassroots remain distorted.
Decentralization aims to resolve the slack between the citizens at the grassroots and the centralized state
institutions (Fung and Wright 2001; Fung 2012; Bardhan 2002; Faguet 2014; Parkinson 2004).
Part II: The First Two Devolution Plans in Pakistan: Ayub’s in 1959 and Zia’s in 1979
The army’s promotion of local government as a space of legitimacy and political tutelage is a
paradigmatic feature of its extraconstitutional reason of state. (Naqvi 2013, 279)
Local governments had existed in Pakistan from the time of the British Raj, but these local
institutions were seen merely as measures to control and monitor local politics. The local institutions of
the time were not devised to involve local communities in policy making for their regions; they were
authorized merely to keep the locals away from directly retaliating against the imperial crown of the
British colonial empire (S. S. Rizvi 1980; Z. Islam 2014, 2015). In my interview with former bureaucrat
Roedaad Khan, he argued “[I]n times of the Raj the British had allowed for limited political control to the
subjects; similarly, the military rulers also carried such a controlling syndrome allowing for minimal
political control to the people.”3
Local government elections are adopted by military rulers to manage the domestic elite upon
whom the dictator relies for regime stability. In addition, elections at local levels are important sources of
information for the military ruler, through which he and his administration gauges their regime’s support
in the public sphere. Critics of the military regimes and their plans of local governments have argued that
the local government elections work as a kind of mechanism for the “selection of those individuals who
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Mr. Roedaad Khan, a former high-ranking bureaucrat who served under three military dictators and elected
governments from 1951-1993. Khan served under the military dictators General Ayub Khan (1958-1969), General
Yahaya Khan (1969-1971), Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-1978), General Zia-ul-Haq (1978-1988),
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990), and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993). Interview with the
author, January 25, 2017.
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shall generate and guard discourses in the public sphere that support the military rulers to strengthen their
rule.”4
The Start: Basic Democracy Led by Military and Bureaucratic Elite
Under General Ayub Khan, the system of Basic Democracy (BD) was devised after he imposed
martial law in 1958. The designing and planning of this program were undertaken by the special office of
the Bureau of National Research & Reconstruction (BNR&R), which was set up by the military regime.
The plan devised by the BNR&R was implemented by the military and the civil bureaucracy throughout
the entire country. BNR&R was headed by Brigadier F. R. Khan. BNR&R was the military regime’s
devised institution for designing the plan for BD. During the designing of the plan, the military regime
never consulted any of the actors in civil society, such as academia, print media, or citizen groups.5
The Basic Democracy Order was launched in October 1959, and by December 1959, 80,000 local
officials were elected as Basic Democrats. The BD system envisaged a four-tier hierarchical system of
governance. The 37,959 villages in Pakistan were divided into Union Councils in rural areas and Town
and Union Committees in urban areas.6 The next highest tier was that of Tehsil Councils in rural areas
and Municipal Committees and Cantonment boards in urban areas, followed by District Councils and,
finally, the fourth tier of Divisional Councils. It was the lowest tier, that of Union Councils and Town and
Union Committees, that had members elected on the basis of adult franchise, who then elected a chairman
from amongst themselves.
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Dr. Hassan Nasir, Secretary General, National Party (NP). NP is a regional political party from the province of
Balochistan. Dr. Nasir has been a member of NP for the last 15 years. During General Zia’s rule, Dr. Nasir was a
student leader and was imprisoned for his political activism. He later fled from Pakistan and lived in Europe during
the 1990s. He joined NP because, as he explains, it “is a political party that is ideologically left.” Interview with the
author in Islamabad on February 18, 2017.
5

Khursheed-ul Hassan, “National Reconstruction Bureau to Be Set Up – Will Enjoy Wide Powers,” Dawn,
December 4, 1958.
6

The areas with a population of more than 14,000 inhabitants were categorized as Town Committees, and areas
where the population was less than 14,000 inhabitants were the Union Committees (S. S. Rizvi 1980, 34).

197
The higher tiers had some members who were indirectly elected by these directly elected
members, as well as members nominated by the government. The system was highly restrictive in its
participatory and electoral framework, since the far more important position of the chairman of Municipal
Committee was appointed by the government. The civil bureaucrats appointed by the Central and
Provincial governments, such as the Deputy Commissioner (DC) and the Commissioner, would be
appointed as chairmen of the Municipal Committee, the District Committee, and the divisions (Sayeed
1967, 248-50; Zaidi 2015, 332).
The 80,000 Basic Democrats (BDs) who were elected to the committees, in fact, became the
electoral college for the election of President General Ayub Khan. General Ayub Khan, after being
elected the president of the country, was able to rule with the system of BD as his constituency.
According to Shahid Javed Burki, who had served as a bureaucrat under the military regime of General
Ayub, “The system of BD was not a project in enactment of democracy, it was devised by the military
regime to help it implement the aid received by the US state which was called PL-480 towards
implementation of the Village-Agriculture and Industrial Development (VAID) program.”7 Therefore, for
the implementation of VAID, Burki argues, “the military ruler needed administrative bureaucracy to work
closely with the people at village levels, but in essence the locals did not have authority to decide over
matters of local governance.” Scholar Khalid Bin Sayeed (1967) shared a similar observation on the
system of BD. He asserted that the system was as basic as its title; the locally elected members to the
committees had no powers devolved to them, and the decisions on the development of the community
remained under the control of the civil administrative bureaucracy (244-46).8

7
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Interview with the author in Lahore on March 29, 2017.
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The Next Stage: Establishment of Local Bodies Led by Military and Bureaucratic Elite
1n 1972, after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had emerged on the political landscape as the populist leader of
the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), he dissolved the military-devised BD system and announced a new
system of “three-tier local government to replace the BD system.” Bhutto was unequivocal in his criticism
of the BD system, and he believed it was “a system that reduced democracy to farce.”9 Bhutto had
announced his intention to launch a new Local Bodies plan, and indeed two Local Government
Ordinances were introduced in 1972 and in 1975, but they were never implemented. This was a
contradiction to the populist discourse espoused by Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). However, as
many observers of Pakistan politics contend, despite his populist appeal, Bhutto never could have pursued
the elections to local bodies for the fear that opposition parties might win the electoral base at the local
levels and damage the support base held by PPP.10
Following the general elections in 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq imposed martial law and stunted the
continuance of a democratic process. After postponing and delaying general elections for national and
provincial assemblies according to the 1973 Constitution, General Zia-ul-Haq instead announced a plan
for local governments in June 1979, essentially the same local government plan that was earlier devised
by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1972 and 1975. General Zia-ul-Haq’s military government amended provisions
in the local government ordinance of 1975 and announced local government elections. When these local
government elections were announced, the political parties criticized this policy initiative, arguing that
elections to local governments, in the absence of provincial and national governments, would be
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“Steps to Restore Democracy: Three-Tier Local Government to Replace BD System.” Dawn. January 23, 1972.
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In my interviews with academics, senior retired civil servants, and the representatives of civil society
organizations, all 29 of the interviewees repeated the same response as to why Bhutto did not hold elections at local
levels despite having control over the Central government and his party’s achievement of the promulgation of the
1973 Constitution of Pakistan.
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detrimental to the restoration of democracy in the country.11 The criticism did not deter General Zia-ulHaq from launching another military-civil bureaucracy-devised local government plan across Pakistan.
Political Significance of the Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 1979
Under the LGO 1979, there was a four-tiered municipal governance in urban areas—Town
Committees, Municipal Committees, Municipal Corporation, and Metropolitan Corporation.12 There was
a three-tiered system of local government in operation in the rural areas, where Union Councils, Tehsil or
Taluka13 Councils, and District Councils existed. Under the LGO 1979, elections for all local bodies were
held in 1979, 1983, and 1987. After the elections of all the members of the unit, the chairman, vicechairmen and mayors were all elected on the basis of indirect vote from within the local council. In each
election cycle from 1979 to 1987, 80,000 seats were contested in each election, of which 89 percent of the
representatives belonged to rural local councils (Zaidi 2015, 335). Depending on the availability of the
trained human resource and the technical skills in each urban and rural area, the services provided by
these councils were limited, and these councils therefore relied on either the Central government or the
existing civil bureaucratic setup in each district.
As Zaidi (2015) asserted, “[D]espite the large number of legislative functions of local councils
and their often extensive organization and management structures, very few functions by local councils
were actually carried out.”14 Furthermore, like his predecessor, the military government of General Zia-
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ul-Haq did not engage with any of the actors in civil society for the making the local government plan
service-delivery oriented.
General Zia-ul-Haq devised the local government plan to centralize power with the military and
civil bureaucratic elite. And, in order to emasculate the political parties and the political institutions of the
legislature at both the national and provincial levels, the elected bodies at the local levels, through the
District Councils, gave General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime an electoral connection to the society. Since
the political parties had been vocal in criticizing the local government elections before the general
elections in 1979, this therefore gave space for some new political contenders to contest the local
government elections. Furthermore, the traditional political parties rejected the local-level elections, and
the political competition had also been reduced, thus signaling an opening for new candidates vying for
political power. As Ali Cheema contended, the “army was at the helm of political centralization. Under
General Zia, the army controlled the federal and provincial levels with a legitimization strategy
strengthened through the electoral representation at the local levels.”15
I believe these new contenders for power extended their loyalty to the military rule to remain
electorally relevant in their constituencies and politically significant to the military ruler. The military
regime of General Zia-ul-Haq benefitted from the entry of the new political contenders on the local level
in absence of any direct political competition at such levels and at the provincial and federal levels. Thus,
the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq held the local government elections in 1979, 1983, and then in 1987.
The 1979 and 1983 local government elections are important in the sense that these elections were held
before the general elections in 1985. General Zia-ul-Haq realized the benefits of having nonpartisan
elections at the local levels and therefore replicated the same order when he announced the general
elections in 1985.
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Dr. Ali Cheema, Professor of Economics at Lahore University of Management Sciences. Interview with the
author, March 27, 2017.
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The nonpartisan elections at the local levels and their replication at the general level in 1985 had
a huge impact in the emergence of localized politics at the national level. “Zia had used these local bodies
elections as a litmus test to his regime’s popularity; when the local bodies elections were held in 1979 and
1983 many political contenders who were elected belonged to the Pakistan People’s Party; this therefore
made Zia to persecute partisan politics at all levels, local, provincial and federal levels.”16 However, the
military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq was able to draw broad-based support for the local governments
“because of the relative importance given to this tier of government by the large developmental funds
channeled through it.”17 The military intervention and interference in politics led to the emergence of
localization and personalization of politics at the local level (Ziring 1988, 1997; Cheema, Khwaja, and
Qadir 2005, Cheema and Sayeed 2006, Cheema and Mohmand 2008).
The military regime carefully selected and favored many social groups that challenged the
political mobilization of political parties. A very large number of individuals who had been trained for the
first time in politics through the local bodies emerged later as members of the national and provincial
assemblies in 1985 and in subsequent elections. One media report cited by S. Akbar Zaidi (2015) claimed
that in 1985, of the 240 members of the Punjab Provincial Assembly, 124 were sitting councilors at the
Tehsil and/or District Councils; of the 11 Metropolitan/Municipal Corporations in the provinces of Punjab
and Sindh, at one time or another, the mayors of as many as 10 Metropolitan/Municipal Corporations had
been members of the National Assembly or members of the Provincial Assembly. When the general
elections were in held in 1993, it was estimated that more than 70 percent of the members of the Punjab
and national assemblies had started their political careers from local bodies (see Zaidi 2015, 337, footnote
29).
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One member of the civil society organization Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), an
Islamabad-based organization that monitors election processes, contended that the local bodies election
that had been held under General Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime, “even if they were non-partisan contests,
it nevertheless had solidified a political class to emerge in local areas, and this class of political elite
gained control at the national and provincial level legislature levels in time of democratic transition that
followed from 1988 onwards.”18
Additionally, these nonpartisan elections at local levels “brought in a large number of local level
politicians who had become prominent in their own geographic region or constituency at the local level,
contested the 1985 elections and were thus propelled to provincial and national status, as were some
political parties.”19 Political parties such as Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), which later was renamed
Muttahida Quomi Movement (MQM), came into existence under General Zia-ul-Haq’s rule and became a
powerful regional contender for political control in Sindh in the 1990s.20
A group of political elite that had been elected in the 1985 general elections under General Zia-ulHaq started to reorganize themselves to reconstitute and reactivate - Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The
political elite were favored by the military regime over the oppositional political elite having affiliation
with Pakistan People Party (PPP). Later in the decade of the 1990s, this political party came to be known
for its leader, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The traditional stronghold of this party is the populous Punjab
province. The party credited its leader for political reorganization and came to be known as the Pakistan
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Muslim League (PML-N).21 This political party and its main rival party, the PPP, had formed elected
governments during the 1990s.
These are examples of political parties that emerged on the political scene under the two military
regimes. Most of their members had launched their political careers as nonpartisan candidates at local
levels in 1979 and 1983. However, with time, the political parties reorganized their members to channel
political parties’ access to provincial and national assemblies.22
In the absence of elected assemblies, local governments were the only popularly elected bodies. I
believe these locally elected political elite became politically relevant for the military regime for three
reasons: (a) it kept the people connected electorally to their representatives; (b) it channeled peoples’
discontentment with democratic politics squarely at the local levels and did not let it spill over at the
national level; and (c) since many new political contenders contested the local elections, it therefore
fragmented the political parties and their opposition to the military regime. The locally elected political
elite and the local governments therefore played an important political role in legitimizing the rule of the
military regime. The locally elected political elite also became a political channel for the military regimes,
for they had been raised as a new cadre of political elite.
For the local governments to perform at grassroots, the administrative structure of state provided
the necessary technical and administrative support. The civil bureaucracy therefore was in service of the
military dictatorships. The military rulers and the later elected governments however also initiated various
steps to reform the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. The devolution plans devised by the military
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governments were also seen by the designer as a step towards the reformation of bureaucratic apparatus.
Next section of this chapter looks into the various civil reforms initiated by the state.
Part III: Civil Service Reforms Commissioned by the Civilian and Military Governments
At the time of Pakistan’s independence, the civil bureaucracy inherited from the British Raj
provided the administrative workforce for the newly created country. The Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)
was Pakistan’s version of the colonial Indian Civil Service (ICS). The ICS had provided the hierarchal
chain of command linking the field administration (i.e., at the districts) to the provincial and federal tiers.
Under the British rule, the civil bureaucracy functioned under the viceroy. The characteristic feature of
British colonial administration was that none of the positions to these offices (district, provincial, federal)
were elected.
The CSP inherited these characteristics from ICS under colonial times. Nasir Islam (1989)
contended the CSP had no experience of working as subordinates to elected politicians (272). The CSP
maintained its colonial prestige of deep understanding of the administrative laws and thus provided the
crucial bureaucratic workforce23 to the state of Pakistan (Niaz 2010, 89-96). The CSP, at the time of
Pakistan’s independence, was comprised of 157 officers; 99 officers were Muslim ICS, and 50 were
British ICS who were hired by the Pakistan government on a contractual basis to fill the personnel
shortage (N. Islam 1989, 273).24
The elitist orientation of the service structure of CSP was the most crucial feature of its prestige
in the civil bureaucracy. The political elite relied on the CSP to manage the administration of the newly
established country. However, at the same time, the political elite initiated the review and performance
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appraisal of the working efficiency of the CSP. From 1949 to 1962, attempts were made by the political
and military elite to reform civil services in Pakistan, reducing its colonial prestige and making it more
specialized to serve the development and administrative needs of the people.25
In the 1960s, under the military rule of General Ayub Khan, two evaluative commissions were
initiated—one in 1961 and the other in 1962. Both commissions recommended to the military ruler that
the CSP must root out its colonial mindset of ruling over the people; the office of DC under the CSP must
be reoriented to serve the people rather than to act and rule as a colonial governor in the districts.
However, the recommendations made in the two reports—the Ahmad Report of 1961 and the Cornelius
Report of 1962—were not implemented by the military government. On the contrary, under Ayub Khan’s
system of BD, the DC effectively had become district governors that not only controlled functions of
district administration but “also acted as the political representatives of the president” (Niaz 2010, 104).
Civil Services Reforms under Bhutto (1973) and General Zia (1978)
The governments before General Ayub and his military government did not produce measures to
reform the civil services. However, in the aftermath of the events of 1971, the elected government of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto initiated the reformation of the civil services and administrative bureaucracy. Those
measures were devised to bring control of the state’s bureaucracy under the elected office of the prime
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minister.26 However, hardly any measures were devised by the elected regime to strengthen the locally
elected officials parallel to the administrative bureaucracy.
Similar measures were taken up by General Zia-ul-Haq; not only did the military ruler devise
policies to subordinate civil bureaucracy to the military regime, but he also gave the military a direct entry
to the public administration via the civil bureaucracy (Wilder 2009). Under General Zia-ul-Haq, the army
was given a 10 percent share of positions in the civil administration. This meant that serving military
officers and retired officers could be transferred to the civil bureaucracy and, more broadly, this meant the
military’s direct engagement in the civil administration.
Christophe Jaffrelot (2015) noted that “between 1980 and 1985, 96 army officers entered the
CSS27 while 115 were recruited on contract and in 1985, a military official was appointed head of the civil
intelligence bureau for the first time” (330). Under General Zia-ul-Haq, a fact-finding team under the
leadership of senior civil services bureaucrat Anwar-ul-Haq was commissioned. The report did not advise
any revolutionary changes to the officer cadre of the District Management Group (DMG). Instead, “it
retained deputy commissioners as the linchpin of the provincial administrative system” while the “elected
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officials (for example, the chairmen of the district councils) were reduced to auxiliary roles” (Shafqat
2013, 106).28
Civil Services Reform under the Elected Government of Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999)
Under the elected government of Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999), two investigative missions were
commissioned to advise the government on how to make the civil administration most responsive to the
changing domestic, national needs and to make them more effective in delivering services to the people.
One report, the Fakhar Imam (1999) Report of the Commission on Administrative Restructuring on ReEngineering of the Federal Government, recommended that “the prime minister personally oversee the
process of restructuring and reengineering civil services reforms and the government” (Shafqat 2013,
107).
The other report commissioned at the behest of Nawaz Sharif’s government was compiled in
1998 by the World Bank (WB)29 and was titled Pakistan: A Framework for Civil Service Reform in
Pakistan. The World Bank noted the “politicization of civil service decision-making. Political
interference has reduced the effectiveness and professionalism of the civil service, while at the same time
politicians have often failed to exercise their oversight role in the wider public interest” (World Bank
1998, ii).
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This report made strong observations of the lack of responsive local governments, stating that
“the lack of effectively functioning, politically accountable local governments in Pakistan leaves a
vacuum,” and in such a scenario, “[R]ural communities are increasingly relying on their own efforts to
develop local village infrastructure and social services. Although greater reliance on community/NGO
and private efforts is generally a positive development,” the report cautioned that “when this occurs in the
core areas of responsibility of the public sector it is a worrisome sign of disillusionment with the latter’s
inability to deliver” (World Bank 1998, 28). The WB recommended devolution as one of the means to
improve government in Pakistan.
Though it was Nawaz Sharif’s elected government that had commissioned these above-mentioned
reports, there is no evidence that the government acted on either of the two commissions’
recommendations. Saeed Shafqat argued, “[S]such reports were commissioned merely to give the
impression to the civil society that government is deliberating on bringing reforms to the civil
administration; in reality, however, the government has minimal commitment to change the status quo.”30
Part IV: The Decade of the 1990s
The decade of the 1990s is known for the return of partisan electoral democracy in Pakistan.
During this period, the elected governments moved between the two major political parties, the PPP and
PML-N. However, neither of these political parties worked on the issue to reconcile their political
differences to move toward the consolidation of democracy in terms of strengthening political institutions.
The period between the 1988 and 1999 is termed the “democratic interregnum” (Weiss and Khattak 2013,
7). Democracy during this period remained transitional, in the sense that the political elite remained
focused on their electoral success rather than on making policies for the creation of an enabling political
environment. When major political parties are prevented by military rulers from engaging in politics,
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those political parties express a strong dispensation for democracy. However, once these political parties
are in government, they “change and demonstrated authoritarian tendencies” (Shafqat 2002, 213).
Weiss and Khattak (2013) argued that the elected governments during the decade of the ’90s
“seemed more intent with staying in power than with taking chances to enact substantive change” (7).
Dismal Economic Performance of the Elected Governments and the International Financial
Institutions (IFIs)
The decade of the ’90s saw the return of democratically elected governments. The period also
brought with it economic hardships for the country. During the military rule of General Zia-ul-Haq, the
country had witnessed a large volume of international humanitarian aid for the country. This humanitarian
aid was provided to Pakistan for its contribution to the ongoing Afghan Jihad in neighboring Afghanistan
against the Soviet invasion. From 1979 to 1989, Pakistan received financial assistance from the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The WB and IMF had made available to Pakistan an
extended loan facility to help it manage its budget deficit, and the Reagan administration provided a
US$3.2 billion economic and military aid package to Pakistan in 1981 (Gwertzman 1981).
General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime also accessed loan facilities made available through the IMF. Under
the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in November 1980, the government of General Zia-ul-Haq had an
agreement to receive Special Drawing Rights (SDR)31 of 1.27 billion from IMF. During this period, the
IFIs’ Structural Adjustment Program was also being established in developing countries. Since Pakistan
had been receiving international aid from the West during the Afghan Jihad, it did not experience any
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serious effects from the Structural Adjustment Program32 (A. S. Akhtar 2013, 49-50). But as soon as the
Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan, and with the demise of General Zia-ul-Haq, the economic
situation of the country started to deteriorate.
With the return of electoral democracy in Pakistan, the elected government found itself severely
handicapped by the loan conditionality imposed by the IFIs. During the 1990s, the IFIs put economic
pressure on the country to reduce its public expenditure and develop new measures in its governance
policies. The elected governments did manage to receive loans from the IFIs, but the elected governments
did not accomplish any measures to reform governance. During this same period, the country also
witnessed the rise of the NGOs as the third sector in the country. The NGOs that had initially started
operating during the Afghan Jihad did not terminate their operations; in fact, local affiliates were created
and domestic NGOs established their operations across Pakistan. These NGOs had valuable technical
expertise in community mobilization and development.
Omar Asghar Khan, a leading development practitioner (who later joined the cabinet of General
Pervez Musharraf), credited the NGOs for helping the people in the wake of an unresponsive political
government. According to Khan, the democratically elected governments did not initiate direct
engagement with the people to respond to their developmental needs; this void was filled by the NGOs
(O. A. Khan 2001). In filling this gap, others argued the NGOs were the interface between the donor
agencies and the local communities, and, similarly, NGO also serviced the gap between the state and the
people (Naviwala 2010).
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NGOs as the Third Sector in Pakistan
In the last chapter, I discussed the emergence of the NGOs as civil society actors in Pakistan. In
Pakistan, as I have argued, the existence of the civil society is a misunderstood concept and a complex
entity. The civil society, in the traditional sense, is an entity of citizens organized into civic associations,
and trade unions, but in Pakistan, such is not the embodiment of civil society. As Christophe Jaffrelot
(2015) contended, “[T]rade unions’ weakness partly explains why in Pakistan, “civil society” is often
understood as a synonym for NGO” (427). In Pakistan, the NGO as a sector was strengthened as a
consequence of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. With Afghan refugees in Pakistan during the ongoing
conflict in Afghanistan, international aid agencies opened operations in Pakistan and supported local
organizations in initiating humanitarian programs to aid the refugees.
International humanitarian and development organizations such as the United Nations and its
affiliates opened their operations in the country, but worked closely with Pakistan-based domestic nonprofit organizations. It was during this period that the number of NGOs in Pakistan multiplied. Likewise,
other international agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID),
the Department for International Development (DFID), and Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), had also initiated their operations in support of Pakistan’s government to manage the refugee
crisis and also to help establish the local NGOs. The establishment of local NGOs was encouraged by the
military regime to absorb the special funds made available for development programs (Nejima 2002,
97).33
But with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, these agencies cut back on their operations.
The funds that had been available to these agencies were utilized to establish domestic agencies that
would provide technical support to the state’s agencies in providing basic services in the rural and urban
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areas of Pakistan (O. A. Khan 2001). The local organizations that were formed with international funds,
for example, the Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO), were established under an agreement
between CIDA in 1994 and the Pakistan government, with the purpose of supporting NGOs in rural areas.
The Trust for Voluntary Organization (TVO) was created in 1990 by the Pakistan government to
provide financial support to NGOs under an agreement with the USAID. The South Asian Partnership
(SAP-PK) was set up in 1989 as the Pakistani affiliate of an association of voluntary agencies in Canada
and South Asia. The fact that NGOs emerged as a distinct phenomenon in the 1980s can largely be
attributed to the influence of international NGOs working in Pakistan (Ghaus-Pasha and Iqbal 2003; Bano
2012).
Table 3 presents the list of the NGOs that were formed in the 1980s; these organizations were
formed as NGOs independent from the government of Pakistan. These organizations, however, were
registered entities under the laws of the state.
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Table 3: List of NGOs Established in the 1980s
Name of the Organization

Year Established

Nature of Work

Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan

1986

Rights-based organization, works for
minority and women rights.

Aurat Foundation34

1986

Rights-based organization, works for
women’s rights.

SUNGI35

1989

Service-delivery organization, works with
the local communities in the rural areas of
Pakistan, especially the province of KPK.
Source: NGO Resource Center 2000

All these Pakistan-grown NGOs and think tanks collaborated with and were provided funding
support from the international NGOs and think tanks working in Pakistan. Although these organizations
were established as independent entities from the government, they relied on funds from the international
donor agencies. These organizations do not disclose their funding sources to outside persons such as
myself. However, by law they have to share their funding sources to the state agencies.
In my interviews with the staff of these organizations, such as the HRCP, SAP-PK, SPO, and
SUNGI, all of them admitted that the various international donor agencies are providing them the funds to
operate in Pakistan. But the projects that these organizations undertake for the various donor agencies are
only short-term, not lasting for more than 3 years. In some cases, the donor agencies commission research
studies, such as on the rights of women under women-specific laws by the state, child protection laws,
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KPK in the late 1980s—the SUNGI Foundation. When General Pervez Musharraf came to power with the military
coup in October 1999, Omar Asghar Khan was asked to join General Musharraf’s cabinet of advisors. Khan severed
his association with the SUNGI Foundation and joined the cabinet as Minister for Labor, and Minister for Rural
Development and Local Government. In 2002, he launched his political party, but just before the general elections
of 2002, he died. His death is marked with controversies; some argue he committed suicide, while others believe he
was murdered.
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minority rights under the Constitution of Pakistan, etc. One NGO representative candidly conceded
NGOs’ reliance on external funding; he contended, “The NGO sector in Pakistan are the mere
contractors; we do what we are told by the donor agencies. If, for example, the donors are interested in
devolution programs as they were in Musharraf’s time, the entire NGO sector therefore engaged in
implementing the program at the grassroots. We, as I said to you, are contractors.”36
As I have mentioned, during the 1980s, the NGOs started to reemerge as the third sector, other
than the state and the economy. The elected governments of the ’90s, especially the government of Nawaz
Sharif, built partnerships with this newly reconstituted NGO sector. However, also during the decade of
the ’90s, Pakistan’s elected governments faced credit shortfalls, resulting in a deficit in their budget.
During this time, the IFIs, such as WB and IMF, placed conditions on the governments to drastically cut
down on public expenditure. This, therefore, led the state to build partnerships with the NGOs sector to
engage in programs that would serve the needs of the people.
In her analysis of state-NGO partnerships in Pakistan, Susumu Nejima (2002) argued that because
of the powerful influence of donors, the Pakistan government began to play a favorable role in the
activities of the NGOs. Furthermore, she asserted, “[T]he one concrete example of this change in
governments’ attitude was the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1993–98).37 During the period of this plan the
government promoted the Social Action Programme (SAP) with support from the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank. Under the SAP, a policy was laid to facilitate activities through community
organizations in the four fields of basic education, basic health and sanitation, waterworks and sewerage
systems in rural villages, and population planning” (Nejima 2002, 103-4).
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, I argue that the decade of the ’90s was also the
decade of democracy. However, it was during this decade that Pakistan’s dismal economic performance
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and its increased reliance on the IFIs began to be felt by the people. The SAP, which was devised by the
elected government under Nawaz Sharif, looked toward building partnerships with the NGO sector. SAP
had a budget of US$7.7 billion and had an important requirement of community participation through the
involvement of NGOs (Bano 2008, 91).38 This paved the way for the NGO sector to formally enter into
development activities. Much of the emphasis, however, was for the use of these nonprofit organizations
as agents for social service delivery in order to reduce the fiscal burden on government, so as to meet the
demands of public expenditure. Consequently, a large endowment was given to government-sponsored
voluntary organizations such as National Rural Support Program (NRSP); the Pakistan Poverty
Alleviation Fund (PPAF) was made operational; fiscal incentives were given for corporate and individual
philanthropy; and space was created within the Social Action Program for a greater role by NGOs
(Ghaus-Pasha and Iqbal 2003, 24).
During the 1990s, international donor agencies provided monetary support to the elected
governments, but they also pressured the governments to enact governance reforms, especially in the civil
service and in working closely with the NGOs. The elected governments, however, remained recalcitrant
to the demands of the international donor agencies. The civil service reforms that were recommended by
WB in 1998 were not accepted by the elected government. However, this changed with the third military
dictatorship. The military rule of General Pervez Musharraf not only enacted reforms in the civil
bureaucracy, but it also engaged with the international donor agencies and opened the regime to work
with the civil society actors in Pakistan.
Prelude to the Local Government Plan 2001 (LGP)
In my interviews with civil society activists, 16 out of 17 of them believed the military regime’s
immediate attention to the local government is attributed to the members of General Musharraf’s first
38
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cabinet. The cabinet members included Mr. Omar Asghar Khan, Mr. Javed Jabbar, and Dr. Atiya
Inayatullah. These three members were known figures in the NGO sector. Omar Asghar Khan, of SUNGI
in the province of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KPK), and Javed Jabbar, of Baahn Beli in the province of
Sindh, were working in the rural areas of Pakistan. Dr. Atiya Inayatullah was known for his work in
Planned Parenthood and population welfare. All three were aware of the ongoing debate and demands
emanating from civil society for reforms in civil service and reviving local governments.
However, one of the bureaucrats who had previously worked for the military’s enacted think tank
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) asserted that “NRB had devised this plan, and NRB had its own
team of experts. These cabinet members had minimal influence on setting the agenda for NRB.”39 On the
contrary, his colleague from NRB, who had also worked on the planning of the LGP as a private
consultant representing civil society, held a slightly different opinion. He admitted that the members of
Musharraf’s cabinet were selected before NRB had started its planning for the LGP; however, he argued
“there was no direct linkage between NRB and Mr. Omar Asghar Khan. But at the top level the
coordination mechanism that existed, he was part of that. But I don’t believe his role was any more than
that.”40
Nevertheless, I strongly believe that Mr. Omar Asghar Khan’s role cannot be denied in apprising
the military government of the ongoing debates on civil service reforms and reviving local governments.
Omar Asghar Khan was highly respected in the NGO sector for his grassroots development initiatives. He
held strong opinions about reviving local governments and believed in the military government’s agenda
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Interview with Mr. Ikramullah Ghauri. Mr. Ghauri was member of the five-member team of NRB led by General
Tanvir Naqvi that generated the strategy document on the Local Government Plan 2001. This document was shared
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of good governance.41 Khan represented the military government in its coordination with the civil society
organizations and international donor agencies. He was instrumental in bringing local organizations, such
as Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), and international donor agencies, such as Asia
Foundation in Pakistan, UNDP, ADB, WB, DFID, CIDA and the Norwegian Agency for Development
(NORAD), to assist the NRB in developing the LGP (Niaz 2010, 149-50).
Furthermore, there are others who argue that the military regime had already been in preparation
for taking up the role of bringing reforms to civil service and establishing local governments. In its annual
report on the state of governance in Pakistan in 2000, Human Rights Watch observed that in order to
strengthen his control on the political landscape, “Sharif pursued what proved to be an untenable strategy:
relying on the army as an instrument of governance while attempting to assert control over the army
itself.” Furthermore, the report indicated that by giving the army the “administration of the country’s
largest public sector utility, army-run organizations were awarded a contract for all major development
projects in Punjab, and troops were called out to conduct the census,” and the elected government of
Nawaz Sharif involved the military in the domestic administration and governance (Human Rights Watch
2000).42 This overreliance on the military to resolve the country’s governance problems gave the military
critical insight into bureaucratic and political shortcomings. Thus, not surprisingly, as Aqil Shah (2014a)
contended, “[A]rmy monitoring teams were the prelude to the military government’s planned
restructuring of the government machinery” (198).
I believe the military’s involvement in the domestic tasks of governance exposed the elected
government’s administrative weaknesses. The performance shortcomings of the elected governments
became more prominent in the public sphere. The public could see the military engaged in domestic
affairs that should have been performed by the civilian government. The government’s inefficiency did
41
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not go unnoticed by international aid agencies also. The WB report, discussed above, highlighted
governance discrepancies and governments’ ineffectiveness in undertaking governance reforms.43 The
lack of effective governance by the elected regime and its overreliance on the military enabled the future
military government of General Pervez Musharraf to undertake reforms at the level of civil administration
and local governance soon after he assumed power.
Part V: Local Government Plan 2001 (LGP) under General Pervez Musharraf’s Regime
According to the deliberative theory of democracy, while government agents may be responsible
for establishing policies for regulating the society, it is the role of civil society organizations to work with
citizens to shape these policies into effective plans. A focus on civil society requires viewing
governments’ policy making and deliberation over collective decisions within the broader political
landscape. Within the theory of deliberative democracy, the pattern of deliberating over collective
decisions recognizes that planning for decisions that affect the political community must not be confined
to discrete forums such as most formal political institutions, either through elections, contestation over
policies between the political parties, or debates over laws in the legislature.
Instead, the deliberative canvas is far bigger and must include other spheres. Drawing on
Mansbridge (1999),44 Hendriks (2006) defined the deliberative system as “a series of arenas where . . .
communicative practices that foster critical, public reflection” take place (499). These can include
discrete forums in government (like committee meetings and task forces) or in civil society (like public
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seminars and church events) but go beyond these to also include public deliberation in courts, legislatures,
news media, and even “everyday talk” (Mansbridge 1999).
The military regime of General Pervez Musharraf instituted local governance structure by
engaging with civil society actors in the public sphere. It was the first time in Pakistan’s history that the
state engaged with the civil society to implement, if not to design, governance reforms. The Local
Government Plan 2001 was devised to bring in “revolution by devolution.” Through this plan, the state
engaged with the civil society actors and was able to craft a radical plan, which did bring certain
remarkable changes to the political landscape.
Speech by General Musharraf on Reforming the Institutions of the State
In his first address as military dictator to the nation on October 17, 1999, after he took over in a
bloodless coup on October 12, 1999, General Musharraf laid out his agenda to reform the institutions of
the state. The agenda consisted of seven points; the program for “devolution” was the sixth point on his
agenda.
My dear countrymen. The choice before us on 12th October was between saving the body—that
is the nation, at the cost of losing a limb—which is the Constitution, or saving the limb and losing
the whole body. The Constitution is but a part of the nation; therefore, I chose to save the nation
and yet took care not to sacrifice the Constitution. The Constitution has only been temporarily
held in abeyance. This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed forces
have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for
true democracy to flourish in Pakistan.
Ever since 12th October I have deliberated, carried out consultations and crystallized my views
about the future course to be adopted. I wish to share these with you today.
My dear countrymen, our aims and objectives shall be:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Rebuild national confidence and morale.
Strengthen the federation, remove inter provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion.
Revive the economy and restore investor confidence.
Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice.
Depoliticise state institutions.
Devolution of power to the grassroots level.
Ensure swift and across the board accountability.
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Good governance is the pre-requisite to achieve these objectives. In the past, our governments
have ruled the people. It is time now for the governments to serve the people.
(Excerpt from General Musharraf’s First Speech to the Nation, October 17, 1999)
In his address to the nation, the general presented a new project of the state that he termed “the
7-point agenda,” which, according to him, was devised after “consultations.” While not explaining with
whom these consultations had taken place, the 7-point agenda focused on rebuilding the state, regaining
political and economic stability, ensuring law and order, and requiring accountability for those who were
corrupt. The civil society actors whom I interviewed in the course of this research believe these many
“consultations” were the consequence of the military’s increased role in the country’s internal domestic
engagements, such as the monitoring teams employed to make institutions of the state viable.45
Through agenda point 6, the general presents the project of devolving power to the grassroots.
For General Pervez Musharraf, good governance was critical to making a success of the 7-point agenda
and became the project of the military coup. Through his military government, the general aimed to
reform the state’s very purpose: from ruling the subjects to serving the citizens. I believe that military
regimes, as in the past, have focused on using certain vocabulary to reach the people. Each military ruler
has emphasized democracy as system of government, but a system that was possible only with the
military’s engagement in politics. I believe the use of language by the three generals directs us to how
they envisaged resolving the problem of governance. The language spoken by Ayub Khan centered on
serving the people; he asserted, “I say that what we are practicing is also democracy. People like it. It is
done for their own good. It is cleaning up all the mess of the past.”46 In a similar use of words, General
Zia also emphasized that the purpose of military government was to bring a democratic system of
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government imbued with a spirit of serving the people, arguing that “. . . such a democratic system should
have genuine love for Islam, and the country and spirit of service to the people.”47 General Musharraf’s
use of language centered on empowering the citizens.
However, as I have argued, their motives were to strengthen the rule of military governments
over the political processes. As one former high-ranking bureaucrat argued,
Ayub believed local governments were to suit the genius of people by channeling their focus on
issues of local development and service delivery, for example, construction of health, education
facilities, etc. Similarly, Zia’s focus was to keep politicians squabbling over access to state
resources for service delivery projects in their constituencies. Likewise, Musharraf’s interest was
to revive the structure of local governments so as to neutralize political elite and to boost the
structure of patronage at local levels.48
Undeterred by the past experiences of military governments, General Musharraf immediately
placed a priority in his reform agenda on the empowerment of local government. In an interview with
Time magazine in 1999, he stressed,
I would like to move toward the substance of democracy and away from the sham democracy we
have had in Pakistan. I want a really true democracy at the grassroots level where people can
govern themselves and run their own health programs and road construction. I intend to devolve
power from the center to the provinces and from the provinces to the districts. Members of the
National Assembly were doling out uncontrolled funds and controlling people’s destinies at their
whims and wishes. I’ll change that. The electoral system needs to be reformed so that the right
people come in to the assemblies and the wrong people, those who are not honest and dedicated
to the people, are eliminated. Our political culture can only change when new clean leaders
emerge from the grassroots.”49 (“Time Asia” 1999).
As I have discussed in Part III of this chapter, “Civil Service Reforms Commissioned by the
Civilian and Military Governments,” various initiatives had already been taken up by the previous elected
and military governments to reform the institutions of the state to better serve the people. As one civil
society representative noted, “There has always been the demand by the civil society actors such as the
non-government organizations in Pakistan for good governance by reforming the bureaucratic apparatus;
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hence, the military government of General Pervez Musharraf had in fact picked on this very crucial need
demanded by the civil society.”50 And as one other senior journalist and human rights activist contended,
“The agenda by the military general on good governance was not something that was crafted by the
military regime; the elected governments did not perform and therefore military government stressed
making good governance possible.51
One of the civil society activists interviewed asserted, “Musharraf’s regime very well knew the
regime lacked legitimacy to rule; they had to carve support for themselves. Reforming civil service and
establishing local governments was the public demand that had been voiced in the public sphere by the
citizens, and civil society. Now that international donor agencies also were demanding the same, the
military regime found it expedient to use these reforms to achieve legitimacy for their rule.”52 Another
civil society representative, a vocal supporter of the Local Government Plan (LGP), Salman Abid argued,
“I don’t see any issue in military gaining legitimacy through the local governments. We must look at the
local government and civil service reforms as an end of good governance. Do not judge these initiatives
as a means to gain legitimacy.” He further contended, “Elected governments have had electoral
legitimacy to rule, but they failed to deliver on policy pronouncements. In comparison, Musharraf’s
regime delivered on its policy pronouncement.”53
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Echoing similar opinions, Sarwar Bari, another civil society representative and a supporter of the
LGP, argued, “Critics of his [Musharraf’s] devolution plan ignore the fact that elected governments see
local governments as threats to their political relevance. The elected governments therefore prevent any
new electoral competition. But democratic politics does not mean selective competition; democracy is
about pluralism, and participation.”54
In interviews with civil society activists, former retired bureaucratic elite, and academics,55 I have
been reminded that local governments are seen as threats by the elected governments, whereas the
military regimes invest in these local governments to develop a base for popular legitimacy of their
military rule. The political elite56 whom I interviewed argued that the political elite do not see the locally
elected elite as electoral threats; they, however, believe “military’s devised local governments are
aberrations to the progress towards democracy.”57 Furthermore, “these plans are mere stop-gap measures
devised by military regimes to help them manipulate political parties and aggravate political
fragmentation in the political community.”58
Dr. Saeed Shafqat, an academic by profession who has studied the local government reforms
under General Pervez Musharraf, argued, “By stating his military government’s motivation for reforming
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the state through good governance, he was making a case for Pakistan to the supranational organizations,
multilateral donor agencies such as World Bank, UNDP, ADB. And to show to them his military
government is committed to the reforms demanded by these agencies.”59
Shafqat and Wahlah (2006) have argued that the World Bank in the 1980s had initiated a “global
campaign for Civil Services Reform (CSRs). For a nation to receive Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs),
it had to privatize state-held industry, restructure markets to boost free trade, lower tariffs on imports, and
undertake Civil Service Reforms. . . . The World Bank conducted a CSR study in Pakistan in 1998 and
one of its recommendations was ‘devolution of power’” (209).60 The recommendation for “devolution of
power” was “dismissed contemptuously” by the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan under the elected
leadership. Shafqat argued, “It can be stated that a case had already been made for Pakistan to join the
international thrust towards good governance and decentralization.”61
Hence, even before General Musharraf’s reform agenda, there had been earlier calls for
decentralization and good governance of the Pakistani state from within the government and the
international donors. Furthermore, to find recognition on the stage of world politics and, most crucially, to
gain access to foreign aid, General Musharraf’s regime voiced its commitment to achieve good
governance through reform. In this regard, Musharraf positioned the Pakistani state to qualify for, and
match the conditions of, financial assistance from the multilateral donor agencies (Aqil Shah 2006).
Therefore, it should not be surprising that “the Musharraf regime looked at the 1998 World Bank report
with an eye to establishing contact and trust with the Bank and other donor agencies” and thus, in this
regard, “Local Government Plan was part of this strategy” (Shafqat and Wahlah 2006, 209).
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From Speech to Action: The Establishment of the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB)
After General Pervez Musharraf presented his 7-point agenda, the systematic work of reforming
the institutions of the state in the name of good governance was initiated. To spearhead this process, the
state created a think tank in November 1999—the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB). This think
tank echoed the name of the first such state-managed organization under the military regime of General
Ayub Khan—the Bureau for National Research & Reconstruction (BNR&R). That earlier agency had also
been assigned to undertake the reconstruction and reformation of the institutions of the state, such as the
fractious political parties and the inefficient state bureaucracy.
The NRB was headed by a retired general of the Pakistan army, Lieutenant General Tanvir
Hussain Naqvi. General Naqvi supervised and led the operations of the NRB with the objective of
reconstructing state institutions aimed at ensuring good governance and irreversibly transferring powers
to the people of Pakistan. In one of his interviews given on national television, he stated the rationale for
his decision to join General Pervez Musharraf’s cabinet, arguing, “To make a lasting change in the society
of Pakistan, it was imperative that reformation of the institutions of the state be initiated, and by being
part of NRB, I felt, I could effect that change.”62 Thus, by focusing on point 6 of the 7-point agenda, a
five-member team was formed to work on the initial propositional draft on devolving of power to
grassroots.
The initial five-member team of NRB comprised, in addition to the team leader General Tanvir
Naqvi, an aspiring political contender, a senior academic, a retired military officer, and a serving
bureaucrat. This five-member team worked on proposing a strategy to establish local governments. The
first draft was generated in March 2000. From March to July 2000, the proposed plan was debated in the
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public sphere, as this document was widely circulated among the civil society organizations in order to
receive public feedback from civil society and the development sector.
UNDP office in Pakistan also established a Good Governance Group (G3) focused on reviving
the local governments. The group included members of the civil bureaucracy, civil society activists, and
international donor agencies such as UNDP, CIDA, ABD, WB, DFID, and ADB. The document prepared
by the NRB also received feedback from the G3. In fact, one of the senior consultants specializing in local
government reforms from UNDP had also joined the NRB to develop the plan.63
The international donor agencies were, however, not unaware of the military regime’s objective
to gain a popular base through the establishment of local governments, as one official of the multilateral
lending bank acknowledged: “We knew that regime security was primary to devolution; it was obvious to
us that the military was circumventing provinces to create new constituencies for local support while
reaping the added benefit of donor support” (cited in International Crisis Group 2004, 23). Another
ruefully observed, “We did and still have serious reservations about the local government plan but we
could either equivocate and risk reform failure, or put our money behind [the military government] to
gain a voice” (cited in International Crisis Group 2004, 23). Despite reservations of the international
donor agencies, a consortium was formed consisting of UNDP, DFID, CIDA, and the Norwegian Agency
for Development Co-operation (NORAD) to help the military regime design and implement a devolution
plan. Initially, through this consortium, US$5 million for the devolution plan was made available to the
regime (International Crisis Group 2004, 23).
During the designing period, a number of conferences were arranged by the NGO sector to
generate discussion on the plan. These conferences were encouraged by the military regime; however, the
most controversial elements of the plan were not discussed, such as holding local government elections in
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the absence of provincial and national assemblies, and nonpartisan elections for local governments. As
one representative of an international NGO argued, “When we arranged the conference we were told by
the NRB not to raise questions on elected assemblies at provincial and federal levels. Instead we were
instructed to focus only on how to make plan successfully implemented at grassroots . . . however, the
political parties did raise questions on sustainability of such reforms, but their concerns were not
addressed by NRB.”64 The military regime, on the other hand, undeterred in its objective against the
critique, emphasized that the establishment of local governments by the military regime is a step toward
democratization. The political parties squabbled over the issue of control in districts rather than engaging
with the military in constructive dialogue.
Another civil society activist, Shahrukh Rafi Khan (2001), who is an academic and is associated
with the research organization Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), advised the military
regime “to take a long-term view of achieving the kind of far-reaching reform . . . [that] would require
diffusion of power via land reform and electoral reforms to prevent capture of power at grassroots levels”
(88). Furthermore, he argued that exclusion of political parties in local governments makes the goal of
good governance untenable, for it “creates social discord and rifts that will jeopardize the process” (87).
In other words, the goal of good governance, Khan (2001) believed, cannot be achieved unless all
voices coming from the political and bureaucratic elite and civil society groups are incorporated.
“Power,” he argued, “is a zero-sum game. Achieving the empowerment of the poor at the grassroots level
may mean disempowering other groups” (87). He urged military government to listen to dissenting
groups; he argued dissenting voices should be respected, and incorporated to achieve the goal of
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empowerment of citizens at the grassroots. Furthermore, Khan cautioned the military regime,
“[D]evolution of power is not . . . a straightforward exercise” (92).
I believe the military regime was selective in responding to the criticisms leveled against the
launch of the LGP. In my interviews with the designers of the plan, they argued that they were aware of
the critique that local governments should not be established before the general elections, but as had
happened in the past, the elected leadership never allowed the establishment of local governments.
Designers of LGP believed that criticism from political parties lacked persuasive argumentation.65
Despite the critical voices concerning the military’s devised devolution plan, civil society
organizations such as SUNGI, PATTAN, SPO, and TVO and international donor agencies UNDP, DFID,
WB, NORAD, and ADB participated in consultations with the military state. As one high-ranking DFID
official in Pakistan argued, “Mass empowerment was the real motivation behind devolution. Colonialism
and centralisation, twin evils of Pakistan’s bureaucratic institutions, can’t be abolished overnight—101
elected districts are the answer” (cited in ICG 2004, 23).
The NRB embarked on devising the plan with a systematic scheme of analyzing the bureaucratic
lapses at the local levels. The military government reengaged the army monitoring teams headed by the
army officers at all levels of the state civil bureaucratic apparatus. Previously, these teams were engaged
to assist the elected government in recovering public loans from defaulters. Under the military
government, these teams were sent out to monitor the bureaucratic and citizen engagement at the district,
provincial, and federal levels (Human Rights Watch 2000; Shafqat and Wahlah 2006; Aqil Shah 2014a).
Based on the reports from the monitoring teams, the NRB led the military governments’ objective to
outline the plan to contract the “influence and autonomy” of the District Management Group of the state’s
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bureaucracy. The NRB believed “over-concentration of authority, particularly in the office of Deputy
Commissioner” is the primary cause of bad governance at the grassroots.
The proposed Local Government Plan 2001, which was circulated among the civil society
organizations, identified both the inefficiency of problematic institutions of the state of Pakistan as well
as a strategy to resolve these. The opening four paragraphs of this plan highlighted the problem in the
existing local governance and the measure to resolve the problem:
1. In the existing system of governance at the local level, the province governs the districts and
tehsils directly through the bureaucracy at the division, district and tehsil levels. And the local
government for towns and cities exist separately from those of the rural areas. The provincial
bureaucratic set-ups are the designated “controlling authorities” of the local governments, and
tend to undermine and over-ride them, which breeds a colonial relationship of “ruler” and
“subject.” The separate local government structures engender rural-urban antagonism, while
the administration’s role as “controlling authorities” accentuates the rural-urban divide.
2. The two structural and systemic disjoints mentioned above, coupled with the absence of
horizontal integration and the consequent inadequacy of functional coordination between the
line departments at the division, district, and tehsil levels, lead to inefficiency and corruption,
and are the root causes of the crisis of governance at the grass root level. This crisis appears to
have been addressed through over-concentration of authority, particularly in the office of the
Deputy Commissioner, which besides creating the potential for abuse of authority, diffuses
operational focus and results in the expedient handling of routine functions through crisis
management.
The next two paragraphs of the proposed plan suggested the possible measures to resolve the problematic
local system of governance:
3. The proposed Local Government Plan integrates the rural with the urban local governments on
the one hand, and the bureaucracy with the local governments on the other, into one coherent
structure in which the district administration and police are answerable to the elected chief
executive of the district. Citizen monitoring by elected representatives, the civil society’s
involvement with development, and a system of effective checks and balances, completes the
hard core of the political structure and system of the Local Government.
4. The Local Government design is based on five fundamentals: devolution of political power,
decentralisation of administrative authority, deconcentration of management functions,
diffusion of the power-authority nexus, and distribution of resources to the district level. It is
designed to ensure that the genuine interests of the people are served and their rights
safeguarded. The new system will create an enabling environment in which the people can
start participating in community welfare and be the masters of their own destiny.
(National Reconstruction Bureau 2000a)
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As can be seen from these paragraphs, a narrative was promoted in the public sphere in which the
military regime identified the principal problems of the state institutions. The criticism that centered on
inefficiency and corruption leveled at the state institutions could hardly be denied by the citizens of
Pakistan. The military generals have always blamed the political parties and the elite for the institutional
decay, and following such a precedent, General Musharraf’s regime argued that only the military as an
institution could bring order to the chaos. Of course, the narrative established by the military regime did
not consider military rule as the source of bad governance in Pakistan. Instead, the NRB in its policy
document contended that politicians and bureaucrats were the primary sources of corruption and bad
governance. As a high-ranking civil servant working in the military government’s established National
Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), Mr. Ikramullah Ghauri asserted emphatically, “[W]e the original team of
the NRB were committed to absolute empowerment of the people; it cannot be done through
parliamentary processes—it is impossible.”66 Such sentiments were reflective of the military regime’s
disaffection with political processes.
Further, the NRB claimed that the political and bureaucratic elite were unresponsive to the needs
of the people, and because they remained unaccountable to the people, effective governance had broken
down. The chairman of the NRB argued, “Decentralization and empowerment of local government would
lead to efficient administration and effective utilization of resources,”67 and another member of the NRB
team claimed, “Devolution was to be seen as a means of better access to justice, democracy and giving
back the power to the people.”68 The objective of the local governments was to engage the locally elected
body of representatives with the local civil bureaucracy. Under the LGP, for the first time the locally
elected governments were given authority over the use of district resources. Similarly, the hierarchal
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structure was also reformed; bureaucratic elite were made subservient to the local governments. The
bureaucratic elite were to work for and with the local governments, rather than exercise control over the
districts as their personal fiefdoms. General Musharraf proclaimed that the LGP “did away with the
vestiges of the colonial era, when a deputy commissioner and a superintendent of police ran districts like
lords. With the stroke of the pen they were both subordinated to the elected mayor” (Musharraf 2006,
172).69
In its Structural Analysis of National Reconstruction, the NRB (2000) laid out the rationale:
The civil service is effectively controlled by the DMG. The group has close relations with
international donors . . . other groups in the public administration chafe under the control of one
group and would welcome a democratization of civil service structure as a basic element of civil
service reform. The end of domination of the bureaucracy by one group is a necessary precondition for the attainment of administrative power by the Army and the creation of conditions
for national reconstruction.
The NRB believed that the colonial system of governance must be abolished to enable any progress
toward the empowerment of the grassroots. With this objective, the NRB, with its pronouncement for
devolution, announced the dissolution of the DMG.70
This policy to minimize the authority of civil bureaucracy in the districts and to establish
autonomous local governments was disliked by both the civil bureaucracy and political society. These
two entities joined in their opposition to the LGP, and the two launched a concerted effort to make
revisions to the LGP. I will show in chapter 5 that civil bureaucracy and the political parties exerted
pressure on General Musharraf to revise the status of local governments vis-à-vis civil bureaucracy and
elected governments at provincial and federal levels.
But at the start of planning for the LGP, the military regime, by depicting a crisis in the state, was
creating room for the proposed reform in light of the 7-point agenda. By focusing on fixing governance at
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the grassroots, the military regime attempted to take away the focus from questioning the military rule at
the top levels of governance. It is interesting to observe that in one of its publications, The Pakistan
Army: Green Book, for year 2000,71 the serving military officers took pride in espousing the military
government’s reform agenda.
The Green Book is the most relevant document for the purposes of my research because it
provides the best insight into the military’s view about governance and the role that the military
government can play in resolving issues of governance. In its 2000 publication, The Book contains essays
on the theme of that particular year: “nation-building.” It was published a year after the 1999 military
coup. Essays written by 17 active-duty officers of the rank of captain or above were analytical pieces
focusing on social, political, and economic conditions. The military’s discourse on reforming the polity
was indicative of its all-encompassing belief that the military is the nation’s savior in times of political
chaos.72
The imaginative use of language in this publication is significant, because Pakistan is
characterized as the ailing patient and the military as the messiah that shall treat the nation for its own
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good. As one of the serving generals asserted, “[A]rmy’s role in the nation building must remain that of a
surgeon, who has to make hard decisions on behalf of the patient for saving his life, including amputation,
if required. These hard decisions will certainly bother some who have vested interests.” Further in the
essay, the author identified “bureaucracy” as being the infected limb of the patient; he argued, “It is the
bureaucracy which needs over-hauling and major transfusion.”73 The views of this serving general were
similar to General Musharraf’s speech delivered on October 17, five days after the coup, in which he
asserted that the country is the ailing patient, and the army is the specialist surgeon who has the expert
knowledge and skill to undertake the violent act of amputation on the patient to extend his/her life
options.
The editorial of The Book imaginatively conjured up Pakistan as being a “beautiful garden” and
the army as the “gardener” that has the astute knowledge of ridding the garden of “weeds.” The Book’s
editorial contended, “[M]ere love of flowers only does not make a good gardener. To develop a beautiful
garden, the gardener must also hate weeds and must use all possible means to uproot them.” Furthermore,
the editorial asserted, “[I]t is hoped that the present issue of the Pakistan Army Green Book would prove
to be an interesting and intellectually rewarding reading for its readers whose judgment is not beclouded
by ambivalent evidence and biased partisanship in matter of true national interest.”74 This was a
surprising assertion, because this publication is not available for the general public to read; this is a
military publication and accessible only to military personnel.
Thus, in an attempt to save the life of the ailing patient and to rid the garden of the weeds, the
military government’s plan of devolution was one such initiative. The reforms planned by the NRB were
more comprehensive and significantly more ambitious in their objective to transfer meaningful power to
grassroots organizations than the reforms that had been instituted in 1959 and 1979.
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However, the military’s devised plan was still criticized by all major political parties and
segments of civil society, including lawyers, human rights groups, and journalists. The political parties
believed that the plan undermined federalism by eroding provincial autonomy (International Crisis Group
2002, 2004; Waseem, 2006a) and that it was an attempt to weaken political forces in the country by
creating a new class of politicians who were more amenable to the military regime (International Crisis
Group 2004). The critiques by the oppositional groups, such as political parties and civil society
organizations, were valid concerns, for they feared that through local governments the military would
gain popular support. One of the officers writing for The Book observed that “despite all its sincerity” for
bringing reforms in governance, the efforts of the “Army” will not be appreciated by the “politicians and
bureaucrats.”75 The military saw its initiative as a means to address the issues of governance, whereas the
critics of the military dictatorship argued that such reforms are a means to sustain the military
governments. The military elite vehemently denied that its motive of local government reforms was to
strengthen its rule.
Civil society organizations such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) and ICG
were suspicious of reforms because they were being instituted within a non-democratic regime. Referring
back to the BD system implemented during Gen. Ayub Khan’s regime in 1959, and the LGO
implemented in 1979 under General Zia-ul-Haq, the HRCP commented that the purpose of reforms
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initiated by General Musharraf was to depoliticize governance in order to earn a lease on life for his
military government.76
The third plan implemented under General Musharraf (2000-2008), however, engaged with civil
society for implementing the program at the grassroots, in contrast to the preceding military regimes
relying heavily on the bureaucratic elite for implementation of devolution programs. Despite these
differences, for each of the military rulers, the devolution program was devised to gain legitimacy, at both
the domestic and international levels (LaPorte 2004; Aqil Shah 2004, 2006; Kennedy 2006a).
As will be argued in the following discussion, the public discourse that was generated by the print
media reflected public intellectuals’ ambivalence to the military government’s emphasis on devolution to
solve all the administrative and governance problems of the country. The print media of the time,
covering the period from 2000 to 2001, reflected the clash and confrontation of the military’s devised
narrative versus the public intellectuals’ argument, especially their skepticism over the military’s “good
governance” agenda.
Critical Themes on Devolution from the Civil Society
In the following discussion, I rely on my analysis of newspapers articles and my interviews with
elites of the civil society organizations engaged in the implementation of the LGP under the Musharraf
regime. I also interviewed the political and bureaucratic elite to get their views as to why devolution was
planned by the military regimes and what effect it has left on the political landscape.
The documentary evidence collected through the newspapers extends from 2000 to 2002. This
was the time when the LGP was announced, designed, exchanged with other actors in society such as the
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NGOs, and, finally, implemented. The print media during this period raised critical questions on the
military regime’s political intentions for the establishment of local governments but also highlighted the
need for reviving local governments.
Furthermore, the analysis presented in this section also draws on the information gathered from
the interviews with civil society actors, including academics and NGO workers.77 Those who have been
interviewed have had direct experience pertaining to the implementation of the LGP. These interviews
were conducted after almost 10 years of implementation of the LGP; the LGP was in effect from 2002 to
2008. Views expressed by the interviewees fall into three subcategories— critics, cynics, and
supporters—that I created to present their intellectual position on the military’s devised LGP. I explain
these categories in detail in the following sub-sections as they are classified into different occupational
groups.78
In my interviews and direct meetings with these workers belonging to the NGOs in Pakistan, I
noticed that all those who had direct experience with designing and implementing the LGP
overwhelmingly had positive views about the plan. For example, these actors expressed the following:


They see this plan as the most radical of the local government reforms.



NGOs duly admitted that they had been co-opted by the military regime, but that this cooptation was voluntary, because



No other elected government had ever shown serious commitment to grassroots
empowerment, as space for political participation was created for the society’s
disenfranchised, such as minorities, women, peasants, and workers.
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For the first time, elected leadership at the local levels was in control of the mini-viceroys,
i.e., the Deputy Commissioners (belonging to the DMG of Pakistan’s Central Superior
Services).



The local governments were made autonomous units responsible for their own development
in terms of community development.

Based on the interviewees’ responses, in Table 4 I classified them by those who favored the LGP
and those who did not. Those interviewees who had the favorable view were divided into two subgroups:
the cynics/realists and the supporters of the LGP. All of the civil society activists interviewed had a
favorable view of the LGP and thus were divided into the two subgroups.
Table 4: Respondents’ Categorization on the LGP
Categories
Favorable Attitude
Attitudes toward the LGP

Professional occupations of
those holding the attitude

Not Favorable
Attitude

Supporters

Cynics/Realists

The plan was radical
and created space
for the
disenfranchised;
based on the impact
of the plan, only the
military were
serious about
devolution.

Appreciate the fact
that the Local
Government Plan
was radical. But it
could not be
sustained for long, as
the plan was
designed to benefit
the military regime.

NGO workers

Critics
The program was
designed to legitimize
the military rule; the
military is the usurper.

Academics

Designers of the
LGP

Bureaucratic elite
Political elite
Journalists

Source: From the field work with n = 29
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However, a few were vehement critics of the military regime and its reform initiatives. To better
understand the intellectual position of the critics on the LGP, I further divided them into four professional
occupations. The first occupation applies to the political elite who have participated in the political
processes and electoral competition under both civilian and military rule. The second professional
occupation of critics are the academics who have observed such policy initiatives devised by the previous
military regimes and strongly believed that the local government plan devised under military dictatorship
was just another of “executive fiat”79 having no lasting effect on Pakistan’s institutional politics. This
therefore “created institutional chaos between the federation and the federating units such as the
provinces.”80 The third professional occupation of critics consists of the former bureaucrat elite, who
have had the experience of working with the military regimes in the past and believed General
Musharraf’s planned initiative was in effect only during his rule. The fourth occupation category is that of
journalists. Though I did not interview journalists81 for this research, I reviewed over 50 newspaper
articles, from 2000 to 2002, which gave me substantive data to categorize journalists as a professional
occupational group. The fifth occupational category is the NGO workers.
Based on the documentary evidence I gathered from the various civil society organizations, the
NGOs, and the elite interviews, I show that the LGP devised by the military regime of General Pervez
Musharraf created discourse on the significance of the reforms by declaring that reform initiatives caused
revolution by devolution. As I show in the discussion to follow, this discourse generated by the military
regime was debated by civil society actors in the public sphere. The print media, in particular, raised
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critical counter questions as to why the military generated the discourse: What objectives will the military
achieve from the proclaimed revolution caused by devolution? Which actors in the polity will be affected
by the military’s designed revolution by devolution? What will be the implications of this revolution on
the political landscape? What effect will the new devolution plan have on provincial and district
relations?
(Critical) Discourse on the Devolution Plan in the Public Sphere
The dominant themes that emerged through data collection presented three interrelated premises
that were prevalent in the public sphere. First, the military’s plan of good governance through devolution
reforms was seen as a means to strengthen the military rule at the expense developing political institutions
such as political parties, elections, the legislature, and the activism of civil society in the public sphere.
Secondly, citizens appreciated the action taken by the military government because it forced the civil
bureaucratic apparatus to reorient itself to serve the people. The civil bureaucratic apparatus had behaved
in a manner reminiscent of the colonial reign in which the civil bureaucrat ruled over the people much as
a master would rule over a slave. Thirdly, it became evident that international donor agencies channeled
funding for the military government-initiated local reforms.
These dominant themes raised critical observations and questions about the military regime’s
disregard for democratic politics. I explain these questions in the following sections and analyze the views
of the civil society actors.
Holding of Local Elections on a Non-Party Basis
When local government is nonpartisan, political parties cannot enhance their reputations by
sponsoring better local governance. In all the local government reforms under different military regimes,
political parties were consistently excluded from any role in sponsoring candidates for local elections.
Thus, democratic competition to improve local government was weakened. Rules against partisan politics
were imposed by military regimes to restrict their opponents without limiting military’s own favored
candidates (Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir 2005; Cheema and Mohmand 2008; Mohmand 2008). As a result
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of this rule, mainstream political parties have viewed nonpartisan local governments as an instrument of
military regimes for creating a class of collaborative politicians to displace the parties’ representatives at
the local level.82 This is another reason why the civilian elected governments would discontinue such
reform, since “it allowed for non-party but an individualistic competition between elites competing for a
share in the country’s politics, and, secondly, because such reforms ignored political parties’ mobilization
at provincial and federal levels.”83
The issue of holding elections on a non-party basis was seriously contested and debated in the
print media. For example, one columnist writing for a leading Urdu newspaper, The Daily Jung, was
flabbergasted at the military rulers’ singular resolve to implement its version of the LGP: “Our rulers—
the military generals have undertaken an enormous task. They also believe they will be able to fully
implement their plan; and that they will be able to overcome the challenges pertaining to the completion
of the task. But this is extremely difficult since to effect change in the existing administrative system
peoples’ support and their consent is the precondition for the success of the planned [i.e., grassroots]
initiative.”84 Another showed his disappointment regarding nonpartisan political competition, asking,
“Can the idea of local democracy function without the political parties?” Further, he contended that
military rulers have never learned that “governments are managed by the politicians and not by the
technocrats.”85
Under military governments, local government elections are held regularly but on a nonpartisan
basis; therefore, candidates contest the elections as independents. Military regimes have never established
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a political party of their own but instead have always put together a coalition of individuals—politicians
from the same basic class of local electables who have obvious party affiliations, which are known to the
voters. Yet political elite, once elected at various levels of the governance hierarchy, do little to curb the
military’s power because they fear their own ouster at the hands of military. Siddiqa (2016) argued that in
Pakistan the military encroaches upon political institutions by “building partnerships . . . by the presence
of pro-military officers” (60). Moreover the military perpetuates its control over the political landscape
“by aligning with the existing political parties” (Siddiqa 2016).86
The trend of holding elections on a non-party basis even extended to the national and provincial
levels. Under the military regime of Zia-ul-Haq (from 1977-1988), local-body elections were held on a
non-party basis to “gauge the support for the different political parties; politicians elected at local levels
had clearly evident party affiliations known to the electorate and military regime but they were not
allowed by the military ruler to contest elections on party platforms.”87 Through the local-body elections,
General Zia established an electoral scheme that excluded political parties from contesting elections for
the provincial and national assembly. Political parties were seen by the military ruler as the source of
factions in the polity, and this threatened the rule of the military dictator (Ziring 1988; Wilder 2004; S. A.
Khan 2015).
For military rulers, factions caused by political parties accentuate the differences in the political
community. Military rulers believed the political differences are a danger to the national unity, because if
differences are not resolved, friction and hostilities intensify among the people against their leaders.
Political parties fuel the partisan differences in the polity with no commitment to resolving them. Essays
authored by serving mid-ranked military officers in The Green Book declared that “[P]olitical parties
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have, by and large, failed to acquire national consensus”88 to mitigate the regional and ethnic differences
in the country. Similarly, another officer argued, “Politicians are always at watch to cash any opportunity
to promote their political party” at the expense of building “political consensus on any major policy issue”
faced by the country.89 Furthermore, another officer asserted that the “political system has become so
inept and corrupt,” and in order to provide for “good governance to the people,” the officer argued, “the
ongoing efforts to introduce Local Government System for devolution of power, down to district level,
may help incorporate the common citizen in managing the administration at grassroots level.”90
Local Governments: A Source of Military Patronage to the Local Elite
While decentralization was publicly justified in terms of good governance and its trickle-down
effect in establishing grassroots democracy, these aims, however, were secondary to the military regimes’
chief concern: creating political allies for the regime at the local level to counter its opponents at the
national and provincial levels. A new mechanism of local governance therefore was implemented under
each military regime with the publicly stated goal of developing grassroots democracy by empowering
citizens to govern themselves.
Under the latest LGP, elected local officials could offer the non-representative central
government a vital political connection to local constituencies throughout the nation (Cheema, Khwaja,
and Qadir 2005). Local officials could communicate local concerns to the center as they helped the nonrepresentative center to extend its influence in local politics. This mechanism therefore enabled military
rulers to manage the ruling political elite and to further strengthen their hold on the political landscape.
Through the mechanism of local governments, the military regimes invested in local elites’
governing resources while these local elites provided legitimacy for the military governments’ political
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survival. The management and support of local elites was therefore important for the military regimes.
Therefore, the elected local officials were given progressively greater authority than other elected leaders,
such as a Member of Provincial Assemblies (MPA) and Member of National Assembly (MNA).
Under the LGP, “each Nazim91 had more authority and power than any elected Minister in prior
civilian governments. And, thus for this very reason, people have started to put their faith in the new
grassroots democratic governance.”92 According to one of the reports published by a Lahore-based civil
society organization, Saangat Development Foundation (SDF), “[I]n the second local government
elections of 2005 [which followed the first elections in 2001] four MNAs resigned from National
Assembly to contest in the district elections” (Saangat Development Foundation 2015, 5).
Based on the categorization of the interviewees, I believe both critics and cynics agreed that the
military’s devised revolution by devolution reform created space for the military to bestow patronage to
its loyalist, locally elected elite. Regarding Musharraf’s plan, cynics such as those NGO workers who had
a favorable view of the LGP argued that the plan had extended authority to the locally elected, and this
therefore made the locally elected stronger than the elected political elite for the provincial and the
national assemblies. The critics of the LGP, which includes academics, political elite, bureaucratic elite,
and journalists, contended such a measure of granting authority over the use of district resources to the
locally elected was the military’s objective of neutralizing the established political parties in the electoral
constituencies. Thus, the military government benefitted from the locally elected to mobilize the popular
base for the military ruler.
On the other hand, supporters of the LGP, which includes NGO workers, argued this was the first
plan that meaningfully established local governments autonomous and free from the bureaucratic and
political parties’ machinations. The increased autonomy of the district governments, as one NGO worker
claimed, “was seen as a challenge by the political elite who get elected to provincial and national
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assemblies, since through these autonomous district governments the locally elected were made
politically stronger in the constituencies.”93 Another NGO worker exclaimed that the “strong local
governments were anathema to the traditional authority of the political elite. How could they be
acceptable to the political sharks!”94
However, in my understanding of the effect of the LGP, I believe a strong locally elected
government was indeed one of the contrasting features in comparison to the previous two devolution
plans. Under Generals Ayub and Zia, the devolution plans had not given substantive authority to the
locally elected, but General Musharraf’s devolution plan made the locally elected leadership stronger in
terms of access to state resources and their disbursement for the local development projects. As I
explained, because Pakistan politics is characterized by constituency-level politicians, the LGP created an
opportunity for local contenders for political power to contest political offices. The increase in political
competition at the grassroots was seen as a challenge by the parliamentarians, and so in order to prevent
the rise of local contenders, the parliamentarians focused their attention on local politics.
Recruitment of Loyalists by the Military
With the local government system in place, the next step was to announce a general election to
fill the seats in the legislative assemblies to endorse the constitutional changes made by the military
regime. The expectation was that many of those who had been recruited to the local governing bodies
would participate in the election to advance their political careers and move from nonpartisan local
government and party offices to more prestigious elected offices at the provincial or national levels;
however, their career advancement is dependent on their support for the military regime. The “local
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government elections therefore provide aspirants an effective career path”95; in essence, however, as one
academic argued, “[T]he claim by military rulers is nullified that it plans to raise new political leadership
because all these initiatives [devolution of power] have done is the emergence of dynastic politics.”96
What essentially happens is that first those who are elected at local levels get to advance their
political career by going up the hierarchy to the national and provincial assemblies. The position they
vacate at the local level, however, is taken up by their associates who are also protégés of the military
regime. The military therefore facilitates the formation of that “select but an elect group that shall
legitimize military’s rule.”97 The rationale for having this mechanism in place satisfies the goal of
maintaining a linkage between the state and society and ensures that the political elite supports and
responds to the new regime.
Scholars argue that the patronage extended by the military regimes to the local elite advances
individual political elites’ career paths. This trend, however, paved the way for the exclusion of party
politics and party ideology; politics became more localized, enabling the military rulers to further
encroach upon the political landscape and fragment the partisan politics. According to Ziring (1988),
party-less elections in the 1980s resulted in parochial and subnational identities. The narrow identities
created were strictly based on the local issues in politics. This therefore allowed the local elites to become
dominant power brokers and thus emasculate the traditional base of the political parties (Wilder 1999;
Waseem 2006a). In a landscape of localized politics, politicians, rather than political parties, become
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ascendant in the political process; locally elected elites are neither expected to coalesce for national
purposes nor likely to put aside their parochial concerns (Ziring 1988).98
In his discussion on the effect of party-less electoral competition at the provincial and national
assemblies, Wilder (1999) contended, “[T]he 1985 National and Provincial elections demonstrated that
Local Body politics had become the entry point into Provincial and National politics . . . [which] meant
that Provincial and National politics began to resemble Local Body politics. Patronage politics became
the order of the day, and representing personal and constituent interests became much more important for
legislators than representing national interests” (52).
Through the interviews with the civil society actors, I observed that all of the 29 of the
interviewees—17 NGO workers,99 four academics, four political elite, three former bureaucratic elite, and
a designer of the LGP—had agreed on this point that the military did utilize the local governments as the
platform to recruit the regime loyalists. However, the two designers of the LGP believed that the NRB’s
motivation was to enact local governments, and this was the aim with which the NRB was established.100
One of them asserted, “NRB devised the LGP to empower the local governments, but it was the pressures
of political processes at the local levels that played out and thus for sustainment of the plan military relied
on elected loyalists,”101 whereas the other argued, “We can be called naïve idealists who believed that
strong local governments would make the political decisions independent of the control of the military
and pressures of political expediencies; however, we underestimated the pressures of politics on the
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military regime.”102 On the other hand, the cynics argued that the military regime was aware that for the
sustainment of its rule and the LGP, it was expedient that loyalist politicians were recruited, which would
act as a buffer against the political parties.
However, I believe the political processes unleashed pressure on the military regime to forge an
alliance with the political parties such as PML-Q, and the coalition of religious parties called the
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA)103 for sustainment of the LGP. The recruitment of the locally elected
elite as military loyalists was short-lived, because with the general elections in 2002 and the establishment
of provincial and national assemblies, the military regime relied on its alliance and support to PML-Q for
sustainment of the military rule and continuation of the LGP. As I will show in chapter 5, with the return
of parliamentary politics in October 2002, the district governments established under the LGP were
restructured by the military’s backed political party, PML-Q.
It seems to me that the claim by the critics of the LGP that the military recruited the regime’s
loyalists with the LGP does not remain a relevant argument, because even the pseudo political
government that came into being under the hybrid regime of General Musharraf was not favorable to the
locally elected elite, unless the locally elected extended their allegiance to the political government of
PML-Q and its allies.
In chapter 5, I present the analysis of the amendments made to the LGP by the military’s loyalist
government of PML-Q. The argument that I present counters the critique leveled by the critics of the
LGP, that through the LGP, the military had recruited the regime’s loyalists, when, in fact, it was the
political government under the hybrid regime that recruited loyalists. Most crucially, the recruitment of
the locally elected elite, I believe, benefited the political families in the constituencies. The political
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families extended their political influence in the constituencies and, thus, through their electoral successes
and their alliance with the military regime, the political families maintained their political influence over
parliamentarian and local politics.
No Change in Political Leadership
Elected local governments helped the military regimes to legitimize and strengthen their control
over the state. To counter the popular support of democratic political parties, the military regimes built an
alternative base of political support by patronizing a class of new locally elected politicians (Sayeed 1967;
Amir 2001; Cheema, Khwaja, and Qadir 2005; Cheema and Mohmand 2008; Waseem 2006a; Aqil Shah
2014a). Military regimes have used local governments to also provide patronage to select political elite
and open up an avenue for democratization—for holding elections and nurturing new political leadership
loyal to the military regime while replacing the existing leadership. The party-less political competition
and focus on localized issues diverted the energies of the political elite toward securing their place at the
lower levels of governance (i.e., districts). By using their local offices as launching pads for their career
advance, this “strengthened the military dictators at the cost of political growth and maturity of the
political elite and the political parties.”104
This pattern has led to the emergence of “dynastic rule” in Pakistan. Such “dynastic rule,” critics
have argued, “in the context of Pakistan refers to that select group of elites who emerge on the political
landscape only because of the patronage they receive through the military rulers.”105 The patronized
politics created a unique dynastic character in the electoral politics. Since electoral competition excluded
political parties, the electorate still required a certain tangible edifice that could enable them to feel
connected to the political elite. A former high-ranking bureaucrat and critic of LGP argued, “It enabled
the military to take strong roots in the political landscape; this also substantively damaged the political
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maturity of the political parties that should have been based on issue articulation.”106 The aspirants for
political power therefore relied on their personal and, most specifically, their familial lineage to present
themselves to their prospective voters (Aslam 2017, 5-6), while the military regimes found it convenient
to navigate through the political morass by focusing on democratic reforms at the grassroots to effect
change at the macro, i.e., national, level and to lengthen their stay in power.
In other words, critics assert that the party-less competition in Pakistan politics created a
personalist style of politics that depended more on personal glorification and individualist style of
politics, but not on any party ideology. Furthermore, to get elected, political aspirants had to align
themselves according to the military’s directives.107 Party-less competition suited the military’s objective
of control over the political landscape; furthermore, as elections were held on a non-party basis at local
levels, the local elite therefore were expected to provide and express their support for the military
government.
In the public sphere, the military regimes’ reliance on the local elite was seen as “depoliticizing
the political process . . . whereas the irony is whenever electoral competition excluded political parties;
the party affiliations were relegated to be taken over by political families which has transformed political
forums and institutions into personalized arenas of politics.”108 Furthermore, such a trend was not
welcomed by the critics of the military’s designed devolution plans, as the academics and civil society
faulted military intervention that caused “personalized-styled dynastic politics” to take root.109
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Dissent toward party-less political competition at local levels was evident in the number of
editorials of the leading newspapers, both in English and Urdu. The Daily Jung argued that the local
leadership emerging at the district levels after the 2001 Local Government elections drew its “strength
from hereditary influence, wealth and familial network” and that the military regime’s claims that its plan
for “good-governance” brings in new leadership is all but a “farce.” Instead, the newspaper argued,
“behind this façade lies the compromised and patronized political leadership” that owes its success to the
military’s largesse and their “personalized-styled politics safeguarded by their familial lineage.”110
Furthermore, one of the editorials in the Urdu daily Nawa-i-waqt warned the military regime to
“tread carefully” in pursuing the idea of “reintroducing” the “local governments planning” in the country
because the previous two plans (in 1959 and 1979) failed “miserably.” The editorial argued, “The military
regime should resist the temptation of experimenting with the local bodies” at the expense of “party-less”
competition.111 The leading English daily, Dawn, in its editorial was most vociferous in its critique of
General Musharraf’s plan of “good-governance.” Launching an invective against the “party-less
competition” and despairing at the continued and regular military interventions’ destruction of political
institutions, the editorial also acknowledged the failure of the civil and political society: “We have shown
an uncommon proclivity to refuse to learn any lessons from our past—even to the extent of ignoring the
results of repeated military interventions.”112
Though the party-less competition was criticized by many actors in the public sphere, this modusoperandi benefitted both the military regimes and the political parties that were subdued by the military
regimes. By putting restrictions on the traditional leaderships’ participation in the electoral processes, the
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military not only curtailed their influence, but the military rulers were also able to bring new contenders
onto the political landscape vis-à-vis traditional parties’ leadership.
Though the political parties were subdued for a short while, I believe they were able to gauge the
clout that each new contender had with the electorate. The parties would therefore express their support to
these new political contenders to show their commitment to electoral processes, however compromised
they may be. The new contenders on the political scene owed their electoral success to the military
regime, while keeping their political affiliations intact, however fluid these may have been. The
mechanism of party-less competition, therefore, as one cynic of the LGP argued, “in fact served the
purpose of military and political parties; through this military legitimized its rule, but at the same time
recruitment of political elite was ensured” that this recruitment “served political parties for it enabled the
parties to keep themselves relevant to the electorate through new faces on political landscape.”113
Devolution Reforms for Strengthening Military Rule
In my understanding of the hybrid regimes in Pakistan, I believe the military has an enduring
commitment to democracy, and so under the pretext of ineffective political governments, the military
keeps intervening in politics to “save” the country.114 The military rulers voice an endearing but
ambivalent commitment to democracy by pledging to hold free and fair elections as mandated by the
Constitution and to return to democratic civilian government. But to reach that end, the most crucial of
the steps is to hold local government elections; this is undertaken by the military rulers in order to have a
supportive base at the local level, as one cynic believed, to maintain their “hegemonic control over the
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country’s political institutions.”115 One print media article lamented that “[A]ll of the non-representative
governments so far have attempted to create local government structures, while each democratically
elected government has abolished such structures. In fact, the military regimes that have ruled the country
for more than half of its history have made decentralization reforms the keystone of their reform
agenda.”116
The “military rulers undertake such initiatives only to legitimize their rule, and thus by investing
time and energy in fixing issues of governance the military regime gets a reprieve, since military does not
have a political party it creates a local representative setup that provides legitimacy to military rulers.”117
An agenda of “good governance is only the pretext that military utilizes to justify its control over the
political landscape.”118 Siddiqa (2016) argued the military in Pakistan is the “prime arbiter and often
creator of a new power elite. From a political perspective, the military, in fact, was responsible for
creating three sets of elite: (a) during the 1950s, (b) the 1980s, and (c) 2000s” (64). Furthermore, Siddiqa
asserted, “Local bodies’ elections are a sure method to achieve such an objective (64).119
The BD system was implemented during Gen. Ayub Khan’s regime in 1959, a year after the
military coup. Ayub Khan’s plan was to provide himself with an electoral college in the form of the BD
members who elected him as president. As one of the critics argued, “Ayub’s local government plan
utilized his vision of democracy to get him elected, for he strongly believed Western style democracy
does not suit the genius of people of Pakistan. The locals of the country should better focus on localized
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issues such as yield of their crops, educational facilities in the villages, availability of clean drinking
water, etcetera.”120 Praising Ayub Khan as being “close to filling the role of a Solon or Lycurgus or
“Great Legislator” on the Platonic or Rousseauin model,” Samuel P. Huntington ([1968] 2006), in his
work Political Order in Changing Societies, praised the system of Basic Democracy (251) and noted:
Politically the Basic Democracies thus: (a) involved in the political system a new class of local
political leaders throughout the country; (b) provided an institutional link between the
government and the rural populace upon whose support stability depended; (c) created a popular
counterweight to the dominance of bureaucratic officialdom; and (d) provided a structure through
which subsequent broadening of political participation could be challenged. (253)
The BD plan, however, revamped the political institutions of the country from a parliamentary
democracy to a strong presidential form of government. Ayub Khan, with the help of 80,000 BDs, got
himself elected president. This therefore paved the way for all military dictators to follow, all of whom
infused parliamentary democracy with strong presidential dispositions. Ayub’s system was outright
presidential, while the hybridized system of political regimes that followed after the 1977 general
elections favored the unrepresentative political institution (military ruler as the executive) over the elected
political institutions, such as Parliament.
The second plan to reform democracy was implemented through the LGO, which was issued
through a presidential order and was implemented in 1979, in the second year of General Zia-ul-Haq’s
11-year military rule. Zia also claimed these reforms moved toward democratization of the political
system, but those reforms were also designed to provide legitimacy for his rule. Under the military
government of Zia, the local government functioned on a non-party basis as it had under Ayub Khan’s
system of BD. Zia, however, did not “encourage” politicizing the electoral process; in fact, he held the
“local government elections on non-party basis to gauge the support that different political parties carried;
and the local bodies elections were the litmus paper to know what support the military would have.”121
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While Ayub Khan’s system of BD enabled him to use the 80,000 BDs as an electoral college to get him
elected as president, Zia, on the other hand, used the local governments to gauge the measure of support
in the polity for the military regime through the locally elected representatives. The representatives
elected at local levels had evident party affiliations, though they were not allowed to express them.
Thus, upon knowing the results of local bodies’ elections, Zia’s regime decided to hold a general
election on a non-party basis so that voters’ mobilization driven by any of the political parties could be
undermined; for him, political parties were the source of factionalism and division in the community.
Since the military did not have a political party of its own, he therefore preferred to keep the political elite
divided. As Siddiqa (2016) argued, the military in Pakistan does not get into the forming of its own
political party (59). Rather, it supports factions or certain groups to be incarnated as what civil society
observers have called the King’s Party.122 Siddiqa contended, “[T]he usual pattern is to put the army’s
organizational weight behind one party or one faction of a party and then manufacture consent amongst
political stakeholders who join the crowd favoured by the GHQ”123 (59).
General Zia-ul-Haq divided the political elite by holding nonpartisan local and general elections
(Ziring 1988). By doing so, his devised authoritarian rule created divisions within the political parties,
resulting in defections and access for political aspirants. By declaring allegiance to the dictator, these
contenders for political power gained political access to state resources. As Mohammad Waseem, an
academic by profession and critic of devolution planning, believes, “Zia’s rule was different than Ayub
Khan in terms of the utility that local governments provided: aside from providing legitimacy to the
122
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regime, the other utility local governments provided to Zia was to weaken the political parties and their
efforts to mobilize support along party ideology. Zia did this by holding the elections for national and
provincial assemblies on a non-party basis—the move that only encouraged the personalist style political
competition under the watchful eye of the military regime.”124
General Musharraf was aware of the actions of his two predecessors. Thus, carrying the example
set by previous military dictators, General Musharraf also claimed that, for the sake of good governance
and bringing real democracy to Pakistan, a devolution plan was to be developed. Musharraf announced
the reformation of local governments at the grassroots so as to empower citizenry to hold elected leaders
accountable; the team of his advisors, however, focused not only on weakening the political parties, but
also on reforming the bureaucratic administration at the district levels (Aqil Shah 2004, 2014a). The
objectives, however, were the same: to utilize the good-governance reforms to legitimize the military rule
and, furthermore, as the other critic of devolution planning argued, “to show to the world, especially the
international donor agencies, that the military is keen on democratization and local government reform is
the first step toward the restoration of parliamentary democracy.”125
Musharraf’s regime, hence, strongly believed “by enactment of local governments . . . [we] are
bringing revolution. Furthermore, the devolution scheme was developed in consultation with civil society
and subject experts on community development.”126 There was also a belief among designers of the LGP
that their plan was “one true plan that respected citizen empowerment and giving citizens opportunity to
engage in local level politics as never before. The previous two plans lacked commitment to empower
citizens. We believed we could effect revolution through devolution in Pakistan. The revolution initiated

124

Dr. Mohammad Waseem, Professor of Political Science at Lahore University of Management Sciences.
Interview with the author, November 29, 2016. Also see, Lawrence Ziring, “Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan’s
Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia ul-Haq,” Asian Survey, 28, no. 8 (1988).
125

Dr. Saeed Shafqat. Professor of Political Science and Founding Director at Center for Public Policy &
Governance, Forman Christian College University, Lahore. Interview with the author, November 28, 2016.
126

Interview with Mr. Azhar Bashir Malik. Interview with the author in Islamabad on August 17, 2017.

256
will be significant as never had been witnessed before.”127 These beliefs with which the LGP was
launched, however, could not withstand the political pressures.
The International Crisis Group, in a report released in March 2004, strongly criticized the
government’s claims of devolution under its agenda of good governance. The report said that the
devolution plan served to strengthen the military rule of President Musharraf’s government. Such
policies, the report contended, had drained authority from the provinces, since this mechanism
undermined the established political parties. The report also argued the devolution plan does little to meet
its stated aims to devolve power, reduce corruption, improve service delivery, or establish accountability
at the local level.
Bypassing the Middle Tier of the Governance, i.e., the Provincial Governments
The devolution plans assumed Pakistan to be a state with only two tiers, a federal and several
local units, downgrading the middle tier of provincial units that were an interface between the federal and
local units. Furthermore, the military elite who designed the devolution plan(s) gave the federal
government unprecedented control over the provincial units. These plan(s) tacitly declared that no tier
other than the federal government can endorse district governments. Hence, by circumventing the middle
tier, i.e., the provincial level(s), “[T]hese efforts of the military rulers made the two—provinces and
districts—as competitors, and therefore the political parties adopted a more antagonistic view toward the
local elite, whom they saw as potential rivals on the political landscape.”128
The planning for local governments essentially refused to recognize the federated character of
governance in the country where the provinces are fundamental constitutional units of governance, while
local government institutions are creations of the provincial governments. The stature and place of
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provinces in Pakistan’s Constitution cannot be denied. Successive devolution plans designed under the
military regimes, as one critic argued, “not only ignored this fact, but they also facilitated the district level
to rise as a parallel to the provincial governance.”129 This cynic contended that since local governments
were not a central part of the Constitution, these were to be “created upon the approval and ratification by
the provincial governments.”130 This, therefore, meant that these local governments owed their existence
and powers to the provincial governments. Thus, “as per the Constitution, the provincial governments
could dismiss local governments by themselves, and provincial governments were not liable to take the
advice of the federal government.”131
In other words, local governments were not supposed to operate independently from the
provincial governments and could hardly exercise any influence. But with the military’s intervention and
promulgation of ordinances such as the LGO (in 1979) and LGP (in 2001), the federal directive had
encroached upon the provincial governments’ constitutional authority to establish district governments in
provincial jurisdictions. I believe the military governments sustained their rule by controlling the political
institutions and by discrediting the institutional process in democracy. The encroachment of federal power
established under the military severed relations between provincial governments and respective district
governments.
Furthermore, I will show in the next chapter that, with the return of the political government
under the military’s devised hybrid regime, the political parties and provincial tiers unleashed their biases
toward local governments. The antagonism directed toward local government by the collective force of
the provincial and national assemblies was evident. The bias that was latent in their attitude toward local
governments could not remain unattended for long.
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As one supporter of LGP argued, “[A]mbivalent but an opportunist demeanor is reflective of
political parties’ disconnection from local government when in power, and their attitude therefore then
creates a local political vacuum that has been repeatedly exploited by nondemocratic forces to undermine
the national system of civilian governance; so it can be stated, political elite are nonetheless responsible
for bringing in military governments upon them and the general population.”132 A cynic was also
perplexed that political parties never have learned to give “importance to local governments. They
[political parties], I would argue, see local governments as aberrations. Once in power, elected
governments would move toward repealing local governments, but when they were ousted by the military
rulers, the parties would show their commitment to local governments.”133
Indeed, the military governments benefit from the underperformance of the political parties. The
politicians, as I have argued, remain engaged in electoral competition so as to remain electorally relevant
in their constituencies. The military governments benefit from politicians’ aspirations to remain active in
politics. In order to reap the benefit, the military regimes incentivize local governments as one of the
electoral arenas so as to encroach upon the political landscape. Thus, by manipulating the electoral arena
to appeal to politicians’ aspirations for political power, the military not only downplayed political
institutions, but it also magnified citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy, the political elite, and politics.
Disdain for the Bureaucracy
Political competition in Pakistan is heavily influenced by the state institutions it inherited from
colonial India. The tumultuous history of Pakistani politics reflects interaction between two dominant
political forces: state elite consisting of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, and political elite consisting
of political parties and their leaders. While the military-bureaucratic oligarchy has dominated directly
under periods of martial law, their influence has not completely waned during the intermittent periods of
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political elites’ control of governance apparatus. Historians and political scientists have cited the
country’s extensive administrative setup designed by the British colonialists as one of the reasons why the
political leadership in the country could not take root.
British colonial administration relied on the powerful and highly centralized civil and military
institutions that protected the strategic interests of the British in the Indian subcontinent. Representative
institutions, by contrast, were much weaker, as they had been established to legitimize the authority of the
bureaucratic state and not to promote democratic rule. Their role was to serve as advisory bodies to the
executive rather than to carry out a legislative function. Such bodies did have some say in local
governance but no substantive role in decision making at the national level; these bodies lacked authority
to “self-govern.”134 This created an enduring power imbalance between weak representative institutions
and strong civil and military bureaucracies.
The effect was more pervasive in Pakistan than in India and is the reason for the dysfunctional
nature of civil-military relations in Pakistan (Sayeed 1967; Alavi 1972; Waseem 1989; Jalal [1990] 2007;
Shafqat 1999; Wilder 2009). One of the explanations for weak parliamentarian institutions arose from the
fact that the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) leaders under the country’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
belonged to the Muslim minority provinces from United India. These leaders had decided to come to
Pakistan, leaving behind their constituencies and constituents. In the new country, the political leaders
therefore relied on the bureaucratic apparatus to help them rule over the population. In contrast, the
Congress party of India was a unified political organization that was not divided across the territorial
boundaries of the newly independent India.
Hamza Alavi (1972, 1982) stressed that the involvement of the bureaucracy and the military in
the administration in the initial days of the country’s independence shaped the political leadership’s
dependence on the military-bureaucratic alliance. The political elite, military, and bureaucracy wrestled
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for a share in the country’s governance, but the political elite lacked the necessary political mobilization
and organization to exert command over the military and bureaucracy established by the British
colonialists. Ayesha Jalal (1997, [1990] 2007) argued that the founders of the Pakistani state believed that
an already established bureaucracy had a better chance of putting together its own structures of command,
control, and coordination. As a result, positions in unelected institutions of the state (military and civil
bureaucracy), rather than the electoral support derived from popular competition, became the key to
exercising political power in Pakistan.
Prior to the Musharraf reforms, the district administration headed by the district commissioner
(DC), like his colonial predecessors, combined the functions of coordination, magistracy, and revenue
collection. This made the DC a key figure of state power in the district. The new devolution-centric, local
government system attempted to de-concentrate this power in the district by taking the magistracy
function away from the DC office. Under the LGP, the elected representatives at each level were given
authority to hold the administrative bureaucracy accountable, an institutional measure unique to the 2001
plan. The major responsibility of the district government was to prepare the plan, formulate and execute
policies, allocate the budget, and monitor legislation at the district level. The district was to be controlled
by elected the district Nazim and head of district administration known as the District Coordination
Officer (DCO), who reported to the district Nazim.
When the LGP was devised by the military elite, it was claimed that the new system would roll
back the age-old influence of the unelected state institutions. The discourse generated by the NRB
contended the unelected civil administrator, called the Deputy Commissioner, at the lower level of
governing unit had to be curtailed. The report by the NRB argued “over concentration of authority,
particularly in the office of Deputy Commissioner . . . [which creates] the potential for abuse of
authority.” The report further argued this particular group within the civil bureaucracy had to be
neutralized: “The end of the domination of the bureaucracy by one group is a necessary pre-condition for
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the attainment of administrative power by the Army and the creation of conditions for national
reconstruction” (National Reconstruction Bureau 2000b).
This change made the district administration and police answerable to the elected head of the
district. This was a huge departure from the administrative and law-and-order structures inherited from
the colonial government, in which the local governments were subservient to the district administration.
This move by the military regime was appreciated by civil society. The public discourse was in favor of
terminating this position, as it was seen as the last vestige of the colonial period: “This colonial relic was
obsolete and has to be replaced with the elected representative at the lowest level of governance.”135 This
revamping of the civil and bureaucratic administration was the one point in the LGP that seemed to have
been supported by the civil society.136 The categories that I have developed based on my interviews—
critics, supporters, and cynics—all appreciated that the “octopus-like status of bureaucracy”137 is the bane
of Pakistan’s governance problems.
The administrative system of the country, which had remained the same since the country’s
formation in 1947, needed to be “revamped” because that “system had become obsolete. The termination
of that system is necessary for the development of our society.”138 But to effect change in the “existing
system, there must be groundswell support; the military singularly has taken up the task to bring about
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change in the existing power structure while excluding other actors such as political leadership who
would be forming the next civilian governments.”139
The 2001 reforms were unlike previous local government reforms because the Musharraf regime
believed civil administration had been manipulated by the civilian governments of the past; hence, the
bureaucratic administration was to be restructured. The restructuring entailed the empowerment of local
citizenry, not only against the local administrative bureaucracy, but also against the traditional political
leadership that acted through the mainstream political parties. At the same time, there was still skepticism
in the public sphere toward the devolution reforms initiated by the military regime under General
Musharraf. The critics saw these reforms as necessary; however, they also asserted such reforms were in
fact enabling the military regime to legitimize its rule, as had been the case with previous military
dictatorships.
Part VI: Concluding Remarks
The institutional history of Pakistan shows that successive military and civilian governments have
been rather consistent in their policy making toward governance of the country. My discussion on a
devolution plan as a preferred strategy of military regimes shows that the military has always prioritized
devolving power to the grassroots as a means to legitimize its rule and to secure a popular base.
Devolution has been the most pervasive and consistent governance strategy adopted by the military
generals who have ruled Pakistan. The military governments under leadership of a military general
devised plans of governance that gave his government access to ordinary citizens at the grassroots levels,
while civilian governments would break any such ties at the grassroots on the pretext that such
governance strategies were devised by the military regime and hence were dictatorial and undemocratic.
Though civilian governments were critical of devolution schemes devised by the military
regimes, the political elite let themselves be co-opted during the time of military rule. In exchange for
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their co-optation, the political elite endeavored to remain electorally relevant among their constituencies
in order to secure their political significance and to benefit from the largesse made available by the
military regimes. As a result, because the political elite cooperated with their design, the military regimes
perpetuated their control over the political landscape.
The civil society, despite its misgivings toward the military dictatorships, had ambivalent
engagements with the military regime. As seen in chapter 3, the civil society in Pakistan has had a
complex relationship with the state. In Pakistan, the state and civil society cooperative engagement is a
rare phenomenon. The military and elected regimes have sought to subdue oppositional voices coming
from the civil society. However, in the time of the military government of General Musharraf, the tenuous
state-civil society engagement was launched and multiple voices were heard. For the first time, the
oppositional voices against the military regime found space in the public sphere, while enthusiasts of the
military regime from within the civil society gained access to the military regime’s endeavor of modeling
political institutions. The establishment of local governments at the grassroots was one such institution.
Moreover, in order to capture political and administrative control of the state, the third plan of
devolution devised by the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf also aimed at reforming the
bureaucratic apparatus. As one senior journalist and human rights activist contended, “Though the ulterior
motive was to legitimize the military rule, the plan was in fact more radical than any such plans devised
by the previous military regimes and even the elected democratic governments, and this is an undeniable
fact.”140 Another civil society activist asserted, “The military’s objective was to legitimize their rule,
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agreed; but the demand for people’s empowerment has never been addressed by the elected governments
either.”141
The civil society, as I have shown in this chapter, was already expressing the need for civil
service reforms and reviving of local governments. Furthermore, the international donor agencies had also
been urging the Pakistan state to address the issue of bad governance. These donor agencies called for the
establishment of local governments and civil service reforms. The elected governments lacked the
commitment to bring reforms to governance; on the contrary, the military government of General
Musharraf found the enactment of good-governance measures as an opportunity to engage with the civil
society and to gain wider acceptance, not only among the people but with the donor agencies as well.
General Musharraf’s regime, in its search for popular support and to secure financial support from the
IFIs, engaged with the civil society to gain wider acceptance.
General Musharraf’s regime was successful in installing local governments, and, surprisingly, the
many political parties that had opposed the LGP did allow their members to contest the local elections
and be part of the electoral politics, even in a political landscape controlled by the military regime. In this
regard, the political elite did choose to be co-opted by the military regime to remain active in the militarycontrolled politics. This was, after all, not new in the politics of Pakistan.
However, as I will show in the next chapter, local governments faced political opposition with the
return of the elected Parliament under General Musharraf’s hybrid regime. From 2002 to 2008, various
aspects of the LGP, such as representation of women at local levels and independence of the locally
elected representative from the provincial governments, were rolled back by the provincial legislatures.
And, finally, with the return of the democratically elected government in 2008, the LGP was
effectively terminated. In addition, the elected government in 2008 retained in the Constitution the
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recognition bestowed upon the local governments; however, by law the provincial governments were
made the only constitutional authority to decide the fate of the LGP and local governments. Thus, the role
of the federal government was neutralized. By recognizing local governments to be the constitutional
responsibility of the provincial governments, the tension that existed between the provincial and federal
levels of government was addressed by the elected government.
In the next chapter, I show that the political parties that had been active during Musharraf’s
hybrid regime were equally effective in bringing local governments under the authority of the provincial
governments. Under Musharraf’s regime, the elected government led by PML-Q did indeed effect
changes to the LGP; the changes were supported by the federal government but were criticized by the
opposition led by PPP and PML-N. Opposition parties believed the changes effected by PML-Q gave
provincial governments authority over district governments. But when the elected government led by the
PPP in 2008 held executive governing powers at the federal and provincial levels, it granted provincial
governments the authority to oversee local governments. The criticism that was leveled against the
military government seemed not to have bothered the elected government in 2008.

CHAPTER 5
LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLAN 2001 AND THE ELECTED GOVERNMENTS
OF 2002 AND 2008
Musharraf’s regime created and opened space for the marginalized in the society; the critics
overlook the fact that political parties, its elite and the civil bureaucracy have always stalled such
progress.1
…the quality of this system was: this system brought in a huge number of women, peasant, labor,
and disabled. It was for the first time in Pakistan that their stakes were created in the system.2
Instead of empowering citizens, the devolution scheme has exacerbated the Pakistani state’s
institutional crisis by rooting the military in local politics. (International Crisis Group 2004, 10)
Background
The previous chapter 3 mapped Pakistan’s civil society, in which the predominant actors are the
print media and non-governmental organizations, the latter being one of the major recognized constituents
of what is defined as civil society in Pakistan. With the implementation of the Local Government Plan
2001 or LGP, the civil society actors such as the NGOs became supporters of the plan, because the NGOs
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contended the plan was needed at the time, and with this plan, space for political engagement was created
for minorities, women, peasants, and workers in the society.3
One of the monitoring survey reports generated by the NGO PATTAN, in a rather strong tone,
highlighted the local government conundrum:
[I]t is often argued that whenever military regime comes to power in Pakistan, it holds local
bodies’ elections (on non-party basis). True. One the other hand, the successive elected
governments of Z. A. Bhutto (1971-1977), Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto (1988-1999) did not
hold local government elections. This is also true. Why the military governments hold and the
elected government did not local government elections? The protagonists of political parties tend
to argue that military holds party-less local government elections (a) to de-politicize the polity
and (b) to create a new class of leadership, which would be dependent on the establishment. This
seems to be true as well. However, it has now become imperative to analyze why successive
elected governments did not hold local government elections? Had political parties held local
government elections regularly, it would have not only provided many benefits to them, but also
disarmed military governments from using it as a tool to legitimate their rule. (Bari and Khan
2001, 3)
In similar vein, another NGO, the South Asia Partnership–Pakistan (SAP-PK), in its report titled
Devolution – A Civil Society Perspective, blamed the political parties, stating, “Our sporadic political
regimes continued dealing with the masses on a patronage basis with the primary objective of legitimizing
a personal hold on power in disregard to their representational responsibilities” (SAP-PK 2003, 4).
In my interviews with civil society activists and review of documentary evidence through media
reports and analyses published by NGOs, the one observation that stands out in data gathering is that as
long as military generals were in control of the political regime, their respective devolution plans
remained in effect. But with the departure of military generals and return of elected governments, the

3

The annual reports of the leading NGOs lauded the effort of the military regime in creating the space for political
engagement for the disenfranchised. In its annual report for 2005-2006, Aurat Foundation (leading women’s rights
organization) emphasized, “[I]n response to the continued pressure of the women’s rights organizations, the
Government of Pakistan reserved 33 percent of seats for women at all tiers of local government for Local
Government elections scheduled in 2001, with direct elections to the reserved seats for women at the lowest tier, i.e.,
at the union council level. . . . To ensure maximum participation of women, Aurat Foundation (AF) activated and
organized its networks to undertake the Citizen’s Campaign for Women’s Representation in Local Government to
mobilize support for women to come forward to contest as candidates in the Local Government elections held in
2001 under the new law. The result was beyond all expectations, as over 90 percent of the seats were occupied after
the final count of the ballots was done, and around 32,222 were elected as union councilors” (Aurat Foundation
2009).
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devolution plans were considered the scourge of military rule and hence eliminated. Such has been the
fate of all of the military’s devised devolution plans. The LGP was no exception. However, the LGP
experienced a distinctive reception in the public sphere, for it not only received criticism but also found
support. Both the critique and appraisal generated interest.
During General Musharraf’s rule (1999-2008),4 the LGP was in implementation, but it was
eliminated in 2008 with the democratic transition and return of elected government. In 2008, the elected
government, led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and its coalition partners, included all those
oppositional parties that had earlier rejected the LGP. The coalition government, in its institutional design
under the 18th Amendment, did not reject the policy of devolution; the constitutional clause that was
devised by General Musharraf’s regime was retained by the elected government. However, this tacit
support for devolution per se by the elected government was not to promote autonomous district
governments as such; rather, it signified the elected government’s ambivalent attitude toward devolution
planning. Even with the ratification of clause 140-A under the 18th Amendment, the elected government
showed no keen interest in activating district governments. The elected government’s attitude was
reminiscent of its distrust for the military government’s devised policies.
Outline of the Chapter
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first part looks at the implementation of the plan at
the grassroots and the district assemblies that came into operation with the local government elections
held in 2001 and 2002. In the second part, I discuss how the elected government that came to power with
the general elections in 2002 embarked upon revising the radical components of the LGP. This elected
government was led by the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) or PML-Q political party; this is the political
party instituted by the military ruler to support himself in the implementation of his governance agenda.

4

General Musharraf achieved a military coup in October 1999. From October 1999 to April 2002, the country was
under direct military rule. From October 2002 to February 2008, a hybrid regime was enacted with an elected
government but under the executive of a military general, i.e., General Musharraf.
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However, the political elite supported by General Musharraf was the actor that stripped the LGP of its
radical components. The oppositional political parties, such as the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), had rejected the LGP; however, these parties had no influence on the
military government of General Musharraf and PML-Q to make changes to the LGP. On the other hand,
the oppositional political parties fielded their candidates in the local government elections in order to
maintain their political presence and remain electorally relevant in the electoral districts.
The third part of this chapter looks at the Charter of Democracy (CoD), which was signed
between the major opposition political parties in 2006. According to the CoD, the political parties made a
commitment to restore democracy and to continue local governments under their leadership if they came
to power in the upcoming general elections in 2007. The fourth part of the chapter looks into the process
of decision making under the elected government that had come into power in 2008. The elected
government of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and its rival party, the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz
(PML-N), had earlier signed the CoD in 2006 in which they made a commitment to the continuation of
the local governments had they come to power.
In the concluding section of the chapter, I discuss that with the newly elected government formed
in 2008, the political parties PPP and PML-N, which had signed the CoD in 2006 pledging to continue
with local governments, did not act on their commitment. In fact, not only these two political parties but
all others who had shown commitment to the local governments in their election manifestos failed on
their promise. In other words, following the general elections in 2008 and the arrival of the newly elected
government, the pledges made by the political parties to continue the LGP proven to be a farce. The
attitude of the elected government in 2008 toward the LGP showed the political parties’ continued
resentment.
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Part I: Implementation of the LGP at the Grassroots
We will take all possible measures to ensure that the local government system could not be
reversed by the succeeding governments.5
The plan devised by the military regime was an extension of the stated objectives in the 1973
Constitution of Pakistan. Under Article 32, the Constitution stated: “The State shall encourage local
government institutions composed of elected representatives of the area concerned. And, in such
institutions special representation will be given to peasants, workers, and women.” Likewise, Article 37
of the Constitution asserts that “The State shall Decentralize the Government administration so as to
facilitate expeditious disposal of its business to meet the convenience and requirement of the public.”
Amidst furor and critique leveled against the military regime’s devolution plan, the plan was
implemented at the grassroots in a phase-wise scheme from August 2000 to August 2001. Since the
elections for local governments were to be held in the 97 districts all across Pakistan, the elections
therefore were held in five phases. These local elections were held when there was no elected government
either at the provincial or federal levels; in other words, elections at the district level were held under
direct military rule.
The local district councils that were established, followed by the local government elections in
2001 and 2002, operated in the political landscape where the provincial and national legislatures had been
dissolved because of the military coup effected by General Musharraf in October 1999; during this period
the Constitution of Pakistan was in abeyance. Thus, from October 1999 to October 2002, the state of
Pakistan was under direct military rule with General Pervez Musharraf as the head of state. The military
was the only state institution that had executive powers, and it therefore asserted itself on the political and
civil society. All across Pakistan, local governments were formed in 97 districts, and they operated in the

5

Chairman NRB, General Naqvi, in a press conference on the LGP. Please refer to the newspaper report by Ansar
Abbasi, “NRB Chief Hints at Imminent Changes: Constitution Being Amended,” Dawn, August 19, 2000. Available
at: https://asianstudies.github.io/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/aug19.html#nrbc
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political environment that had been established only because of the dictatorial decree enforced by the
military junta.
When the district governments were formed in each district, it was the first time that elected
officials at the local levels were granted executive powers to administer and govern their localities based
on their local needs. At the same time, the state’s bureaucratic apparatus was made subordinate to the
elected local political elite. Hence, the bureaucratic apparatus at the district level was revamped and the
authority that was vested in the office of the Deputy Commissioner was given away to the elected district
mayors or Nazims.
The locally elected representatives contested the elections on a non-party basis and were elected
to the local district assemblies. The bureaucratic head in each district belonging to the District
Management Group (DMG), the Deputy Commissioner (DC), was to report to the elected district
official—a landmark step toward the devolution of power in the history of Pakistan. Table 5 shows the
number of total constituencies of the local governments according to the LGP.

Table 5: Local Governments Composition
Province

Districts

Sub-districts
(Tehsils)

Towns

Total Tehsils/Towns

Union Councils

Punjab

34

116

6

122

3,453

Sindh

16

84

18

104

1,094

KPK

24

34

4

38

957

Balochistan

22

71

2

73

518

Total

97

307

30

337

6,022
(Shafqat and Wahlah 2006, 213)
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Tension in the Civil Bureaucracy
General Pervez Musharraf announced in his address to the nation on August 14, 2000: “[The]
basic issue is to empower the impoverished and make the people master of their own destiny. . . . We
want to introduce essence of democracy and not sham democracy which promotes the privileged people
and their offsprings [sic]. We will bring to the fore essence of democracy.”6 Furthermore, General
Musharraf, referring to local government as point 6 on his 7-point agenda, emphasized, “In my opinion,
given its importance, it was on the top priority. It will bring far reaching consequences and will change
the fate of the country.”7 In his speech to the nation, General Pervez Musharraf outlined the four
requirements for implementation of the local government plan to hand over power to the people at the
lowest level. He contended that the first requirement was to make the people master of their own destiny.
The second was that the district bureaucracy should be put under the elected people, which could ensure
transfer of power to the masses. The third requirement was to give financial autonomy to the local
government. The fourth requirement was to ensure speedy justice at the doorsteps of the people, which
meant that the people did not have to wait for the provincial or the federal representatives to provide them
the relief. People faced with the issues of local governance were able to have their representatives respond
at the lowest level of state’s administration.
General Musharraf’s cabinet was comprised of leading figures from civil society organizations,
and non-partisan professionals such as lawyers, academics, media personnel, political contenders, and the
representatives of the provincial and federal bureaucracy. While the former groups advocated for the
LGP, the latter (the provincial and federal bureaucracy) saw the “radical components” of the LGP as a

6

Address to the nation on the 53rd independence day of Pakistan’s existence. Please see: M. Ziauddin, “District
Setup, Police to Work under Elected Men: Musharraf Announces Partyless LB Polls,” Dawn, August 19, 2000.
Available at: https://asianstudies.github.io/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/aug19.html
7

Ibid.
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“threat to their political influence and bureaucratic control.”8 The media reported that there were tensions
between the planning team at the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), the think tank established by
the military to design the LGP, and the bureaucracy. These two institutions were at daggers drawn, with
the former insisting the elected representatives have authority over the district bureaucrat, the Deputy
Commissioner (DC), who was given the new role as the District Coordination Officer (DCO).9 However,
the provincial and federal bureaucratic apparatus was persistent in restricting the influence of the elected
mayor over the office of the DCO.
On the other hand, the NRB was assertively pursuing that devolution should be “seen as a means
of providing better access to justice,” and to ensure that decisions were locally decided, local elected
officials were given the authority to make decisions pertaining to local governance (Shafqat and Wahlah
2006, 211). Thus, in order to make the local elected mayor accountable to the peoples’ needs and to give
him/her the authority to make collective decisions with the district council, the NRB gave executive and
administrative control to the elected mayor. This decision of the NRB made the DC subservient to the
elected mayor.
This decision taken by the NRB—of giving unprecedented executive powers to the locally
elected—did not fare well with the provincial and federal bureaucracy channels. This was because
officials holding the position of DC in the districts were selected from the civil services executive group
of highly educated men and women. The executive group formed the state’s civil services and was
divided into the federal, provincial, and district officers’ cadres. The district positions were the junior civil
services position from which officers were promoted to the provincial and federal levels. The officers
were selected to fill the positions at the district bureaucracy based on a country-wide civil services

8

Mr. Ikramullah Ghauri, member of the five-member team of the NRB led by General Tanvir Naqvi that generated
the strategy document on the LGP. This document was shared with the civil society organizations when it was
produced in March 2000. Interview with the author in Islamabad, February 28 and March 4, 2017.
9

See report: “Government Modifies Devolution Plan.” Dawn, August 5, 2000. Available at:
https://asianstudies.github.io/area-studies/SouthAsia/SAserials/Dawn/2000/aug05.html#modi
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competitive examination. This is why the rank of DC in the district administration had always been a
coveted civil services position.
The state’s bureaucratic apparatus thoroughly functioned based on the officer’s educational
qualification and professional spiritedness. Each selected officer passed through the rigorous training in
the civil services academy to reach a position in the district administration. Thus, the DC was always
considered to be the most coveted of the civil services’ rank, because this formed the base of the state’s
bureaucracy. The officers selected to the position of DC, therefore, carried the most prestige and were the
vested executive authority in each district over any elected district officials.
However, the LGP devised by the NRB reversed the executive powers vested in the position of
the DC. In fact, the executive controls given to the DCs were taken away from them and granted to the
locally elected mayors and the district council. When the LGP was being designed, the bureaucratic elite
opposed many components of the LGP. According to one member of the NRB team responsible for
devising the LGP, the “revolutionary aspects of the plan were thrown into controversy and the NRB
compromised on the revolutionary measures to appease the oppositional forces.”10
The radical aspects of the NRB, which were debated between the designers of the LGP and
bureaucratic elite, consisted of four elements. The first was the direct election of the district mayor or
Nazim. The second was the issue of writing an appraisal or the Annual Confidential Report (ACR) of the
DCO in the district by the elected mayor. Third was the removal of the district mayor by the district
council; by granting the decision-making authority to the district council, the role of provincial
government(s) was reduced, thus giving extraordinary powers to the local district council on matters of
governance. The fourth element was the issue of reserving 50 percent representation in the district council
for the women who were electable.

10

Mr. Ikramullah Ghauri, member of the five-member team of the NRB led by General Tanvir Naqvi. Interview
with the author in Islamabad, February 28 and March 4, 2017.
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In the following discussion, I present these points of contention between the planning team led by
the NRB and the bureaucratic elite. The civil society actors, such as the NGOs who had been solicited by
the military government for their input and feedback, supported these measures advocated by the NRB.
However, both the civil bureaucracy and the political elite, who later became part of the military
government, resisted the efforts of the civil society actors and the NRB.
The following discussion explains that while the LGP was being developed, its various
components were being challenged by the bureaucratic elite. Later, when the elected government came to
power, followed by general elections in October 2002, tensions between the local elected governments,
the civil bureaucracy, and the provincially elected political elite came to the fore.
The critics of the LGP, who had been vocal in their attack on the military leadership’s devised
devolution scheme, maintained that since the provincial and federal legislatures were not in place when
the local government elections were held (from August 2000 to August 2002), these tensions were only
natural. The political elite and civil society actors such as the media, public intellectuals, and nongovernment organizations in Pakistan believed these decentralization plans, though designed to devolve
decision making from centralized authority to the grassroots levels, in fact were governance measures
devised by the military to emasculate already existing (though weak) political institutions, such as the
legislature and political parties. Scholars believed that these governance measures to devolve power
focused attention on the micro issues of governance at local levels and thus diverted their attention away
from the mega structures of democratic governance, such as the need to have an elected representation
and electoral competition at the national stage (Waseem 2006a; Mohmand 2008).
Through the documentary evidence collected through the interviews, media, and civil society
reports, I argue that, with the return of elected governments at the provincial and federal levels in October
2002, the military-created think tank, the NRB, had to make concessions on the LGP to maintain alliances
with the political and bureaucratic elite. The communicative interexchange that had been initiated by the
NRB with the civil society actors was also short-lived; when the elected governments at the provincial
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and federal levels were formed in October 2002, the state and civil society communicative engagement
came to a halt.
The following discussion shows that the political and bureaucratic elite as institutional actors had
been putting pressure on General Musharraf’s military government not to alter the traditionally
functioning political bureaucratic setup in districts all across Pakistan. On the other hand, although the
civil society actors had criticized the military regime for using the local governments to legitimize their
rule, they were, in fact, supportive of dismantling the traditional political bureaucratic structure. Because
the LGP was to dismantle the political and bureaucratic influences in the districts, the civil society thence
became accommodative to the military’s devised local governments.
Furthermore, this discussion also demonstrates that the fluidity of the hybrid regime in Pakistan
resulted in compromises made by the military elite to the political and bureaucratic elite. The governance
measures taken by the military elite could not sustain political pressure for long; with the return of elected
government under General Musharraf’s military rule in 2002 and later in 2008, the political parties and
civil services exerted greater political control in reducing the radical measures of the LGP in the districts.
These radical measures were revised and amended in the LGP. Although the civil society actors did raise
a critical voice against the LGP’s amendments, they could not halt the revision process initiated by the
joint political and bureaucratic forces. The state and civil society communicative interexchange, which
was introduced for a brief period during the designing of the LGP, was short-lived, and political forces
became the only authority to decide the fate of the local governments.
Direct Election for the District Mayor
The NRB, in its plan for reconstructing the institutions of the state, established democratically
elected local government bodies. These bodies aimed to reform the apparatus of the civil bureaucracy at
the district levels. The NRB believed “politicians and bureaucrats were corrupt and they were the menace
causing bad governance, and they have license for philandering because there is no accountability checks
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on them and thus they remain unresponsive to local needs.”11 Therefore, the designers of the LGP
strongly believed that decentralization and the empowerment of local government would lead to efficient
administration and effective utilization of resources. The chairman of the NRB, General Naqvi, argued,
“People expect their representatives to respond to their needs. But people’s representatives are situated far
from local constituencies,12 whereas the district bureaucratic apparatus derives its strength by subjugating
people’s voices against the governance lapses. The disconnect between the people and the state create
grievances amongst the populace. In order to address the misgivings against the state, the people must be
empowered to hold their public officials accountable.”13
In order to do so, the NRB team believed that by having district Nazims elected directly, these
officials would be directly accountable to the people of the respective districts. The district Nazims, or
elected district mayors, were given executive powers to decide matters of local governance; however,
they were accountable to the district assemblies. Within the district constituency, the mayors and the
people are closely situated; in other words, there are no intermediaries. Hence, rather than waiting for
provincial and federal ministers to respond to their demands, the people could interact with their elected
mayors. Thus, the elected mayors, with whom the locals could interact, share, and voice the issues of
district governance, were the interface at each district.
By having district mayors as the intermediaries in each district, the NRB not only gave these
district mayors executive powers, but also made the civil services subservient to those who were locally
elected. This extraordinary measure mitigated the executive control of the DCs in districts, and the
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Ibid.
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The people’s representatives are in the provincial legislatures, far from their district constituencies.
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General Tanvir Hussain Naqvi, former chairman of the NRB, on a television program, Jawab-deh. The program
was televised on the GEO TV on January 24, 2010. This is a 40-minute long program, in which the anchor, Mr.
Iftikhar Ahmed, a journalist by profession and a widely recognized journalist in the country, invites the leading
policy makers, politicians, civil society activists, retired bureaucrats, and generals to discuss the country’s social,
economic, political, cultural, and ethnic landscape. The program is known for the hard-hitting questions posed by
the interviewer to his interviewees, especially on the role of the latter’s contributions in their respective professions.
The program is available online at http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x10rjtj. The interview was aired in the Urdu
language; the translation into English is mine.
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political influence of the provincial and federal ministers over local politics was reduced. In other words,
the locally elected district mayor and the assembly were the deliberative decision-making body in each
district.
However, the members of General Musharraf’s cabinet, having strong political motivations, were
convinced by the civil bureaucracy that a direct election would strengthen the district mayor’s position in
the district; hence, his/her electoral strength might pose a challenge to subsequent provincial and national
elected political elite. Furthermore, it was also argued that within each district there are no more than four
electoral constituencies for the provincial assemblies and at least two constituencies represented by the
Member of National Assembly (MNA) at the National Assembly. Having a district mayor elected by a
single constituency sets the locally elected mayor against the provincial and federal ministers. This
arrangement would therefore reduce the electoral prestige of the provincial and federal ministers.
The NRB team, on the contrary, asserted that this singular authority of the district mayor or
Nazim would not be free from any checks and balances, as the citizen monitoring teams at the district,
which were formed upon implementation of the LGP, would hold the locally elected leader accountable.
The NRB also argued that having the district Nazim indirectly elected (as it was done eventually) would
present fewer chances for local district influentials, such as political parties, to manipulate the district
assembly.
However, in the end, the provincial/federal bureaucracy was able to reach a compromise on the
issue, and, finally, it was decided that elections for the district mayor (nazim) and the district vice-mayor
(naib-nazim) were to be on an indirect basis, with the locally elected mayors of the councils at the subdistrict levels electing the district mayor and the district vice mayor. In addition to this compromise, the
NRB conceded to hold run-off elections for the district mayor and deputy mayor in the district
governments.
However, the provincial/federal bureaucracy opposed the idea and insisted that the candidate with
the majority of votes should be declared the winner. They argued that a run-off election could potentially
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initiate law-and-order disturbances within districts, fueling political rivalries between opposing
candidates. Furthermore, holding run-off elections was seen as a radical measure by the bureaucratic elite;
throughout the country’s history, winners of all levels of elections—local, provincial, and federal—had
always been determined by a majority of votes, and run-off elections were never a practice in political
elections.
Annual Appraisal of the DCO by the District Mayor
Shafqat and Wahlah (2006) argued:
[W]hen the Musharraf regime announced its Devolution Plan, many DMG officers simply
refused to believe that the military could actually implement it. This disbelief was based on two
premises widely held among the DMG. First, the false perception that the DMG was the “best and
brightest” and the only service able to manage the districts; and second, that the military
government was not serious about devolution and was simply trying to tame the bureaucracy by
threatening it with the devolution of power. (219)
Furthermore, the DMG also believed that “like previous military regimes [General Ayub and General
Zia], Musharraf would eventually co-opt them as junior partner” (219). However, the false belief that the
DMG had held throughout the country’s bureaucratic history was shattered when the LGP was
implemented. As one media source reported, the civil bureaucracy, because of the “massive restructuring
has left a very large number of the civil servants into complete disarray. Uncertain about their own future
and completely dark about the shape of their service, majority of these civil servants do not show much
interest in their assignments.”14
One of the other most debated points between the NRB and the provincial and federal
bureaucratic representatives was the issue of appraising the performance of the District Coordination
Officer, or DCO. The NRB argued that to give executive and administrative authority to the elected
mayor, it was imperative that the district bureaucracy be answerable to the mayor. Therefore, to ensure
this, the NRB proposed that the mayor initiate the DCO’s annual confidential report (ACR). The
provincial and federal bureaucracy opposed letting the locally elected have such authority to monitor their
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performance, since the ACR of a civil bureaucrat is the official dossier of his/her entire professional
career, and through this performance appraisal the civil bureaucrat is awarded official promotions, perks,
and other fringe benefits.
The provincial and federal bureaucracy argued that the district bureaucrat or the DCO was a
federal/provincial civil servant who worked for and was accountable to the provincial government; thus,
the authority to appraise his/her performance should be with the provincial authorities. The NRB
contended that, although the DCO may be a provincial/federal civil servant, with the implementation of
the LGP the DCO becomes accountable to the elected mayor, i.e., the Nazim. After being heatedly
debated, the matter ended in a compromise by the NRB, and provincial and federal bureaucracy was
indeed able to extract compromises from the military regime in securing a certain degree of authority for
the newly created positions of the DCOs, which replaced the officer cadre of DCs.
Initially, the NRB had proposed that absolute authority should be vested in the office of the
district mayor to appoint the DCO in the district. The provincial/federal bureaucracy opposed this
proposition, stating that this would introduce tension with the provincial and local governments; if all
powers on matters of administrative positions are reserved for the district mayor, then the elected
governments at the provincial and the federal levels would battle for control in the districts.
According to the compromise reached, it was decided that the ACR of the DCO was to be written
by the chief secretary, who represents the provincial bureaucracy, whereas the counter-signing authority
would be the district mayor. Shafqat and Wahlah (2006) argued that, although this measure temporarily
provided relief from the tension between the NRB and the provincial/federal bureaucracy, when the
district governments came into operation and the LGP was being implemented, the “quandary for the
DCO [was] how to juggle the demands of both the nazim and the Chief Secretary” (Shafqat and Wahlah
2006, 217). Another proposal by the NRB on the removal of the DCO by the district council was quashed
by the provincial/federal bureaucracy. The NRB insisted that the two-thirds majority of the district
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assembly should have the right to remove the DCO, but the provincial governments believed it would
lead to the worst form of politicization in the bureaucracy and successfully opposed the proposal.15
Removal of the District Mayor by District Council
The NRB designing team believed in giving maximum authority to the locally elected mayor;
however, the team did propose measures to make the district mayor accountable to the people of the
district and the members of the district council. According to one of the members of the designing team
for the LGP, “There were three measures which were proposed by the NRB to remove the district mayor
from his position if the district mayor (nazim) was found to be underperforming, philandering, and/or
favoring nepotism over meritocracy.”16 The measures were:


Removal of the district mayor by the district council through a simple majority.



Removal of the district mayor by the governor of the respective province, but to effect the
removal, the governor had to refer to the Provincial Assembly to vote for the removal of the
district mayor. If the majority of Provincial Assembly members voted to remove the district
mayor, the governor could then effect the removal of the district mayor.



Removal of the district mayor through the system of recall. This proposition could mean that
the citizens of the district could launch the process to dislodge the district mayor, if he/she
was found to be underperforming.

These measures, though, were not as heatedly debated between the NRB team and the
provincial/federal bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the provincial/federal bureaucracy prevailed over the NRB
team in the case of removal of a district mayor by the district council and by the governor of the province.
It was decided that to remove the district mayor, there must be a two-thirds majority of the district council
through secret ballot. Furthermore, the chief minister of the respective province must pass a motion in the
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Mr. Ikramullah Ghauri, member of the five-member team of the NRB led by General Tanvir Naqvi. Interview
with the author in Islamabad, February 28 and March 4, 2017.
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Provincial Assembly against the district mayor; here also the Provincial Assembly must decide by a twothirds majority to remove the mayor.
Women’s Representation in the District Council
The LGP was “radical” in terms of reforming the civil service, but also in making basic changes
to the composition of the elected governments in the districts. The NRB argued for 50 percent
representation by women in the district governments, its subordinate sub-district councils, and the union
councils. The argument for 50 percent women’s representation, 20 percent representation for workers and
peasants, and 10 percent representation for minorities in the district council meant that these
disenfranchised segments of society had the opportunity through the affirmative action to take part in
local decision-making councils.
The military regime of General Pervez Musharraf initiated steps to bring women into the public
sphere. However, such an endeavor was staunchly opposed by the political and bureaucratic elite. Within
the print media, as discussed in my last chapter, the policy measure to bring women into the local councils
was appreciated, but even in the print media there were conservative voices and opposition against such a
measure.17 Women’s participation in political processes at the local levels was seen as challenging the
societal norms and cultural values. The print media even reported that religious groups issued religious
decrees or fatwas against women participating in local councils (Abid 2007b, 96-102).
The provincial/federal bureaucracy also opposed the proposition of giving women equal
representation in the district council, as they believed this measure would challenge local traditional
segments in the society. The political and bureaucratic elite argued that Pakistan’s traditional society in its
rural areas might not let women participate in local politics on such a massive scale because of religious
sensitivities and patriarchal pressure. The NRB team, however, maintained that since women account for
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48 percent of Pakistan’s population, this warrants their participation in local politics. Nevertheless, the
NRB had to concede on this proposition so as to not contest the patriarchal pressures prevalent in society
against women’s empowerment.
Part II: The LGP under the Elected Government (2002-2007)
Under the military dictatorship of General Musharraf, the structure of the hybrid regime was
strengthened by the discourse on devolution. The LGP was devised by the military regime at a time when
the military had taken over the government and dissolved the political governments. The military
government therefore engaged with the civil society actors, including NGOs that had participated with the
military government’s established think tank, the NRB. Thus, the NRB team, in consultation with the
NGOs comprising the international donor agencies such as the World Bank, Department for International
Development (DFID), Asian Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Development Program (UNDP),
and Asia Foundation, embarked on designing the LGP. The NRB and the donor agencies created an
arrangement through which the people’s aspirations and needs would be incorporated in the LGP.18 Some
of the nationally based NGOs that had provided the data on people’s needs and aspirations found the
foundation for making radical changes in the LGP. These changes were to give administrative and
planning controls to the locally elected leaders, such as the mayor and deputy mayors of the district and
its sub-units, and to create space for the disenfranchised segments of society.
According to a report by the Asia Foundation, some “forty people’s assemblies” were held in
2000 across Pakistan, in different villages and towns, on the devolution of power. These “people’s
assemblies” involved over 15,000 citizens from local villages to the national level. In these people’s
assemblies, women enthusiastically participated, sharing their thoughts on devolution of power to the
grassroots and their role in local governments (Dohad 2002).
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The Army Monitoring Teams in the districts all across Pakistan had also been supplying information on the
inefficiencies of the district bureaucratic apparatus, providing the basis for the NRB’s tough resolve on civil services
reforms, which were initiated with the implementation of the LGP (Aqil Shah 2014a, 198-99).
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However, some of the propositions provided by other civil society organizations, such as
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) and the SUNGI, were ignored by the NRB. These civil
society organizations had argued that political parties must not be banned from contesting local
government elections. The argument was that political parties provided a platform for mobilizing people
on issue-based politics. In the absence of political parties, politics at the grassroots would then be led by
individual candidates, who, for their own political interests, would be inclined only to strengthen their
own electoral positions in district constituencies.
The NRB, however, believed that politics at local levels must be non-partisan, since each district
was faced with certain specific issues germane to social, political, and economic realities. Furthermore,
the NRB was criticized by the civil society and political parties, who alleged that the LGP devised by the
military was a significant attempt to emasculate the already existing (though weak) political institutions,
such as the legislature and political parties. The military government was aware that the LGP required
continued political support and that it could remain in effect only if the military-backed political regime
came to power. To reach to this end, the military elite devised another plan to garner public support for
the continuity of the LGP.
Presidential Referendum
The military regime tied the continuity of newly enacted local governments to the provisional
support for the military government of General Musharraf. This was seen as a highly controversial step
undertaken by the military regime, but a step that many observers of the LGP had earlier predicted. In
2002, after the LGP had been put into effect, International Crisis Group (ICG 2002), in one of its critical
assessments of the devolution plans devised by the military rulers (General Ayub, Zial-ul-Haq, and
Musharraf), declared that the military rulers’ primary motivation had been to create local bodies to
legitimize their military government(s), broaden its support base among the masses, and use the newly
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created and pliable local elite to undermine the military regime’s opponents. In essence, the local bodies,
ICG observed, provided a “civilian base . . . to military government” (7).19
Another report published by ICG (2004) declared that the military regime’s mantra of revolution
by devolution was a mere façade. The report charged, “[U]nlike attempts at decentralization in some other
countries, which appear to have been motivated more by changes in state ideology or multilateral
pressure, in Pakistan, the military’s need for legitimization of state control appears to be a prime reason
behind the recurring attempts at local government reform” (5). Other critics of the military regime alleged
that the LGP was enacted by the military elite to capture other political institutions of the state. For
example, one article in the English daily Dawn asserted, “[L]et us not fool ourselves. At issue is not any
question of administrative regeneration as the think-tankers of the regime would have the nation believe.
At stake is the creation of the civilian base for the military government. Once the nazims (mayors) assume
control of their district baronies, attention will turn to the next stage of democracy: the election of
military-friendly assemblies, at the center and in the provinces.”20 The print media (as discussed in the
previous chapter) severely criticized the presidential referendum, and leading journalists in the Urdu and
English print media expressed their discontent toward the military dictator.21
Despite criticism against the military regime, in April 2002, after the local governments had been
established in the country, General Pervez Musharraf announced a presidential referendum through which
he could get himself elected as president for five years, from 2002 to 2007. On the referendum ballot,
voters were asked to consent to the LGP and its continuation in the districts for achieving the military
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regime’s goals of grassroots empowerment. Voters were faced with a dilemma, since they had seen that
the elected governments never permitted the establishment of the local governments. Voters were also
asked to decide whether they were willing to live under the military dictatorship once again. The question
posed to the voters was:
For the survival of the local government system, establishment of democracy, continuity of
reforms, end to sectarianism and extremism, and to fulfill the vision of Qauid-e-Azam, would you
like to elect President General Pervez Musharraf as president of Pakistan for five years? (Aqil
Shah 2014a, 191; Jaffrelot 2015, 347)22
The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) reported that 71 percent of Pakistani citizens had cast votes
in the referendum; of those votes, 97.5 percent voted a resounding “yes.” Fraud in the referendum vote
was reported, since the entire state apparatus was activated to secure a “yes” vote for the military
dictatorship to continue (Waseem 2006a; Wilder 2004). The state apparatus was used by the regime to
obtain a favorable result to get General Musharraf elected as president. Waseem (2006a, 59-61) argued
that elected Nazims (though non-partisan) in the districts mobilized the people to vote for General
Musharraf through the referendum. Even Pervez Musharraf, in his autobiography, admitted to
“irregularities” that had taken place during the course of the referendum (Musharraf 2006, 168). Wilder
(2004) contended that General Musharraf seemed to be “embarrassed” because of the rigged referendum
vote. He issued a “half-hearted apology” to the nation in a televised address on May 27, 2002, attributing
the irregularities to the “incompetence” and “overenthusiasm” of a few state officials (107). He also
argued that his victory in the referendum ushered in a new epoch of “enlightened democracy” in the
country.23 In a subsequent interview given to the British Broadcasting Service (BBC), Musharraf
mentioned “the low point of his three years in power was the referendum that ‘unbeknownst’ to him had
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been conducted in a ‘dubious manner’ and had ‘cast aspersions on his own credibility’” (cited in Wilder
2004, 107).
During the course of my field work, I interviewed members of the NRB team on the utility of the
referendum for electing General Pervez Musharraf as president of the country, and on the services that the
elected district mayors had provided to get General Musharraf elected. The NRB team member argued,
“[W]e did not know the motives of General Musharraf, and the chairman of the NRB, General Naqvi, left
his position as chairman when he found that the LGP was to be utilized for providing electoral legitimacy
to General Musharraf.”24 Chairman Tanvir Naqvi’s departure from the NRB during the implementation
phase was not a good omen for the future of the local government system introduced in Pakistan by the
military regime. The LGP was devised by the NRB with a very specific role: to “empower the grassroots
and not to elect the General as president.”25
Furthermore, an interview with another member of the NRB team, who, although not directly
involved in designing the LGP, also confirmed (on the condition of anonymity), “There had been friction
between the NRB planning team on the LGP and General Musharraf’s governance advisors who had
become part of his cabinet, since all the members of his cabinet had advised him to get elected as the
President, make changes to the 1973 Constitution, and then set up a political government that gives a
semblance of democracy.”26
From the media and civil society reports 17 years ago to the interviews that I conducted recently,
it is evident that the LGP’s sustainability tied to the presidential referendum was a controversial issue.
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Voices within the NRB opposed General Musharraf’s decision to utilize the local governments in order to
be elected as president. In my interviews, former staff of the NRB identified that within General
Musharraf’s cabinet two distinctive groups existed—one that was opposed to utilizing the local
governments’ political base to help General Musharraf get elected through a presidential referendum, and
the other that ardently supported such a scheme. The group against the referendum believed that the local
governments were established to empower the grassroots; the objective of local governments was to
mobilize people politically to engage in matters of local governance. Forcing people to support military
rule on the basis of the military regime’s devised LGP compromises the sanctity of the plan itself. The
LGP was a means to people’s empowerment, not a means to legitimize military rule.27
On the other hand, the group favoring the referendum believed that local governments provide the
necessary public support via the grassroots political base. The military elite and advocates of military rule
within General Musharraf’s cabinet strongly believed that the existing institutions of representative
democracy were weak, and thus to resuscitate democracy, the military government had to bring about
democratic reforms. However, to reform a weakened democracy, the military regime needed political
support. Advocates of the military government believed that to legitimize military rule, the local
governments offered such a political base, connecting the military junta to the citizenry.
And, thus, as it happens in hybrid regimes, the contradictory forces of authoritarianism and
democratic principles culminate in a system of governance that combines the two in an imperfect union.
The system remains imperfect because it qualifies as neither democratic nor authoritarian; however, in
order to remain relevant to the people, the regime crafts certain democratic institutions to present itself as
sensitive to democracy. The autocrat, therefore, strives to control political power by establishing
nominally democratic political institutions as a means of increasing the stability of the regime. The
empirical findings of Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) indicate that autocratic rulers establish formal
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institutions to create a façade of democracy for an outside audience, in order to enhance their grip on
power and ensure their political and personal survival.
The sustainability of the hybrid regime showcased by General Musharraf’s military government
was dependent on finding crucial political support. The legitimacy of the military government was
dependent on local government support through a presidential referendum. The military government then
would sustain its rule over the polity by granting the political elite the capacity to engage in political
processes at the provincial and federal levels. Within hybrid regimes, autocrats, in an attempt to sustain
their rule, always rely on forged alliances with other actors on the political landscape. In Pakistan, the
alliance came in the form of the military elite extracting loyalty from local politicians at the grassroots.
With the establishment of local governments and the election of General Musharraf as president,
the military government believed Musharraf’s political position could be further strengthened by an
elected government at the provincial and federal levels. In my interviews with civil society activists and
politicians, these actors asserted that the military ruler believed that the local governments’ expressed
loyalty through the referendum gave the military rule a reliable public base at the district level. The
elections for the provincial and federal assemblies were announced once the military ruler was elected as
the executive of the political system.
The political system in place was a hybrid, combining authoritarian actions with democratic
influences. These two contradictory forces of political governance affected the conduct and performance
of the military government. Consider, for example, the role of the provincial and federal governments that
were formed by the general elections in October 2002. The crucial first and second tiers of political
governance, i.e., the federal and provincial governments, were established only after the third layer of
governance, i.e., the local governments, was established.
In practice, however, the third component of political governance should be established after the
first two levels are in place. These first two levels grant fiscal resources and administrative advice to the
district governance. Furthermore, the provincial and federal political elite derive their respective political
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relevance by mobilizing electoral support at the district levels, since the constituencies are carved out of
the electoral districts. Designers of the LGP, however, reversed this pattern of electoral politics; each
electoral district was given priority over the provincial and federal constituencies.
The designers of the LGP believed that by having the local governments operate the political
mobilization at the grassroots, a system of accountability would be generated. This would enable the
citizenry at the district levels to elect local representatives at a micro level of governance—the village,
union council, sub-district, and district level. Thus, by electing the local governments, the connection
between the electorate and the elected was established at closest proximity, whereas the electorate and
those elected as provincial and federal representatives are distantly situated. Provincial and federal
representatives hear and respond to the electorate’s voice only before or during the elections; however,
with local governments in operation, the electorate is able to access their elected representatives more
frequently.28
The designers of the LGP also believed that operational local governments at the micro level of
governance offered a step toward democratizing the political system. In other words, the local
governments would trigger the traditional political elite to become proactive in order to respond to their
electorate’s demands. But such an expectation from the military regime was misplaced, because, as one
civil society activist argued, “Expecting local governments to provide him [General Musharraf] a popular
base and then believing that this would cause provincial and federal governments to present a better
democratic performance was utter nonsense.”29
The following discussion reveals that when the elected provincial and federal governments, the
higher two tiers of governance, came into operation, the tensions between them and the local governments

28

Mr. Ikramullah Ghauri, member of the five-member team of the NRB led by General Tanvir Naqvi. Interview
with the author in Islamabad, February 28 and March 4, 2017. General Tanvir Naqvi also affirmed the reason of
closest proximity of the electorate with the elected for local governments on a television program, Jawab-deh.
Please also see footnote 13.
29

Interview with Mr. Salman Abid, Regional Head of Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO), Lahore,
August 4, 2017.

291
came to the fore; the former viewed the local governments as rivals encroaching upon the control of the
traditional political elite at their respective constituencies. As one political elite commented, “The military
regime was expecting too much from local governments, which irritated the provincial and federal
governments.”30 An academic asserted, “Political institutions are shaped by political negotiations and are
not the result of an executive decree. The political government which was formed rearranged the formal
connection between district, provincial, and federal levels.”31 But the connection that was reformulated
was not accepted by the traditional political elite, and steps were taken to reverse the change effected by
the military government.
Elected Government under Military Rule
The military’s control of political power has always been perpetuated by the enactment of the
local government reforms. Military regimes have thus presented themselves as the “guardian” and the
“savior” (Shah 2004, 2014a; Siddiqa 2007).32 Unsurprisingly, the military government of General
Musharraf behaved in the manner indicative of any other autocrat operating within a hybrid regime. The
military’s devised LGP and the resulting establishment of local governments not only created a façade of
democracy but also provided the military government a connection to the citizenry.
The designers of the LGP assumed that with the establishment of local governments, the military
dictatorship had created a benchmark for successive governments to follow. But when the military
dictatorship used these local governments to fortify its position as the key political player, the innovation
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of empowered local governments lost its appeal. One designer of the LGP argued that the establishment
of local governments was for “genuine democratic purposes, such as enabling the people to engage in
political processes at local levels. But when the devolution plan was utilized as a means to sustain military
rule, it triggered the collapse of the plan.”33 This observation was shared by civil society activists. In my
interviews, activists asserted that the stated objective of the revolution by devolution of General
Musharraf’s regime could be sustained only for a brief time; his presidential referendum and later his
favored political government led by PML-Q caused the LGP to decline in popularity with the civil
society.34
As discussed, the military rule legitimized its active engagement on the political landscape by
establishing local governments, but to wield political control over other formal institutions of
representative democracy, the military rule had to withstand the restoration of institutions such as political
parties, the legislature, and the executive. The morphed regeneration of these formal political institutions
was professed by the military ruler as a step toward democratization. However, this institutional
manipulation could not withstand the political pressures when the political elite competed for political
control.
In the general elections in October 2002, public representatives were elected by citizens to four
provincial assemblies and the National Assembly. The legislatures that were formed operated within the
hybrid regime; that is, with General Musharraf as the president with executive powers, the legislature and
elected representatives were subservient to presidential decrees. Pakistan has a parliamentary form of the
democratic system in which the president is a ceremonial figurehead elected by members of the national
legislature, i.e., the National Assembly. The president is not elected by either a referendum or a direct
vote.
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Nevertheless, the position of president secures the favor of the military elite throughout periods of
military rule. With General Musharraf elected as president of the country while holding two offices—
general and chief of the armed forces, and a president elected through a popular referendum—the political
system in Pakistan morphed once again into a hybrid of democratic institutions under dictatorial controls.
As discussed in chapter 4, the hybrid regime shaped under General Musharraf was distinctive from the
previous military dictatorships, as it engaged in devising democratic institutions that were previously
insular.
The case of General Musharraf’s military rule is different from previous military regimes. In one
crucial sense, the liberalization policies of his regime, such as the opening of media (electronic) and direct
engagement with civil society actors in the public sphere, created opportunities for civil society actors to
be involved in mobilizing the citizenry for civic and political engagement. The print media and active
electronic media are the result of his regime’s liberalization policies; media appreciated the result of the
Musharraf’s liberalization policies and admitted that “[T]he irony cannot be lost that in many ways the
devolution process by a military dictator may have actually helped democratise—through increased
representation and participation—the political involvement of citizens” (“Democracy and Devolution”
2010).
Under the military rule of General Musharraf, institutions such as political parties and civil
bureaucracy came under pressure. Political parties were monitored closely by the military government,
and the bureaucratic apparatus was reorganized to withstand the military rule. Since the political system
of the country had been rearranged with the military’s direct intervention, the political engagement of the
military also underwent change. As one commentator argued, “General Musharraf’s military rule was
distinctive from the previous dictatorships because military as an institution was aware that the institution
is neither a public service organization nor designed to serve citizens’ socio-political or economic

294
needs.”35 The military elite, therefore, had to engage with other vital political institutions, such as political
parties and the civil services, to regenerate the system of governance to serve society and to be accepted
by the people.
In doing so, General Musharraf’s cabinet reengaged with politicians and political parties to
reformulate the military government’s relationship with these formal political institutions. The
establishment of the Pakistan Muslim League–Quaid (PML-Q) as a political party was one such initiative.
As one civil society activist argued, “[The] military ruler needed a public political face to show the people
and outside world that the military government has democratic motivations.”36 A political party that was
loyal to the military ruler was established to strengthen the military rule and advance military engagement
in political governance.
In my analysis of the hybrid regime of military-political alliance, I observed in the interviews
with a range of actors belonging to civil and political society that the military government of General
Musharraf was tenacious in liberalizing the military rule. The military regime had not exerted violent
force over civil and political society in order to annihilate their presence on the socio-political landscape.
Civil society such as critical print media and oppositional political parties wielded their influence by
being active in the public sphere. There appeared to be an unstable yet acceptable equilibrium reached
between the military elite and other actors in society, which included civil society, political society, and
civil bureaucracy. But this unstable equilibrium was susceptible to political pressures that the military
government had tried to prevent from erupting.
The political pressure that was generated within the democratically elected government was a
formidable challenge for the military government. Before the return of political governments in October
2002, the military elite had to renegotiate with the bureaucratic elite on the design of the LGP. But when
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the elected governments were established at the provincial and federal levels, the military ruler had to
renegotiate with the political elite to ensure the longevity of his rule. As shown in the following
discussion, the military rulers favored the political loyalist—the political party of PML-Q. This political
party was able to form provincial and federal governments. But the military’s loyalist party engaged in
revising the military’s flagship initiative of local governments in districts. With the loyalist PML-Q, the
military ruler had to make concessions on the LGP to maintain the hybrid regime of the military-political
alliance.
As shown in the preceding section, when the military elite embarked on devising the LGP, it had
to face the opposition of the bureaucratic elite, and in order to pacify the civil service, certain radical
aspects, such as an autonomous district mayor and 50 percent representation for women in local councils,
were compromised. But as the elected governments were established in provinces and in the center, the
military regime was faced with additional political actors from whom negotiations, compromises, and
cooperation were to be extracted.
Within this political landscape, the civil society experienced these negotiations among the
political actors, military, bureaucracy, and politicians from afar. The military elite had engaged the civil
society during the planning of the devolution plan, to gauge public support for the plan. But the same civil
society actors were not consulted when the LGP was in operation, and their critical voices were ignored
by the political governments after the elected governments at the provinces and center had been
established.
Tensions Between the District and Provincial Governments
In 2002, when PML-Q had formed the government at the center and was in a coalition
government in the provinces of Pakistan, the LGP presented some opposition to the authority of the
provincial governments. Mainly two issues created friction between the elected governments in the
provinces and the district governments. One issue was the non-partisan district governments, which
created a clash with the newly elected provincial government. The other issue was a consequence of the
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first, but dealt with administrative independence of the district governments. The non-partisan character
of the elected district governments was managed by the provincial governments through establishing
excessive controlling mechanisms to oversee the independent local governments.
Though the political affiliation in the local government elections held in 2001 and 2002 was not
widely publicized, in the electorates the voters knew of the political affinities of the political contenders.
What seemed contradictory about the LGP was that although district elections were held on a non-party
basis, the political parties still had a strong presence in the districts, since it is the district that provides the
electoral constituency for partisan political mobilization to take place. According to a report by
Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), of the councilors elected to the local councils, 38
percent indicated they had no prior political affiliation and had never contested the elections, whereas 62
percent reported that they belonged to political families who have contested elections in the past (S. R.
Khan 2002). In its analysis of the LGP, the NGO PATTAN Development Organization found that
although the local government elections were held on a non-party basis, the political pronouncements of
the candidates were evident, since the voters could relate to individual candidates’ political affiliations
(Bari 2001, 59).37
Soon after the provincial governments were elected and the national government was formed
following the general elections in 2002, the tensions between the non-party district government and the
partisan assemblies at the provinces and center became an administrative hurdle for provincial
governments over policies of local governance, creating friction between the district and provincial
governments.
The provincial assemblies had come into being followed by partisan elections, and the chief
minister(s) of the provinces, who were also the chief executive(s), were not supportive of autonomous
district governments. The independence of district governments in terms of partisan politics and their
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administrative independence was seen by the chief minister(s) as a challenge to the elected provincial
governments because, as one academic argued, “Electoral constituencies are drawn from districts;
freestanding district governments were seen as contenders to political power by the provincial
governments. Hence, to check the independence of these local governments, provincial assemblies
embarked on curbing their independence.”38
By adding amendments to the LGP, the provincial governments gained administrative control
over the local governments. To enact these amendments, the provincial governments made the case that
working with each district government as an independent and autonomous unit creates administrative
difficulties in responding to the needs of every district; a lack of uniformity exists in the cultural, social,
and economic composition of each district. And since the provincial government has to serve each district
according to its own unique characteristics, the provincial government(s) argued this was not an efficient
administrative strategy since the provincial legislature is comprised of the constituencies from within the
district.
In my interview, the former chief minister of Punjab Province, Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, also the
senior member of PML-Q, argued that “designers of the LGP devised the plan in isolation since they did
not have a clue how the provincial governments work.”39 This surely was a strange comment, because
Elahi had been an ardent supporter of General Musharraf’s military dictatorship, and he was the leading
figure of PML-Q, the political party established by the military ruler; yet, he did not accept autonomous
local governments. Furthermore, as a chief executive of the provincial government in Punjab Province
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(the most populous province), Elahi’s government effected changes to the LGP.40 In the interview, Elahi
enumerated the series of development works that he had initiated in the province of Punjab as the chief
minister from 2002-2007. He attributed the success of these community development initiatives to the
experience he had gained as the council chairman in his home district of Gujarat under the military rule of
General Zia-ul-Haq in the 1980s.
Similarly, another member of the political elite belonging to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP),
who was elected the mayor (or nazim) of the district of Khairpur in the province of Sindh in 2001, noted,
“The provinces were clamoring for an increased role in district politics, and the provinces were despairing
at the fact that they were being reduced to mere post offices, handing out resources to districts and losing
out on their authority in the district constituencies.”41 Nafisa Shah credits the LGP with having launched
her political career. However, she believed that the local governments, which were established after the
local government elections in 2001-2002, developed greater administrative animosities toward the
provincial governments. The district mayors, who did not belong to the support group of the thenprovincial governments, faced “red tape bureaucratic hurdles in the release of funds and technical human
resource from the provincial headquarters.”42
In one of the evaluation studies conducted by WB, DFID, and ADB, provincial governments
were found to be favorable to the district governments when:


The chief minister and/or the main provincial coalition and the district nazim are from the
same political alliance.
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Please see the subsection “Amendments to the LGP.”
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Dr. Nafisa Shah was one of the two females who was elected as the mayor in local government elections in 2001.
She was the mayor of the district Khairpur in the province of Sindh. She belongs to a political family that has close
affinity to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Currently, Dr. Nafisa Shah is the Member of National Assembly
(MNA) in a women’s seat in the national legislature, which essentially means that she is the MNA by the virtue of
her party position in the National Assembly and not because she contested the election in open competition.
Interview with the author in Islamabad, August 22, 2017.
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The Provincial Assembly constituencies within the district are filled with politicians from the
same political alliance as the nazim.

When these two conditions were not met, the nazim had no sufficient independent political
standing to prevent administrative interventions implemented by the provincial governments (World Bank
2004, 10). Therefore, in the cases of adversarial district governments at local levels, the provincial
governments started to contract the autonomy of the district governments, which was made possible by
the design of the LGP.
As I have stated, if non-partisan elected district governments were unwelcomed by provincial
governments, the administrative independence of the district governments was another problem for
provincial governments. The animosity exhibited by the provincial governments toward local
governments ran deep. Because provincial governments did not want district governments to operate
autonomously, the provincial governments wanted to maintain administrative, financial, and political
control over district governments. Scholars argue that the control traditionally exercised by provincial
governments had been contracted because of the military rule (Shafqat and Wahlah 2006; Aqil Shah
2014a; Martin 2016; Waseem 2006a).
The central government that was formed consisted of an elected legislature, and it operated as in
any other hybrid regime—characterized by a combination of democratic principles but propelled by
authoritarian controls. Under General Musharraf’s rule, the hybrid political system in place vested
executive powers in Musharraf as the elected president, while the political institutions that were
established under his rule perpetuated authoritarianism. But as it happens, the institutional manipulation
initiated under the military’s designed hybrid political setup could not sustain the political pressures.
For example, the political elite, for reasons of political expediency, willingly performed the role
of junior partners in the hybrid regime. However, in the long run, the central political forces attenuated
the empowerment of the district governments, since the political elite (even those who had been co-opted
by the military regime) believed devolution planning initiated by the military elite was more of an attempt
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to fragment political opposition to the military rule and to create a loyal pro-government constituency.
The ruling political elite led by the PML-Q thrived on fragmented political opposition by aligning itself
closely to the military ruler. At the same time PML-Q also argued for subservient local governments so as
to maintain the loyal pro-government constituency and to strengthen its control over local politics.
In his analysis on the frictions between the provincial and district governments, Martin (2016)
argued, “Musharraf’s devolution program served to ensure regime survival by actually centralizing power
and fragmenting the political opposition. The military regime forced the provinces to transfer 40 percent
of their total revenue to local bodies, the [military’s established] central government was able to take
power away from provincial governments” (124). The provincial elected governments grew weary of
autonomous local governments. They believed that if district governments were given authority to decide
matters of local governance, then the Provincial Assembly would lose its institutional prestige.
Hence, once the political elite at the provincial and national levels were in place, they then
systematically “stripped the radical components off the plan, such as women’s and minorities’
representation to local councils and the independence of district elected representatives.”43 The landmark
and the highlight of the military regime’s work on devolution started to crumble; a process that was
initiated with the presidential referendum was moving toward annulment under the military regime’s own
favored political government.
Amendments to the LGP
The tension between the district and provincial governments reached its culmination when new
rounds of local government elections were held in 2005. According to Article 140, which was introduced
to the 1973 Constitution, local governments were given an unambiguous constitutional protection. The
approved changes to the Constitution, enacted on December 30, 2003, placed the local government under
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Interview with Mr. Salman Abid, Regional Head of Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO), Lahore,
August 4, 2017. Please also refer to footnote 4. The repeal of radical components of the LGP are explained in more
detail in this chapter.
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the provincial governments. Furthermore, by clause 140 in the 1973 Constitution, President Musharraf
provided constitutional protection to the structure of devolution against amendment or repeal for six years
(until December 31, 2009), except with the approval of the president (World Bank 2004; Arif et al. 2010).
However, this did not deter the provincial governments from effecting changes to the LGP. Just
one month prior to the second round of local government elections in August 2005, the provincial
governments had introduced amendments to the LGP. For the amendments to be enacted, they must be
approved by the president. President General Musharraf, for the sake of keeping the hybridity of the
military-elected government intact, approved those amendments proposed by the provincial governments.
Defending the changes to the LGP, Musharraf asserted, “If the local government system is to take root
and flourish, then the people of Pakistan must be allowed the right to change and modify the system in the
manner they see fit. . . . This is a system of the people and they can amend it in accordance with their
needs.”44
It was not the people who had decided to make these changes to the LGP. It was the provincial
governments in each province that had made concerted efforts to amend some of the main provisions in
the LGP. There were some 15 amendments to the 198 clauses of the LGP. They all pertained to the
increased role of the provincial governments over the operations of the district governments, and also to
the reduction of the people’s representation in local council(s). The first was the reduction of council
members from 21 to 13 in each union council (the lowest unit of the district tier); the second was to give
the controlling check over the district mayor (nazim) to the chief minister of the provinces. The
interesting fact about these amendments was that the provincial governments had proposed to reduce the
amount of women’s representation in the district council from 33 percent to 10 percent. But the civil
society organizations, especially the NGOs, opposed the announced policy measure, such that the
provincial governments had to revise their policy on reducing the percentage of reserved seats for women.
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Reduction in People’s Representation at Union Councils
For the first time in Pakistan’s history, the LGP had provided for 33 percent of the representation,
in all tiers of the local government across the four provinces, to be reserved for women. These seats were
directly elected at the village level for union councils and indirectly elected at the district and sub-district
levels for district and sub-district councils (Abid 2007a, 2007b; M. Z. Islam 2015). The LGP opened
windows of opportunity for women and marginalized sections of society to participate and represent their
interests and concerns in local governance through the affirmative action of reserving 33 percent of seats
for women, 20 percent for peasants and workers, and 10 percent for minorities (International Crisis Group
2005; Aurat Foundation 2009).
This measure saw the entry of approximately 36,000 women into local government structures and
initiated the process of mainstreaming them in the political arena. In the second round of elections in
2005, the provincial governments reduced the number of women’s seats at the council level. (See Table 6
for women’s representation in local governments in 2001 versus 2005.) Amidst the protests from women
councilors and the NGOs, the provincial governments were forced to keep the women’s quota at 33
percent (ICG 2005). The 33 percent of seats reserved for women remained intact, but the number of seats
reserved for peasants and workers (now 5 percent, rather than 20 percent) and minorities (now 5 percent,
rather than 10 percent) was reduced from the initial LGP. Prior to the 2005 local government election,
through an amendment in the LGO 2001, the total number of seats at the union council was reduced from
21 to 13. This decision negatively impacted women’s, peasants’, workers’, and minorities’ political
participation.
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Table 6: Women’s Representation in Local Governments, 2001 Versus 2005
Electoral Details

Local Government
Election 2000-2001

Local Government
Elections 2005

Total number of available
seats

36,066
(The number of seats was
42,101, but there were 9.6
percent of seats reserved for
women that remained vacant
in the local government
election in 2001.)

24,463 (excluding the
minorities, peasants, and
workers)
(There were 28,577 seats, but
all were not contested.)

Contesting candidates

47,845

47,422

Adapted from Khattak (2010, 53) and National Commission on the Status of Women (2010, 12-13)

The overall reduction in seats resulted in fewer women entering the political scene, but by 2005,
more women had been mobilized by the work of the NGOs, and more women were contesting the general
seats. The PATTAN Development Organization and the Aurat Foundation had mobilized the network of
women councilors across Pakistan to create pressure and prevent the elected provincial governments to
make revisions in women’s reserved seats in the local governments. The quota for women’s seats was
kept to 33 percent, but the representation of minorities, peasants, and workers was reduced.
Powers Extended to the Chief Minister of the Province
In 2005, the second round of local government elections took place across Pakistan. During this
period, substantive changes had taken place that shaped the political landscape of the country (ICG 2005).
For example, the number of constituencies was increased all across Pakistan, and new electoral districts
were crafted from within existing electoral districts.
The foremost changes had taken place in the province of Sindh, where the incumbent Chief
Minister Arbab Ghulam Rahim, in order to placate coalition partner Muttahida Quami Movement
(MQM), crafted new districts from within existing ones. The creation of new districts by the provincial
government was to create gerrymandering at the behest of the coalition partner; however, the policy of
establishing new districts was undertaken to reduce the political influence of the rival political party, the
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Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The PPP has traditionally been politically influential in the province of
Sindh, and it derives its strength from a loyal voter base. The crafting of new districts from larger districts
was seen by observers as a means to dislodge the PPP, the political party of Benazir Bhutto at the fringes
(PATTAN 2006a, 2, 14).45
A senior member of the PPP and the member of the Senate, Raza Rabbani,46 argued, “The real
motive behind these changes is to establish the dictatorship of the chief minister, who can suspend the
nazims [district mayors] whimsically on politically motivated grounds” (cited in ICG 2005, 3). These
include the power to suspend a district mayor (nazim) for 90 days while the Provincial Local Government
Commission undertakes an inquiry. The irony was that the Commission was headed by the chief minister
himself, who enjoyed the power of veto over the recommendation of the Commission. Critics argued that
the establishment of the Commission was farce, since the power to decide the fate of district mayor was
reserved for the chief minister (ICG 2005).
Likewise, the chief minister could also suspend the resolutions of the district, sub-district, and
union councils if they were considered to be in violation of the law or the interest of the people and could
refer them to back to the Local Government Commission for an inquiry. Furthermore, the amendments
also removed the legislative check on the misuse of executive authority by the district mayor, and instead
the onus of responsibility and authority was transferred back to the provincial government and the office
of the Local Government Commission that was to report to the chief minister (ICG 2005; PATTAN

45

Also see: Saeed Shafqat and Saeed Wahlah. 2006. “Experimenting with Democratic Governance: The Impact of
the 2001 Local Government Ordinance on Pakistan’s Bureaucracy.” In Pakistan 2005, edited by Charles H.
Kennedy and Cynthia Botteron. Oxford University Press, 216.
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to power following the general elections in February 2008. Mr. Raza Rabbani, though a severe critic of the military
regime’s devised policies, had retained the clause 140 in the 1973 Constitution when the deliberation on the 18th
Amendment ensued with the formation of Special Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Reforms (SPCCR)
in April 2010.
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2006a, 2006b, 2006c).47 An International Crisis Group’s report on these amendments observed that these
amendments were made by the provincial governments in order to ensure the incumbent political parties a
secure transition to the upcoming general elections, which were expected in 2007 (ICG 2005, 3).
The examples cited above signify that elected governments at the provincial level wielded
political pressure on the sustainability of the LGP. Elected district governments operated in a political
vacuum, because the first and second tiers of democratic governance, i.e., the federal and provincial
legislatures, were deposed by the military. As long as these two political institutions (provincial and
federal assemblies) were absent from the political landscape, the military negotiated with only one state
actor, i.e., the bureaucratic elite, while political parties were prevented from engaging in any political
negotiations.
During this same period, the military and civil bureaucracy were active on the political scene, and
the civil society was engaged by the military to gather and evaluate popular opinions on the military’s
devised devolution plan. Civil society did participate in gathering public opinion for the military regime;
however, civil society actors were not the authors of the LGP. The designers of the LGP did create space
for civil society to engage with district governments when the LGP was in effect, but the role of civil
society was authored by the military regime. It was the military dictatorship that brought in the civil
society in the absence of political parties. The situation, however, changed with the return of the political
government.
Hence, the political parties had a greater influence on how the LGP evolved. Though the political
parties had no role in the designing of the LGP, they were not even invited by the military for gathering
and evaluating public opinion. The military had assigned the role of gathering people’s opinions to civil
society actors such as the NGOs. But as soon as the elected governments at the provincial and federal
levels were established, the civil society was taken over by the political government. And thus with the
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Please also see the op-ed by I. A. Rehman, “Local Bodies: Whose Fiefdom?” Dawn, August 1, 2005. Also
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return of political process at the provincial and federal tiers, the incumbent political party PML-Q and its
allies that had established the government in the center and in the provinces took gradual steps toward
reversing the LGP. And, while doing so, PML-Q also ignored the concerns voiced by NGOs and
opposition political parties on expunging the LGP of its radical components.
Part III: Political Parties’ Proclamation for Local Governments
under the Charter of Democracy (CoD)48
The leaders of two major political parties, Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz
and Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), were excluded by the military regime from
participating directly in the political processes in Pakistan. These political leaders had been in power in
the 1990s, during which they were bitter rivals. Throughout this period, their political rivalry had
strengthened the military elite to engage in electoral politics and to effect changes to the political
leadership. These two political leaders who had been adversaries later became political allies during the
military regime of General Musharraf.
When these two political leaders were in power, the government had a dismal record of
establishing local governments. In fact, the elected governments formed by the PPP in 1988-1990 and
1993-1996, and by the PML-N in 1990-1992 and 1997-1999 never had been serious about the devolution
of power to the grassroots (Abid 2007a, 2012; M. Z. Islam 2015; SAP-PK 2003). According to one
publication by South Asia Partnership–Pakistan (SAP-PK), though local government elections had been
held under the elected governments of PPP and PML-N, the effect of their service delivery to the people
in the district was negligible.
In my interview, one civil society activist contended, “The elected government had enjoyed
electoral legitimacy but failed on performance legitimacy, that is to say, to better the lives of electorates,
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For reading through the points of the agreement, please refer to: “Text of the Charter of Democracy.” Dawn, May
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in terms of people’s access to basic needs such as health, education, and livelihood.”49 Furthermore, he
argued that the elected governments failed to meet the material needs of the people and were not able to
deliver on their democratic promises.
The democratically elected governments at the provincial and federal tiers were remote from the
local levels, while the local governments, which came into being under elected governments, lacked
sufficient authority over the local bureaucratic apparatus. Local government elections were held
intermittently under democratic governments; however, the political elite from these leading political
parties did not initiate any policy to empower the people to participate in local politics and to hold their
public representatives accountable (Z. Islam 2014, 21-24, 133). With nonexistent local governments at the
grassroots, the void between the people and their political representatives at the provincial and federal
levels increased. However, under military rule, this growing void was addressed with the establishment of
local governments at the grassroots.
When in 1999 the military coup had been imposed, and gradually the military regime had taken
control of the political landscape, these political leaders fled the country for fear of being politically
persecuted by the military ruler. Though there was substantive evidence of financial embezzlement and
corruption on the part of these political leaders, the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf allowed
these leaders to escape from Pakistan, rather than be held accountable. The military regime did not pursue
them in the locations of their temporary residences outside Pakistan (I. Hussain, 2000). Though these
leaders were prevented from directly engaging in any political process within Pakistan, their political
parties remained intact. The members of their parties did contest the general elections in 2002, and their
members also contested the elections for the position of district mayor when the LGP was implemented.
In fact, in some of the districts across Pakistan, members of these two political parties were able to
advance to the position of district mayor.
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Mr. Zahid Islam, the Chief Executive of Saangat Development Foundation (SDF) a Lahore-based civil society
organization. Interview with the author, November 29, 2016.

308
Their members’ participation in the electoral processes, at both the national and the local levels,
allowed both political parties to remain active on the political scene and to mobilize their voters.
Although the local government elections held in 2001-2002 and 2005 were on a non-party basis, the
political contestants and the voters in the constituency knew of the candidates’ political affiliations. In my
interviews with civil society actors, academics, and representatives of the NGOs, all agreed that political
affiliations of the local contenders of power were evident to the voters. Though there were new entrants,
they were at the village and union council levels, whereas at the sub-district and the district levels, the
political elite elected by electorates were recognized by voters because of their political affiliation. One
academic I interviewed argued, “Local governments established by the military elite had pushed political
parties off the political landscape, but voters recognized politicians because of their political
affiliations.”50 Furthermore, in his analysis on political affiliations of local political elite, Abid (2007b)
contended, “More than 80 percent of the local elected representatives had [political] party affiliations, and
it was their affiliation that was recognized by the voters” (56).51
This allowed the ousted political parties to remain relevant in the politics of Pakistan, and
therefore their party members were supported by the party leadership to be part of the electoral processes.
In my interview with Dr. Nafisa Shah, an ardent PPP worker who was elected the district mayor in
Khairpur from the province of Sindh, I asked her that why she contested the local government election
when the PPP had been so vocal in its critique of the military dictatorship, and especially because the PPP
had rejected the local government elections. In response, Shah stated, “It was my party’s decision to
contest the elections, because in any manner, if we could serve the people, we have to be part of the
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political process.” These sentiments were also shared by another member of her party, Senator Rubina
Khalid. Senator Khalid argued, “Political party exists because of the people. My party [PPP] strongly
believes in mobilizing people to partake in political processes. If we had not participated in local
government elections, the party would have lost the ideological connection to its support base among the
people.”52
Thus, by being close to the electorate and the constituencies, the PPP and the PML-N had sensed,
experienced, and realized that the “local governments established with the LGP provide their parties a
political connection to the voters, and that by supporting the local governments, the parties can remain
relevant to the citizens.”53 Another member from the local NGO SUNGI Development Foundation
argued, “The political parties had to compete in the local government elections in 2001 and 2005 because
they could see that the plan, though with all its shortcomings, did indeed give considerable authority to
the elected district mayor—and thus by being part of the system, they could remain relevant political
actors.”54
Thus, to remain relevant to the voters and to be actively engaged in the politics of Pakistan, the
political parties decided to resolve their differences and pledged their commitment to the restoration of
democracy in Pakistan. The two parties signed an agreement in London on May 14, 2006; this agreement
was called the Charter of Democracy (CoD). The agreement consisted of 36 positions on the governance
and public policy by the political parties. The agreement was signed not only between the PPP and
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PML-N; the CoD was an alliance of all the oppositional parties against the military rule of General Pervez
Musharraf.
Local Governments on the Charter of Democracy
The oppositional parties pledged their commitment for the continuation of the local governments
and argued that changes should be made to the existing local government plan, which had been amended
by the incumbent party, PML-Q. As discussed in the previous section, the amendments that were made in
the LGP gave executive control to the chief minister of the provinces, thereby reducing the influence of
the district mayor in making decisions at the local level. The oppositional political parties believed these
changes had given extraordinary powers to the provincial executive, i.e., the chief minister, to overrule
the designated authority of the district mayor.
Three policy pronouncements were made in the CoD on the local government plan:55


Policy pronouncement 10: Local bodies election will be held on a party basis through
provincial election commissions in respective provinces, and constitutional protection will be
given to the local bodies to make them autonomous and answerable to their respective
assemblies, as well as to the people through regular courts of law.



Policy pronouncement 29: Local bodies elections will be held within three months of the
holding of general elections.



Policy pronouncement 30: The concerned election authority shall suspend and appoint
neutral administrators for all local bodies from the date of formation of a caretaker
government for holding of general elections till the elections are held.
(“Text of the Charter of Democracy” 2006)
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Later in the chapter, I discuss that only a part of the three policy pronouncements on local governments was
incorporated when the 18th Amendment was deliberated upon and promulgated in 2010.
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By making these pronouncements, the oppositional parties agreed upon and recognized that local
government elections should have permanence in the governance system. Thus, by making their
commitment to the enactment of local governments, these oppositional political parties conveyed their
support to local governments. Their party workers were advised to mobilize local support for their
respective political parties in the upcoming general elections, which were expected in 2007, a year from
the signing of the CoD.
Manifestos of Political Parties for General Elections in 2008
The signing of the CoD marked the oppositional political parties’ policy positions on pivotal
matters of restoration of democracy, foreign relations, security in the region, and domestic governance.
On the question of domestic governance, the one key issue was the strengthening of the local
governments and maintaining the local governments as a permanent feature in the structure of governance
of the state. By pledging commitment for the restoration of democracy and by including local
governments in the policy agreement, the political parties declared their support of the establishment of
the local governments.
The political parties that were in the opposition and had signed the CoD were Awami National
Party (ANP), PPP, and PML-N. The political parties in the government, PML-Q, MQM, and Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), had all featured the local governments in their election manifestos. However, an
Islamabad-based think tank, the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
(PILDAT), contended the political parties had not given any definite or assertive position on the local
governments (PILDAT 2007, 9). The issue of local governments did feature in the parties’ position on the
political issues; however, the political parties remained evasive in their planning for the local
governments.
Nevertheless, it was the first time that the political parties deemed local governments to be the
issue that had to be seriously considered. According to the civil society actors such as the NGOs, the
political parties had shown respect for the issue of local government because the civil society had actively

312
supported the LGP devised by the military regimes, and the NGOs in the country had mobilized
Pakistan’s citizens to engage in the political process at local levels (Abid 2012; M. Z. Islam 2015). The
representatives of the NGOs interviewed during the course of this research argued it was the “active role
played by the NGOs that has raised the importance of the local government to be considered one of the
issues in the election campaigns of the political parties.”56 Another believed that the “political
mobilization at the local levels had made citizens aware of the importance of the local government, and
any retraction from the system would not have bode well for the electoral success of the political
parties.”57
The political parties made commitments to the continued support for local governments and made
several pledges in their party manifesto for the general elections held in February 2008. The political
pronouncements focused on the devolving authority to the local governments. The issues ranged from
giving local governments constitutional protection so as to make them accountable to their respective
assemblies (PML-N), to the declaration of a specified time frame for holding the local government
election (PPP), to the issue of making the provincial government devolve power to the local levels
(PML-Q), and to the issue of having local government elections on a party basis (PPP and PML-N).58
However, none of the political parties had taken an explicit position on the declaration of the
local governments as one of the statuary administrative tiers in the definition of the state in the 1973
Constitution of Pakistan. According to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan in its Article 7, “The State
means the Federal Government, [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)], a Provincial Government, a Provincial
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Assembly, and such local or other authorities in Pakistan as are by law empowered to impose any tax or
cess.59” The members of the NGOs interviewed in the course of this research have argued if, in the
definition of the state, the local governments are mentioned as one of the tiers of the administrative
structure, then the issue of reestablishing, reformulating, and reviving of local governments is addressed
constitutionally, which therefore makes it legally binding on political and bureaucratic elite to enact local
governments irrespective of military dictatorships.
By having local governments be constitutionally binding, the local governments become the
statuary political institution of the state. The statutory reaffirmation of local governments in the
Constitution in itself wields political pressure on political parties to seriously consider local governments
as political arenas. Only during the time of a military dictatorship do political parties mobilize themselves
around the issue of local governments. In times of military rule, political parties consider local
governments as encroachers of parties’ electoral constituencies, and thus to counter the encroachment,
political parties vigorously participate in local political processes. But when the same political parties
form elected government(s) at the provincial and federal levels, they ignore strengthening the parties’
mobilized local governments. It is my analysis that constitutional reaffirmation of local governments as
the third tier of governance would resolve the many tensions and conflicts.
This is the point I believe is the missing link that has never been addressed either by the military,
or the political and bureaucratic elite. It has only been recently that civil society actors have started to
raise the issue of local governments being recognized as the third tier in the Constitution. In my
interviews with the civil society activists, academics, workers of the NGOs, and even the political elite,
there seems to be recognition of the issue, but it has not been translated by the elected governments in
action.
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The following discussion on the promulgation of the 18th Amendment showcases how the issue
of local governments was sidelined in the deliberative process by the political elite as they overlooked the
policy pronouncements made on local governments in the CoD and election manifestos of their respective
political parties. Skeptics would argue that election manifestos are not sincere declarations of intent. My
counter argument to this objection is that although manifestos are rarely affirmed by political parties, the
fact is, as in the case of Pakistan most specifically, election manifestos declared by parties (opposition and
government) signify political parties’ position on governance policies, thus making each one of them
distinctive from the ruling military regime. All political parties, opposition and government alike, made a
commitment to their voters that local government would be protected under the elected government. But
in practice, the political parties were selective in actualizing their policy pronouncements.
Part IV: Elected Regime and Local Government after the 2008 Elections
The devolution plan that was devised in 2001 and amended in 2005 was in implementation from
2001 to 2009. When General Musharraf’s regime devised the LGP, it was given constitutional protection
until the year 2009. This provision stated that if provincial governments deemed changes necessary to the
LGP, only the president had the authority to ratify the changes proposed by the provincial governments.
As discussed in the previous section, when the provincial governments proposed amendments in
2005, President General Musharraf did approve them. During the research interviews, representatives of
the NGOs strongly expressed their belief that the amendments ratified by presidential approval were the
death knell to the lofty claims the military regime had made in the name of revolution by devolution.60
In 2008, when the general election was held and the newly elected governments had come to
power, the military rule of General Musharraf had already weakened because of internal conflicts and
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pressures between the institutions of state. The executive and the judiciary were in conflict on the issue of
extending the retirement period to General Musharraf for his military service. He was, after all, the
serving general in the military and chief of army staff and was the elected president of the country
through the presidential referendum held in April 2002.61
To extend his military service, President General Musharraf sought approval from the legislature
but was vetoed by the judiciary. The legislature was led by PML-Q, Musharraf’s favored political party.
If the judiciary had complied with the presidential instruction, President Musharraf could have easily
obtained his requested extension, but the judiciary under the Chief Justice Supreme Court Iftikhar
Muhammad Chaudhry refused.62 This confrontation led to the entire institution of the judiciary, supported
by the lawyers’ association and later joined by the civil society actors—print media, electronic media,
political parties, and human rights groups, to launch a movement to pressure General Musharraf to revisit
his decision of holding the two official positions (Ghias 2010; Ahmed and Stephan 2010; S. Ahmed
2015).
Therefore, under considerable internal and external pressure,63 General Musharraf completed his
military service in November 2007 and as a civilian retained the role of the president of the country. He
then announced general elections for 2008. In the general elections of February 2008, Musharraf’s
favored political party that was in power from 2002-2007 was faced with a resounding defeat.
The elected government led by the PPP and its coalition partners, the PML-N, the MQM, and
ANP, formed the government. The PPP was in coalition with the other parties to form governments in the
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provinces. In Punjab province, it was the PML-N; in Sindh, it was the coalition of PPP and MQM; in
KPK it was the ANP, and in Balochistan it was a coalition of Pukhtunkhwa National Awami Party
(PKNAP), the Balochistan National Party (BNP), and the Jamiat-e-ulama Islam (Fazalur Rehman) (JUIF). The PPP was able to have control of the central government; this therefore led to President
Musharraf’s resignation from the presidency in August 2008, though his term limit was also to expire in
the same year.
All these political parties in the coalition government, with the exception of MQM and JUI-F, had
been the signatories of the CoD, signed by the political parties who had been in opposition to Musharraf’s
regime. These parties that had signed the CoD, as well as those who had not, nevertheless stated their
positions on the local governments in their election manifestos. They had given assurances to their voters
and constituencies that they would continue with the local governments if they came to power.
Thus, keeping the pledges made by the political parties in the CoD, the government of the PPP
devised a Special Parliamentary Commission on Constitutional Reforms (SPCCR) in June 2009 to review
the changes required in the 1973 Constitution and to effect major policy changes to the presidential
decrees and legislation(s) that were promulgated under the military rule from 2002-2007.64 Under the
military regime, General Musharraf had effected change to the 1973 Constitution through the 17th
Amendment. Under this amendment, the presidential referendum devised in April 2002 was recognized as
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a constitutional necessity and had also given (back) power to the president to dissolve the national
government if the president deemed it necessary.65
The SPCCR was formed under the directive of President Asif Zardari66; the main objective of this
parliamentary committee was to suspend and revise amendments made to the 1973 Constitution of
Pakistan through the 17th Amendment under the military regime of General Musharraf and also to
introduce measures to the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan derived from the CoD in consultation with all the
political stakeholders, i.e., the ruling and oppositional political parties.
Political Parties in Government Following the 2008 Elections
The democratic government elected through the 2008 general elections, led by the political party
PPP in deliberation with other leading political parties—PML-N, PML-Q67; the regional parties ANP,
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MQM, Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP), National Party (NP), Pakistan Peoples Party
(Sherpao), Balochistan National Party (BNP), Pakistan Muslim League (Functional), Jamhoori Watan
Party (JWP); and religious parties JI and JUI-F—devised the 18th Amendment to the Constitution. The
18th Amendment changed more than 103 Articles of the 1973 Constitution and granted a significant level
of provincial autonomy that had been the matter of severe conflict with the central government in the past.
Seventeen ministries were devolved to the provincial governments, including education, social
welfare, special education, population welfare, labor and manpower, tourism, mining, local government,
and rural development. The devolution of these ministries to the provincial governments, therefore, meant
that each province would devise policies and institutional arrangements according to their respective
regional needs.
LGP under the 18th Amendment
In the previous chapter, I analyzed how the military governments have successively devised
devolution LGPs to weaken the political landscape by circumventing the provincial levels in order to gain
legitimacy for their military rule. The elected governments, on the other hand, have not only rebuked such
institutional arrangements but have also devised measures to weaken the LGP effected by the military
governments. In the following section, I will discuss how the newly elected government that came to
power in 2008 managed the issue of local governments.
The question What were the factors that made the elected government continue with the local
governments? is asked in this research. The hypothesis set in this research was: The civil society created
pressure on the elected government to continue the LGP. But as I have described in the above discussion,
the civil society was not seen to be actively engaged in working with the elected governments. The civil
society was active only during the period when the military elite planned for the LGP, because the
political parties were sidelined by the military’s established think tank, the NRB.
However, as soon as the political party (PML-Q) formed the elected government under the
military dictator’s rule, PML-Q and its allies amended the LGP. The oppositional political parties, along
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with the civil society organizations, raised their voices against the amendments made; however, none of
the actors, the political opposition or civil society, had any substantive effect on the elected government to
review the amendments. The following discussion explains that the political elite effected changes to and
decided on the fate of the LGP.
In 2008, when the PPP-led elected government had come in power and General Pervez Musharraf
abdicated the office of President, the LGP was dissolved. However, this dissolution did not mean an end
to the idea of devolution, as has been the practice in the past. The elected government in 2008 waited for
the constitutional protection granted to the LGP to expire. When General Musharraf’s regime introduced
and implemented the LGP, it provided constitutional protection to the LGP from 2001-2009. Hence, the
elected government coming to power in 2008 waited for this limit to expire in 2009. According to a
report, the political party PML-N had pressured the government of the PPP to suspend the local
governments before their term expiration,68 but because of the pressure by the other parties—PML-Q69
and the MQM,70 President Zardari had to wait for the constitutional protection provided to the local
governments to expire on December 31, 2009 (Abid 2012); also, pressures were created by the elected
district mayors all across the country, and they wrote a letter to President Zardari “cautioning him not to
abolish the local governments” (Abid 2012, 9).71
However, amidst voices in favor of local governments, the elected government led by the PPP
adopted an ambivalent approach toward local governments. To surpass critical pressures from the public
sphere, the elected government announced that local governments were under the purview of provincial
governments; the central government therefore cannot intervene in a provincial matter. If the central
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government encroaches upon a provincial matter, the ideal of provincial autonomy is compromised. The
coalition government led by the PPP therefore argued such an encroachment would be a breach of the
CoD.
According to this discourse espoused by PPP, the provincial governments, therefore, were
independent in either retaining or disposing of the locally elected governments, which were established
under the military rule of General Musharraf. Furthermore, since the locally elected governments were to
expire in 2009, the elections for local governments were expected to be held in the same year. The central
government, however, argued that the matter of local government was a provincial subject, and it was the
prerogative of the provinces to decide how they wanted to proceed with the imminent expiration of local
governments.
In the election manifestos prior to the general elections in 2008, all the political parties in the
government and the opposition made policy pronouncements on the continuation of local governments
should they gain political power in the election. But when these political parties were engaged in a
deliberative process on the 18th Amendment, only one regional political party, the Pashtoonkhwa Milli
Awami Party (PKMAP), asserted its official position for continuing local governments. Thus, the
PKMAP was the only political party that fulfilled its electoral commitment.
All other political parties—PPP, PML-N, MQM, PML-Q, and others—did not take any official
position on local governments, though prior to the 2008 elections, all had pledged to continue local
governments should they come to power. In their official position papers and dissenting notes, these
political parties did not mention local governments as an issue for the SPCCR to deliberate upon.
The elected government led by the PPP, in its decision-making process over the 18th
Amendment, overlooked the key elements of the three policy pronouncements made in the CoD. The
provision that local government elections should be held on a party basis (policy pronouncement 10), the
time frame for local government elections (policy pronouncement 29), and the provision to make the local
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governments autonomous (policy pronouncement 30) were not deliberated upon by the participant
members of SPCCR.
The SPCCR, led by the Senate Chairman Mian Raza Rabbani (belonging to the PPP), decided to
continue with the mere idea of local governments. However, the claims expressed by the political parties
in their manifestos and the policy positions signed in the CoD did not appear in the 18th Amendment. The
18th Amendment retained one of the clauses from the 17th Amendment pertaining to the local
government and added another to clause 140, thereby making it clause 140-A in the 1973 Constitution of
Pakistan:
(1) Each province shall, by law, establish a local government system and devolve political,
administrative and financial responsibility and authority to the elected representatives of the local
governments.
(2) Elections to the local governments shall be held by the Election Commission of Pakistan.
Instead, the SPCCR focused only on outlining the role of the Election Commission of Pakistan
(ECP) to regulate the local elections. The SPCCR granted the authority to the provincial governments to
legislate over local governments, thus obligating the provincial governments to decide, design, and
implement local governments in their respective provincial territories. Thus, the issues of whether local
government elections should be held on a party basis and the time frame for local government elections
were policy decisions reserved for each provincial government. The political parties within the SPCCR
had relieved the federal government of the right to interfere with local governments and thus clash with
provincial governments on such a policy. As a result, the provincial governments devised local
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government laws based on their respective requirements and never rushed to install local governments as
was done under the military government of General Musharraf.72
The participant political parties had not pursued their electoral pledges outlined in their election
manifestos. Furthermore, the political parties, it seems to me, behaved in a manner similar to their
historical attitude toward local governments. As explained in this chapter, political parties saw that the
local political elite were contenders of political power at the local levels, challenging the electoral
successes of the political parties in order to be elected to the provincial and federal legislatures. As I see
the situation, the political party structure in Pakistan is the crucial factor that explains why local
governments are ignored by the democratically elected government. The political parties, as one academic
asserted, “operate on parochial and familial lineages that favor dynastic politics while such primordial
thinking discredits the entry of outsiders.”73
In an interview, Chaudhry Pervez Elahi, one of the leading figures of PML-Q, declared, “We did
not want local governments to continue under the 18th Amendment, and our position is stated in the
dissenting note.”74 I believe his party’s discontent was because his political party, PML-Q, had faced
defeat in the general election. The party therefore ascertained that under the rival party’s provincial
government, PML-Q party workers would have no chance to win seats in the district councils. My view
on PML-Q’s displeasure is strengthened by the information I gathered from one other civil society actor.
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In an interview, Mr. Muddasir Rizvi, senior officer at Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN), a civil
society organization that monitors elections at all levels of government, argued that PML-Q was defeated
in general elections, and because “all newly elected chief ministers in the provinces did not belong to
PML-Q, the party leadership therefore lost interest in keeping the LGP.” 75
18th Amendment – Civil Society and State Communicative Interexchange
Why did the elected government continue with the local governments in 2010? was one of the
leading questions posed in this research. Did the civil society actors who had participated in the
consultative process for the design of the LGP under the military regime play any role in pursuing the
elected government? The answer is none.
As one member of the NRB argued, the political parties and the political elite decided to continue
with the “rhetoric of local government because they realized that the original LGP had become
innocuous.”76 During the course of data gathering, I was reminded by civil society activists that the
originality of LGP was compromised by the political elite, even under military rule. Dr. Ali Cheema, a
senior academic and policy advisor to the provincial governments under the military rule and democratic
government, asserted, “Amendments made to the LGP in 2005 initiated the collapse of the LGP, and with
the 18th Amendment, its annihilation was complete.”77 After the elections of 2002, when the elected
government came to power, the so-called favored political elite at the provincial and federal levels (from
PML-Q) gave veto powers to the chief ministers of the provincial governments at the expense of local
governments. The process, which was started by the military ruler, was met with great inhibitions by the
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political elite. Under military rule, the political elite could not eliminate the local government; they did,
however, manage to mitigate its autonomy.
And when the newly elected democratic government was formed with the return of oppositional
political parties, the PML-N and PPP, the political elite did not intend to continue with the vestige of
military rule. As a result, the newly elected government and its coalition partners never did engage with
civil society actors in the deliberative process of the 18th Amendment. The newly elected political elite,
amongst themselves, had decided what issues were to be contained, suspended, continued, added, and/or
amended in the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan.
There are reports on the decision-making process within the SPCCR and the civil society actors’
discussion on the elements of the devolution of the 17 ministries to the provinces by the federal
government.78 These reports, however, are mainly the records that highlight the process of deliberation
that had taken place between the political parties and those who were in government and in opposition.
The consultations were open to the political elite only; all other actors, such civil society actors, were
missing from the deliberations. These reports signified that the civil society had observed these political
consultations from afar, and as had happened under the military regime, as soon as the political
government was formed (in 2002 by PML-Q), the critical voices raised by civil society actors on
amending the LGP were ignored. The cycle of ignoring the civil society again had become prominent
with the return of democratic rule.
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The civil society organizations, as one representative from an NGO claimed, “have no
independent status vis-à-vis the state in Pakistan; the civil society in Pakistan is a fluid phenomenon for
the state in Pakistan. The military regimes, serviced through the NGOs under General Musharraf and
under the elected government [of 2008], have been reduced to mere spectators witnessing the political
changes effected by the elected government.”79 Another representative of the NGO shared the sentiment
and stated, “Now we have to make our presence known by voicing our concerns to the government. In the
time of military rule under General Pervez Musharraf, the avenue was easier to access, but now we have
to make efforts to remain an actor on the political landscape.”80
The field work for this research has shown that the elected government’s reason for continuing
the institution of local governments stems from its own internal motivation for maintaining control over
these governments. As discussed in the previous section, even when the pseudo-elected government was
in power under the military rule, substantive changes were made to the devolution plan devised as the
LGP. The provincial governments and the bureaucracy were challenged by the increased authority
devolved to the district governments and, therefore, the provincial governments viewed these district
(local) governments as a threat to their electoral success. Furthermore, since the local government
elections were held on a non-party basis, the political affiliation of the elected district mayors and their
deputies was also seen as threat by the political parties that controlled the provincial and federal
governments. The district mayors and the deputy mayors at the lower levels of the district governance
therefore became institutional irritants for the provincial governments and the political parties, especially
when these local elected officials had no party affiliation with the ruling party in the province. According
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to the evaluation report conducted by the joint commission of the WB, DFID, and ADB, elected local
governments were in conflict with the provincial governments over the control and devolution of
resources to the district government (World Bank 2004).
One of the observers of the LGP, Dr. Ali Cheema believes, “The elected governments, in fact, the
political elite are always threatened by the local governments; they do not see these local governments as
the means to reach out to the voters. For the political elite, local governments disturb the electoral
equilibrium”81 and thus in order to balance the “equilibrium, it was necessary that traditional political elite
retain the authority.” Another observer of Pakistan politics argued that there is another actor in the
equilibrium and that is the bureaucracy; “the bureaucracy continues to enjoy the octopus-like status, and
they advise the political elite that local conditions can turn against them if the empowerment to the
grassroots is effected.”82 As shown in this chapter, the bureaucratic elite challenged the military’s initial
design of the LGP, and as the political elite gained influence on the political landscape (at the provincial
and federal levels), the agenda of devolution set forth by the military dictatorship was prevented from
taking effect.
I believe the question Why was the military regime able to continue with the LGP? has few
plausible answers. First, it was the military elite’s continued desire and need to gain popular support at the
grassroots and not because the military had committed to devolution per se. Secondly, the military
endorsed the local governments because political parties have considered local governments a threat to
parties’ electoral success at local levels. Thus, by sidelining the political parties at local levels, the
military elite believed local non-partisan political elites, who would be loyal to the military regime, would
arise. These local elected political elite would realize that their significance on the political landscape was
due to the military’s designed devolution plan. Thirdly, by establishing local governments and granting
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them executive powers at the expense of provincial governments, the military elite believed that the
political control of the provinces not only would be loosened, but would impact the bureaucratic
administration at the local levels to become responsive to the locally elected elite.
As shown in the previous discussion, historically all political parties (in government and
opposition) have fundamentally believed that autonomous local governments are a challenge to the
provincial governments, the middle tier of governance. (The federal is the highest tier, provincial is the
middle tier, and district is the lowest.) By requiring districts to be dependent on the provinces, the
political governments attempt to control political activism at the district level. Provincial governments
maintain political power in the districts by blocking any new contenders of political power at the local
levels. Political parties believe that district constituencies should always remain subservient to the
provincial political governments. In my interviews with the civil society actors, all of them believe that
the democratically elected governments have never considered the local government as a necessary,
crucial political institution. The elected governments at the provincial and federal levels view local
governments as threats to their electoral significance in their constituencies. Likewise, military
governments have pursued local governments because democratic governments consider district
governments political adversaries.
I believe, of all the actors on the political landscape, it was only the civil society that emerged as
supporters of the LGP, though the civil society raised some very fundamental questions on the long-term
sustainability of the LGP.83 The civil society actors such as the NGOs saw in the LGP an opening up of
politics for people at the grassroots. With people elected to the local councils, having authority to resolve
local issues of concern, such as access to basic services, education, health, livelihood protection,
environment conservation, etc., was unprecedented in local governance.
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As explained in Part I of this chapter, traditionally the governance planning for districts was
undertaken by the district bureaucratic elites, while provincial governments released funds and grant
approvals for such planning. Hence, both the provincial governments and bureaucratic elite maintained
political and administrative control over the districts. This equation was upended when the military
dictatorship of General Musharraf was established. The launch of the LGP pushed back and dislodged
these two players—the provincial governments and bureaucratic elite. However, as the military elite
perpetuated its version of the hybrid regime that granted partisan political engagement under authoritarian
precepts, the collapse of the LGP was initiated. The military dictatorship that had announced its
devolution plan had to make adjustments with other actors—the civil services and political elite of
Pakistan. As the latter two weighed in, they asserted themselves by rolling back the LGP.
During the interviews, all the civil society activists expressed belief that the military
dictatorships’ claims of devolution of power to democratize the political system were mere rhetorical
declarations to gain popular approval. Because the military dictators also were wary of partisan political
activism, military governments revived the local governments only to prevent political parties from
directly engaging in political mobilization. By kindling the tensions and stoking the fear of local
governments, the military government created the political chaos on which it thrived.
According to a senior journalist and an expert on Pakistan politics, “The military has to have
these local governments at the grassroots levels so that they can claim they have the connection to the
people. The elected governments, on the other hand, argue, “We are the elected representatives; we
already have the connection to the people; we do not need this unwanted link.”84 The political elite, on the
contrary, believe the local governments have to work within the stated framework as devised by the
provincial governments. They argue, “Districts are the constituencies from within the provinces, and any

84

Mr. I. A. Rehman, the senior-most journalist and leading human rights activist in Pakistan. Interview with the
author in Lahore, August 2, 2017.

329
direct federal link to the district would mean that provinces are redundant and any such drastic measure
would mean political chaos in the country.”85
Based on my data collection and interactions with the civil society, I also now believe that since
local governments have increased the number of political contenders, this therefore is seen as a threat by
the political parties. During the deliberation on the 18th Amendment, the political parties remained
evasive on the fate of local governments; the political parties (in government and opposition), however,
retained the constitutional clause but did not exhibit any motivation to put the words into action.
In my interview with Dr. Nafisa Shah, a Member of National Assembly (MNA) belonging to the
PPP, I asked her why the SPCCR, led by the PPP, had not given instructions to the political government
to pursue local governments as had been done under the military government of General Musharraf. In
response she explained, “The political process is slow and it takes time for political actors to reach
consensual agreement. Military dictators have no such obligation to fulfill.” This left me with the counter
observation that, even with the experience of three military dictatorships, the political parties lack the
wisdom to consider local governments as a key component of a mature democracy. Dr. Shah, in response,
argued, “As I said, the political process is time-consuming. I strongly believe [political] parties showed
political astuteness in retaining the clause [140-A].”86
Based on my data collection and review of documentary evidence, I argue that political parties
who were members of the SPCCR had certainly retained the policy measure devised by the military ruler,
but, in essence, the political parties had given provincial governments executive control over local
governments. This policy measure had also been a bone of contention among the designers of the LGP,
the bureaucratic elite, and the political elite under the military-operated hybrid regime. The elected
government under General Musharraf (from 2002 to 2007) had exerted provincial pressure over district
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governments, but since the military ruler was at the helm of state affairs, the elected government could
not dissolve district governments. In 2008, with the return of a democratically elected government, direct
confrontation between the provincial and district governments surfaced. But because the local
governments had been given constitutional protection until 2009, the newly elected government endured
the local governments with a blatant disregard for people’s councils at the grassroots.
However, the political parties that were in opposition under the military dictatorship also had
come to recognize that by being participants in local politics, they had maintained their importance in the
eyes of their electorates. So, if political parties had devalued local governments, again, it would have only
downplayed their political relevance with the people. Hence, even before the local governments were
dissolved, some of the locally elected political elite relinquished local politics and competed for seats in
the provincial and national assemblies. One of the civil society reports reviewed for this research shows
that in the 2008 general elections, some 28 district mayors from the province of Punjab contested the
election for the national legislature, and 64 district mayors contested the provincial legislature election (Z.
Islam 2014, 80).
The issue of local governments came full circle in 2010 with the passage of the 18th Amendment.
The elected government and all the political parties that were part of the SPCCR decided to reserve the
issue of local government for the provincial governments to decide on the schedule of their establishment,
management, and operations. With the 18th Amendment, provinces were given the authority to reduce the
influence and federal control over the 17 ministries that were devolved to the provincial governments;
however, there was no such provision within the 18th Amendment that could have made it mandatory for
the provincial governments to devolve authority down to the district level.
There seemed to be no substantive change in terms of the status of the local governments
compared to other times when elected governments had been in power. Article 32 had been in the 1973
Constitution of Pakistan during the 1990s also, but it was invoked only under the military regime in the
1980s, and then the same was invoked in the 2000s. However, the application of institutional rule of local
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governments was not seen as a dominant issue that needed to be addressed when the elected governments
came to power, although the elected governments were always critiquing the military regimes when the
local governments were invoked under the military rule.
In my analysis of the enactment of local governments post Musharraf’s military government, I
argue that the elected governments formed in 2008 showed a consistent apprehension for local
governments. In my interviews with the civil society actors, including academics, staff of nongovernment organizations, and the bureaucratic and political elite, the respondents contended that the
democratically elected government did not invite, engage, and deliberate on the matter of local
government with civil society. As one respondent asserted, “The military government of Musharraf relied
on civil society because there was a vacuum on the political landscape, since major political parties were
severally restricted to partake in planning for a governance system.”87 The elected government in 2008
tolerated the local governments until July 2009, and later it gave authority to the provincial governments
to decide the fate of local governments that had been established under the rule of General Musharraf.
Furthermore, the elected government of 2008, within few months (in April 2009), had assigned
the SPCCR to devise the 18th Amendment. Thus, by April 20, 2010, the 18th Amendment had been
promulgated, granting authority to the provincial governments to devise a local government plan based on
provincial needs. Hence, the period from the expiration of local governments in 2009 to the promulgation
of the 18th Amendment was short; moreover, this did not demonstrate that the elected government was
averse to devolution per se. Rather, the central government led by the PPP and its coalition partners
asserted that local government is a subject under the provincial governments; thus, provincial
governments would decide the devolution of power from provincial governments to local governments. A
question on the future of local governments—whether local government elections should be party-based
or not—was an issue to be considered by the provincial governments.
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Though the coalition government led by the PPP in 2008 in designing the 18th Amendment
agreed to grant local governments recognition in the Constitution, the 18th Amendment had not outlined
the election timeframe for provincial governments to establish local governments. Thus, policy
pronouncement 29 of the CoD was refuted. In other words, the central government argued that, for
reasons of provincial autonomy, the subject of local governments could not be encroached upon by the
central government.
In its terms of reference, the SPCCR stated the objective that its purpose was to “propose
amendments to the Constitution, keeping in view the 17th Amendment, Charter of Democracy (CoD), and
provincial autonomy” (Special Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms 2010, 5). Nine
criteria were identified by the SPCCR, of which three pertained to provincial autonomy, good
governance, and strengthening of institutions. The issue of local governments was considered a subject of
provincial autonomy for ensuring good governance and strengthening institutions. The SPCCR thus
granted governance to local governments, under the purview of provincial governments. SPCCR invited
suggestions and recommendations from the general public for repealing the 17th Amendment, from July
29 to August 10, 2009. Also, the SPCCR claimed that it “decided to invite suggestions/proposals and
amendments from the public at large through the press with a cut-off date of 1st of August, 2009, which
was subsequently extended by the Committee [SPCCR] to 10th August, 2009. The Committee received a
total number of 982 recommendations/proposals and amendments through this process” (Special
Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms 2010, 6). However, there is no official
documentation of what these 982 recommendations were.
I analyzed the period from June 29, 2009 to August 2009 and show that, though there had been a
voice raised by civil society actors in support of local governments, there was no concerted effort by the
civil society to directly engage with the state. The voices in favor of local governments were marginal,
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and the outcome of civil society’s mobilization for local government was ineffective.88 Petitions were
made in favor of local governments, but the elected government at the federal and provincial levels
persisted in downplaying the pressure emanating from the public sphere. Therefore, I believe the civil
society remained marginal in creating pressure on the elected government to pursue the local
governments, which had been established in 2005 under the rule of General Musharraf.89
In my analyses of newspaper reports I found that the elected government of the PPP asserted that
local governments established under General Musharraf were “illegal and unconstitutional”90 and that the
provincial governments would decide the fate of local governments.91 The provincial governments instead
made the local governments redundant by curtailing their administrative powers and driving them under
bureaucratic controls that had been removed during the military rule of General Musharraf. In the
populous province of Punjab, the provincial government led by PML-N, despite criticism from political
and civil society,92 appointed bureaucrats to oversee the local government, thus sidelining locally elected
officials.93
The claim with which I embarked on the research journey was: State and civil society
communicative interexchange led to the democratically elected government to retain the constitutional
clause on devolution. However, as the research progressed, and in analyzing the evidence gathered
through documentary analysis and interviews with academics, civil society activists, politicians, and civil
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servants, it became increasingly evident that civil society had a minimal role in exerting pressure on the
elected government to retain the clause; rather, it resulted from the sole decision making of the political
and civil service elite.94
In my evaluation of the case of devolution planning in Pakistan and, in particular, the postMusharraf era, I had assumed that civil society had played an integral role in creating public discourse on
the continuation of devolution and, in this regard, the enduring effect of the LGP. But the astounding fact
is that the role of civil society in the case of local governments was minimal in 2008 and beyond. The
civil society was not formally engaged by the democratic government to participate in deliberation
processes for the continuation and strengthening of local governments in the 18th Amendment. Street
protests were mobilized by the local elected political elite,95 but the central and provincial governments
prevailed, deciding the fate of local governments.96
Though there had been informal communicative engagement between the representatives of the
NGOs and the political elite, there is no official record of such meetings; even the SPCCR, in its official
report on the 18th Amendment, does not make any reference to such informal engagements. I, therefore,
cannot speculate on such an informal communicative engagement between the political elite and civil
society actors.97 Therefore, based on interviews with civil society actors, I strongly believe that the
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retention of public discourse on devolution by elected governments is an outcome of a changed political
and social landscape of the country. The political society (elite and parties) had learned that steps must be
taken in order to recognize local governments so that they must never be utilized by any future military
leadership to garner public support. In this regard, the political society did take a substantive step to grant
authority to the provincial governments to decide the issue of local government; by doing so, the political
society diluted the role of the federal government over the matter of local government.
Concluding Remarks
The story of devolution of power to the grassroots in Pakistan is a complex one. It merited a
narrative that locates the problem in a wider evolving political context, with special focus on the recently
developed local government plan devised by the military regime.
Devolution plans implemented by the state in Pakistan illustrate a case where institutional design
devised to regulate society was deliberated amongst a certain segment of the elite—the military elite. The
design of decision making devised by the military elite was not inclusive, as the process adopted by them
not only superseded the democratic system, but also excluded the inhibitions of political society and
critical voices of civil society actors. Not only was legitimacy of institutional measures dubious because it
ignored elected democratic institutions (such as political parties), but it also precluded debate and critical
examination by civil society. The civil society and state communicative interexchange remains sporadic.
The state under the elected governments always has exhibited the tendency to centralize the state
governing apparatus with tight controls on the civil society. Elected governments determine that the
legitimacy to rule manifests only through their electoral successes, while state and civil society
communicative engagement to develop and/or innovate political institutions of state is secondary to the
democratic rule.
On the other hand, the military rule demonstrates that a perpetual hybrid regime is a perfect
excuse for the creation of controlled political space in which the military drives the political landscape.
Hence, in an attempt to legitimize their military rule, the military governments manipulate the political
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institutions and grant minimal access to the civil society to engage with the state in the public sphere. The
objective of both elected and military governments is the same: control the political landscape through
whatever institutional manipulation is possible.
In this chapter, I have discussed and analyzed how the plan for local governments devised by the
military regime of General Pervez Musharraf utilized the local governments to serve the purpose of
electing General Musharraf as president of the country. Early in the chapter I discussed the reason why
the military regime had taken on the task to reform the governance structure in Pakistan. But as the
discussion progressed, the role of other key players, such the civil bureaucratic apparatus and the political
elite, came to the fore. These were the actors who negotiated with the military regime on the design of the
LGP. As it became evident to the bureaucracy and political elite that the local governments were
established to serve the military general, enabling him to be elected president for a 5-year term, the
bargaining process accelerated the gradual demise of the LGP.
The elected governments that came to power in 2008 and later in 2013 continued their
recalcitrance for revitalizing local governments. Local governments, in the eyes and minds of the elected
political elite, are an administrative issue for the provincial governments and, therefore, federal
government should not intervene in the provincial matters of governance unless asked for policy advice.
But as I have explained, political parties believe that local governments at the grassroots levels
challenge their electoral success and their authority; hence, they prefer that these local bodies remain
inactive, or when activated, continue without any authority. The military regime, on the other hand, sees
these local governments as an extension of their influence to bypass the traditional political structure
valued by the political parties. Within this cartography of the key actors on the political landscape of
Pakistan, the bureaucratic elite are crucial. They also have an interest in guarding their position within the
existing power framework, and since the LGP had systematically reduced the civil bureaucracy’s
traditional influence in society, they were therefore severe critics of the plan. With the return of the
democratically elected government in 2008, the bureaucratic elite gained back the prestige they had lost,
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while the local governments that had been established because of the LGP’s implementation were
systematically made redundant.
On the other hand, the civil society actors within this framework observed the changes made to
the local governments as mere spectators of the political bargains between the different institutions of the
state: the executive versus the administrative bureaucracy; the executive versus the legislative branch;
and the executive versus the judicial branch. Civil society actors such the NGOs and the media did not
shy away from highlighting the deficits in the pledges made by the military regime and the political elite.
The work they did, however, made no substantive difference to the policy design and its implementation
of the state. In Pakistan, the civil society and state communicative interexchange in the design of the rules
that enable the state to regulate society is contingent upon the state’s (military and political governments)
willingness to adhere to the principle of inclusiveness in democratic politics.
My initial research question placed greater significance on the role of civil society in informing
the state on the design of institution through which the state regulates state and society relations. But as I
delved into the case of Pakistan, I encountered serious structural issues that pushed me in the direction of
first identifying and understanding the role of key actors in Pakistan. These actors include not only
partisan political players but also the state actors, such as the military and bureaucracy.
The role of civil society is marked by the state’s temporary inclination to bring civil society’s
voices to policy-making debates. However, the state in Pakistan has been obstinate in bringing civil
society’s perspectives into institutional design. Traditionally, the actors having a strong presence and
influence on the institutional design have been political parties and the political, bureaucratic, and military
elite. Of all these actors, the military has had the greatest influence in transforming the political
institutions to serve their interest in controlling administrative, legislative, and executive power. The role
of civil society as an actor in informing the design of political institutions remains an improbable
idealistic construct.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
“The New Constitution”
In a short story by Saadat Hassan Manto,1 “The New Law,” the main character, Ustad Mangu,
believed that the “New Law” promulgated by the British gave extraordinary powers to the Indians to
question their British rulers if they mistreated them. “The New Law” refers to the Government of India
Act of 1935 that supposedly gave considerable autonomy to the colonialists to decide on matters of
governance.2 In his newfound excitement with the New Law, Ustad Mangu decided that the time had
come to confront the British Raj.
The following short excerpt from the story emphasizes that Ustad Mangu’s excitement and
confidence with the New Law was unfounded; the change to an institutional structure did not transform
the mindset of the colonial British. The custodians of the British Raj, the English colonials also known as
the gora3 in Manto’s story, reprimanded Ustad Mangu and reminded him that it was the gora who ruled
over society, and that any change in the law that supposedly empowered people like Ustad Mangu was a
figment of his imagination. Manto’s story lays out the confrontation between the protagonist Ustad
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Mangu and his gora nemesis. The police personnel (enforcers of the colonial law) also facilitate the
gora’s forcing Ustad Mangu into submission.
With his swagger stick, he [gora] motioned Ustad Mangu to get down. The polished cane
touched Ustad Mangu’s thigh two or three times. Ustad Mangu, standing up, looked down at the
short-statured gora as if the sheer weight of a single glance would grind him down. Then his fist
rose like an arrow leaving a bow and landed heavily on the goras’s chin. He pushed the man
aside, got down from his tonga and began to hit him all over his body.
The astonished gora made several efforts to save himself from the heavy blows raining down
on him, but when he notices that his assailant was in a rage bordering on madness and flames
were shooting forth from his eyes, he began to scream. He was thrashing the gora to his heart’s
content while shouting, “The same cockiness even on 1 April! Well, sonny boy, it is our Raj
now.”
A crowd gathered. Two policemen appeared from somewhere and with great difficulty
managed to rescue the Englishman. There stood Ustad Mangu, one policeman to his left and one
to his right, his broad chest heaving because he was breathless. Foaming at the mouth, with his
smiling eyes he was looking at the astonished crowd and saying in a breathless voice, “Those
days are gone, friends, when they ruled the roost. There is a new constitution now, fellows, a new
constitution.”
The poor gora, with his disfigured face, was looking foolishly, sometimes at Ustad Mangu,
other times at the crowd.
Ustad Mangu was taken by police constables to the station.

All along the way, and even inside the station, he kept screaming, “New constitution, new
constitution!” but nobody paid any attention to him.
“New constitution, new constitution! What rubbish are you talking? It’s the same old
constitution.”
And he was locked up. (201-02)4
My objective in citing Manto’s story is to show that there are striking parallels between what is
illustrated in the story and in contemporary politics of Pakistan. In my view, the citizenry and the civil
society are the Ustad Mangus of the contemporary period, while the gora and two sentries are the
military, political society, and bureaucracy, respectively. Moreover, the literal translation of the name of
the protagonist is a critical observation by Manto. Because the word Ustad in the Urdu language is an
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adjective and a title, its literal translation in English is a mentor or teacher.5 Mangu is the shorter version
of a proper noun; it even can be described as a term of endearment; Mangu, however, cannot be a proper
noun. The etymology of Mangu is derived from the Urdu word Manng, which literally translates as
“demand.” I am assuming that Manto imagined Ustad Mangu to be the people that the British Raj had
colonized; yet Manto also does acknowledge, through the symbolism of the Urdu language, that the
people demanded political empowerment from the colonial state. In my opinion the story’s symbolism
echoes the tumultuous political course of Pakistan.
Through this writing, I encountered numerous difficulties in understanding the Pakistani state,
which consistently defies being pinned down, as it forever fluctuates between moments of order and
disorder, equilibrium and disequilibrium. Through a writing strategy that is as fluid as the state itself, I
investigate the actors that have come to define the governing structure of the state. I cannot claim that I
have been able to pin down the state, but what I have been able to do in this research is to show that the
complexity of the regime type undermines the proposition of communicative interexchange between the
state and the society.
In the beginning, while searching for evidence of the communicative interexchange between the
state and the civil society, I believed that the devolution planning undertaken during the military rule of
General Musharraf had paved the way for civil society to engage with the state. I had assumed that the
military rule had created an enabling environment for the political and civil society to engage with the
military elite in the designing of institutions.
My singular focus was on finding evidence of communicative interexchange. As a consequence, I
overlooked the fact that the case I was studying was not a democratic regime, but rather a regime type that
is neither democratic nor authoritarian. Thus, I have found that my hypothesis—state and civil society
communicative interexchange is imperative for the sustainability of the laws devised by state—is refuted.
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The study of regime type thus became the central focus of my study in order to understand the
communicative interexchange between state and civil society.
I therefore had to first reorient myself with the reality of the regime type in Pakistan, focusing on
the intervention of the military in politics. Secondly, I had to investigate political society and, within it,
the political parties and role of the political elite in particular. Thirdly, the role of civil society was studied
in contrast to the role of political society. Hence, the actors investigated in this research were the militarybureaucratic elite, the political elite, and the civil society actors, such as the print media and
nongovernmental organizations.
I began this research with the claim that the state-civil society communicative interexchange
enables the state to devise the laws through which it regulates the society. Furthermore, I had argued that
the laws are sustainable only when the laws devised are the result of public deliberation in the public
sphere between the state and the civil society. But as I ventured further into the research, it became
evident to me that, in a regime that is not democratic, the laws are not the consequence of state-civil
society engagement. Instead, the laws are devised by the ruling elite (which included, in the case of
Pakistan, the military, political, and bureaucratic elite) to strengthen their control over the political
landscape in order to sustain their rule.
I, as a researcher and a citizen of Pakistan, witnessed through the course of this dissertation
research that there is deep entrenchment of authoritarianism rooted in Pakistan’s political landscape.
Authoritarianism has always been a constant feature of nominally democratic institutions established by
the ruling elite. For example, though democratic institutions such as frequently held elections and the
pliant elected legislature were considered the epitome of democracy, measures to strengthen state and
society engagement were always ignored by the ruling elite. In essence, the ruling elite conserved the
authoritarianism of the state. The result was that political rule oscillated between periods of rule under
elected leadership and military-bureaucratic oligarchy.
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The political rule that oscillated between elected governments and the military’s authoritarian rule
constrained democratic institutions but did not strengthen them. Undoubtedly, political institutions did
operate, but under severe restrictions, as in the advent of political competition during elections and the
mobilization of political parties, and when permission was granted by the state to civil society actors such
as the print media to experience press freedom; in a similar manner, the state also allowed nongovernment
organizations to assist and augment state-devised development programs for the citizenry.
The measures adopted by the ruling elite, however, masked the deep-rooted authoritarianism. The
political institutions were indeed enacted, and the political rights and civil liberties were certainly granted,
but under constraints. However, the institutions were manipulated to make authoritarianism permanent,
thus disabling democracy from being established as a secured political system. I have now come to realize
that the military rulers, the bureaucratic elite, and the elected leaders have been engaged in establishing a
seemingly perpetual hybrid regime.
The political institutions devised under the various military rulers and elected leaders rarely
empowered the ordinary citizen. The citizenry did indeed experience the rule of military dictator(s) and
elected leader(s), but the experience was lacking in democratic empowerment. There were momentary
upsurges of activism—e.g., the coming together of political parties in 2006, and the signing of the Charter
of Democracy (CoD) and lawyers’ movement of 2007, but such activism lacked the vigor to dislodge the
base of the hybrid political regime. My argument is that the institutional measures undertaken by the
authoritarian regime morphed into a perpetual hybrid regime, thus having minimal effect on the political
landscape. Under the institutional rules of the authoritarian regime, there were a few episodes of
momentary activism—and the same was witnessed under the hybrid regime—but such momentary
activism was episodic.
My research delved into a particular policy designed by military rulers through which they
strengthened their rule over society: devolution plans. The military elite successively initiated three
distinctive versions of devolution. Since these plans were designed and implemented by the military
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regimes, they therefore lacked electoral legitimacy and accountability. I realized, much like the character
of Ustad Mangu, I had wrongly imagined that the laws devised by the state of Pakistan were for the
empowerment of the citizenry.
During the course of this research, I was reminded by academics, activists from NGOs, political
elites, and members of the state’s bureaucracy that devolution planning initiated by the state has been
devoid of state and civil society communicative engagement. It seems the Ustad Mangu (the citizen) in
me was oblivious to the fact that institutions of the state are devised by the ruling elite to enable the rulers
to have control of the citizenry, rather than to empower them to hold the rulers accountable. Moreover, I
had seemed to ignore the fact that when the base of a political system is founded on solidly persistent
authoritarian grounds, the institutional design on the surface remains precarious.
In my interviews, I was told to reacquaint myself with the empirical reality that is Pakistan’s
unfortunate history of political institutions. The historical account of formal institutional design,
investigated in chapters 3 and 4, showcases the country’s repeated swings from civilian to military rule.
During these repeated transitions, there were infrequent episodes of state engagement with society over
design of institutions, but such engagement was the prerogative of the state. It was the state that would, if
it desired, engage with society. It seems to me that, for the ruling elite, society is a mere mass to rule over
and not an entity to dialogue with. The ruling elite of the state, the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and the
elected rulers, rarely respected communicative engagement with society.
Moreover, in these transitional swings, a predictable governance pattern emerges: the army takes
over every decade or so, welcomed by Pakistan’s fractious civil society and political parties because of
the underperformance of civilian governments. The military elite rule over the society for a decade.
However, political society eventually becomes tired of military rule and joins forces with the civil society
to temporarily push for the restoration of civilian rule. While the transition happens, the new civilian
government starts to aggrandize its personal rule.
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The political leadership detaches itself from the manipulated political institutions that were
enacted by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. But the political elite lack the astuteness to devise
institutional measures that will strengthen political institutions. There is this lack of intuitive sharpness on
the part of political society to forge democratic alliances for the benefit of the polity. Furthermore, elected
leadership starts to distance itself from civil society while undercutting the political institutions. The
result, therefore, is perpetual adulation for the past military rules. Hence, the authoritarian principles
enacted by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy find perpetual resonance, even in electoral democracy. The
elected leadership, in its complacency, perpetuates the hybrid regime, and this then leads to society’s
disenchantment with the civilian government.
The military intervenes and is welcomed by society, thus relegating the political society to the
sidelines once again. Once it takes over, the military devises institutional measures to revitalize its direct
control of the political and societal landscape. Since the military-bureaucratic oligarchy has a need for
politicians, the military regime with the subservient bureaucracy coalesce the factitious political society
into submission. The political elite does not resist the military’s encroachment; the selectorate, whom I
define as the willing subset of political elite, become the collaborators by allowing themselves to be coopted by the dominant military. The selectorate are therefore elected to the legislative assemblies
(national, provincial, district) to give a perception of representative governance and to support the
constitutional changes made by the military regime.
Argument in This Dissertation
At the beginning of this dissertation, my argument was that state and civil society communicative
interexchange enables the state to devise institutional measures through which it can regulate society. But
in the course of the field research for this study, I came to realize, through the evidence collected from
interviews and research material, that civil society in Pakistan has been a convenient tool for the
authoritarian state to achieve its policy objectives. Furthermore, the research material I collected from
various sources in the print media, scholarship on Pakistan, and the military’s publications highlights the
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fact that the political society did make itself available to serve the military in their efforts to usurp
political power.
My attention to the theoretical focus on state and civil society was soon eclipsed by the reality of
political experience of the regime type. I soon realized that, for the theory of deliberative democracy, the
regime type is not the primary issue of concern. Deliberative democrats assert that the ruling elite in any
regime type—authoritarian or democratic—can devise micro-initiatives between the state and the
citizenry to plan for policies that engage the state with the wider public. The works by deliberative
democrats Goodin and Dryzek (2006), Dryzek (2009), Dryzek and Niemeyer (2012), Fung and Wright
(2003), Fung (2006), Parkinson (2007), Warren (2009), and Mackenzie and Warren (2013) were
persuasive texts that argued for making deliberative democracy a reality in the contemporary world.
Works by Dryzek (2009) and Dryzek and Niemeyer (2012) argued that even authoritarian regimes such as
China have brought state policies closer to society by engaging in communicative interchange with the
citizenry.
Hence, these deliberative democrats, Dryzek (2009) and Dryzek and Niemeyer (2012), argued
that the theory of deliberative democracy transcends the challenge of regime type. However, I do not
believe that such micro-engagements between an authoritarian state and the citizenry can have a lasting
effect on democratizing the authoritarian political regime. My research in Pakistan’s devolution planning
shows that an authoritarian state might engage with civil society to help the citizenry feel empowered,
but, in essence, such measures by the authoritarian state are just other means to strengthen its outreach in
the society. Dryzek; Dryzek and Niemeyer do not investigate the authoritarian state’s engagement with
the citizenry as a result of the voices coming from the society, but rather they focus on the authoritarian
state’s own desire to engage with the citizenry.
The prerogative of the state to engage with society does not translate into democratizing the
authoritarian state; rather, it indicates that authoritarian states are ever willing to manipulate institutions to
perpetuate authoritarianism. Furthermore, the studies by Dryzek (2009) and Dryzek and Niemeyer (2012)
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do not tell us what becomes of the voices that oppose the authoritarian state. Are these voices heard or
ignored? It seems to me that these studies assume that since the authoritarian state is open to engagement
with society, it therefore signals the march of the authoritarian state toward democratization.
However, in my analysis of the case of Pakistan, I show that in a state where political institutions
are manipulated by the ruling elite, the resultant laws are never sustainable. The ruling elite, in giving a
semblance of communicative engagement with society, manipulate political institutions to further
entrench authoritarianism. There is no substantive advance toward democratization; instead, the citizenry
is deceived by the ruling elite. In other words, authoritarianism persists and communicative engagement
withers away.
As I researched planning for devolution to look for an answer as to how state and civil society
communicative interexchange enables the state to devise sustainable institutional measures, I endeavored
to evaluate the case of devolution planning in Pakistan through the engagement of the state with civil
society.
This dissertation looked into the three distinctive military dictatorships. It highlights that, under
dictatorial rule, the regime incumbents established a system of governance that thrived on institutional
manipulation that has had a lasting effect on the resulting elected regimes. The political parties belonging
to the political society, the print media, and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) representing the
civil society were affected by the military’s intervention and institutional manipulation. The elected
governments often did not challenge but rather cooperated with the military and bureaucratic complex;
thus, as a result, elected governments could never break away from the authoritarian legacy.
Scholars have argued that autocrats institutionalize their rule to sustain their political survival
(Geddes 1999, 2005; Gandhi 2008). Their political survival is enhanced by the benefits that carefully
managed elections and legislatures may be able to provide (Gandhi 2008; Lust 2009). Hence, the adoption
of nominally democratic institutions is the rational choice made by self–interested dictators seeking to coopt challengers and counterbalance the power of political and civil society actors. In order to maintain,
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strengthen, and secure political survival, regime incumbents exploit political parties and legislatures for
their added efficiencies in the distribution of patronage to regime sympathizers.
In his discussion on the “institutional creature(s)” that are devised by the autocrats, Schedler
(2010) contended that the institutions of local governments are also manipulated by authoritarian rulers to
create pliable political support for the autocrat. Decentralization, therefore, is such an institutional
creature, where dictators share power with local elites in the interest of efficient and effective governance,
which arguably benefits their political survival. Thus, dictators share power with local elites in exchange
for their political support.
The local elites possess in-depth knowledge, maintain personal connections, and even bear moral
legitimacy at local levels to stabilize social orders. The local elites are identified as those local people
who (1) have the background of strong familial influence in the region, (2) are local bureaucrats, and/or
(3) are the local faction leaders. To qualify as local elites, they have to maintain a strong bond with local
people. In other words, a sufficiently long period of stay in the region is required. The longer local elites
stay in sub-national levels, the more likely they are to accumulate information about local governance and
build up relationships with local people. The presence of this local-level elite thus provides an interface
with the dictator (Schedler 2010).
I have argued that in Pakistan the military dictators have a time-tested policy tool of
decentralizing and devolving power to the grassroots, a tool that permits them to concede only a small
portion of decision-making authority to the lower levels of the state’s hierarchy. With the installing of the
local governments, the military dictators were able to reach out to the citizenry. However, this reaching
out of the military regime to the public was further strengthened by the pliable local political elite that
provided to the military regime the access to the society. But these measures were preemptive. Schedler
(2010) argued that in hybrid regimes, such measures are enacted only to counter “local challenges”; thus,
by revising the local government, central authorities “minimize the odds that [they] will lose control over
local elites” (75).
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The military’s intervening in local politics gave an impression to the civil society that its plans for
devolution were designed to grant more space to the citizens in the local politics and development. The
claim made by the military was that by empowering citizens to effect change in their communities, the
citizens can make local elites accountable. But in reality, these plans devised by the dictators strengthened
their rule, even though the regime insisted that these measures were meant to empower the citizenry.
I realized that the military government(s) utilized devolution to enhance their legitimacy; they
were keen on devolution in the name of “real” democracy when, in reality, all other formal political
institutions are abrogated. However, in this moment of realization, I was faced with the question as to
why civilian government(s) never exhibited any serious resistance to such a policy of devolution—aside
from the discontinuation of such plans when in power. On the surface, it is self-explanatory that civilian
governments reject the military rulers’ claims to legitimize their rule through the structural façade of
devolution. But why would civilian governments themselves not have sought democratic penetration in
the society by similar means? In other words, during the military rule, the state’s push for empowering
local government is very visible, but during democratically elected civilian rule, the local governments
are stagnant.
The answer, I believe, lies in ruling elites’ reluctance to effect a democratic design of political
institutions. The ruling elite, comprised of the bureaucratic, political, and military, successively devised
institutions by reducing the burgeoning civil society to a mere service tool to be invoked as and when the
state requires. The nascent civil society witnessed the designing of political institutions as bystanders,
mere conduits of the state’s unilateral institutional designs.
Pakistan’s Experience of Devolution Planning
I had assumed that there was communicative interexchange between the state and the civil society
when the devolution plans were devised by the state. But as I progressed into the research, my hypothesis
that state and civil society communicative interexchange informs the laws of state encountered the
challenge of the political regime type in Pakistan. I then had to explain what role does the political regime
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type play in the design of political institutions? Without first understanding the political regime type, and
identifying the actors of the political regime and their role in structuring the political institutions, my
inquiry into the communicative interexchange between the state and civil society would have been
incomplete.
This dissertation has made an effort to investigate, evaluate, and understand the following:


Why did military dictatorships engage in redesigning local government institutions?



What has been the role of communicative interexchange between the state and civil society in
designing state institutions?



In designing institutions, what actors from the political and civil society were coerced, coopted, and manipulated by the military dictatorships?



What lasting effect did the military’s devised institutions have on the political landscape?



What explains the continued endurance of devolution planning in Pakistan’s hybrid regime?

One answer, I believe, lies in the hybridity of the political regime: in Pakistan there is a continual
tussle for control of political power by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and political parties. Another
answer is the ineffectiveness of the civil society to encourage critical resistance against the joint forces of
the military-bureaucratic oligarchy and political parties. These two groups of ruling elites have devised
the laws of the state, thus enabling the state to regulate society.
Amongst the ruling elites, the military-bureaucracy oligarchy was dominant; by drawing on the
inability of the political elite to design effective political institutions, the military encroached upon the
political landscape. The result was the emergence of a political regime which was hybrid regime in which
institutions devised by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy remained in effect. The political elite not only
provided political legitimacy to the dominant military and bureaucratic elites to rule over the political
landscape, but they were willing contributors to the military and bureaucratic oligarchy.
The military dictatorships have shown ambivalent regard for the democratic institutions to benefit
their military rule. At the same time, the elected governments never did strengthen the democratic
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institutions to challenge the military’s intervention in the political landscape. The extent of
authoritarianism, as I have shown in this dissertation, is exhibited by the military and political elite in
their opportunistic use of democratic principles.
To say that the military, bureaucracy, and political parties are embroiled in a continual tug of war
to craft permanent shares of political power in the Pakistani hybrid regime ignores the work of civil
society. However, there is no denying that the role of civil society in hybrid regimes is often curtailed by
the rulers, curbing citizens’ political and civil freedoms. Undoubtedly, as is shown in this dissertation,
civil society actors such as the print media and nongovernmental organizations have all been greatly
coerced and influenced by the ruling elite to amplify the state’s narrative. The ruling elite, including the
military and political leadership, enacted institutional measures such as the devolution plans to
successively influence the civil society. But the civil society did show some resistance in challenging the
dictatorial measures (e.g., the lawyers’ movement of 2007 against General Musharraf); however, as I have
been arguing, such incidents were momentary and episodic. The fact is, the civil society served the
governing interest of the military-bureaucratic oligarchy. For example, as shown in this dissertation, by
designing the devolution governance laws, the military elite not only co-opted the political society but
also paved the way for the civil society to engage with the citizenry at the grassroots.
This institutional measure enabled the military’s enacted hybrid regime to devolve its control
over political power beyond the hold of the traditional macro-institutions of representative democracy,
such as the legislature and the executive. The nodes of political decision making are expanded to include
not only the traditional institutions of the federal state, but also those institutions at the lowest rung of the
governance chain. These institutions include the district governments, the focus of the institutional design
of devolution of power. The military governments were legitimized by the establishment of the district
governments and the farcical claims to empowerment of the masses. The bureaucracy strengthened its
control over the local administrative governance units by virtue of its specialized knowledge of rules of
governance. The selectorate, on the other hand, benefitted from their willing partnership with the military-
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bureaucratic oligarchy to secure their political careers and strengthen their control over their electoral
constituencies. This engagement between the military, bureaucracy, and political elite has led to the
design of institutional rules favoring traditional institutions of power over any innovative measures that
genuinely devolved political power to local or grassroots levels.
Ultimately, the military, bureaucracy, and political elite successively undermined the autonomy
of the district governments. In chapter 5, I showed that the way the elected government, led by PML-Q
under the regime of General Musharraf, made amendments to the LGP fundamentally redefined the
dynamic and the revolutionary elements of the LGP. Instead of expanding the political participation of
citizens in the local district governments, the military and selectorate successfully used these reforms to
encroach upon the local political landscape.
Military Regimes and Devolution Planning
The Pakistani military dictators (Generals Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, Pervez Musharraf) all effected
military coups, held presidential referenda to substantively change the parliamentary form of government,
influenced the judiciary to get legal concession for the military rule, and formed a particular group of their
advocates among the political elite. Of all of these measures, the revival of local governments has been
the most persistent and consistent strategy employed by military juntas to legitimize their removal of
elected governments.
Their authoritarian style of governance permeated the society not only by the force of coercive
apparatus (in the Weberian sense) but also through the hegemonic influence of discursive engagement (in
the Gramscian sense). In the initiation of discourses, the coercive apparatus of the state generated such
discourse in the public sphere that overpowered any counter-hegemonic narratives in the society. For
example, military-generated terms such as “true democracy,” “guided democracy,” and “grassroots
democracy” found a permanent place in the public’s imagination when military dictatorships took control
of the political landscape.
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Scholars argue that under authoritarian rule, such measures for generating a pro-regime discourse
are a prerequisite for the regime’s survival: “[A]uthoritarian states expend considerable resources to
maintain hegemonic discourse that both legitimizes the existing regime and also renders political
alternatives politically and discursively impossible. Maintaining these legitimacy discourses involves . . .
consistent policing of actors—including civil society—who may influence this process” (Lewis 2013,
333). For example, each military dictator, after taking control over the state’s apparatus, emphasized that
the political elite’s incompetent rule and their machinations to strengthen their own personalist rule over
the state was the foremost reason the military had to intervene. This therefore suggests “authoritarian
legitimation (like all political legitimation) relies heavily on hegemonic strategies of presenting existing
political order as natural and uncontroversial” (March 2003, 210).
Thus, “hegemony is achieved through discourses that do important ideological work: they
circulate in society, in both official language and in daily informal intercourse and in so doing contribute
to the everyday maintenance of regime legitimacy” (Lewis 2013, 334). General Ayub legitimized his rule
by imagining the Pakistani population as politically immature and gullible because of the ineptitude of
political society amidst the communist threat from the USSR. General Zia legitimized his action against
the elected government as an effort to save the country and to reform its laws according to Islamic laws
amidst the Afghan Jihad against the USSR invasion of neighboring Afghanistan. General Musharraf
followed the lead of General Ayub and launched his military rule to oust the elected government,
claiming that the political society had failed on the issue of “good governance.” General Musharraf
perpetuated the military rule amidst the ongoing Global War on Terror; he believed that in order to tutor
society on “good governance,” enlightened mediation with the civil society ought to be initiated by the
military regime.
Thus, under the military dictator, discursive hegemony allowed the leader to associate his regime
with stability, order, security, and modernization, suggesting that authoritarian rule is the morally correct
order for Pakistan because of the inept political society and dysfunctional political institutions. Against
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such a backdrop, civil society actors faced a considerable task. The repressive regime had not only purged
the counter-discourses that challenged the regime’s legitimation efforts, but the political society was also
unable to challenge the dictator’s discursive hegemony. Chapter 3 of this dissertation investigated the role
of the passive political society and the nascent civil society vis-à-vis the volatile political regime in
Pakistan.
The three military rulers were different from each other only in their personal styles of
governance. For example, General Ayub was keen on the modernization of the Pakistan in terms of
industrialization and mega development in the country; for him the military’s devised modernization of
the political system was crucial. In contrast, General Zia saw religious vigor as the route to the country’s
Islamization and made the military the custodian of order of this kind. General Musharraf believed in the
modernization of Pakistan’s society but also accepted that other actors in the society might play a role in
bringing about political stability. Another very critical pattern that emerges in the Pakistani polity is that
regional and international political crises always give the military-bureaucratic oligarchy in Pakistan a
new lease on life: the red scare during the rule of General Ayub, the Afghan Jihad under General Zia, and
the Global War on Terror in the time of General Musharraf.
However, in each of these three periods of military rule, each military dictator never could
distance himself from the appeal of democracy as system of governance. I argue that under each of these
military dictatorships, authoritarianism was partially concealed by the manipulation of democratic
political institutions. The military dictators had not completely eradicated political institutions such as
elections, political parties, legislature, etc. The military, by manipulating the political institutions, in fact
carved out a permanent role for itself to direct political processes. What is more, the elected governments
that ruled the polity in the aftermath of the military dictatorships lacked the vigor to strengthen political
institutions in order to overcome institutional manipulation devised by the previous military
government(s). One of my interviewees, a leading veteran journalist, contended that the political elite had
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not learned about the institutional design of democratic political institutions, whereas the military elite
encouraged debates on the design of political institutions as part of the military’s training.6
The military dictators never did believe in being subservient to political rule. The military
generals co-opted the political elite to be the military governments’ electoral façade. The blatant
authoritarianism under Generals Ayub and Zia curtailed the political and civil liberties of the people; the
political society was curtailed and the civil society was severely censored. During the rule of
authoritarianism, the political society also did not consistently resist the military in its encroachment on
the political landscape. Instead, the new recruits to the selectorate continuously sought to retain the ability
to use the military for their own political gains when needed.
The military encroachment upon the political landscape was also enabled by the political
society’s inability to prevent democratic backsliding. In fact, political parties and political elites have
themselves indulged in autocratic governance, damaging democratic norms. The political society, as in
the case of Pakistan, remained inept and passive to the military’s engagement in politics and, in fact,
became the collaborators of the military and bureaucratic complex to perpetuate a mixed system of
political governance: the hybrid regime. Hence, under the military rule of General Musharraf, the political
regime was shaped into a political system that had been transformed into a hybrid regime with a lasting
imprint of the authoritarianism of the past. However, under General Musharraf’s rule, as I have shown in
the dissertation, the liberalization policies of his government activated the dormant civil society to engage
with the state.
Political Society: Willing Cooperators with Military Dictatorships
In their recent book titled How Democracies Die, Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2018)
claim that democracies can die from two causes: either through military coups or because of inept elected
6
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leadership. These authors believe, “[D]emocracies may die at the hands not of generals but of elected
leaders—presidents or prime ministers who subvert the very process that brought them to power” (3).
The authors of the book believe that a political society that shows resolute ability to engage in
communicative engagement with the public can overcome the autocratic advance of the undemocratic
forces. Political society helps to foster democratic norms, but if political society is incompetent in forging
democratic principles of engagement, dialogue and participation in political discourse, the result is
political chaos. Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) argue, “Political parties are democracy’s gatekeepers” only if
they are committed to the norms of democracy (20). But when the political parties are inept, they
succumb to the authoritarian advance. Or, as I have shown in this research, it can even be argued that
political society can become collaborators with authoritarianism.
In Pakistan, sadly, it is the ineptness of the parties that has paved the way for military hegemony
and downplayed parliamentary supremacy. The political parties and the selectorate, as shown in chapter
3, for the sake of their political significance in the polity, were compelled to cooperate with the military
regimes. The selectorate, in order to secure their relevance in local constituencies, remained actively
engaged in electoral politics under the military regime; the result was that the political elite never did
resist military intervention in order to strengthen democratic principles. The selectorate relied on and
facilitated the military and bureaucratic oligarchy to take over the political system. The first of my
hypotheses stated: In a political system that emerges from authoritarian rule, the institutional
arrangement devised by the ruling elite perpetuates an authoritarian footprint. My research into
Pakistan’s political system confirms that this certainly has been the case.
For the political elite, the perpetual authoritarian rule enacted by the military and bureaucratic
oligarchy meant the political elite absolved themselves of the task of designing political institutions; the
political elite were dependent on the military and bureaucratic oligarchy and rarely challenged its
hegemony. When the political society did oppose the hegemony of the military and bureaucratic
oligarchy, the consequences were dire for the political elite. The decade of the 1990s exhibited the
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ineptness of the political parties and their ineffectiveness to transcend their differences to challenge the
hegemony of the military and bureaucratic oligarchy. The political society lacked a unifying voice against
the encroachment of military intervention on the political landscape. The internal differences of the
political society paved an interventionist path for the military.
As shown in this dissertation, the military’s advancement in politics continued because of the
political society’s complacency and incompetency. My discussion of the selectorate indicates that the
political elite were compelled to become cooperators with the military elite. Those who did not cooperate
experienced a failed or stalled political career during the period of military rule. The political elite that
comprised the selectorate were basically what I call the constituency-level politicians. The selectorate is a
subset of the political society with a fluid political loyalty. These are the political elites who are most
interested in keeping themselves electorally relevant in their respective constituencies, and thus in order
to remain relevant, these politicians allow themselves to be co-opted by the military elite.
To draw a parallel with Manto’s story, “The New Constitution,” I believe the political elite is like
one of the sentries (the other sentry being the bureaucratic elite) that facilitated the goras’ (i.e., the
military rulers) control over society. Also, it can be argued that the political society wanted to take up the
role of the gora, but due to the military’s frequent use of coercive power, it has been reduced to the role
of the sentry. The political elite who might have protected society against authoritarianism were, in fact,
controlled by the military and bureaucratic oligarchy.
As a result, the political culture that developed in Pakistan is most focused on local political
issues primarily concerned with constituency politics and not the establishment of a democratic regime or
strengthening political institutions. The political parties and the political elite have primarily focused their
energies on conserving their electoral relevance on the level of constituency politics. For the political
society, the recurrent military intervention is not a matter of concern as long as the political society’s
engagement in constituency politics is not challenged. But if the secured electoral position of political
society is threatened by the military’s devised institutional design, the political society endeavors to
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prevent such institutions from taking root. The analysis of decentralization reforms in chapter 5 reinforces
this observation.
The political elite brought on the political landscape by the military regime were the
constituency-level politicians, or those whom I have defined as the selectorate. These politicians define
the culture of political society in Pakistan. I believe the pliable political society and, within it, the
constituency-level politicians that explain the presence of the military-bureaucracy oligarchy at the macro
level of politics and its control of the executive branch, legislature, and law enforcement. For the
constituency-level politicians, the establishing of political institutions that check the encroachment of the
military and bureaucratic complex has been of minimal concern to the political elite. The constituencyfocused selectorate derived their support from strong clientele relationships in their constituencies and are
therefore not affected by who is in control of macro institutions of politics. The presence of these
constituency-focused political elite, therefore, made them a perfect candidate for co-optation by the
military governments, as they are easy to identify and bring a reservoir of political support to the dictator.
My analysis of decentralization reforms revealed that the political society participated in their
implementation only to safeguard its interest in remaining electorally relevant at the level of constituency
politics. However, remaining relevant at the constituency level meant that the selectorate was seen as the
beneficiary of the military benefactor. Moreover, this meant that that political society was amenable to
arbitrary rule by the dictator. But a political regime established on artificial, opportunistic alliances is
unlikely to sustain itself. As I have argued, Pakistan’s political history is marked by intermittent electoral
rule and frequent military takeovers; thus, in such a political regime that continues to shift between
authoritarianism and electoral democracy, the political actors make strategic choices to safeguard their
political careers for example the conduct of selectorate.
For example, in time of direct military rule, the military regimes were aware that their control of
political power would remain temporary unless the political elite were co-opted. In my analyses, I show
that the military rulers understood that their rule could be endured by society only through those political
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elite whom the military regime would bring on the political landscape. The role of the political elite coopted by the military rulers was to mediate between citizens and the military’s enacted hybrid regime.
The selectorate, carved out of the political elite, was aware that the military rule would be sustained only
if alliances were fostered between the two. Hence, for the advancement of the selectorate’s own political
career and sustainment of a regime led by military, the military and selectorate found decentralization
reforms expedient for the survival of their partnership.
Civil Society: Nascent Existence, Weak Activism
In the vast literature on the state-civil society from the field of comparative politics, and the
conception of civil society in the field of political theory, there is general consensus that civil society is an
individualistic, exclusive, voluntary realm of citizens. On the other hand, the state is seen as the
conglomerate of a bureaucratic network of specialized institutions that devise policies and laws so as to
regulate the society at large (Lawson 1993; Young 1999; Habermas 2006).
Much as the modern state complex is composed of specialized institutions, civil society also is
composed of a multitude of actors. The media; interest groups such as trade unions and citizen clubs;
specialized voluntary associations such as religious groups, neighborhood committees, and nongovernmental organizations, etc., are all distinctive examples of such civil society actors. This multitude
of actors gives organized expression to the disparate voices and the distinctive interests professed by
citizens in the society. Other than the media, scholars have argued that non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) stand out as the most recognized entity belonging to the realm of civil society. In recent
scholarship on the deliberative theory of democracy, political theorists such as Habermas (2006), Dryzek
(2010), Chambers (2002), and Young (1999, 2002) have argued that NGOs are a recognized civil society
actor. Comparative politics scholars also contend that in the scholarship on civil society NGOs have
found their permanence (Ndegwa 1996; Yudice 1998; Keane 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lang 2013;
Edwards 2014) .
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Assuming an autonomous civil society according to the theoretical perspective of the deliberative
model of democracy, I proceeded to study the relationship of civil society under authoritarianism. The
case of Pakistan presented not only definitional challenges but also practical difficulties. First, the
definitional challenge: how to proceed with the theoretical analysis when it is exceedingly difficult to
assume that Pakistan had been a democratic state throughout its years as an independent, sovereign state.
Since 1947, the Pakistani state has alternated between military control and civilian control at least four
different times. At each transition, from military to democratic government, the civilian leadership
achieved no substantive advance toward the consolidation of democracy. In short, the case of Pakistan’s
governance system exemplifies a hybrid regime (Adeney 2017).
Second, the practical difficulties: I realized that while conducting interviews with civil society
activists, retired and serving state officials, and academics, these groups viewed the state-civil society
relations as another means by which the political regimes create the false impression that an autonomous
civil society exists. The interviewees asserted that no such entity in Pakistan has an independent status
vis-à-vis the state. They have reminded me that critical voices raised against the military and/or elected
governments have never had any effect on changing the regime type in Pakistan. Such voices can be
heard in the society, but their ability to challenge the political regime is weak to nonexistent. The
academics and activists argued consistently that though there had been incidents when the civil society
did stand up to the state, such incidents were episodic. The incidents rarely dislodged the base of the
hybrid regime. There was the student movement against presidential rule of General Ayub, the women’s
movement against the Sharia laws under General Zia-ul-Haq, and the lawyers’ movement against the
dictatorial edict under General Musharraf, but the state has withstood the activism of the civil society. The
momentary upsurge created euphoria that was soon replaced by the coercive, controlling imperative of the
state.
The role of civil society actors, most specifically NGOs, came up in discussion whenever I would
inquire about the role civil society actors played in informing state policy on devolution plan(s), most
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specifically the 2001 Devolution Plan under the Musharraf regime. It did not matter to the interviewees
whether the state control and bureaucratic apparatus was under a military ruler or civilian elected
governments, because, before the respondents could respond with any detail, they would assert
emphatically that most of civil society in Pakistan is inactive and that NGOs are recognized as the civil
society. In fact, most surprisingly, as I have shown in chapter 4, NGOs have come to be known as the
civil society in Pakistan and the ideal of civil society being autonomous is a farce.
Hence, my respondents would then ask me, How could the NGOs ever oppose the state’s
directives? Interviewees insisted that my theoretical argument overlooked the fact that the very actors
whom I regarded as critical players in the public sphere have always been under the overpowering
influence of the state. Amidst such a façade, I had wrongfully (much like the character of Ustaad Mangu)
assumed that there existed an independent and critical entity of the civil society that countered the
hegemony of state. Within the civil society, the media as an actor appear to have a critical role—
criticizing the political actors. The media are indeed critical of political governments, which include the
military and elected; however, the media are extremely careful in criticizing the military as an institution,
more so than its vociferous criticism of the political society.
Given that I, along with many scholars of comparative politics, expected an adversarial
relationship between civil society organizations and the authoritarian state, it is no wonder that
investigating the organizational autonomy of NGOs is perceived to be of utmost importance for analysts
and policymakers. While the co-opted, compromised, and/or cooperative civil society is a practical reality
that is realized by scholars of civil society, this line of thinking is largely missing amongst the
deliberative theorists of democracy. In my discussion of the actors of the civil society in chapters 3 and 4,
I explained that the civil society actors, the print media, and the NGOs had been under pressure from the
authoritarian practices of the hybrid regime.
The military and successive elected governments had constrained these actors to generate counter
discourses on the devised institutions of the hybrid regime. The laws devised by the military and elected
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governments had placed these actors under the bureaucratic control of the state. Through the laws directed
against the independence of these actors, the print media and NGOs became dependent on the state for
their continued existence in society. If they challenged the state through the generation of counterhegemonic discourses, these actors faced the termination of their work in society.
I have discussed that the theory of deliberative democracy tends to conceptualize the presence of
the civil society as autonomous from the state; furthermore, theorists of deliberative democracy argue that
civil society actors communicate independent opinions formed in the public sphere to the institutions of
the state. Such an arrangement may be a permanent feature in consolidated democracies, but such
communicative interexchange between the civil society and state is absent within hybrid political regimes
such as Pakistan.
The empirical research on the deliberative theory of democracy highlights examples where
practitioners of this theory have created institutional innovations, such as cooperative projects between
the government and civil society, to increase the access of citizen groups to the policy process. In addition
to creating channels for groups to access public policy in their area of interest, these cooperative projects
also have enlarged the space available for social action through building trust between government and
the citizenry.
But these institutional innovations were designed in contexts ruled by democratic governments
and not by authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, deliberative democrats such as Dryzek (2009) and Dryzek
and Niemeyer (2012) have assumed that even in authoritarian regimes, the ruling elite can devise
institutional innovations to bridge the gap between the state and citizenry, which is a positive step toward
democratization. But elsewhere, Dryzek (2001, 2012) argued for the multiplicity of voices in the public
sphere; for him, the public sphere is an integral base for deliberative democracy. But in his later writings,
he reduces the conditions for communicative engagement between state and civil society. But I believe
this assumption conveniently dismisses the hegemony of authoritarian state and softens its
authoritarianism without addressing the fundamentals of the regime type. In other words, when the base
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of the political system is not inclusive, then the decision-making process in such systems remains with the
ruling elite. Under authoritarianism, the ruling elite use the very measures of so-called engagement with
society to strengthen their rule, not to open the system to the citizens.
Whereas deliberative democrats may view these institutional measures in democracies as
innovations to address the democratic deficits, we cannot assume that such measures are steps toward
democratization in authoritarian regimes. I have argued that under authoritarian regimes rulers use similar
measures to strengthen their rule over society. The investigation in this research shows that military
dictators devised institutional measures of devolution to neutralize the opposition against their military
rule.
I suggest that under military rulers, the centralization or decentralization of state structures in
Pakistan is inevitably connected to military dictators’ desire to protect themselves against potential
internal or popular threats and, ultimately, to prolong their tenures in power. Therefore, to preserve their
rule, military governments created institutions to strengthen their rule over society. The political society,
on the other hand, has been willing cooperators with the military-devised institutional campaigns,
whereas the civil society has been somewhat forced by the state to engage with the state institutions.
My second hypothesis stated: Civil society actors critically analyze the institutional
arrangements devised by the state. State laws will continue to endure when the laws devised are informed
by civil society actors. My research shows that this hypothesis is not confirmed and thus is rejected based
on the evidence gathered. While it is true that civil society critically analyzes the institutional
arrangements, evidence suggested that the civil society in Pakistan was severely censored and directed by
the state to engage with the state itself. Furthermore, as long as the state willingly accepted the presence
of civil society, the state heard the voices of civil society; but when the state was hegemonic, the civil
society became dormant.
As discussed in chapter 3, the role of civil society has depended on a particular autocrat’s
openness to engage with it in the first place. In practice, both military dictators and elected leaderships
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have had a rather consistent repressive attitude toward any communicative interexchange with civil
society actors. Under the authoritarianism of Generals Ayub and Zia, the military regime curbed civil and
political liberties. For instance, the print media, one of the most prominent actors of civil society in
Pakistan, remained under the state’s repressive policy that curbed freedom of speech. Likewise, civic
associational groups and associations had been routinely under the state’s watchful monitoring.7
However, as discussed in chapter 4, with geopolitical changes in the region, due to the Jihad in
neighboring Afghanistan and the concurrent instability of the political regimes in Pakistan, an increase in
NGO formation and activity began in the 1990s. These NGOs served the developmental needs of citizens
in Pakistan’s chaotic socio-political scenario. With the rise of NGOs and Pakistan’s dependence on
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the WB, IMF, ADB, and other donor agencies, the
magnitude of the work of the NGOs increased to include working on the state’s devised policies.
As a result, the NGOs’ attention moved toward reorienting the state to devise laws that extended
political decentralization to the grassroots and to reform the civil bureaucracy to serve the citizenry. The
elected governments of the 1990s and the military government established with General Pervez
Musharraf’s military coup selectively engaged with civil society to understand and effect measures to
address the issues of governance. Evaluative studies initiated by the elected governments advised these
governments to undertake reform measures to devolve bureaucratic and political powers from the central
government to the provincial and district governments.
Though there had been piecemeal reforms effected under previous military governments, only the
military government of General Pervez Musharraf engaged with civil society to undertake measures to
address gaps in bureaucratic governance. It also mobilized political commitment to effect the reform

7

The elected regime in the 1990s continued with such repressive measures but lacked severity in punishing the
social rights campaigners. However, under the rule of General Musharraf, the curbs were less severe than under the
military and elected predecessors. The period of General Musharraf’s rule witnessed a vibrant public sphere where
the media and NGOs multiplied. The 2000s saw public deliberation on a scale unprecedented in Pakistan’s political
history.
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agenda of Musharraf’s regime. The foremost of the military government’s initiatives was the design of yet
another plan for devolution of power to the grassroots. But as I have shown in my investigation of
devolution plans devised under the military governments, the political and bureaucratic elite reluctantly
implemented such plans.
The communicative interexchange initiated under General Musharraf’s regime also remained
selective in its engagement with the political society. Such interexchange was also inattentive to the
demands of the civil society to implement devolution reforms that affected all levels of government, from
federal to provincial to district levels. Civil society organizations argued that devolving decision-making
power from the federal to district governments, bypassing the provincial governments, ignores political
and bureaucratic institutions. This then results in the isolation of these institutions and their consequent
unwillingness to undertake reform measures that would be effective at the grassroots level.
Concluding Remarks
Deliberative democratic theory focuses on the primacy of communicative dialogue between
varied political and societal forces. The assumption is that the force of better argument should shape the
decision making in a polity. The protagonists in the decision-making process so conceived are the
designers of the policies and laws through which the political community is regulated. The advocates of
the theory of deliberative democracy argue that while the state is the chief architect of lawmaking, to
regulate the society it cannot ignore the actors of either the political or civil society. The site where state
and civil society engage in communicative interexchange is the public sphere.
Furthermore, the advocates of deliberative democracy argue the communicative process between
the state and civil society in the public sphere lends legitimacy to political decision making. The theory of
deliberative democracy takes for granted the legitimacy of lawmakers nor the institutions through which
elected representatives are chosen. It is, however, the process of making and legitimizing decisions,
policies, and laws that the deliberative theory of democracy is interested in.
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But what explains the role of civil society actors within such regimes that enact institutions that
favor authoritarianism over democratic rule? When I looked to the deliberative theory of democracy to
explain the complexity of the case of devolution planning in Pakistan, I realized that the theory of
deliberative democracy was insufficient to address the state and civil society interexchange. First, this is
because the very entity of autonomous civil society has been absent in Pakistan. Secondly, the issue of
regime type has not been adequately addressed by theorists of the deliberative theory of democracy.
However, this does not mean that theorists of the deliberative theory of democracy dismiss the
value of studying undemocratic political systems. In fact, there have been attempts to evaluate state and
citizenry communicative engagement on specific policies of community development. But these studies, I
have argued, do not study the political system per se and thus fail to evaluate the reach of deliberative
theory beyond democratic systems. I, on the other hand, have focused on utilizing the theoretical
conditions of the state-civil society communicative interexchange on a political regime that keeps
hovering between authoritarianism and democracy.
The hybrid state in Pakistan combined democratic principles with the authoritarianism of the
military junta. Pakistan has hovered between an authoritarian regime and transitional democracy. It has
been an authoritarian regime with the military ruler being the dictator and president of the country. But
this authoritarianism was obscured by the so-called democratic interventions by the military ruler. Thus,
under the elected leadership, the political system was a transitional democracy as a result of elections. But
the continual military dictatorships have had an effect on political institutions.
Under the military dictatorship of General Musharraf, the democratic institution of elections and
the elected legislature rendered his military rule a hybrid regime with the military ruler being the head of
the state. The political institutions such as the executive, legislature, bureaucratic apparatus, and judiciary
functioned under the directive of the military’s leadership led by a military general.
I argue that the military’s intervention in politics (1960s and 1980s) has transfixed the political
regime to remain unstable. The result was that Pakistan regressed to become an enduring hybrid regime in
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the 1990s. The trend persisted under General Musharraf in 2000s. Under the time of direct military rule,
the military elite have been at the helm of the political landscape; similarly, during the time of elected
rule, the military elite direct the political landscape. In times of the elected governments, the executive
and the legislature were comprised of elected representatives, but the very political system of the regime
was not democratic. The regime was a hybrid regime with the military and bureaucratic apparatus having
the control over the reserved policy domains. Under elected governments, the incumbents were elected
rulers, but they were subject to governing prerogatives reserved for the military elite.
More generally, the case of Pakistan’s political history and most specifically the design of
devolution plans in Pakistan signifies that a state controlled by undemocratic forces devised plans to
strengthen local governance. Such plans were attempts to gain legitimacy to rule over the political
community and not to strengthen local political institutions. The combination of democratic principles
with authoritarian applications perpetuated the hybrid regime in Pakistan.
My research shows that in Pakistan the three actors of the state—the political parties (political
elite), the bureaucratic elite, and the military elite—have been locked in a constant rivalry to take control
of the executive powers of the state. The hybrid regime in Pakistan and the design of laws and policies by
the state is, however, not only the result of the long intervals of military rule. The political society is also
responsible for the foundation of the hybrid regime in Pakistan. The military and political elite build
partnerships when it suits them in order to take the reins of political power. Civil society, I argue, is a
bystander in these partnerships; engagement with civil society is invoked only when required by the
hybrid regime. Though there have been incidents of momentary upsurges by the civil society against the
hegemony of the state, such activism has been episodic. Furthermore, another important caveat of
activism of civil society ignores the fact that civil society is not a monolithic entity; it does include citizen
groups, associations that are cooperators of the state and support the institutional rules and hegemony of
the hybrid regime. I am referring here to the religious, right-wing associations of citizens who have come
into being to counter the left-leaning critical voices coming from within the civil society.
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Genuine democratic deliberation on the design of institutional rules is possible only when the
state apparatus and political and civil society are engaged in communicative interexchange, exchanging
ideas and speaking in a language understood and accepted by all others. Moreover, in such an exchange,
the interlocutors do not hold back their thoughts to achieve strategic control in order to subvert the
communicative engagement. The deliberative theory of democracy advocates communicative engagement
between state and society actors that results in institutional rules that are accepted by all. But as my
research has shown, in the case of Pakistan, elites have always been keen on strengthening their strategic
control over institutional rules rather than engaging in communicative interexchange to strengthen the
institutional rules.
The ruling elite constituting the military bureaucratic complex and the political society are the
defining reality of the political landscape, whereas the people and civil society are the disenfranchised
entities in contemporary Pakistan. The episodes when the people and civil society challenged the ruling
elite were only momentary; though the ruling elite were pushed back, they came back to reassert their
authority over the people and civil society.
The ruling elite, in order to perpetuate themselves, manipulate the political institutions without
destroying the hybrid base of the regime. The ruling elite have never changed the underlying coalitions of
power defining the nature of the hybrid regime. In short, this dissertation argues that the political regime
in Pakistan is an enduring hybrid regime that has remained a pervasive reality. The sporadic illusions of
democratic communicative engagement achieved by the ruling elite have never uprooted the hybrid base
of the political regime.
In the end, I conclude by saying that Ustad Mangu’s desire for a New Constitution remains
unfulfilled.
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Request for an interview

My name is Beenish Kulsoom. I am pursuing doctorate in Political Science from Western Michigan
University, USA. Currently I am in Pakistan to conduct field research for my dissertation. The topic of
research is “Deliberation for Devolution in the Public Sphere: The Case of Pakistan”. There are two
components of my research: theoretical and empirical. The theoretical discussion draws on modern
democratic theory and I examine the model of deliberative democracy focusing on its necessary
conditions. Whereas, the empirical component of my doctorate research analyse the case of Pakistan visà-vis the fundamental conditions of deliberative democracy. The policy issue that I focus on in the case of
Pakistan is “devolution of power”.
Hence, in this regard, I am conducting interviews with civil society actors and academics to investigate
and understand the causes behind military governments’ designing and implementation of ‘devolution of
power’ plans in Pakistan. The plan that is the focus of my research is 2001 Local Government Plan (LGP)
that was designed and implemented under General Musharraf.
Your knowledge and insight on the implementation of the various decentralization and devolutions plans
designed and implemented under the various military regimes provides me relevant data so as to fully
understand that how the political elite of the time engaged with the citizenry under military rule.
Furthermore, I am also keen to gain insight on the process of deliberation that had led to the promulgation
of 18th Amendment.
The questions that I shall be asking during the interview are open-ended and generic pertaining to
the governance strategy (i.e., the devolving of power) preferred by the military leaders than the
democratically elected leadership. Some of the questions are as under:
a. Why would military engage in devolving of power to grassroots?
b. What are the reasons for military preference for emasculating the traditional political parties?
c. When the grassroots initiatives are designed by the military, the political leaders co-opt but later
they dissolve such grassroots initiatives – what are the reasons for doing so?
d. There is evidence that in 2005 when the devolution plan was implemented some of the MNA
resigned and contested for Nazim elections at their respective districts – and later in 2008
elections some Nazmeens contested in general elections – the system of local government
provides for newer leadership to emerge – yet it is not favored by political parties, why?
e. Are political parties weary of the elected leadership at the grassroots? If they are, then why do
you think it is so?
f.

What do you think of the greater provincial autonomy granted under the 18th Amendment?

400
g. The clause 140-A pertaining to the devolution of power to grassroots was retained under the 18th
Amendment – however now we see that provincial governments are not going ahead with the
devolution – why is it so?
h. Does this mean we are witnessing centralization at provincial levels – whereas previously it was
centralization at the Federal level?
i. Do you see any role of civil society organizations in creating a discourse for continuing of the
devolution of power to grassroots?
j.

Has there ever been any active civil society movement on governments (military and elected) to
devolve power to grassroots?

k. Do you think 2001 devolution plan endured better than the earlier such initiatives? Or am I wrong
in assuming this?

Appendix B
List of Major Political Parties, Media Groups, and NGOs in Pakistan
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The number of political parties in Pakistan are closer to 350 (Alvi 2018) however according to the
Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) the official regulatory body that registers the political parties and
grants them the right to contest in the local, provincial and national elections, the number of registered
political parties are 110. This figure suggests that only 31 percent of the political parties in Pakistan are
officially recognized. The other political parties which are not registered are smaller and regional citizen
groups lacking the organizational resources to be declared as a political party. According to the Elections
Act, 2017 passed by the National Assembly (NA) in September 2017, all the political parties registered
with ECP submit a list of 2,000 of its members along with their national identity numbers (confirming
their Pakistani citizenship).
Traditionally, in Pakistan the political parties that have been most organized in mobilizing
popular support in times of elections and raising opposition to the incumbent military and the civilian
elected governments have been only too few. The leading parties are the Pakistan Muslim League
(Nawaz) and Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). The other parties also having electoral strength in times of
election form coalitions with these two leading parties.1
More generally the political parties in Pakistan have ideologically been center to right. The
political parties have traditionally been representing the interests of the dynastic families belonging to
rural landowning base; the urban business interests and the elite belonging to military and civil
bureaucracy. The political parties thus have formed to fulfill the interests of the ruling elite. The political
ideology thus has been to serve the state and hence political parties have largely been center to the right.
There has been a sporadic wave of modelling political party based on ideology for example the Pakistan
Peoples Party (PPP) was established to serve the interests of the disenfranchised segments such as
minorities, workers, farmers and the emerging middle class. But soon for the reasons of political exigency
and the party’s political future the PPP moved towards the center but it clutches onto the rhetoric to serve
the interests of the disenfranchised segments. It was under the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from
1972 to 1977 that private industry was nationalized; socialist policies of providing welfare to the people
was promised; and also that religious sentiment against minorities was raised. It was in his government
that the religious minority the Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims in the 1973 Constitution. This
attempt was crafted by Bhutto to appease the religious parties.2
The other political parties based on ethnic interests and religious conservatism are also stand
ideologically towards the center to right – thus to serve the interests of the ruling elite. The political
parties in Pakistan are geared towards winning elections and they are not ideology based mobilization
platforms. In the wake of political expediency, the political parties have moved towards center to right so
as to become closer to the center of the power which is controlled by the ruling elite and is termed the
establishment (Siddiqa 2016, 63-64).

1

From the time of general elections in 2013 another political party led by a cricketer-turned politician Imran Khan
has also had electoral success. His political party the Pakstan Tehreek-i-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice) has
emerged as the third largest political party to the PML-N and PPP. However, since this political party is a new
addition to the Pakistan’s politics, and has minimal relevance to the study of devolution planning (from year 20002010) in Pakistan, I therefore, have not discussed this political party in this dissertation.
2

Qasmi, Ali Usman. "Chapter VII: The "Final Solution" of the "90-Year-Old Problem"?: The Parliamentary
Proceedings of 1974." In The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan, by Qasmi Ali Usman,
185-220. Anthem Press, 2014.
—. "Beyond 2nd Amendment." The News on Sunday. January 24, 2016. http://tns.thenews.com.pk/beyond-antiahmadi-2nd-amendment-pakistan-constitution/ (accessed Feburary 4, 2019).
—. "What drives calls for giving Ahmadis a distinct identity." Herald. January 19, 2019.
https://herald.dawn.com/news/1398674/what-drives-calls-for-giving-ahmadis-a-distinct-identity (accessed Feburary
4, 2019).
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Table B-1 shows the widely known political parties in Pakistan.
Table B-1: Political Parties in Pakistan3
Name of political party

Year
launched
1906

Ideological
position
Center to Right

Active in electoral
politics
1935

Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz (PML-N)

1990

Center to Right

Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)

1967

Center to Left

Jamat-i-Islami

1941

Right (religious)

Awami National Party (ANP)

1986

Left

1990, 1992, 1995,
1997, 2002, 2008,
2013
1971, 1977, 1988,
1990, 1992, 1995,
1997, 2002, 2008,
2013
1971,1977,
1988,1990,1992,1995
1997, 2002, 2008,
2013
1988,1990, 1992,
1997, 2008, 2013

Mohajjir Quomi Movement (MQM) later the
party was renamed as Muttahida Quomi
Movmenet (MQM)

1988

Center to Left

1988, 1990, 1992,
1997, 2002, 2008,
2013

Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid

2002

Center to Right

2002, 2008, 2013

Jamiat-Ulema-Islam

1940s

Right (religious)

Jamiat-ulema-Pakistan (Fazal-ur-Rehman)

1990s

Right (religious)

1971, 1977, 1988,
1990, 1992, 1995,
1997, 2002
1990, 1992, 1995,
1997, 2002

Pakistan Muslim League
The founding political party, active in the time of
Pakistan’s independence in 1947. But this party
was later divided into different versions of
Muslim League each representing the personalist
style of its leader.

This party was formed with the alliance of
regional parties from province of Sindh,
Balochistan and KPK. The alliance led by the
National Awami Party (NAP) of Wali Khan from
KPK.

Source: (ECP 2018, ICG 2011, Jaffrelot 2015, Waseem and Mufti 2009)

3

The list is not a comprehensive and not exhaustible. The table lists only a few of the major political parties.
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Print Media
There are dozens of newspapers, ranging from the large English and Urdu language dailies and
weeklies, to the small local-language papers. All the major media groups in the country are active through
their newspaper, periodical, magazine circulation and also via their TV channels. The number of
television channels grew from two or three state-run stations in 2000 to over 50 privately owned channels
in 2008.
The leader among the electronic media is The Jang group, owned by the Mir family. The group
has several newspapers, Urdu daily The Jang, and English daily The News, as well as the monthly
Newsline. Since 2003, this group is famous because of its TV Channels Geo News, Geo Entertainment,
Geo Sports, and Geo Tez. Then comes the Dawn, the media group owned by Haroon family. It prints the
oldest English daily in Pakistan Daily Dawn, the English Monthly Hearld, and the news channel Dawn
News. The media group owned by Nizami family is the Nawa-i-Waqat (the oldest and still running Urdu
newspaper in the country) also publishes English daily The Nation and also has news channel Waqat
News. Then comes the group owned by the Lakhani family – the group published Urdu daily Express
News, and English daily Express Tribune and a news channel Express News. And, there is another group
Dunya – this group publishes Urdu daily Dunya News, and news channel Dunya TV. There are other
groups also that have TV channels that present daily shows discussing the political issues, inviting debate
between political parties and their representatives.
Table B-2 shows the number of the media houses in Pakistan, the newspapers and the electronic
media outlets that these media organizations own and manage.
Table B-2: Media groups in Pakistan4
Media group

Year
launched

Ideological position

The Jang Group

1942

Center to Right. The
group is owned by Mir
family, and is
supportive of
government in power.

The Nawa-i-Waqat

1940

Center to Right. The
group is owned by
Nizami family, and
have traditionally
supported government
in power, with strong
leaning to Islamist
policies.

4

Newspapers
(Language medium
English or Urdu)
Jang (Urdu)
News (English)
Mag (English
weekly magazine)
Akhbar-e-Jahan
(Urdu weekly)

T.V. Channels

Nawa-i-Waqat
(Urdu)
Nation (English)

Waqat (Urdu)
news channel.

GEO Channels
(includes a
News
Entertainment;
Sports; Music
channels.

The list is not a comprehensive and not exhaustible. The table only lists few of the major media groups in Pakistan.
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Media group

Year
launched

Ideological position

Dawn group

1941

Center to Right.
The owners (Haroon
family) of this media
house has been in
government under the
military and civilian
rules.

Express group

1998

Dunya group

2007

Center to Right
The owners (Lakhani
family) of this media
house has other
corporate businesses
such as a leading
Tabaco company the
Lakson Tabaco
Company.
Center to Right.
The owners of this group
is a Lahore-based
businessman Mian Aamir.
He also is owner of chain
of private educational
institutions the Punjab
Group of Colleges. Mian
Aamir also was directly
engaged in politics, he
was elected the district
mayor of Lahore
following the Local
Government Plan (LGP)
implemented under
General Musharraf’s
military rule.

Newspapers
(Language medium
English or Urdu)
Dawn (English)
Herald (English
monthly magazine)

T.V. Channels

Dawn (Urdu)
news channel.
Dawn group also
ran English news
channel, but due
to limited
viewership, the
group terminated
the English news
channel to
launch its Urdu
channel.

Express Tribune
(English)
Express (Urdu)

Express (Urdu)
news channel.
Express
entertainment
channel.

Dunya News (Urdu)

Dunya (Urdu)
news channel.

Source: (Khan and Joseph 2008, Mezzera and Sial 2010)
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Non-Governmental Organizations
The NGOs in Pakistan come in every form and size; for example, there are faith-based charities,
including Christian and Islamic charity groups, though the latter are more numerous than the former. The
nature of NGOs is also distinctive based on their work. Some of them are development NGOs that work
on charitable projects in the different locations of the country, while some are advocacy creating
associations that create awareness among citizens on their rights towards the state and vice versa.
The nature of the NGOs’ work is strongly tied to their ideological preferences; for example, the
religious-based NGOs such as those which are supported by the religious political parties such as Jama’ti-Islami and Jama’t-ud-Dawa are more insular in their religious values and works. The other NGOs (such
as the United Nations affiliates for example, United Nations Development Fund (UNDP); United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP); United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF); United Nations Development Fund for Women
(UNIFEM), etc) that espouse liberal standards of freedom of speech and association focus on a range of
development works all across the country, primarily the rights of women, minorities and children. These
NGOs also work on public policies with the state such as environmental protection regulations, etc.
Some of the NGOs are working on community development initiatives, working directly with the
state authorities in provision of basic services to the communities. There are also welfare-based NGOs
such as The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), one of the largest nongovernmental projects in Asia employing
participatory techniques for the provision of sanitation and microcredit facilities to the half-million
residents of the low-income Orangi Town neighborhood in Karachi. The Edhi Foundation is a nationwide
voluntary network of ambulance services, disaster relief, and shelter for abused and abandoned women
and children in Pakistan. There are others advocacy groups, the largest being the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) which was formed in 1986 during the repressive regime of General Ziaul-Haq. There are also right-based initiatives advocating for women, minority and children rights, etc. All
Pakistan Women Association (APWA) is considered to be one of the oldest such entities. Established in
1949, this association operates vocational aid centers and schools across the country.
Table B-3 shows the number of the leading NGOs in Pakistan, their date of origin, and their
nature of work.
Table B-3: NGOs in Pakistan5
Name of NGO

Human Rights
Commission of
Pakistan (HRCP)
Edhi Foundation

5

Status
(International
or Local)
Local

Date of
Operation

Nature of Work

1986

Local

19

Rights-based and Advocacy
The protection of civil and political liberties and
maintenance of the sanctity of the judicial and
electoral machinery.
Service driven including Ambulance service, and
orphanages.

The list is not a comprehensive and not exhaustible. The table only lists few of the commonly known nongovernment organizations in Pakistan. The list does not include all the various local and international NGOs
operating in Pakistan. Some of the organizations, as is mentioned under Part II: NGOs as civil society actors in
Pakistan were formed following natural and man-made disasters, e.g., the Afghan war of 1980s and influx of
refugees in Pakistan and the 2005 earthquake in North of Pakistan. During these eventful periods the number of
nongovernment organizations had increased and with the receding of crisis these organizations withered away.
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Name of NGO

Status
(International
or Local)
Local

Date of
Operation

Nature of Work

1980

All Pakistan
Women
Association
United Nations

Local

1949

Community housing project. Providing education,
and maintenance of housing facility in the region of
Karachi.
One of the oldest NGOs in operation in Pakistan.
Works for the rights of women across Pakistan.

International

1949

Aurat Foundation

Local

1986

Al Khidmat
Foundation6

Local
(associated with
the Islamist
political party,
Jamat-i-Islami)
Local
(associated with
an Islamist
group Jamat-udDawa)

1961

Service driven organization. Works across Pakistan
and provide education, health programs.

1990

Service driven organization. Work in the central
Punjab and the Pakistan Kashmir, provides shelter,
food and education in the project areas.

Orangi Pilot
Project

Falah-e-Insaniat
Foundation7

The United Nations through its specialized agencies
such as United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP); World Food Programme (WFP); United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCR); United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICF), and others are operating in Pakistan.
These specialized agencies work directly in the
communities or partner with the government
agencies, or local NGOs in the different across
Pakistan.
Rights-based, Advocacy organization working for
women rights across Pakistan.

Source: Ghaus-Pasha and Iqbal 2003; Bano 2009

6
7

Khidmat is an Urdu word literally meaning service. Translation is mine.

Falah-e-Insaniat are Urdu words and the literal meaning of the words are betterment of humanity. Translation is
mine.
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List of Interviewees
Total number of interviews conducted so far (latest August 28, 2017) = 29
Civil Society Actors
S. No
1.

Name
Mr. Moazzam Bhatti

2.
3.
4.

Ms. Saeeda Diep
Mr. Zahid Islam
Mr. Ahmad Bilal
Mehboob

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Mr. Muddasir Rizvi
Mr. Rashid
Mr. Sarwar Bari
Mr. Abdul Qadir
Mr. Harris Khalique
Mr. Bilal Naqeeb

11.

Mr. I.A. Rahman

12.

Mr. Salman Abid

13.

Mr. Azhar Bashir Malik

14.

Mr. Irfan Mufti

15.
16.

Mr. Malick Shahbaz
Dr. Kaiser Bengali
(interview via email)
Mr. Omar Javed

17.

Profession
Sustainable Development Policy Institute
(SDPI)
Social rights activist.
SANGAT Development Foundation
Pakistan Institute for Legislative
Accountability and Transparency
(PILDAT)
Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN)
Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN)
PATTAN
FES
AWAZ (worked with SPO)
Worked with Strengthening Participatory
Organization (SPO)
Senior Journalist – Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
Regional Head, Lahore for Strengthening
Participatory Organization (SPO)
Formerly associated with Devolution
Trust for Community Empowerment
(DTCE)
South Asia Partnership – Pakistan (SAPPK)
SUNGI
Independent researcher

Date Interviewed
October 19, 2016

SUNGI

September 7, 2017

Profession
Professor of Political Science at FC
College University, Lahore
Professor of Political Science at LUMS,
Lahore
Professor of History, TUFTS University,
USA
Professor of Economics at LUMS and
Research Analyst at Council of
Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP),
Lahore

Date Interviewed
November 28, 2016

November 16, 2016
November 16, 2016
February 6, 2017

February 15, 2017
February 15, 2017
March 13, 2017
February 16, 2017
July 18, 2017
July 31, 2017
August 2, 2017
August 4, 2017
August 17, 2017

August 21, 2017
August 24, 2017

Academics
S. No
1.

Name
Dr. Saeed Shafqat

2.

Dr. Mohammad Waseem

3.

Dr. Ayesha Jalal

4.

Dr. Ali Cheema

November 29, 2016
March 23, 2017
March 27, 2017
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Political Elite
S. No
1.
2.

Name
Dr. Hassan Nasir
Ch. Pevez Elahi

3.

Dr. Nafisa Shah

4.

Ms. Rubina Khalid

Profession
Secretary General, National Party
Former Chief Minister of Punjab from
year 2002 – 2007 and Deputy Prime
Minister form 2008-2013.
Member of National Assembly (MNA)
from Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and
former Nazima of District Khairpur
Senator from Pakistan Peoples Party
(PPP)

Date Interviewed
February 18, 2017
August 20, 2017

Profession
Member of the 5-member core team of
National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB)
that devised the 2001 Devolution Plan.

Date Interviewed
February 28, 2017 and
March 4, 2017.

Profession
Senior retired bureaucrat. Served from
1947 to 1992.
Serving bureaucrat – working with
Pakistan Institute for Parliamentarian
Services (PIPS)
Retired senior bureaucrat. Associated
with World Bank in Washington. Served
as Finance Minister in Pakistan in 90s.

Date Interviewed
January 25, 2017

August 22, 2017

August 28, 2017

Designer of the 2001 Plan
S. No
1.

Name
Mr. Ikramullah Ghauri

Bureaucratic Elite
S. No
1.

Name
Mr. Roedaad Khan

2.

Mr. Zaffarullah Khan

3.

Mr. Shahid Javed Burki

February 17, 2017

March 29, 2017.
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Map of Pakistan

Source: https://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/asia/pakistan/

Additional Information
1 USD = 141 Pakistan Rupees
In 1947 the territory of Pakistan was divided in two units the East Pakistan (now an independent
sovereign state of Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (the present day geographical territory of Pakistan). In
1971 following the armed conflict in East Pakistan and the war with neighboring India, East Pakistan
declared independence and thus West Pakistan emerged as the sovereign state of present day Pakistan that
comprises the provinces of Punjab, and Sindh bordering India on the South and East; Balochistan and
KPK bordering Iran and Afghanistan in South and West and China in the North respectively.
Local governments were established under the military governments. Under General Ayub (19581969) local governments were established under the Basic Democracies (BD). Under General Zia (19771988) the local governments were established under Local Government Ordinance, 1979. These local
governments were dissolved with the return of electoral democracy.
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However, again under the military government of General Musharraf (1999-2008) the local
governments were established under Local Government Plan 2001. However, these local governments
were dissolved in 2009 and new local governments were not elected until 2013. Hence, any reference
made to local governments is from 2002-2007 period.
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